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SUMMARY
This Thesis examines Che nature of Che framework for corporaCe 
governance wich reference Co Che roles of Che general meeCing and Che 
board of directors, and suggesCs ChaC despiCe numerous reforms of Company 
Lav and Che changing naCure of business enCerprise in general, Che 
framework for corporaCe adminiscracion has undergone liCCle structural 
change. It discusses Che exCenC of shareholders' involvemenc in Che 
conCrol of Cheir companies and direcCora' participation in company 
management, and argues that the da feusto roles of these two corporaCe 
organs is not quite Co Che same extent as is presupposed in legal theory, 
and that more effective participation may be achieved through certain 
changes in the existing framework for participation. To this end 
suggestions are made for increased shareholders' control through share­
holders' committees and institutional shareholders acting individually 
or by collective action, sometimes as representatives of private 
shareholders. In respect of the board the thesis proposes a greater 
supervisory function for boards of directors which presupposes an 
increased use of non-executive directors (some of which would be special 
shareholders'nominees) under a unitary board structure.
This work has involved very little empirical research of its 
own but by drawing on empirical and theoretical materials (original and 
secondary) from economics, business, politics, sociology, etc., litereture, 
a wider dimension is given to the discussion than would normally be the 
case in a "hard law" thesis. As the need for a modification in the frame­
work for corporate governance becomes increasingly recognised and debated, 
it is hoped that lawyers, businessmen, legislators and all concerned would 
find this "law in context" approach to the twin-problems of improving 
shareholders' control and the board's supervisory functions more convincing.
1.
PART I
THE FRAMEWORK FOR CORPORATE ADMINISTRATION
This work is not a thesis on legal history, but in order to 
put the subject natter under study in proper perspective it is necessary 
in this first part to set out the way in which the framework for 
corporate administration has evolved by drawing on historical (mostly 
economic history) sources . The historical account will of necessity 
be brief but some of the most important developments toward the emergence 
of the framework for business company organisation in the seventeenth 
century and the development of the governing regulations in the eighteenth 
century are treated in greater detail. The nature of these regulations 
as they continued to evolve through the 1844 Act to subsequent Companies 
Acts are examined. This will provide the basis for arguing that successive 
companies legislations have mainly sought to modify and modernise these 
regulations without introducing significant changes in the organisational 
structure handed down from the seventeenth century.
2.
CHAPTER 1
THE EVOLUTION OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR CORPORATE 
ADMINISTRATION-
1. Introduction
Problems in the organisation of buainasa enterprises and, in 
particular, the separation of Ownership (the shareholders) from Management 
(the directors) in the modern corporate giants have generated much 
interest in their structures as well as the responsibilities and 
accountability of those who administer their affairs. One aspect of 
the organisation of business enterprise which has received relatively
scant attention is the question of whether the existing structure or2/
framework - for the governance of the modern company is adequate for
the attainment of the principle of shareholders' control over directors which 
3/underlies Company Law. - An associated question is whether it can still 
be correctly claimed that the board of directors "manages" the large 
company of today. Studies in the last fifty or so years have given 
added momentum to the need to re-examine these problems and it is these 
that this thesis is concerned about. But in order to understand the 
nature of the present framework for corporate governance it will be useful 
to consider first, though briefly, the origin of the modern registered 
limited liability company and the development of its organisational 
structure.
1/ This thesis proceeds from the assumption of this separation but tha 
writer is not oblivious of the deep controversy in this area. Furthar 
consideration of this question must in the meantime be reserved for 
Chapter 2.
2/ Although the word "framework" includes the rules, the main concern 
of this thesis is with the institutions or organs through which the 
company's governance is effected. These organs are considered at 
the end of this chapter.
3/ The Principle of Shareholders' Control is discussed in Chapter 2.
3.
2. The Origin of the Company 1/
The legal origin of the modern business company is uncertain. 
However, there is a general consensus among legal and economic historians 
that it had its origin in one of three sources.
The first possible origin is the Sooietaa and Comenda which
were forms of commercial partnership developed in the middle ages. The
Soeieta8, in particular was extensively used by Italian financiers in
England during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries but their impact
as commercial vehicles began to decline from about the mid-fourteenth
2/century. -
Secondly, it is believed that the joint stock company derived 
from the idea of a corporation through the gild system. Gilds formed 
for religious, social as well as commercial purposes started to exist
1/ The historical survey which follows derives mostly from the following 
sources, in alphabetical order : John Carswell, The South Sea Bubble 
(London,1960); A.B.Du Bois, The English Business Company After The 
Bubble Act,1720-1800, (New York,1938); R.R.Formoy, The Historical 
Foundation of Modern Company Law. (London, 1923); Sir William Holdsworth 
A History of English Law, (Second Edition), (London,1937); B.C.Hunt,
The Development of the Business Corporation in England.1800-1867, 
(Harvard, 1936); J.B.Jeffreys, Trends in Business Organisation in 
in Great Britain.Since 1856 (Unpublished Ph.D.Thesis University of 
London 1938); and W.R.Scott, The Contitution and Finance of English 
Scottish and Irish Joint Stock Companies to 1720, Vol.l. /The General 
Development of the Joint-Stock System to 1720/ (New York,1951). 
Henceforth these books will be cited only by the name of author and, 
where necessary, the volume.
2/ See Scott; Chapter 1. For an account of the development of business 
enterprise from partnership to limited liability in the nineteenth 
century, see Hunt, pp.49-55, and Holdsworth,Vol.8,pp.195-222.
4.
from Anglo-Saxon times and soon certain corporate ideas such as the 
conception of "perpetual succession" began to develop. It was, however, 
after the Norman Conquest in 1066 that the Cild Merchant, formed specifically 
for comoercial purposes, and various other trade gilds began to appear.
Many traces of the influence of these gilds were to be found in the 
trading companies of the sixteenth century and in the seventeenth century 
when the framework for the organisation of business companies became 
crystallised.
One important feature in the social gild, and presumably shared 
by the gild merchant, was the series of regulations as to the management 
of their businesses and the control of members at organised feasty, 
convivial meetings as well as other meetings. However, as the administration 
of gild merchants became more complex and had a greater variety of affairs 
to control it was inevitable that the organisation of its government had 
to be more detailed than those of social gilds. Their governing bodies 
often consisted of an "alderman" or "governor" and four associate members.
The governor and his associates were responsible for what might be regarded 
as the business management of the gild in general. In addition there 
were other junior officers most of whom were charged with specific functions. 
With the increase in the commercial affairs of the gild merchant the 
new concern during the seventeenth century became the framing of by-laws 
for the regulation of businesses. This process of framing and recording 
by-laws was not to attain its maturity until the eighteenth century, by which 
time the framework for their governance had already been well established.-^ 
1/ See Scott; p.7.
2/ The important role played by Companies1 Counsel in the development of 
these rules and by-laws in the days of the Bubble Act are described 
by Du Bois in Chapter 4.
The third possible origin of the modern company is through 
the process of transplantation of a joint stock company constitution 
from the continent in view of the early dominance of foreign - mostly Italian 
and German - influence in the external trade of England. As far back as 
the fourteenth century some of these companies engaged in trade already 
had clearly determined systems of organisation such as an elected governor 
vested with executive powers and a general assembly of members who had 
periodic meetings and, of course, governing regulations for those 
meetings and other aspects of the company's operations.
In view of the uncertainty about the exact origin of the 
joint stock company, it is hardly surprising that no precise account 
is available on the process of development of their organisational 
structures. An attempt will be made in the following section to trace 
this development.
3. The Pattern of Internal Organisation in the Joint Stock Company 
and their development.
One thing that is clear about the history of business 
organisation is that most early forms of business enterprises were 
conducted by the Partnership form in which all the partners had a 
direct incentive to be active in the running of the day-to-day affairs 
of the firm. Sleeping partners, if they existed in a firm could not 
afford to distance themselves too much from the affairs of the enterprise
because of the Conmon Law practice of holding liable all the partners, 
whether "sleeping" or active, for the debts contracted by the partnership. 
This meant that in general firms were actively controlled by virtually 
everyone who had their investments sunk in it. Following the 
Industrial Revolution and the expansion and consolidation of methods 
of production the active participation of every partner became increasingly 
impossible in large partnerships. Furthermore, the need to increase the 
size and scale of production encouraged the advent of many wealthy 
investors putting their funds together to form joint stock enterprises. 
Under this new form the participant contributed his "stock" or fund 
with the understanding of receiving an equivalent proportion of the profits 
made in the business venture. If the venture failed he simply lost his 
contribution. He was not expected to participate in the management of 
the enterprise. He was not necessarily a partner. These two forms 
of business were carried on at the same period but the fundamental legal 
distinction between a large partnership and an incorporated joint stock
company was not widely grasped until after 1720. It was not until
2 /1844 that Parliament formally drew a distinction between the two. -
The best accounts of the pattern of internal organisation in
the joint stock company of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries can
3/be found in the works of Scott and Du Bois respectively. -
1/ See Hunt, p.4.
2/ Ibid..89.
3/ These books cover a wider scope than just the patterns of company
organisations so that what follows are not in fact treated systematically 
by the authors but merely mentioned within the general trend they 
described. While it would certainly be very useful to ascertain the 
correlation between the development of these "features" and prevailing 
social, economic or commercial forces of these periods, direct evidence 
of these are scarce. But see J.B.Jeffreys and B.L.Payne, British Entre­
preneurship in the Hineteenth Century.(1974), (henceforth,P.L.Payne), 
for the developments in the nineteenth century.
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Dp until 1620 and possibly beyond, writes Scott, no 
special arrangements had been made in companies charters as to such 
matters as the relation of the votes to the shares or stock and so, not 
surprisingly, companies' meetings witnessed serious dissentions and 
disorders as well as allegations of improper conduct by those put in 
charge of management of the companies. By 1630,however,some companies 
such as The East India Company had introduced rules like voting by 
ballot which helped to regulate and improve the conduct of general 
meetings as an essential element in their governing structure.
Between 1690-95, companies constitutions formulated by Charters 
or Deeds of Settlement adopted the established model of providing for 
the appointment of a governor, deputy governor and assistants - the 
number of the latter being as a rule 12 or a multiple of 12, subject to 
variations according to the individual needs of the companies. The 
use of management committees and the term "managers" were introduced 
during this period and for the first time the name of director displaced 
that of assistant, save in a few companies such as the Banks of England 
and Scotland which retained its use.
Companies' constitutions also provided for different shares 
qualifications for the office of directors, their assistants or comnittees.
The quorum for meetings of the governing bodies was frequently 
seven subject to the proviso that the governor or deputy-governor formed 
part of the quorum, but again this varied as between companies.
1/ Scott, p.339. No evidence is available to account for the choice of 
this figure of 12.
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Other subjects such as members' voting rights, the division 
of capital into shares, methods of promotion, payment of calls 
and the relation of the governing body to the shareholders were often 
specified by companies' constitutions. These early companies
and their patterns of internal organisation continued into the eighteenth
century until 1720 when the development of the joint stock company was
2/temporarily halted by the effect of the Bubble Act. - But, already
3/by this time, writes Du Bois: -
"... the organisation of the large-scale business 
unit in England had become a thing no longer 
amorphous, but clear-cut and stereotyped".
Du Bois' work contains a description of the typical structure 
of the business organisation which existed from the second quarter of 
the eighteenth century up to 1800. Typically, there was an assembly of 
shareholders, then referred to as proprietors, which was called the 
general court or sometimes, the general assembly or general meeting, 
and a court of directors or assistants, elected by the general court 
and presided over by the governor and the sub-governor. The general 
court corresponded to the legislative branch of the government of the Kingdom 
while the court of directors had the executive power. Day-to-day 
administration was carried out by comnittees of directors who were to be 
appointed by the directors themselves. The general courts were usually
1/ Ibid.,pp.339-344.
2/ 6 Geo.l, C.18.
3/ At 287.
summoned by the directors of their companies, but such matters as the 
minimum number of courts per year, the right to call meetings as well 
as the respective powers of the different organs were set out by Charters, 
Acts of Incorporation and Deeds of Settlements.
Companies' constitutional instruments set out the rights 
of members such as the right to vote and the number of votes per shares, 
and sometimes, a maximum number of votes per shareholder. Voting by 
proxy by the eighteenth century had already become a familiar feature in 
general courts and the rules and conditions for voting by proxy were set 
out in constitutional instruments.
Even during this period the nature and conduct of the general 
courts or shareholders' meetings bear close resemblance to the early 
social gilds which had an air of convivial gathering or entertainment 
about them. For the leading companies of this period such as The East 
India and South Sea Companies the problem which conveners of meetings 
encountered was not so much whether there will be enough members in 
attendance but to reduce the gathering to a more manageable size by 
excluding those proprietors whose stock qualifications were below the 
minimum required for the privilege of voting. It is, however, also 
true that for less popular companies - and possibly, those who did not 
afford the same entertainments - "the general courts.... were no better
2/attended then the typical stockholder's meeting of the twentieth century” . -
1/ Cf. J.B.Jeffreys, who suggests that the proxy system had not been 
used to any extent in joint stock companies other than railway 
companies, befors the late 1860s, p.398.
2/ See Du Bois, p.289. The attitude of the 20th century shareholder to 
participation in corporate governance is examined in a later chapter, 
but the points of similarity with the 17th and 18th century practices 
are interesting.
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In some of these companies financial rewards were given as inducement 
for shareholders to attend and penalties for non-attendance at meetings 
were not unknown.
As a general rule, the general court of the eighteenth century 
company had the exclusive consideration of any policy matter or one 
involving important or fundamental change. On the other hand, the
conduct of the day-to-day business was under the control of a general 
court to whom the name directors was generally given. Between these 
two organs the division of authority was effected with a considerable 
amount of flexibility in the companies' constitutions. For example, 
there was often to be seen in such instruments, a clause to the effect 
that the directors
"were to order, direct, manage and transact all 
and every the affairs and thingsof or belonging 
to the said Company except such matters which ought 
to be ordered in and done by the General Court of the 
said Company".
1/ These include the issuance of additional stock, the increase of 
outstanding bonds, extensive property acquisition or expansion 
through the acquisition of competitors and in some cases the power 
to make call on shares. See Du Bois, 291.
2/ See Du Bois at 292, citing a clause from the Charter of Chelsea Water 
Company,1723. (Patent Rolls, 9 Geo.l, Part 2 No.23). A similar clause 
in the proposed incorporation of the West New Jersey Society in 1738 
declared:
"The Court of Directors is to direct,order and manage the 
whole affairs ofthe Company and to have Power of making Rules, 
Orders, By-Laws and Constitutions for the ordering, regulating, 
and disposing of the Estates Affairs, Interest and Effects of 
the Company and for their good Government subject to the 
Order of the Genersl Court".
Petition of February 9,1738/9, State Papers, Dorn.,44/258.
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Despite the existence of such clauses which apparently left the directors 
with unfettered powers the possibility of interference and domination 
by the general court is one which directors rarely forgot. Indeed, 
informed opinion at the time was that the courts of directors have no 
power to dispense with, control or vary the proceedings of the 
general court.
On appointment a director was required by the relevant 
regulation to take an oath to carry out his office, and during this 
period a director's powers and responsibilities were regarded as 
those of a trustee - an analogy which was to continue to modern times. 
Directors have been held to the same fiduciary standards as trustees,
although, as businessmen, to a lesser standard of care and skill,
2/failure of which incurs liability for breach of duty. -
The office of a director imposed on him the duty of loyalty 
to the company by avoiding any position which would give rise to a 
conflict of interest between him and his company, or entering into a 
contract which is prohibited under the company's constitution. Other 
conduct likely to constitute a breach of duty included the misrepresentation 
of the company's affairs to the general meeting, the failure to secure 
the consent or authority of the general meeting, where this was mandatory 
under the company's constitution, and deliberately altering the recorded 
minutes of the general meetings.
1/ Du Bois cites the following rhetorical question by the registrar 
of the Amicable Corporation in 1791. "I wish to put one question 
to you, have the Court of Directors Power to dispense with, control 
or vary the proceedings of the General Court of the Society at Large? 
Pause a little upon this ... But I think I may without presumption 
anticipate that your Answer must be unanimously in the negative".
See Chapter IV, footnote 82.
2/ The legal position of Directors is considered below.
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Punishment against erring directors ranged from reprisiand and 
fine to removal by a vote of the general meeting which was by far the 
s»st usual and far-reaching punishment. However, the sanctions which 
were evolved for the enforcement of directors' obligations really never 
proved effective as, according to Du Bois, the eighteenth century 
director "even by the twentieth century standard was adept in the art 
of using the mechanism of the company for his own best interests.
Perhaps the technique has become more polished and complicated as the 
result of two hundred years of further experience, but the essentials 
were present in the eighteenth century".
Although the directors were regarded as agents of the 
proprietors and despite the power of the general court to over-rule 
the court of directors the superiority of the general court did not 
go unchallenged. While the directors would recognise the theoretical 
power of the general court to over-rule their decisions the reluctance of 
directors to accept this form of control was expressed by the following 
statement of the sub-governor at the general court of the South Sea Company:
"Upon this occasion we cannot avoid saying thus, 
that altho £ai<J it is our general duty to follow 
your orders in doing which we shall ever be legally 
justified, we should nevertheless in a moral sense 
betray our trust by implicitly putting in execution 
orders that may really be, or which to our judgment ,. 
upon mature deliberation may seem to be improper". -
1/ A t. 297
13.
There are, on Che other hand, records of batcles between the general 
court and the court of directors which were resolved in the former's 
favour in confirmation of their superior authority, but with the 
increasing use by directors of "extraordinary delegation" to committees - 
including secret comnitees - and other evasion devices da facto power 
gravitated to the court of directors.
It was usual also for the agenda of a proposed general meeting 
to be considered in advance by the directors themselves before the 
general meeting is held. Indeed, it was not unusual for directors to meet 
in advance and agree resolutions which were later to be moved and almost cer- 
-tainly adopted at the general meeting. Thus, "£lt-J was only exceptionally 
that motions and proposals would be made independently of the directors".
It was also common for directors to dominate the election of 
new directors by ensuring the appointment of their state of new appointees 
in replacement of retiring directors. Through this system of self­
perpetuation directors were enabled to maintain control over the running 
of the company, and to preserve or even reinforce rules which restricted 
shareholders' intervention. It was, for example, common for companies 
to restrict the number of votes permitted to a proprietor at a general 
meeting and to prohibit attempts to evade this rule by the splitting of the 
member's shares amongst several proprietors or transfer to nominees.
1/ Du Bois, p.301.
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Although companies' charters or regulations gave a prescribed 
number of proprietors the power to summon the general court, the proprietors 
were usually required to be holders of a substantial interest in the 
company's stocks so that only wealthy people could enjoy this power.
Each proprietor was entitled by charter to inspect his company's 
accounts. For some companies he enjoyed unrestricted access to his company's 
accounts but in others his right was restricted only to those accounts 
which were submitted to the general court.
Despite their existence, the rights of the eighteenth century 
proprietor to convene a general court and to inspect his company's 
books of accounts were so circumscribed that most members contented 
themselves with receiving dividends if and when declared and showed 
little or no enthusiasm for summoning or attending general courts or 
concerning themselves with accounts.
It is to be noted that the framework for corporate governance, 
with particular regard to the role of the general court and the court of 
directors, as described above evolved very slowly with the development 
of the joint stock company and is largely the same as exists today, 
though noting that this structure was formally incorporated into the 
1862 Companies Act which is now generally regarded as establishing the 
present framework and the relation between the shareholders and directors. 
Although there has been an increasing number of companies' legislation 
since 1720 these have had little effect on the basic governing 
structure, the main emphasis having often been to pro tect investors and 
creditors from fraud perpetrated by promoters and directors, rather than
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increasing shareholders' control over directors and their companies.
This pattern is borne out in the survey of companies legislation which 
follows in the next section.
4. Companies Legislations and their Effects on the Framework for 
Corporate Governance. 1/
(i) Pre - 1856 Legislation:
What may conveniently be regarded as the first legislation
2/to regulate the joint stock company is the Bubble Companies Act, 1720, -
which was passed in order to offset the then "prevailing orgy of company
promotion and speculation"generated by the bogus "success" of the South 
3/Sea Company. - This company chartered in 1711 had speculated in 
and manipulated its own securities which resulted in a great but fictitious 
rise in their market value. Companies which were quickly formed to cash 
in on the market "boom" soon crashed with amazing rapidity, generating 
large-scale scandals in their wake. These scandals led to the passing 
of the Bubble Act to restrict the formation of such "bubble" companies and 
the Act, ambiguous and unpopular as it was, did succeed to some extent 
in retarding the incorporation of joint stock companies and the development 
of company law for about a century.
1/ The purpose of this section is not to discuss the detailed provisions 
of these Acts or the circumstances which led to their enactment, but 
to show the concern of Parliament and the objectives of the Acts.
2/ This Act provided, inter alia, that anyone "who contrived dangerous 
and mischevious undertakings or projects under false pretense of 
the public good...." and all such "undertakings and attempts" to 
defraud the public were to be "effectually suppressed and restrained", 
as tending to "the conmon grievance, prejudice and inconvenience", and 
"to be punishable as public nuisance".
3/ For detailed account of the history of this company and the Bubble
~ Act, see Carswell, supra, Scott, Chapters XVII-XXI; Holdsworth, Vol.8, 
206-22, passim and Hunt,6 et.seq.
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It is remarkable that although the Bubble Act officially 
restricted the incorporation of companies, company law and enterprises 
continued to develop in spite of its draconian penalties, thanks largely 
to the ingenuity of eighteenth century companies counsel who advised 
businessmen to carry on business mostly through the trust device.
As a result the Act did not completely halt the formation of companies, 
and this led to its repeal.
After the repeal of the Bubble Act in 1825 the next Act was
2/the Chartered Companies Act 1837 - which empowered the Crown to 
grant letters patent to a body of persons associated together for the 
purposes of trading. It soon became clear, however, that in spite of 
existing laws too many companies were being formed for fraudulent 
purposes and that better precautions against frauds perpetuated by 
company promoters were urgently needed. In 1841 a parliamentary 
comnittee was appointed "to inquire into the state of the laws respecting 
joint-stock companies, with a view to the greater security of the 
public". - According to one commentator, the public during this 
period was "at the mercy of anyone who chose to publish an advertisement,
4/call himself a company and receive money for assurances and annuities". - 
When the Parliamentary Committee reported in 1844 it revealed that from 
1837 to 1843, some fifteen of such companies had "comnenced and ceased 
to exist". The Committee examined ten cases of company failures and
1/ See Du Bois, Chapter IV.
2/ 7 William IV and 1 Victoria C.73.
3/ Hunt, p.90.
4/ See, Ibid, citing the remarks of Francis, Annals of Life Insurance(1853777*252.
5/ Report of the Select Committee on Joint Stock Companies VII (1844). 
Evidence Q.828.
its investigations revealed several flagrant abuses. In one
of the companies it vas found that the shareholders were unable to 
remove incompetent directors on discovering their mismanagement of the 
company because they had no power to inspect the books and papers of 
the company and to call a general meeting. This was in spite of the 
fact that an Act of Parliament had been obtained and a board of directors 
appointed to take over the running of the company. The committee reported 
that the "concoctors" of these bogus companies:
"however fraudulent and however largely they had 
despoiled the public, are practically unamenable 
to any judicature, civil or criminal, for the reason 
that the parties affected could not discover of whom the 
company consisted; or if it was possible to discover 
the names of the parties responsible for the fraud, the 
victims were too poor or too ashamed to pursue the 
offenders, or were deterred by fear of losing the 
chance of recovering a portion of their loss. Moreover, 
legal proceedings were so cumbrous as to be almost 
impracticable". 2/
The Coomittee's report led to the passing of the Joint Stock Companies
3/Registration and Regulation Act,1844, - which was designed to check the 
frauds and encourage honest entrepreneurs and so protect the investing 
public against swindlers operating behind the facade of bogus companies. 
For the first time it became possible to obtain incorporation and 
registration of companies without a Royal Charter or Act of Parliament. *7
1/ See Formoy, pp.62-65.
2/ Ibid, p.64.
3/ 74 8 Viet. CC 110. There were in fact two 1844 Acts, the other being
7, 8. Victoria C.lll which dealt with the winding up of insolvent 
companies.
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Some other provisions introduced by the 1844 Act to protect
investors and creditors include that requiring the publication of
certain information regarding the company's organisation and its
membership. The requirement for publicity was for the first time
introduced by this Act, as an important protection for investors, thus
implementing Mr.Gladstone's desire for adequate information for members.
Indeed, the preamble to the Bill expressed this desire: "Whereas it is
necessary that due publicity be given to the objects, nature and
constitution of Companies, the names of their Members, their capital1/
and liability'*? And as The T im e also wrote: "Publicity is all that
2/
is necessary. Show up the roguery and it is harmless".
The information required included half yearly returns of members 
and their holdings; Directors were to cause "a full and fair balance 
sheet to be made up" and to approve it before delivery to auditors.
The appointment of auditors "to receive and examine the accounts" was 
made prerequisite to provisional registration. Indeed, the parlia­
mentary Committee in its report emphasised its belief in the value of 
publishing of accounts: "periodical accounts if honestly made and
fairly audited, cannot fail to excite attention to the real state of
3/
(a) concern".
\J See Parliamentary Debates (H.C.) LXXV (1844), 277-78. 
2/ July 4 (1844), Cited by Hunt; 95.
3/ See Hunt, 97.
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Some other provisions introduced by the 1844 Act to protect
investors and creditors include that requiring the publication of
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membership. The requirement for publicity was for the first time
introduced by this Act, as an important protection for investors, thus
implementing Mr.Gladstone's desire for adequate information for members.
Indeed, the preamble to the Bill expressed this desire: "Whereas it is
necessary that due publicity be given to the objects, nature and
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and liability'T And as The Times also wrote: "Publicity is all that
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is necessary. Show up the roguery and it is harmless".
The information required included half yearly returns of members 
and their holdings; Directors were to cause "a full and fair balance 
sheet to be made up" and to approve it before delivery to auditors.
The appointment of auditors "to receive and examine the accounts" was 
made prerequisite to provisional registration. Indeed, the parlia­
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publishing of accounts: "periodical accounts if honestly made and
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2/ July 4 (1844), Cited by Hunt; 95.
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The innovative provisions having been introduced by this Act 
subsequent legislations have merely "amplified, clarified and extended"
the rules. However, the Act was soon found to have certain weaknesses.
Existing standard forms for charters and deec^of association for the
larger incorporated companies developed mostly in the eighteenth century
continued to be used in framing the internal organisations and control
of the Companies. Hot surprisingly, the weakness of shareholders was
further compounded, particularly in the large company which could not
in all reality be "democratically controlled" and where the voting2/
power of shareholders became insignificant. The realities of share­
holders' position in t'.’e governance of their companies during this
period is described in an illuminating passage by one Herbert Spencer
3/
cited by Professor B.C.Hunt:
1/
"As devised by Act of Parliament, the administrations 
of our public companies are almost purely democractic. 
The representative system is carried out in them with 
scarcely a check. Shareholders elect their Directors, 
Directors their Chairman; there is an annual retirement 
of a certain proportion of the Board, giving facilities 
for suspending them; and by this means, the whole ruling 
body may be changed in periods varying from three to 
five years. Yet, not only are the characteristic vices 
of our political state reproduced in each of these 
mercantile corporations - some even in intenser degree - 
but the very form of government, whilst remaining 
nominally democratic, is substantially so remodelled
1/ For example, there was requirement only for provisional regis­
tration and the Act had not yet accepted the principle of 
limited liability. For a critique of this Act see Formoy, 83 
and Holdsworth, Vol.5, pp.49-54.
2/ See Hunt, 135.
3/ Ibid, Quoting from Edinburgh Review, Vol.C pp.420-21.
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"as Co become a miniature of our national constitution.
The direction» ceasing to fulfill its theory as a 
deliberative body whose members possess like powers» 
falls under the control of some one member of superior 
cunning, will or wealth, to whom the majority become 
so subordinate, that, the decision on every question 
depends on the course he takes. Proprietors, instead of 
constantly exercising their franchise, allow it to 
become on all ordinary occasions a dead letter, retiring 
directors are so habitually re-elected without opposition 
and have so great a power of insuring their own re-election 
when opposed, that the board becomes practically a close 
body; and it is only when the government grows extreme 
enough to produce a revolutionary agitation among the 
shareholders that any change can be effected".
Such observations failed to secure the attention of the legislature to 
devise a way that would improve shareholders' control over directors 
and the existing forms of internal regulations, and so forth, continued 
to be adopted until they were embodied in the 1856 Act, and later in 
the Table A model clauses addended to the 1862 Act. Before these two 
Acts, however, was the 1855 Act which, for the first time introduced the 
principle of limited liability in defiance of vigorous opposition from 
those who believed that limited liability would only encourage and 
protect reckless and fraudulent promoters.
(ii) The 1856 Act
2/
The Joint Stock Companies Act, 1856 first introduced the 
modern manner in which the essential features of a company are constituted 
as well as some of the rights and responsibilities of directors and 
shareholders. It introduced companies constituted by memorandum and
1/ For a history of the hard-fought battle for the introduction of 
the limited liability company, see Formoy, 114; Hunt 72-144; 
Jeffreys, Chapter 1.
2/ Joint Stock Companies Act (19 &20Vict. C.47). This Act repealed 
the 1844 Act and the amending Acts of 1847 as well as the 1855 
Act. See Holdsworth, Vol. 15, 55.
article of association - the main constitutional documents of a 
company. It set out in its schedule a form for the memorandum of 
association and the information to be contained in it. It provided 
for a minimum of seven members to form a company. The company was 
to be regulated by articles of association signed by the subscribers 
to the memorandum and if there were no such articles the regulations 
in Table B in the schedule vas to apply, save to the extent to which 
it may have been modified by the company and were to be in the form
set out in Table C. As soon as the certificate of incorporation
2/was granted the company was entitled to comnence business. - The 
share register was to be open to inspection and copies of the memorandum 
and articles were to be forwarded to shareholders for a small fee.
In respect of the management and administration of the
company, power was given to the company to alter its regulations by
special resolutions which were to be registered. The right of shareholders
to be involved in the operation of their company through the general
meeting was recognised and so it was required to be held at least once
a year. If the number of shareholders fell below the statutory minimum of
seven, it automatically lost its privilege of limited liability with
3/consequences as they still are today.- Sections 48 to 52 gave power to one- 
fifth in the number and value of the shareholders to obtain inspection of
1/ Sections 5 - 10.
2/ Section 15.
3/ Every member who remains while the company carries on business for 
more than six months from the reduction and is cognisant of the fact 
that the membership is less than the required minimum is severally 
liable for the company's debts cnntracted during that period.
See Section 31 1948 Act.
21.
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the affairs of the company by the Board of Trade or to the company 
in general meeting to appoint its own inspector. Apart from 
this one instance of inspection by the Board of Trade, the general 
policy of Parliament was one of non-interference in the relations 
between shareholders and directors in the management of their company. 
The oft-quoted Robert Lowe, the then President of the Board of Trade, 
explained during a Parliamentary debate the reason for this attitude:
"to interfere with and abridge men's liberty, 
to undertake to do for them what they can do 
for themselves... is helping the fraudulent 
to mislead them.... The only way that the 
Legislature should interfere is by giving the 
greatest publicity to the affairs of such 
companies, that everyone may know on what 
grounds he is dealing".
And
"Having given them a pattern the State leaves 
them to manage their own affairs and has no 
desire to force on these little republics 
any particular constitution".
This liberty scarcely benefitted the small shareholders but allowed
3/the directors to dominate them. But to Robert Lowe, this was la issez-fa ire . -
1/ The equivalent provision now is Section 164 of the 1948 Act which 
requires the Board to appoint an inspector on the application 
of 200 members holding not less than one-tenth of issued capital.
Part III of the 1856 Act contained provisions relating to winding-up.
2/ Parliamentary Debates (H.C.). CXL (1856), 110-38, passim.
3/ J.B.Jeffreys' work attempts to account for the way the pattern of 
internal organisation during the second half of the last century 
was influenced by prevailing economic ideology and attitudes.
See in particular. Chapter IX.
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(iii) The 1862 Act and After.
With the foundation of modern Company Law having been laid 
by the 1856 Act it continued in operation until 1862 when the next 
major Companies Act was passed. — It was with the passing of 
this Act that the joint stock company formally assumed the structure 
which has survived to the present day. It must be mentioned again 
that this Act did not create but only formally incorporated into 
Statute the pre-existing structure for corporate governance. Current
terminology such as the board of directors, annual general meeting and
, . 2/ auditors appeared with statutory force, replacing the older terminology. —
Shareholders and their rights became well defined. The conditions
for granting limited liability were also spelt out. The model sets
of articles contained in Table B of the 1856 Act was to appear for the
first time in Table A of the First Schedule and it has remained there
ever since.
The major significance of this Act was that it made company 
law very clear and provided a simple method of incorporation and an
3/elastic framework for the constitution and management of companies. —
1/ The full title was "An Act for the incorporation, regulation, and 
winding-up of trading companies and other associations". 25, 26 
Victoria C.89.
2/ See pp>7 - 9 supra. J.B. Jeffreys suggests that the substitution of 
the word "shareholder" for "proprietor" or "adventurer" was not just 
a matter of semantics but was designed to reflect the idea that 
investors in large companies did not in fact undertake in the 
"adventures" and were not "propertied" as such but only held shares 
in the companies, p. 39.
3/ See A.B. Levy, Private Corporations And Their Control. (1950), p.82.
—  (To be cited henceforth as A.B. Levy).
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Some of the most important provisions of this Act include that which 
maintained the principle that the liability of shareholders may be limited 
by the memorandum of association to the amount of the par value of their 
shares (S.7). By Section 12 any company limited by shares was empowered 
to alter its memorandum of association if authorised to do so by its 
original Regulations or by a special resolution in general meeting. The 
company could also by a special resolution increase its capital, by the 
issue of new shares or consolidate and divide its capital into shares 
of larger amounts than its existing shares or convert its paid-up shares 
into stock. Power was also conferred by Section 13 for a company to 
change its name by a special resolution but the approval of the Board of 
Trade was required in addition.
In respect of a Company limited by shares it was provided that 
if the Memorandun of association was not accompanied by the articles of 
association or in so far as the articles did not exclude or modify the 
Regulations contained in Table A contained in the First Schedule to the 
Act, that Table would so far as it was applicable be deemed to be the 
Regulations of the Company (S.15)
With regard to the membership of the company it was provided 
that the subscribers of the memorandum of association of any company 
under the Act shall be deemed to have agreed to become members of the 
company whose memorandum they have subscribed, and upon the registration 
of the company shall be entered as members on the Register of members. 
Membership could be extended to every other person who had agreed to 
become a member of a company under the Act and whose name was entered on 
the register of members (S.23).
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It was made compulsory under the Act for every company to keep 
a register of its members. Amongst the Information to be contained in 
the register were the names, addresses and occupations, if any, of 
members, a statement of the shares held by each member distinguishing 
each share by its number — and the amount paid or agreed to be paid on
each share by each member. Other particulars to be entered in the 
register included the date at which the name of any person was entered 
into the register as a member and the date at which such person ceased 
to be a member (S.25).
By Section 26 an Annual list of members was required to be 
compiled on the fourteenth day after the day on which the first or only 
general meeting for that year was held. This list and a sumnary of 
certain particulars about the membership were to be contained in a 
separate part of the register and be completed within seven days after 
the fourteenth day and a copy forwarded forthwith to the Registrar of 
Companies (S.26). Penalty on a company for failure to keep a proper 
register was a fine not exceeding five pounds for every day during which 
the default continued. Every director and manager of the Company who 
knowingly or wilfully authorized or permitted such default were to incur 
the like penalty (S.27).
1/ One important reason for this requirement was to provide the means 
of knowing the extent of directors' personal interests as a yard­
stick for measuring the risks in investing in a company because it 
was believed that the companies in which directors had heavy invest­
ments tended to be better managed and less susceptible to bank­
ruptcies.
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This Act maintained that only registered shareholders are 
deemed to be members of the company by providing that "no notice of 
any Trust, expressed, implied, or Constructive shall be entered on the 
register" (S.30).
Companies were required to keep a register in respect of 
mortgages and other charges which register must be open to inspection by 
any creditor or member of the Company at all reasonable times. Every 
director or manager who knowingly and wilfully authorized or permitted 
the omission of such entry was punishable by a fine not exceeding £50 
and a further penalty not exceeding £2 for every day during which such 
refusal continued. In addition to such penalties an order could be made 
by a Judge in special circumstances to compel an immediate inspection of 
the register (S.43). These stringent provisions were necessary in view 
of the widespread financing of companies by the issue of preferred shares 
and debentures with special securities which was prevalent at this period. 
However, the right to inspect was exercisable only by members and creditors 
and other members of the public were not covered by the section.
Certain companies (that is, banks and Insurance companies) were 
required to publish a statement in a form contained in the First Schedule 
copies of which were to be made available to members and creditors on 
payment of a sum not exceeding six pence (S.44). Companies without share 
capital were required to keep at their registered office a Register con­
taining the names, addresses and occupation of their directors and 
managers and to send a copy of such register to the Registrar of Companies.
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Any changes in such directors and managers were to be notified to the 
Registrar from time to time (S.45). If any Company required to keep 
such a register failed to keep one or notify the Registrar of any changes 
such delinquent company became liable to a fine not exceeding five pounds 
for every day for which the default continued and every director and 
manager of the company who knowingly and wilfully authorized or permitted 
the default incurred a like penalty (S.46).
The general objective of protecting the company's members was 
ensured in the Act by specific provisions for this purpose in Sections 
49 - 61, which include some provisions that had been introduced by earlier
One innovation introduced by this Act was the power given to 
the Court on the application of a liquidator, shareholder or creditor to 
investigate the conduct of any past or present director, manager, liquidator 
or officer of the company. If it found that such person has misapplied or 
retained, or became liable to account for any monies of the company, the 
Court could compel him to repay the sum Involved and for which he was 
accountable, together with interest at a rate determined by the court, or, 
to contribute such sum of money to the assets of the company by way of 
compensation in respect of the sum in question or for breach of trust, 
as the court deemed fit (S.165).
1/ For instance, the provisions for investigation by the Board of 
Trade which were first introduced in the 1856 Act.
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The 1862 Act contained some other novel provisions In regard
to companies limited by guarantee and unincorporated companies which we
cannot go into here. It is to be regretted, however, that the legislature
did not seize the opportunity in this Act to introduce provisions to
strengthen control by members. Some of the most far-reaching provisions
were, curiously enough, of restricted application only. — ^ The Act
set out in the main to regulate relations between shareholders and those
they appoint to look after their interests, but, as well as many other
major Acts since then it failed to add anything substantial to the
2/Company's organisational structure. —  It may well be that the existing 
structure served its purpose adequately and so there was no reason for 
any modification or "tinkering”. — As the Loreburn Committee — said 
of the 1862 Act in 1906, it gave:
"an immense stimulus to commercial enterprises. Under 
this system British trade has widely developed and the 
wealth of the community has been largely augmented... 
the number of persons interested as shareholders, 
debenture holders, stockholders, customers, creditors 
and employees are legion".
1/ For example, Section 44. See Supra. 
2/ See J.B. Jeffreys, 394.
_3/ See Hunt, 27 and P.L. Payne, 17.
4/ Cd. 3052 (1906).
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Although British trade undoubtedly expanded in the post-1862 period 
this was not, one nay say, because the system of organisation of 
companies operated so efficiently and effectively, but in spite of it. 
Shareholders were neither willing nor able to exercise control over 
directors and directors did not in general perform their duties honestly.
The general character of the 1862 Act may be explained by the 
fact that it was essentially designed to consolidate the earlier Acts of 
1856, 1855 and,to some extent^ 1844 and there was not much scope for 
entirely new formulations. Nevertheless, there were important areas 
where the Act should have at least effected some pressing reforms but 
did not.
A major weakness which quickly became apparent in company 
legislations was the Inadequacy of rules as to accounts. Although the 
1844 Act had made certain provisions for compulsory auditing this was 
abolished by the 1856 Act which made it a discretionary matter by placing 
the requirement in Table B of the Act. — ^
1/ Articles 69-73 dealt with accounts while articles 74-84 dealt 
with audits. By some curious irony it was the same Robert Lowe 
who in 1854 emphasised before the Royal Commission the necessity 
of full publicity as to accounts and auditing, who nevertheless 
as President of the Board of Trade introduced the Bill which 
dispensed with the compulsory appointment of auditors under the 
1856 Act. See A.B. Levy, 76 and p. 22 Supra.
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The 1862 Act adopted the same approach as the 1856 Act in 
respect of this question although here Table B of that Act became the 
new Table A. Having missed the opportunity in this Act to introduce 
new rules for company accounts successive attempts to do this achieved 
very little success until several years afterwards. However, before 
proceeding further to discuss the difficulties brought about by this 
omission, a distinction has to be drawn between the two types of companies 
that operated, for the system of control between them differed.
The first type of companies were the so-called "home industrials" 
in which shares were not easily marketable or transferable. In most of 
them the shareholders were few and mostly wealthy and the control exercised 
by them over the directors was of a personal nature since every investor 
had good knowledge of those elected to the Board of Management. These 
men were persons who themselves had great financial and personal interests 
in the success of the company.
The second type of Companies were those constituted by a thousand 
or more shareholders. Amongst these companies were to be found railways, 
docks, gas, water, telegraph and some shipping companies as well as Joint 
Stock Banks. Of these companies it was said, "the properletors throw up 
the reins and leave them in the hands of the directors". — ^
1/ Bankers Magazine (1860). Voi XX, p.411, cited by Jeffreys, 
at 408.
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According to one commentator,"Theoretically speaking and in the eyes
of the law shareholders are all powerful - this is a legal fiction;
practically it is the reverse", And according to another, "the
shareholders look mainly to the dividend paid and care little how it
2/may have been earned". -
A leading company solicitor observed of shareholders in 1877:
"So long as a company pays dividends and everything 
goes smoothly, one-twentieth of the shareholders 
only attend the meetings and you cannot get more 
of them to do so. Directly you get into difficulties 
the proportion increases; you get a fifth or a sixth; 
but by all the power in the world you could not . ,  
generally get half".
Several attempts were made to improve shareholders' control 
over the direction of large companies through such means as attendance 
at meetings. Voting by proxy was being encouraged and during the 
eighteen seventies most books dealing with details of company 
administration had a section on the use of proxies and often a fascimile 
form was incorporated for company directors to copy. There were 
suggestions that shorthand notes of the deliberations at general meetings 
should be sent to all the members and for a sort of "compulsory balance 
sheet" of the company's performances to be circulated by companies to 
their shareholders. These ideas never really took off.
1/ Herepath's Jounal, (1867), p.363, cited by Jeffreys, 409.
2/ The Economists (1887), p.107, cited by Jeffreys, Ibid.
3/ John Morris, Report of the Select Cossnittee on the Companies Acts 
~ of 1862 and 1867, VIII (1877) Evidence Q.975.
3 2.
The organisation of "Shareholders Protection Associations" 
were a favourite suggestion proffered by, among others, the "Shareholders 
Guardian". In 1864 it proposed the idea and a shareholder replied, 
expressing agreement that "the value and importance of your suggestion 
that shareholders should combine for mutual defence ... cannot be 
over-estimated". But after pushing and advertising the idea for
six months, writes J.B. Jeffreys "the editor had to announce 
reluctantly thatone could not be formed owing to lack of consistent 
support from the investors. The scope of the association was too great, 
and the London shareholders were too much concerned with dividends and 
premiums”
Common suggestions fox increasing shareholders'influence in
the governance of their companies which were thought more practicable
include one, for example, which called for more effective use of
auditors: "Find honest auditors, pay them liberally, make them do their
* 3/duty.... encourage them to sift boldly and to speak freely. - 
This did not provequite effective because although the election of 
auditors by shareholders did increase after the 1862 Act their services to 
the shareholders were doubtful and it was difficult to find "an honest 
accountant's certificate hon^tlyapplied" to a document.
1/ See Jeffreys, 401.
2/ Ibid 
3/ See Ibid.
4/ See Jeffreys, 402, quoting from The Statist (1887) Vol.284.
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Another suggestion was for shareholders to keep a more 
watchful eye on their directors. As one writer put it in 1863,
"under the circumstances the statute itself (1862) will afford very little 
security to members of a company .... this will .... consist in their 
ascertaining that the Directors and Officers managing its affairs are 
honest and able men". —^ Here again, there were many directors who 
could not in truth be regarded as honest or able, but only lent their 
names to be used by promoters in prospectuses in order to attract 
investors. These were the so-called "guinea-pig" directors for their 
rewards were payment in guineas. From being "agents" appointed by the
members to protect their interests the function of directors in these
2/ 3/
companies became that of a "decoy", "• and, in some cases, "dummies". -
By the eighteen-nineties the attempts to improve shareholders' 
control and to reform the general meetings had begun to lose their steam, 
and the chief protagonists began to lose hope. By 1884 one popular 
advocate of shareholders' collective action came to accept the conclusion 
that "shareholders as a body are scarcely capable of effective action".
It became generally agreed that shareholders' meetings were a farce due 
to proxies. "In effect the chief use of the proxy is to shield mal­
administration, to baulk enquiry, to thwart reform and its legitimate 
use is relatively so trifling that it would be better done away with 
altogether". And "no abuse is more common in the management of companies 
than the proxy one”. The Legislature failed to come to the rescue
1/ Ibid
2/ Ibid, at 437.
3/ See Jeffreys at 424 
4/ Ibid at 429 
5/ Ibid
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believing that all that was necessary was to ensure Increased publicity 
of companies' accounts for the benefit of both shareholders and creditors.
It has been seen that the motivation behind the earlier Acts 
was to protect investors and creditors froo fraudulent pomoters and reck­
less directors in the light of the crisis that had plagued many companies, 
especially banks, which went bankrupt. The slump in commercial activities 
in 1867 and widespread dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of the 1862 
Act in serving its purpose gave rise to demands for reform which led to 
the passing of the 1867 Amendment Act. — ^
In order to protect the public against fraudulent promotions 
it was required by Section 38 of this Act that every prospectus of a 
company and every notice inviting the public to subscribe for shares in 
any company must specify the dates and names of the parties to any contract 
entered into by the company, or the promoters, or trustee, before the 
issue of the prospectus or notice. Any prospectus or notice which failed 
to specify the aforementioned information was prima facie regarded as 
fraudulent on the part of the promoters, directors and officers of the 
Company issuing it as regards persons acting on such prospectus in good 
faith and without notice. This provision proved less useful than might 
have been expected because, firstly, there was no obligation to disclose 
the contents of the contracts in question and merely to disclose the names 
of the parties to a contract without also disclosing what the contracts 
Involved served very little practical purpose. Secondly, (and neverthe­
less) promoters and directors resorted to the evasive device of inserting
1/ 30 and 31 Viet., c. 131
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in Che prospectus or form of subscription a clause by which the 
subscriber waived such disclosure. This more or less destroyed whatever 
protection might have been intended by this Amendment Act. — ^
No matter that such disclosure provisions proved an ineffective 
protection against fraud from promoters and directors the continued 
emphasis by the legislature for increased and improved publicity over a 
new structural system of control over directors was not in doubt. At the 
deliberations of the Select Committee on the Companies Act in 1867 a 
member explained the importance of publicity in a limited liability 
company in the following words:
"A limited liability Company trades upon publicity. 
The whole essence of limited liability is publicity. 
They are compelled to publish their accounts and 
their reports, and to register their shareholders, 
and so on. That being so, the more effective the 
publicity is made, the more completely the intention 
of the Act is carried out". I f
1/ Other important aspects of the Act involve the requirements
that a reduction of capital was to depend not only on a special 
resolution in general meeting but also on an order of the Court. 
Creditors had a right to object to the reduction. See Sections 
9-11.
2/ William Newmarch, Report of the Select Committee on the Companies 
Act, X (1867). Q. 1093. It is to be noted, however, that under 
the 1862 Act then in force the auditing of accounts was no longer 
compulsory and was not to be until its re-introduction in the 
1900 Act.
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The failure Co achieve adequate publicity were to be corrected in future 
legislation.
Under the 1867 Act provision had been made for the reduction 
of capital by a special resolution in general meeting subject to confirmation 
by an order of the court and the creditors retained a right to object 
to such reduction. Doubts arose, however, whether the capital of a 
company could be reduced if it had been paid up. The 1877 Act was 
passed mainly to resolve this question. The Act provided that any 
company may reduce its capital in so far as in consequence of losses or 
otherwise there is a discrepancy between the nominal capital and the 
value of the assets, or by making partial repayments of amounts paid up, 
or by reducing the shareholders' liability. The reduction was to be 
effected by special resolution subject to approval by the court.
The reform introduced by this Act was followed by a crisis 
which led to the insolvency of many companies, most especially banks, 
one of the most damaging of which was the insolvency of the City of
2/ 40 and 41 Vic., c. 76
Glasgow Bank. ~ Public opinion called for a reform of Company Law to2/
prevent future failures of similar scale. Consequently, the 1879 Act 
was passed.
The 1879 Act was meant to apply to every joint stock company 
but In view of the fact that banks depositors were most In need of the
3/
1/ The period 1874-79 was marked by a famous depression which resulted 
from a combination of several factors. These Included the maintenance 
of higher purchasing power In Britain, with bad harvests at home, and 
relatively falling exports which, until 1877, created a growing net 
balance of imports; a greater fall in the price of Britain's capital- 
goods exports than her consumption-goods imports; an unfavourable 
American exchange rate; gold purchases from Paris and Berlin; and, 
internally, the crash of the City of Glasgow Bank which generated 
suspicions of the banking systemsl
The celebrated crash of that Bank appears from the investigators ' 
report to have resulted from its granting of credits amounting to 
about £6,000,000 to a small number of firms, disregarding the 
principle of distributing risks, and the deception of shareholders 
by over-stating the value of the Bank's gold reserves and reserve 
funds and making false entries in the balance-sheets. The Bank's 
directors, manager and secretary were later convicted for fraud.
For a history of the depression 1874-79, see W.W. Rostow, British 
Economy of the Nineteenth Century. (1947) Chapter IX. For details 
about the City of Glasgow Bank's and other c ompanies' failures see 
A.W. Kerr, History of Banking In Scotland. (1902), Chapter XXV.
See also A.B. Levy, 116. For the discussion in this thesis of 
post-1877 legislation until the 1927 Act I am highly indebted to 
that author.
2/ 42 and 43 Vic. c. 76.
3/ This can be seen from its full title which reads: "An Act to
amend the Law with respect to the Liability of Members of Banking 
and other Joint Stock Companies; and for other purposes".
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protection it offered, it is not suprising that few companies other than 
banks availed themselves of its provisions. However, some of the 
provisions like those relating to audits were expressly restricted to 
banks alone.
For banks — ^ the Act introduced compulsory audits, thus re­
introducing, albeit, to a limited extent the provisions for compulsory 
audits which first appeared in 1844. By Section 7 it was provided that 
at least once a year the accounts of every bank registered as a limited 
company must be examined by an auditor or auditors to be elected annually 
by the general meeting (S.7(l)). A director or office- of the company 
could not be eligible for appointment (S.7(2)) but an auditor quitting 
office could be re-elected (S.7(3)). If any casual vacancy occurred in 
the office of any auditor the surviving auditor or auditors could act 
but if there was no surviving auditor, the directors were to call an 
extra-ordinary general meeting for the purpose of filling the vacancy 
or vacancies (S.7(4)). Every auditor was expected to have delivered to 
him a list of all books kept by the company and was entitled to have 
access to the books and accounts of the company, any auditor could examine 
the directors or any other officer of the company. In the case of branches 
operating outside Europe the submission of copies and extracts from the 
books which have been transmitted to the company's head office in the 
United Kingdom sufficed (S.7(5)).
1/ Except the Bank of England
Although there had been no compulsory requirements for the 
keeping of balance sheets since the 1856 Act Section 7(6) of the 1879 Act 
required the auditor or auditors of banks to make a report to the members 
on the accounts examined by him or them, and on every balance sheet laid 
before the company in general meeting. In every such report it shall be 
stated whether, in his or their opinion, the balance sheet referred to in 
the report is a full and fair balance sheet properly drawn up, so as to 
exhibit a true and correct view of the state of the company's affairs, as 
shown by the books of the company. Such report was required to be read 
before the company in general meeting.
By Section 8 every balance sheet submitted to the annual or 
other meeting of the members of every banking company registered after 
the passing of the Act as a limited company must be signed by the auditor 
or auditors, and by the secretary or manager (if any) and by the directors 
of the company or at least three of such directors.
The effect of the 1879 Act was to boost public confidence in 
the limited liability system which had fallen in the depression of the 
seventies: 1874-79. — This revival was most marked in the Banking 
business, for by the end of 1883 fewer than ten banks maintained unlimited 
liability.
The decade 1881-90 witnessed stupendous growth for companies 
both in numbers and assets. For example in 1888 new registrations amounted
1/ See M. Gaskin, The Scottish Banks: A Modern Survey. (1965), p. 57.
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Co £353 millions, in 1889 to £241 millions and in 1890 to £238 millions. 
However, this growth was accompanied by an increase in the number of 
reckless promotions, some of which turned out to be mere bubbles. For 
example, in 1882 a oompany was formed to carry on business of any kind 
with a nominal capital of £12 millions in which only 20 one-pound shares 
were issued. Another with similarly extensive aims had a nominal capital 
of £10 millions.
In view of the concern generated by these reckless schemes it 
was thought that promoters and directors might be more careful if they 
had high personal stakes in the schemes. Thus in 1888 a new Companies 
Bill was presented which required that directors should have between them 
one-fifth of the total capital of the company. It was not enacted.
However, the 1890 Act — ^ succeeded in introducing liability 
for untrue statements in prospectuses. It was provided in Section 3 of 
the Act that directors and others who took part in the issue of 
prospectuses and notices Inviting persons to take shares or debentures 
were liable to compensate persons who subscribed or purchased such shares 
or debentures on the faith of false statements. Liability was excluded, 
however, if, for example, the person concerned had reasonable ground to 
believe the statement true or if the statement was based on the opinion 
of an expert or official document which had been fairly represented. Where 
the " » «  of a person had been improperly Inserted as a director in the 
prospectus , that person was entitled to be indemnified by the person who 
authorised the issue of the statement (S.4).
1/ 53^54 Vic., c.64. "An Act to amend the Law relating to the Liability 
~  of Directors and others for Statements in Prospectuses and other 
Documents Soliciting application for Shares or Debentures".
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Another Act passed in the same year —  made It possible for 
a Company to alter its objects or form a constitution subject to con­
firmation by the court. Until the passing of this Act the law was that
such an alteration could not be made unless on liquidation or reconstruction. — 
The new provisions can be seen therefore as an attempt to enhance the power 
of shareholders to determine whether to change the nature of the company's 
business and if so what new form of venture to go into. Some protection 
was afforded the minority by a provision whereby the court was empowered 
to adjourn the proceedings in order that an arrangement may be made to 
the satisfaction of the court for the purchase of the interests of 
dissentient members (S.l(4)).
The 1890s witnessed the cyclical pattern of recession and business 
boom which had characterised earlier decades. This decade began with a 
depression which peaked in 1893 but with the development of South African 
mining there came an improvement in economic conditions and a resurgence 
in company promotions which, not surprisingly, also gave rise to a new
3/wave of reckless promotions. One interesting example cited by A.B. Levy —  
is that of the Ancient Goldfields of Africa which was registered with a 
capital of £10,000 divided into 9,600,000 shares of one farthing, but of 
which only a small fraction was ever Issued. Public resentment against the 
abuses and excesses of promoters and company directors led to the setting
2/
1/ 53 and 54 Vic., c. 62.
2/ The power of Companies freely to alter their memorandums of association 
~  under S.12 of the 1862 Act did not include the alteration of objects.
3/ At p. 120.
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up of a Conmittee to amend the existing Companies Act. A Bill was tabled 
before the House of Lords Committee which would make the directors liable 
for false balance sheets and prospectuses but this met with strong 
opposition by the promoting interests who argued, firstly, that the 
director's role was not that of manager or accountant, but was merely to 
be consulted about the running of the company. Secondly, it was argued 
that if the Bill were passed the provisions will be so onerous that 
"honest" directors would decline the risk of directing a company and 
dishonest men with nothing to lose would take their places. —
Concurrent with the attempts to check the abuses of reckless 
promotion was the effort to improve the system of accountability of 
directors. In the 1890s the campaign for greater publicity also 
encountered stiff opposition especially from members and directors of 
"private" limited companies who did not wish to make public the state of 
their businesses. The attempt to introduce the balance sheet, for example, 
faced such a fierce and confused opposition that the Associated Chambers 
of Commerce at its Annual Conference in 1898, after years of preliminary 
discussions found themselves so completely divided on the subject that
it was decided better to make no mention of the subject at all at the2/Conference. —  The usual compromise suggestion was that it should be 
left to the discretion of the company whether a balance sheet should be 
issued or not. However, the evidence available showed that many companies
I f See J.B. Jeffreys, p. 431-432.
2/ See The Chamber of Commerce Journal, "Report of Annual Conference 
~  of Associated Chamber of Commerce", (1898) cited by J.B. Jeffreys, 
433.
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Invited public subscription to preference shares and debentures amounting 
to several millions of pounds without Issuing any balance sheets. In 
some other companies where the public had been invited to subscribe for 
ordinary shares the directors often convinced the shareholders into 
accepting non-disclosure with the argument that the publication of any 
information on the level of a company's profits was bound to encourage 
competition and labour disputes. For example, during the deliberations 
of the Company Law Select Committee in 1898, an amendment was proposed 
to "send a copy of the balance-sheet to the registrar within 30 days 
after the general meeting" but this was opposed. One B. Palmer in 
objection to the suggestion gave the following as his reasons:
"I object altogether to it, I may remind your Lordships that 
when the Conmlttee of the House of Commons in 1877 sat, Mr. 
John Morris, of the firm of Ashhurst & Co, a gentleman well 
known in connection with the formation of companies mentioned 
then that members of companies had been registered, but only 
on the assurance that it would not be necessary to disclose 
their private balance sheets; and there are undoubtedly an 
enormous number of companies who would object strongly to 
disclosing in a public office their private affairs; and 
even in the case of a public company it would sometimes be 
a very dangerous thing, because it is onething to put the 
balance sheet in the hands of the shareholders, supposing 
there are a couple of hundred of them (quite a public company 
in that sense), who are interested in their own business and 
keep it to themselves; but that it should get into everybody's 
hands that everybody is at liberty to go and search into the 
affairs of the Company and see what sort of business it is 
doing, in these days of competition would never do. I 
repeatedly have before me companies whose great difficulty is 
the excessive profit they are making and the danger of 
competition; and yet all these people are to be placed in the 
dangerous position of being obliged to let it all out. Again 
and again I have had companies that have been obliged to 
reconstruct in order to capitalise the great mass of profits 
latent in the business in order to meet the labour difficulties 
or otherwise". 1/
1/ Report of the Select Committee on the Companies Act, IX (1898) Q.681.
—  See also the quotations by Guy Naylor in Guide To Shareholders' Rights.
(1969), pp. 120-121.
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The outcome of all these arguments about publicity were borne 
out in the next Companies Act which was passed in 1900. — The main 
provisions of this amending Act related to the creation of companies and 
the re-introduction of compulsory auditing for all registered companies, 
thus extending the provisions of the 1879 Act which related to banks only.
By Section 21 every company was required at each annual general 
meeting to appoint an auditor or auditors to hold office until the next 
AGM (S.21(1)). If this had not been done, the Board of Trade could on 
the application of any member of the company appoint an auditor of the 
company for the current year and fix his remuneration. A director was 
precluded from being appointed auditor of the company but the first 
auditors could be appointed by the directors before the first statutory 
meeting and directors were empowered to fill a casual vacancy in the 
office of an auditor. The remuneration of the auditors' was to be fixed 
by the dompauy in general meeting or in the case of auditors appointed 
before the statutory meeting by the directors (S.22). Every auditor of a 
company was given a right of access at all times to the books and accounts 
and vouchers of the company, and was empowered to require from the directors 
and officers of the company such information and explanation as may be 
necessary for the performance of the duties of the auditors, and the 
auditors would sign a certificate at the foot of the balance sheet stating 
whether or not all their requirements as auditors have been complied with. 
The auditors were then to make a report to the shareholders on the accounts 
examined by them, and on every balance sheet laid before the oompany in
i
1/ 63 and 64 Vic., c. 48.
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general meeting during their tenure of office; and It was to be stated 
In every such report whether, In their opinion, the balance sheet referred 
to In the report had been properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true and 
correct view of the state of the company's affairs as shown by the books 
of the company. The report was required to be read before the company 
in general meeting (S.23).
Section 28 provided that if any person In any return, report, 
certificate, balance sheet or other document, required under the Act, 
wilfully made a statement false in any material particular, knowing it 
to be false, he would be guilty of a misdemeanor and be liable to 
Imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to a fine in lieu of 
or In addition to imprisonment.
With regard to the provision relating to audits this Act is 
Important for restoring the requirements of the 1844 Act which had been 
repealed in 1856. It is remarkable however that the previous Act had 
been criticised for not containing provisions as to the form and contents 
of the balance sheets and the fact that auditors had no directions to 
govern their work. It is regrettable that once again the legislature 
missed the opportunity to introduce these matters in the new Act.
Other important provisions of this Act include those which 
Introduced more details as to the contents of prospectus. — ^ Non-compliance 
with the requirements rendered the director or person responsible for the
I f  Sections 9-11
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prospectus liable for any omissions, unless he could prove that he was 
not cognisant of the matter not disclosed or that the non-compliance 
arose from an honest mistake of fact on his part (S.10(7)). Clauses 
which waived the requirements for disclosure under the Act were rendered 
void.
It was made necessary under the Act to file every mortgage or 
charges with the registrar in order to be valid (S.14).
With regard to the management of the company it was provided by 
Section 13 that the directors of a company must on the requisition of the 
holders of not less than one-tenth of the issued capital of the company 
upon which all calls or other sums then due have been paid, forthwith 
proceed to convene an extraordinary general meeting of the company (S.13). 
This section was a major attempt to give the members more opportunity to 
intervene in the decision-making process by seizing the initiative from 
management in appropriate circumstances.
The directors were also required to convene a statutory meeting 
to consider among, other things, the total number of share allotted and 
the total amount of cash received by the company in respect of such shares 
(S.12).
The method of appointment and qualification of directors was 
provided for in Sections 2 and 3. These required, in ter  a l ia  that the 
directors must declare their consent to act, which declaration must be 
filed with the Registrar. If under the company's memorandum and articles
of association directors need to have a share qualification it must 
be stated that they have complied with this requirement, but the Act 
itself did not require any share qualification if none was required by 
the articles.
The beneficial effects of the Act can be seen from the increase
once again of the number of new registrations although the nominal capital
of these Companies was constantly diminishing. This was probably due to
the fact that the new registrations comprised mainly of "one-man" companies
engaged mainly in the retail business. The Increase in the number of small
companies was paralleled by an almost equal Increase in the number of
liquidations. The Legislature intervened in 1907 by enacting two Acts,
2/the first —  , to make it possible to register partnerships in which one or
more partners limited their liability to a specified amount, and so making
3/it unnecessary to form a limited liability company. The second Act —  
was more Important in that it regulated the private companies as a new 
type of business entity and Introduced further amendments to the Companies 
Acts 1862 to 1900.
So far as it is relevant here, this Act Introduced supplements 
to the rules relating to mortgages and other charges. The right to inspect 
the debenture register was granted to debenture holders (SS.10-18).
1/ That is, companies in which the former owner of the enterprise 
took up the whole capital.
I f The Limited Partnership Act (1907), 7 Edw., VII c. 24.
3/ Companies (Amendment) Act (1907) 7 Edw., VII c. 50.
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Section 23 of the 1900 Act was repealed by Section 19 which 
strengthened the position of auditors by giving them power to require 
information from the directors, and to state in their report whether they 
have received the information demanded, and whether in their opinion the 
balance sheet referred to in the report had been properly drawn up. 
Companies could appoint auditors other than the retiring ones in general 
meeting only if previous notice had been given to the general meeting.
The annual statement to be filed with the Registrar as required 
under Section 26 of the 1862 Act was required to be in the form of a 
balance sheet in so far as it related to the state of the company. But 
the balance sheet need not include a profit and loss account (S.21). In 
view of the fact that the profit and loss account hag traditionally been 
more comprehensible than the balance sheet — ^ one wonders why the 
legislature should have thought it fit to exclude the profit and loss
1/ The function of the balance sheet is to show in monetary terms the 
capital, reserves and liabilities of a business as at the date at 
which it is prepared and the manner in which total money representing 
them have been distributed over the different types of assets. This 
is meant to serve as a statement of the assets and liabilities of the 
company at a specific point of time. The profit and loss account on 
the other hand shows as profit or loss the difference between the 
revenue for the period covered by the accounts and the expenditure 
chargeable in that period. This serves as an historical record of 
events in the period covered. See The Report of the Company Law 
Committee under the Chairmanship of Lord Jenkins (1962) Cmnd 1749, 
para. 333. These documents and the method of their preparation 
involve a lot of technicalities which make them difficult for the 
layman to understand. For details about the nature and purposes of 
each of these documents, See Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law. 
4th Edition (1979), pp.507-515 and Pennington's Company Law. 4th Edition
(1979), pp.616-627. For more specialised literature, see A.G. Touche, 
Accounting Requirements of the Companies Acts. (1967), and Robert 
Willott, Current Accounting Law and Practice. (1978).
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account from the annual statement. A proviso to the section also excluded 
private companies from Its application.
Other Important provisions Include the right of preference 
shareholders and debenture holders to receive and inspect the balance 
sheets of the oompany and the reports of the auditors and other reports 
as are possessed by ordinary shareholders. Again private companies were 
excluded from the application of the section (S.23).
General meetings were to be held at least once in every calendar 
year and not more than 15 months after the previous meeting (S.24). A 
poll may be demanded at a meeting at which a special resolution was 
submitted to be passed or confirmed, if demanded by at least three members 
entitled to vote or by five members if so specified by the articles.
The 1907 Act was in force for a brief period only, six months 
to be precise, until the passing of the 1908 Act — to consolidate all 
the Companies Acts from 1862 to 1907. The 1908 Act was a comprehensive 
code of Company law and the pattern set by it was followed by the next 
Consolidation Acts of 1929 and 1948. However, the pre -existing structure 
for œrporate governance remained substantially unchanged by it except 
that the systan of publicity and accountability had become greatly refined. 
Thus, the earlier emphasis and focus in the 1860s and 1880s on proposals 
to strengthen shareholders' involvement in corporate governance, by for 
example, forming collective organisations and protection conmittees
1/ 8 Edw. VII, c. 69.
f
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was replaced at the turn of the century by greater concern and emphasis 
on the issue of less "coloured" prospectuses and the publication of the 
balance sheets. Compared with those earlier Acts which contained 
virtually nothing on the above issues the 1908 Act can be said to have 
taken tremendous steps toward protecting investors and creditors. However, 
the contents of companies accounts were often inadequate as the require­
ments of the Acts were often disregarded by companies' directors. This, 
among other reasons, led to the passing of the 1929 Act.
Before proceeding to discuss the few major changes effected in
companies organisational structure in the post-1929 period it is important
to reiterate at this point, that the history of company legislation up to
the end of the nineteenth century reveals a pre-eminent concern by the
legislature over the protection and safeguarding of the Interests of
shareholders and creditors respectively — ^,"with an ever increasing degree 
2/of strictness," —  by introducing rules to regulate commercial enterprises. 
These rules, however, did not Increase the control which shareholders 
exercised over the board of directors.
"And although Table A contained admirable precepts for 
their guidance, directors seem to have been governed to 
a large extent in the selection of Information to be made 
public, by a paternal notion that they knew best what 
shareholders ought to want. Protests of shareholders 
have in practice served only to confirm directors in 
their opinion of the unfitness of shareholders to make 
decisions which directors were always perfectly willing 
to make for them." 3/
1/ See Hunt, 139.
2/ See HoLdsworth, Voi. 15, p. 60. 
3/ Hunt, ibid.
51
The decade 1920-29 started with a boom which was quickly 
followed by a slump and a long depression. Once again public opinion 
was aroused as a result of the large number of fraudulent promotions 
and the evidence of mismanagement which were revealed. As economic 
recovery set In In 1925 a Committee was appointed under the Chairmanship 
of Mr. Wilfred Greene, K.C. (later Lord Greene) — to propose reforms 
of Company law. This committee reported in 1926 proposing a substantial 
number of recommendations but it adopted a rather cautious approach and 
proposed little radical change to the existing organisational structure
of companies. Only a part of these recommendations found their way into
2/  3/the 1928 Act. —  This Act was consolidated in the 1929 Act. —
Amongst the most Important provisions of this Act mention must
be made of the steps taken to protect the rights of minorities from
Improper alteration of the memorandum. By Sections 4 and 5 of the Act
a company could alter its memorandum by special resolution but subject
to confirmation by the court. In exercising its discretion whether or not
to confirm such alteration regard was to be had to the interest of
dissentient shareholders or creditors. The Act introduced special
procedure for the passing of extraordinary and special resolutions (S.117) 
4/and winding up. —
1/ Cmd 2657 (1926).
2/ 184.19 Geo., V. c. 45 
3/ 19 and 20 Geo. V. c.23.
4/ See Section 156 and Part V generally.
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Detailed provisions as to accounts and audits were spelt out 
in sections 112 to 134» Section 122 provided that every company must 
keep proper books of account with respect to all sums of money received 
and expended by the company and the purpose of such receipts and 
expenditure, all sales and purchases of goods by the company and the 
assets and liabilities of the dompany. The books which must be kept 
at the company's registered office or any other place designated by the 
directors must at all times be open to Inspection by the directors. 
Failure by any director to take all reasonable steps to secure compliance 
by the company with the above requirements or any wilful neglect by a 
director to secure compliance rendered him liable to punishment. The 
directors of every company were required to lay before the company in 
general meeting a profit and loss account at a date not later than 
eighteen months after the incorporation of the company or at least once 
every calendar year (S.123(1)). They were also required to cause to be 
made out in every calender year, and to be laid before the company in 
general meeting, a balance sheet as at the date to which the profit and 
loss account, or the income and expenditure account is made up. Every 
such balance sheet was to be accompanied by a report by the directors 
with respect to the state of the company's affairs, the amount, if any, 
which they recommend should be paid as dividend, and the amount if any, 
which they propose to carry to the reserve fund, general reserve or 
reserve account shown specifically on the present or a subsequent balance 
sheet (S.123(2)). Any wilful refusal to comply with the provisions 
rendered the defaulting director liable to up to six months imprisonment 
or a fine not exceeding two hundred pounds (S.123(3)).
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Section 124 enunerated the natters which were to be contained 
in the balance sheets such as the company's authorised and issued capital, 
and its assets and liability. Also to be disclosed were the assets of a 
company consisting of shares owing from a subsidiary or subsidiary 
Companies but these had to be set out separately in the balance sheet 
(S.125). Where also a holding Company held shares in a subsidiary 
Company a statement of this holding was required to be annexed to the 
balance sheet (S.126).
Other general information to be contained in a Company's 
accounts included particulars as to loans made to and renumeration paid 
to directors for their services or other emoluments paid to or received 
by them or from the company or its subsidiary (S.128).
The balance sheet was required to be signed by two directors 
or sole director, if that was the case, on behalf of the board and the 
auditors' report must be attached to the balance sheet, which report must 
be read before the company in general meeting and be open to inspection 
by the members (S.129).
With the exception of private companies every person entitled 
to receive notice of general meetings of a company must be furnished with 
a copy of every balance sheet and other documents required to be annexed 
to it at least seven days before the general meeting at which it was to 
be laid (S.130(1)(a)). In addition every member and debenture holder 
whether or not they were entitled to be sent copies of the balance sheets 
must be furnished on demand and without charge with a copy of the last
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balance sheet of the company Including every document required by law 
to be annexed to it, together with a copy of the auditors' report on the 
balance sheet. Failure to comply with the above requirements rendered 
the director, manager, secretary or other defaulting officer of the 
Company liable to punishment (S.130(l)).
Section 132 provided for the appointment and remuneration of 
auditors and their right to attend general meetings. Section 133 set 
out those disqualified from appointment as auditor and these included 
not only directors and officers of the company, but partners of or in 
the employment of an officer of the company and any body corporate.
The position of auditors was strengthened by section 134 which entitled 
them to attend any general meeting of the company at which any accounts 
which have been examined or reported on by them were to be laid and to 
make any statement or explanation they desired with respect to the 
accounts.
The Board of Trade was also empowered to appoint inspectors 
and to investigate the affairs of a company (S.135).
In order to meet the practical need for reconstructions and 
amalgamations which were prevalent it was provided for the purpose of 
facilitating such arrangements that companies may by special resolution 
insert a clause in their articles giving power to sell the whole under­
taking, or to amalgamate (S.154). Where such a scheme had been approved 
by the company appropriate arrangements could be made to acquire the 
shares of dissenting shareholders.
55.
The "cautious" approach of the Greene Committee contrasts 
with the "radical" one of the Cohen Conmittee —  ^appointed on June 26 
1943,
"to consider and report what major amendments are desirable 
in the Companies Act 1929, and in particular to review the 
requirements prescribed in regard to the formation and 
affairs of companies and the safeguards afforded for 
investors and for the public interest." 2/
The Committee reported a number of defects in the 1929 Act. 
Regarding the availability of information to shareholders in companies 
accounts and reports, it was found that the legal requirements as to the 
contents of accounts to be presented to shareholders was too meagre.
They referred specifically to the absence of "requirements as to the 
form of the profit and loss, or income and expenditure account", and 
the failure to make the auditors' report cover the profit and loss account",
although, in their opinion conscientious auditors often examined this as
3/well. —  The usefulness of accounts was expressed in their conviction 
that the profit and loss account is an Important indication of the trend 
of profits and as such the best Indication of the prosperity of a company. 
They criticised the practice of lumping a number of diverse items together 
which thereby obscured the real position about the assets and liabilities 
of the company and which made it difficult, if not impossible, for investors
1/ Cmd 6659 (1943) 
y  Page 7.
3/ See paras. 96-99 and 103.
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Co form a true view of Che financial position and earnings of the company. 
Regarding the controversial question of the maintenance of undisclosed 
reserves — by companies the Committee found that this practice often 
distorted the correct financial position of the company and made it 
difficult for investors and their advisers to have the information which 
will enable them to estimate the real value of the shares. The traditional
defence that full disclosure encourages shareholders to press for excessive
2/
dividends —  was rejected in favour of "as much disclosure as practicable" 
which would serve to "create confidence in the financial management of 
industry and... dissipate any suggestion that hidden profits are being
accumulated by industrial concerns to the detriment of consumers and
3/those who work for industry". —  The Committee also recommended extensions
to Section 134(3) of the 1928 Act so as to allow auditors to attend not
only general meetings at which accounts examined or reported on by them
are to be laid, but also to receive notices of and attend all general
meetings of the company and to be entitled, if other auditors have been
nominated, or if there is a proposal that they should not be reappointed, to
put their views before the shareholders orally at the meetilng and in writing 
4/prior to the meeting. —  On the general question of shareholders' control it 
was found that the control theoretically exercised by shareholders over 
directors was "illusory". —
1/ These are reserves created by using profits to write down more than is
necessary assets of a ®mpany such as investments, land, plant and machinery 
by creating bad debts and other contingencies, by charging capital 
expenditure to revenue or by under-valuing stock in trade. The object of 
this is usually to enable the c ompany to avoid violent fluctuations in 
its published profits or dividend and accumulated reserves may, for 
example, be used to swell the profits in a year when the Company is doing 
badly. See Cmd 6659 para 101.
2J See supra page 43.
3/ Para. 101.
4/ Para. 112 
5/ Paras. 7(a) and 128.
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The Committee submitted its report in June 1945 stating that:
1.... while in making our recommendations we have
borne in mind the importance of not placing 
unreasonable fetters upon business which is 
conducted in an efficient and honest manner, we 
have included a number of proposals to ensure 
that as much information as is reasonably required 
shall be made available both to the shareholders 
and creditors of the companies concerned and to the 
general public. Ue have also sought to find means 
of making it easier for shareholders to exercise a 
more effective general control over the management 
of their companies".
Most of these reconmendations were incorporated in the Companies Act 1947,
2/consolidated in the Companies Act 1948 - (hereafter, the 1948 Act).
The 1948 Act contains many significant sections which attempt to bolster 
the degree of control which shareholders have in their companies. But 
it is not necessary to set out here the major changes effected by this 
Act as these are referred to at the appropriate point in the thesis where 
they are discussed.
Although the 1948 Act still contains the main body of companies 
legislation, there have been at least four others after it. On December 
10,1959, the President of the Board of Trade set up a committee under the 
chairmanship of Lord Jenkins:
1/ Para. 5.
2/ 11*12 Geo. VI. C.38 - 30 June, 1948
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"To review and report upon the provisions and 
working of the Companies Act,1948,.... to 
consider in the light of modem conditions 
and practices, including the practice of 
take-over bids, what should be the duties 
of directors and the rights of shareholders; 
and generally to reconmend what changes in the . ,  
law are desirable". -
The Committee reported in 1962 making a large number of far-reaching 
recomnendations, not all of which have been fully implemented today. - 
However, it was "the exhaustive labours of that Committee" - that 
formed the starting point of the Bill which later became the 1967 
Companies Act (henceforth, the 1967 Act). The main concern of the Bill 
was to implement the Jenkins Committee's recommendations for greater 
disclosure of information by limited liability companies but its scope 
was later widened to include rules for regulating insurance companies 
which had become expedient in the wake of scandals in the insurance 
business. The then President of the Board of Trade, Mr. Douglas Jay, 
during the presentation of the Bill on the Second Reading stated that 
he recognised the need for further legislation to implement more of 
Jenkins recomnendations. The 1967 Act, he promised, was only intended 
as a first instalment of more comprehensive legislation, adding "I am 
hoping to legislate for wider reforms in the structure and philosophy 
of our Company Law. I think it is time ... to re-examine the whole theory 
and purpose of the limited joint stock company, the comparative rights 
and obligations of shareholders, directors,creditors, employees and the
4/
community as a whole'.'. - Any hopes for "the reform of the structure
1/ See Report of the Company Law Committee Cmndl749 (1962), henceforth, 
the Jenkins Committee Report or Cmnd l)49, p.l.
2/ Several references will be made later to some of the reconsnendations 
of this Comnittee.
3/ Mr.Douglas Jay, President of the Board of Trade in Parliamentary 
Debates (H.C.), Vol.741. Col.358 (1967).
4/ Ibid, at col.359.
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and philosophy" of Company Law promised by that Labour Administration 
were dashed with its defeat.
The Jenkins Committee in its review of the disclosure regulations 
had been mainly concerned with matters of details. Thus the amendments 
which were introduced by the 1967 Act deal with such details in respect 
of accounts as the contents of holding companies and groups accounts and 
such particulars as directors' emoluments, the waiver of rights to receipt 
of such emoluments, and so on. It would be useful at this point to consider 
the essentials of the current law on disclosure as introduced by the 1948 
Act and as strengthened by the 1967 and 1976 Acts.
The current legal requirements for the preparation, audit and 
publication of the annual accounts of companies are to be found in Sections 
147-163 of the 1948 Act and the various sections of the 1967 and 1976 Acts 
which will be referred to below. The general provisions as to the content 
and form of account is contained in Section 149 (1948). Sub-section (1) 
provides that every balance sheet of a company must give a true and fair 
view of the state of affairs of the company as at the end of its financial 
year and that similarly the profit and loss account must give a true and 
fair view of the profit or loss of the company for the financial year.
Both documents are expected to comply with the requirements of the Eighth 
Schedule to the Act (S.149(2)) but the requirements of the Eighth Schedule 
th»11 be without prejudice either to the requirement for the accounts to 
give a "true and fair view" or to any other requirement of the Act (S.149(3)).
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Section 156(1) of the Act requires the auditors' report to be 
attached to the balance sheet and profit and loss account, while section 
157(1) requires that every balance sheet should have a directors' report 
attached to It giving a report of the state of the company's affairs, the 
amount recommended to be paid as dividend and the amount proposed to be 
carried to reserves.
The detailed legislative requirements as to the contents of 
c ompany accounts under the 1948 Act particularly Schedule 8 were extensively 
revised by the 1967 Act. Sections 3-11 of that Act introduced a number of 
further nutters to be included in company accounts and new requirements as 
to the auditors' report were laid down in Section 14.
Details of the contents of the directors' report were also 
enumerated in Sections 16-24 some of the most important of which were the 
requirement in Section 19 that the report must include certain particulars 
of contributions for political or charitable purposes and the right under 
Section 24 to receive copies of the directors' report in addition to the 
rights under Section 158 of the 1948 Act of members, debenture holders 
and persons entitled to receive notices of general meetings to receive 
copies of the balance sheet and auditors' report.
Section 26 required companies to keep at an appropriate place 
copies of directors' service contracts or memorandum thereof, which must 
be open to inspection by members of the company. Every director is required 
by Section 27 to notify the c.ompany of his interest in the shares or 
debentures of the company and subsequent transactions in connection with 
such shares such as a sale, assignment or other specified occurrence in
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relation to the shares or debentures. Any similar interest by the 
directors' wife or child in the shares and debentures of the company 
were also to be disclosed. These provisions were designed to prevent 
breach of directors' fiduciary duties by Irregular dealings in their 
company's securities.
Provisions were also made for the disclosure by persons with 
substantial individual interests in the share capital of the ompany 
carrying unrestricted voting rights of the acquisition, changes in the 
amounts of and disposal of shares in the company. — This was to ensure 
that the public would be able to find out at all times who had de jure  
control of the oompany and to minimise secret "warehousing" of a company's 
equities by a potential take-over bidder.
Important and rather novel provisions to secure greater publicity 
were afforded in Part III of this Act to empower the Board of Trade to 
inspect Companies' books and papers. Section 109 empowers the Department 
of Trade (as the Board of Trade is now called) to require a Company to 
produce such books or papers as may be specified or to authorise any 
officer of the Department to require the production of the books or 
papers (S.109(1)). Production may also be demanded of any person in 
possession, or who appears to be in possession of the documents even though 
such a person has a lien on the documents but the production shall be 
without prejudice to the lien (S.109(2)). The Department or the officers
1/ Sections 33 and 34
appointed by them are entitled to take copies or extracts from the books 
or papers produced to them. A penalty is imposed on any company or other 
person who fails to comply with a demand to produce the documents (S.109(4)).
A search warrant may be issued by a justice of the peace authorising 
any police constable to search any premises on reasonable suspicion that 
the books and papers are to be found there and to take possession of the 
documents which appear to be those in question and take steps to preserve 
and prevent interference with them (S.110).
Any information obtained under section 109 is confidential and 
is not to be published, unless publication or disclosure is necessary, 
for example, with a view to the Institution of proceedings or otherwise 
for the purposes of any criminal proceedings under the Companies Acts, or 
for the purpose of complying with any requirement, or exercising any power 
conferred by the Companies Act with regard to reports made by inspectors 
appointed to investigate the affairs of a company (S.lll).
The inquisitorial powers conferred under Part III of the 1967 
Act is designed to afford further protection to investors by making needed 
information available to them but the Department of Trade has not often 
exercised its power thereunder readily or speedily enough. — ^ "If 
exercised speedily enough, they may prevent oppression [of minority
1/ See Torn Haddenr Company Law and Capitalism. (1977) pp.352-359; 
"Fraud in the City: Enforcing the rules", (1980) Co. Law 9, 12-13. 
See also Gower, 4th Ed., 671-681.
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shareholders] from occurring". — ^
The philosphy of continuing improvement of accounts and auditing 
was continued in the 1976 Act, in fact, half of the Act dwelt on these
matters, but again the provisions relate mainly to matters of details. As
2/
D.D. Prentice has said of this Act, —  it by no means constitutes a
"fundamental restructuring of English Company Law" but contains "modest
though important measures" as to accounts and audits. It is, as that
3/writer puts, "a nuts and bolts statute" —  . Some of the most significant 
provisions of the Act relate to the duty to prepare, lay and deliver 
accounts by reference to the company's accounting reference period, in 
otherwords, its financial year. It defines what the accounting reference 
period of a company shall be (S.2) and rules for the alteration of the 
accounting reference period (S.3).
Section 12 requires that every company must keep accounting 
records which must be sufficient to show and explain the company's trans­
actions. It must disclose with reasonable accuracy, at any time, the 
financial position of the company at that time and enable the directors 
to ensure that any balance sheet prepared by them gives a true and fair
4/
view of the company's profit or loss. —  Accounting records kept in
1/ Gower, ibid., 679.
2/ "Companies Act 1976", (1977) 40 M.L.R. 314.
3/ Ibid., at 321.
4/ That is, it must comply with the requirements of Section 149, 1948 
Act and Section 12(l)-(3) of the 1976 Act.
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accordance with the section must in the case of public companies be 
preserved for at least six years from the date on which they are made.
In relation to auditors a significant innovation was the right
given to an auditor of a company who resigns his office under Section 16
to requisition an extraordinary general meeting of the oompany. The purpose
of the meeting will be to receive and consider his explanation of the
circumstances connected with his resignation as he may wish to place before
the meeting. A copy of a statement in writing by the auditor not exceeding
a reasonable length of the circumstances connected with his resignation
may in appropriate circumstances be sent to every member of the company
2/to whom notice of the meeting has been sent. —  But a c-ourt may dispense
with the requirement to send out copies of the statement or to read it out
at the meeting, if on the application of the company or of any other
person who claims to be aggrieved, it is satisfied that the rights conferred
by this section are being abused to secure needless publicity for defamatory
3/matter. —  The section is an important safeguard to auditors who adopt an 
uncompromising stand in an effort to protect investors from the abuses of 
management. It serves to ensure that the shareholders are given an 
opportunity to find out if the dismissal of the auditor is an attempt to 
prevent possible leakages of whatever Improprieties the directors may wish 
to hide. —
1/ Section 12(9)(b)
2/ Section 17 
y  Section 17(4)
4/ This strengthens the rights of shareholders and debenture holders under 
~  S.158, 1948 Act to receive copies of balance sheets and auditors'
reports and the system of appointment and remuneration of auditors 
under S.159 of that Act.
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To the extent that the rules for disclosure and publicity were
strengthened by the 1967 and 1976 Acts they nay be regarded as having
taken long strides to enhance shareholders' control — but it is clear that
they were effectively designed and accordingly have served to give members
more of protection rather than control. It is submitted that it is one
thing for legislation to protect the interest of investors by making it
difficult for directors and managers to hide frauds and mismanagement from
them and it is another for legislation to facilitate the performance of
those functions which Company L.aw ascribes to them. This is not to say
that legislation for the protection of investors is irrelevant for control.
On the contrary the requirements for disclosure which have been described
above have been very useful in the development of systems of internal and
external control over directors. As Professor Gower puts it the protection
of investors and the control by shareholders over management are both
2/aspects of the same generic problem. —  The philosophy of disclosure has, 
according to the learned Professor, been a useful device for investor 
protection but this like civil and criminal sanctions for mis-statements 
or material omission provide only ex poet facto sanction against management 
and are "far less effective than initial scrutiny of [for example] the 
prospectus to insure its accuracy and completeness". While in the U.S. 
the vital task of Initial screening has been entrusted to the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC): the author lamented the "extraordinarily lax" 
situation of English law. It is to be noted that with the strengthening
1/ See e.g. The Corporate Report: Accounting Standards Steering Committee
(1975), 4.11.
2/ L.C.B. Gower, "Corporation Law in England and America", (1955-56)11 Bus. 
“  Lawyer 39, 47; "British and American Corporation Law", (1956) 69 Harv. 
L.R. 1369, 1381.
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of such institutions as the Stock Exchange and their listing agreements 
with public companies and the City Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers the 
system of extra-legal control has become stronger than it was at the time 
of his address, with the one enforcing through its Quotation Department 
the provisions of the Listing agreement which govern the content and timing 
of disclosure by listed companies and the other enforcing the provisions 
of the City Code on Take-Overs and Mergers. —
The effectiveness of these bodies and the mechanism for their 
operation depends certainly on rather extensive disclosures. But while 
disclosure has been useful for the development of external control over 
directors this, as will be seen later, has proved less effective in 
enhancing shareholders' participation in corporate administration.
2/In their study of shareholder user of corporate report —  
Professor T.A. Lee and Mr. D. P. Tweedie have found that the measure of
1/ This notwithstanding there are still many who advocate a sort of
S.E.C. for British Companies to perform scrutiny functions identical 
to those performed by the S.E.C. in the U.S. See the recent report 
of the Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions 
(the Wilson Committee) Cmnd 7937 (1980) which called for the creation 
of an authority which will keep the regulatory parts of the present 
financial system under regular review. See e.g. para. 1119. As to 
the merits of these demands, see Tom Hadden (1977) pp.361-363. See 
also David Sugarman (1980) 1 Co. Law 302-303 and 304-305. But cf. 
D.D. Prentice, op.cit., (1977) 40 M.L.R. 314, 316.
2/ Lee and TWeedie, The Private Shareholder and The Corporate Report. 
(1977).
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Individual private shareholder's understanding of financial reports is 
in direct proportion to the accounting experience of the reader. Thus 
while financial disclosures in corporate reports are avidly read by such 
knowledgeable users as aanagers of investment institutions and professional 
analysts most private shareholders are unable to use or understand the 
existing form of financial report, that is, the profit and loss account 
and the balance sheet, and appear to be looking for less complex state­
ments in the Chairman's report —  ^ to provide them with relevant information. 
The greatest problem which confronts the "non-accountant" private shareholder
in his understanding of the reports appear to be "the complexity of the
2/reporting system and the terminology used in financial statements". —
Thus while complying with the accounting and disclosure requirements of 
the Companies Acts accountants quite unintentionally produce a financial 
reporting system which is capable of being used thoroughly and reasonably 
understood only by accountants or equivalent professionals. The result 
has been the creation of a considerable communication gap between companies 
and their private shareholders and to give an unfair advantage to other 
shareholders who are more knowledgeable in accounting.
The findings of these two writers as well as numerous other 
3/reports —  highlight the inadequacy of disclosure provisions and support 
our demand here for a re-examination of further and more effective systems
1/ The Chairman's report is not usually covered in the auditors' report.
2/ P. 131.
3/ A useful 11st of references to other reports on accounts is contained 
—  in The Private Shareholder and The Corporate Report. See also the 
Green Papers, The Future of Company Reports ; A Consultative Document 
(1977) Cmnd 6888 and Company Accounting and Disclosure : A Consultative 
Document (1979) Cmnd 7654.
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of control on corporate management in addition to publicity and disclosures 
in corporate reports. —  ^ In order to bring about significant reform in 
the "structure" of Company L aw this thesis advocates the introduction of 
some new structural system of control, not in substitution for but in 
addition to the disclosure requirements of the Companies Acts. So far 
the Companies Acts have dealt very little with this approach to the 
problem of shareholders' participation in corporate administration.
2/The only legislation —  which may be regarded as having affected 
this structure of corporate governance in some way, is the European 
Comunltles Act, 1972, particularly, Section 9 which was enacted in order
1/ Lee and Tweedie suggest that a solution to this inadequacy 
is to simplify the present system in order to make it more 
easily comprehensible to the unskilled user. See p. 132.
There is no denying the fact that the existing system of 
publicity and disclosure are quite essential to financial 
analysts, investment managers and especially the press who 
exert a most effective extra-legal form of control over 
corporate management. These users are not constrained by 
those factors which inhibit the private shareholder users.
2/ The Companies Act 1976 dealt mainly with rules relating to 
accounts, accounting records and the appointment, removal, 
resignation of auditors. The legal position of Auditors 
is outside the main focus of this thesis.
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to comply with the First Council Directive concerning publicity, pre­
incorporation contracts and the capacity of companies and the authority 
of directors. —
2/Section 9(1) of the E.C.A. 1972, —  provides in favour of
a person dealing with a company in good faith, that the directors' power 
to bind the company to a transaction decided upon by them shall be 
deemed to be free from any limitation under the memorandum or articles 
of association. The transaction so decided upon will bind the company 
even if the directors act:
(1) beyond the company's powers, or
(2) beyond the powers vested in them by the 
memorandum and articles of association.
1/ No. 68/151/EEC.
2/ For a very exhaustive examination of this section, see J. 
Segev, The Powers of the General Meeting and the Board of 
Directors in the Company Law of Britain and Israel. 
(Unpublished Fh.D. Thesis, London School of Economics) 
(1973). See also Gower's Principles of Modern Company 
Law (4th edition) 1979, pp. 178, 184-190.
In relation to the general meeting this section can be seen
as greatly strengthening the position of the board of directors by
validating acts which they had no powers to perform and so diminishing
in fact, if not in law, the relevance of any division of powers which
exists between them. It is to be noted, however, that the section
only affects the relations between directors and outsiders dealing with
them and has the effect of saving for such persons contracts which would
2 /
otherwise have been declared ultra  v ires . - The section does not 
alter in any material particular, the traditional relationship between 
the board and the general meeting including the rights of minority 
shareholders and the company.
The latest companies legislation is the Companies Act 1980
(1980 Act) which was designed primarily to implement the European Economic
3/Community Second Directive - on the reclassification of companies and 
the maintenance, increase and reduction of capital. The opportunity was 
seized, however, to introduce long awaited legislation on such matters 
as Insider Trading, the taking of loans by directors in their companies 
and conflict of interest cases. These new provisions became necessary 
to protect shareholders from fraud and mal-practices by company directors, 
of the sort which have been revealed in numerous Department of Trade 
Investigations.
1/ Such as the power to ratify acts which are ultra vires the directors.
2/ In other words, it mainly affects the law relating to ultra vires and 
the rule in Royal British Bank v. Turquand (1856) 6 E.4.B. 327, 
tr, which provides that an outsider dealing with a company 
is,not bound to ensure that the internal regulations of the Company 
Law have in fact been complied with as regards the exercise and de­
legation of authority. See Gower,182-182
3/ N0.77/91/EEC.
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One of the provisions of the Act which is quite significant 
for the structure of corporate governance is Section 46 which provides:
(1) The matters to which the directors of a company 
are to have regard in the performance of their 
functions shall include the interests of the 
company's employees in general as well as the 
interests of its members.
(2) Accordingly, the duty imposed by subsection (1) 
above on the directors of a company is owed by them 
to the company (and the company alone) and is 
enforceable in the same way as any other fiduciary 
duty owed to a company by its directors.
The reason this section is regarded as significant is that for the 
first time in the history of Conpany Law, a positive duty has been 
imposed on directors to consider directly the interest by employees 
in their operation of the company. During the passage of the Bill
1/ This section widens the scope of the fiduciary duty of directors 
to act "bona fide" in what they consider - not what a court may 
consider - is in the interests of the company as a whole. Re:
Smith and Fawcett Ltd £.9427 Ch.304, 306 per Lord Greene M.R.
The traditional legal position has been that when performing 
their function in the "interests of the company" directors are 
required to take account of the interests of the company's present 
and future members only: The Savoy Hotel Ltd and The Berkeley Hotel 
Co.Ltd. Department of Trade Report, (14£4), per Mr.Milner Holland 6.C. 
(as he was then) and that they could not take into account the 
interests of the company's employees except in so far as to do so 
would be in the interests of the members of the company: Hutton v 
West Cork Railway Co. {1883? 23 Ch.D.654; Parke v. Daily News Ltd.
¿19627 Ch.927. The new section now makes it possible for directors 
within the context of their duties to consider directly the 
interests of the employees together with those of the members.
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fears were raised by some sections of the public and in Parliament 
about the possibility of employees seeking to control the board's 
policies under the guise of attempting to enforce directors' compliance 
with the section. It required careful draftsmanship to ensure that this 
absurdity did not arise and the section as it now stands serves only 
as a shield to directors who are challenged for taking actions in the 
interests of the employees and not as a sword for employees to compel 
them to take specific actions in furtherance of their (employees) 
interests. — It can be said, therefore, that the section does not 
affect the relations between shareholders and directors, except that it 
de ju re gives the latter, wider latitude of discretion to do those 
things which it is commonly agreed they have often done, in fact.
At the international level there have been certain develop­
ments which are bound to have future consequences on the present frame­
work for corporate governance. These developments derive from the EEC 
directives of which the most important for the purposes of this thesis 
are the Fourth Directive and the Draft Fifth Directive.
1/ See Victor Joffe, The Companies Act 1980 : A Practical Guide
(1980), 12.102 - 12.104.
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The Fourth Directive — ^ is concerned with the disclosure of 
financial information and the contents of accounts. Article 2(3) of 
the Directive provides that the annual accounts of a company shall 
give "a true and fair view of the company's assets, liabilities, 
financial position and profit or loss". Article 2(4) provides that 
information must be added in order to give a true and fair view if 
compliance with a provision of the Directive would not ensure this.
In the exceptional case where compliance with the rules of the Directive 
would not give a true and fair view they must be departed from and a 
full explanation given in the notes to the accounts (Article 2(5)). 
Article 47 requires that the annual accounts of all companies together 
with the annual or directors' report and auditors' report must be 
published. Article 51 requires that the accounts of large companies 
must be audited.
Further legislation for the implementation of this Directive 
is to be expected but suffice it to say here that the requirements for 
the U.K. are hardly revolutionary and the main practical effect of the 
Directive here will be the provision of all information in a prescribed 
format and the provision of certain additional information. The existing 
over-riding requirement of existing law that the accounts must give "a
1/ 78/660/EEC, (1978). (This is now included in the 1981 Companies
Bill).
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true and fair view" of the c ompany's financial position has been 
retained. —
The Draft Fifth Directive is concerned with the structure2/of companies. —  It applies to the large companies In member states 
with the exception of the United Klnddom and Ireland and requires 
that companies employing more than 500 employees should have two- 
tier boards either with one-third appointed by the workers, or with 
the workers and shareholders having a veto as under the Dutch system. 
Considerable resentment against the almost unqualified adoption of the 
German co-determination system led to its subsequent revision and
1/ For details on this Directive see the Green Paper Company Accounting 
and Disclosure : A Consultative Docunent. (1979) Cmnd 7654 (HMSO), 
p. 10. See also Ernst and Whinney, The Fourth Directive (1979), 315, 
for the effect of this Directive on UK and Irish Companies.
2/ C. 131/49 (1972). See the detailed provisions and the amendments 
thereto in (1979) 66 European Industrial Relations Rev. 23. For a
discussion of the likely effects of the Implementation of this 
Directive on UK and Irish Companies, see Temple Lang, "The Fifth 
EEC Directive on Harmonization of Company Law", (1975) 12 C.M.L.R.
155 and 345.
The three other Draft Directives are the Draft Sixth Directive which 
relates to the issuing and contents of prospectuses and aims at the 
co-ordination of national requirements for the admission of securities 
to listing. The Draft Seventh Directive i s  concerned with the contents 
of group accounts and is a necessary extension of the proposals con­
tained in the Fourth Directive. The Draft Eighth Directive deals with 
auditing and sets out who is entitled to audit the annual account and 
the minimus qualification of auditors.
The First and Second Directives were implemented in the European 
Comnunlties Act 1972 and the Companies Act 1980 respectively while 
the Third Directive aims at the co-ordination of provisions regulating 
internal mergers within a member state, and is yet to be implemented.
amendment by the European Parliament. The final version will have to 
be adopted by the U.K. in future, and is bound to affect in te r  a lia  
the existing rights of shareholders.
Some of the features of the draft Fifth Directive and its highly German bias 
are also to be seen in the Draft Statute on the European Company (1970).
The concept of the European Company was first put forward by Professor
Sanders in 1959, the idea being to have a new form of incorporation for
two or more limited companies which decide to merge or form a joint
holding or subsidiary company. Following the French and German
pattern, the Statute proposes a division of the board of directors into
two separate and independent corporate organs; the board of management and the
supervisory board. Alongside these two organs the shareholders meeting
continues to exist. According to Article 64(1) of the Proposed Statute
the board of management is given wide authority to act for the corporation
in all fields where authority is not expressly reserved by the Statute
for some other organ. The board of management also has full authority
to bind the corporation v ie -a -v is third parties, unfettered by the limits
2/of the corporation's object or the articles of association. - The 
competence of the shareholders' meeting is limited to matters enumerated 
in Article 83. Besides the election of the supervisory board, only basic de­
cisions are to be taken by the general meeting, such as modification 
of the articles of association, increase or reduction of capital or 
dissolution or transformation or merger of the corporation. The only
1/ See Gower, 88. For a history of The European Company see Prof.
Peter Saunders, "The European Company", (1968) J.B.L.184.
2/ Art.67 of the Proposed Statute. The major powers of the respective
organs in the governing structure of the European Company are discussed 
by Hans Claudius Picker in "The Proposed Statute of a European 
Corporation", (1971) J.B.L. 167, 175-77.
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active part the shareholders' meeting may take in the governance 
of their company, apart from electing the members of the supervisory 
board, is to nominate the auditors and to decide what should be done 
with the annual profits. The shareholders meeting is to be held 
only once a year, at which shareholders have the right to put questions 
on matters to be discussed in the agenda.
So alien are most of the provisions of the Proposed Statute 
to the present governing structure in the U.K. that one commentator 
has described the concept of the European Company as "a stumbling 
block" to future development of the pattern of corporate governance 
in English Company Law. - In particular, th« existing machinery for 
shareholders' control will be so diminished at its introduction that 
one must heed the warning of Prof. Gower for more stringent requirements
if mass "emigration" of companies electing for the "European form"
. . 3/is to be avoided. -
The question of workers' participation in corporate governance is 
a central theme underlying most of the legislative initiatives from 
Europe. Although it was omitted in the 1980 Companies Act, this is a 
question which is so important for the future structure of corporate 
governance in this country and has been much discussed in debates under 
the general name of Industrial Democracy. In 1975, the President of the
1/ See Ibid.
2/ J.C.Davies, "The European Company : a Stumbling Block" (1972),116.
Sol.J.227.
3/ At 88. The existing machinery for corporate governance are considered.infra.
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Board of Trade appointed a Committee of Inquiry to "advise on questions 
relating to representation (of employees) at board level in the private 
sector", "/&7aving regard to the interest of the national economy, 
employees, investors and consumers, to analyse the implications of such 
representation for the efficient management of companies and company lav". -
The Committee reported in 1977 and proposed that large British
companies adopt a new unitary board system constituted under the famous
2/2x + y formula. - Their proposals have received little enthusiasm for
their implementation so far although a future labour government under,
3/say, Mr. Tony Benn might be more favourably disposed towards it, - 
but this will not be for several years to come. It is safe to assume 
therefore, that the existing framework for corporate administration will 
remain unchanged for a long time yet - at least until such a time as there 
will be a change in the company law philosophy to accommodate an equal
1/ Cmnd 6707 p.V.
2/ The majority's central recommendation is that in order to provide 
a "new legitimacy for the exercise of the management function" 
and to ensure that employee representatives take equal responsibility 
for the board's decisions, the unitary board should be reconstituted 
so as to be composed of three elements,an equal number of employee and 
shareholders representatives and a third group of co-opted directors. 
This group should: (a) be co-opted with the agreement of a majority of 
each of the other two groups - the employees and shareholders represent­
atives; (b) be an uneven number of three or more; and (c) form less 
than one third of the total board. Thus, called 2x ♦ y formula, 
where x ■ the employee and shareholders representatives and y “ the 
co-opted group of directors. When applied the minimum possible for the 
companies affected would be at least 11 directors. See Chapter 9 and 
para. 13.
3/ At the last Labour Party Annual Conference, Mr. Tony Benn declared 
that he would want to see a future labour government implement the 
proposals on Industrial Democracy, amongst other things.
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role for both shareholders and employees in the governance of their 
company, for much of the U.K. company law rests on the principle of 
shareholder control. This principle will be examined in the next 
chapter. For the moment, however, it is necessary to examine next 
the legal nature of the different organs for corporate governance.
5. The Company’s Organs
Since a company is an "artificial person" it cannot, like a 
natural person by itself organise and conduct its own affairs - functions 
which are referred to in this thesis as corporate governance or corporate 
administration. These functions are, however, performed on its behalf 
by natural persons acting as its organs. As Viscount Haldane L.C. described 
it in Lennard's Carrying Company Limited v. Asiatic Petroleum Company Limited: -
"a corporation is an abstraction. It has no mind 
of its own any more than it has a body of its own; 
its active and directing will must consequently 
be sought in the person of somebody who for some 
purposes may be called an agent, but who is really 
the directing mind and will of the corporation, 
the very ego and centre of the personality of the 
corporation,That person may be under the direction of 
the shareholders in general meeting; that may be 
the board of directors itself, or it may be, and in 
some companies it is so, that that person has an 
authority to co-ordinate with the board of directors 
given to him under the articles of association, and 
is appointed by the genral meeting of the company, 
and can only be removed by the general meeting of 
the company."
1/ ¿l91$7 A.C.705
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(i) The Board of Director« and the General Meeting as Organ«
The persons identified by Viscount Haldane as being 
responsible for the conduct of a company's business are the board of 
directors and the shareholders in general meetings, but the fact 
that his Lordship referred to them as "agents" rather than "organs" 
should not derogate from this position. The comnon tendency has been 
to regard the board of directors as agents who are subject to the control 
of the members acting as the company - a tendency which serves to obscure 
the true legal position of directors. In a recent case Walton J. in 
an attempt to distinguish between the general meeting and the board stated:
"a director is an agent, who casts his votes 
to decide in what manner his principal shall 
act through the collective agency of the 
board of directors; a shareholder who casts 
his vote in general meeting is not casting it as 
an agent of the company in any shape or form.
His acts, therefore, in voting as he pleases, 
cannot in any way be regarded as an act of the 2/ 
company".
Notwithstanding the ambiguities of a director's position 
via-a-via the general meeting, it is now clear, as Professor Gower points 
out that.
"Both ¿the board of director^ and the members in general 
meeting are primary organs of the company between 
whom the company's powers are divided....The old 
idea that the general meeting alone is the company's 
organ and the directors merely the conpany's agents 
or servants, at all times subservient to the general 
meeting, seems no longer to be the law as it is 3/ 
certainly not the fact".1/ Northern Counties Securities v. Jackson * Steeple Ltd. A974J  
W.L.R. 1113.
2/ At 1144
3/ Gower 4th ed. at 152.
80.
Indeed, the board of directors has often been referred to in the
cases as one of the company's organs and its status as one cannot be
. 2/ seriously doubted. -
As corporate organs both the board and the general meeting 
have to function within the spheres of the respective powers allocated 
to them by the company's constitutional instruments. The system of 
allocation and the relations between these principal organs acting within 
the scope of their respective authorities will form the subject of a 
later chapter.
(ii) Other Organs
Although this work is concerned primarily with the board of 
directors acting as a body and the general meeting, this discussion will 
be incomplete without even a cursory reference to other organs of a 
company notably the Managing Director, the General Manager and the 
Company Secretary.
(a) The Managing Director:
3/Companies' articles especially where Table A - is adopted as is 
often the case usually empower the directors to appoint one or more of 
their number to the office of managing director. For example, Article 109 
of Table A provides:
1/ See e.g. Bolton v. Graham A959 ]  1 Q.B. 159, per Denning L.J. (as 
he was then) at 172; RuiJ v \ Elder Dempster and Co. A 933/ 1 K.B.566, 
per Scrutton L.J. at 576 and per Viscount Haldane in Lennards Case.supra.
2/ See G.O.OIawoyjp . ., The Status and Duties of Directors (Ife —
Nigeria, 1977).3/ That is Table A of the First Schedule to the 1948 Act (Regulations 
~ for Management of a company limited by Shares, not being a private 
company), hereafter Table A.
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"The directors may entrust to and confer upon a 
managing director any of the powers exercisable by them 
upon such terms and conditions and with such restrictions 
as they may think fit, and either collaterally with or to  the exclusion o f  th e ir  own powers end may from time to 
time revoke, withdraw, alter or vary all or any of such 
powers".
The words in italics in that article are important for upon their 
construction depends whether or not the managing director is regarded 
as a company's organ. Professor Gower suggests that those words imply 
that the directors may abdicate in favour of the managing directors 
by completely divesting themselves of their own powers in the service 
agreement with the managing director without expressly reserving for 
themselves a right of supervision. "If this(suggestion)is correct" 
he says, "the directors are in effect authorised to substitute a managing 
director for themselves as one of the primary organs of the company.
In such circumstances the powers of the company will be divided among 
three exclusive organs" - the general meeting, the board of 
directors and the managing director.
By the same token it is submitted that where a board of
directors has abdicated in favour of a Committee, for example, an
executive conmittee appointed under Article 102 such committee constitutes
2/another organ of the company. -
1/ Gower 4th ed. at 156.
2/ See in particular Article 105 which provides that acts done by 
~ any meeting of directors or committees or a member of either 
body shall be valid to the same extent. Comsittees are not 
discussed as separate organs in this thesis but further discussion 
on the use of the committee device will be undertaken in a later 
chapter.
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(b) Manager:
Professor Gower points out that a Managing Director is 
something more than "a manager who happens also to be a director". 
Even a manager, he admits is sometimes regarded as something more than 
a mere agent or servant. Indeed, in Fanton v. Denville
the general manager of a company was regarded as an a lte r  ego of the 
company, as Viscount Haldane regarded the board of directors and the 
general meeting in Lennard'« rant. According to Greer, L.J.:
"It has, of course, to be remembered that in 
actions against companies a general manager 
of the business is deemed to be the alter ego 
of the company, and it would be responsible for -, 
his personal negligence". -
Thus, for some purposes, a manager may be regarded as one of the company's 
organs.
(c) The Company Secretary:
4/In a recent case - it was pointed out that a secretary "is not 
concerned in the management of the company... (and) is not concerned 
in carrying on the business of the company".-^Although a secretary's 
duties in the company are essentially "ministerial and administrative" he 
forms suchanimportant and integral part of corporate governance that he 
deserves some mention. A secretary is not,strictly speaking,an organ of 
the company, but dicta in a recent case -^indicate that for some purposes 
he would be regarded as one.
1/ At p.156.
2/ A9327 2 K.B.309.
3/ At 329.
4/ Re. Maidstone Building Provisions Ltd. û.97lj 1 W.L.R.1085.
5/ Per Pennycuick V.C. at p.1092.6/ p»nnr«wui-Developments (Guildford) Ltd, v. Fidelia Furnishing Fabrics
ltd.' w / T ]  2 q.B.m,t.A.-- :
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Until 1971 a company's secretary has been generally considered 
* mere servant. Thus in Barnett, Hoarea and Co. v. South London Tramways 
Co. it was stated by Lord Esher M.R. that a secretary:
"is a mere servant; his position is that he is 
to do what he is told, and no person can assume 
that he has any authority to represent anything 
at all; nor can anyone assume that statements 
made by him are necessarily to be accepted as 
trustworthy without further inquiry, any more than 
in the case of a merchant it can be assumed that 
one who is only a clerk has authority to make 
representation to induce persons to enter into a 
contract".
Even at the beginning of the present century that conception of a
secretary's position in a company had not changed. In 1902 Lord
. 3/Macnaghten in George Whitechurch Ltd, v. Cavanagh - stated:
"Now, the duties of a company's secretary are 
well understood. They are of a limited and .. 
somewhat humble character".
In 1971 Lord Denning M.R., heralded a change in this conception in 
the case of Panorama Development (Guildford) v. Fidelis Funishing 
Fabrics Ltd. In that case B, secretary to the defendant company
hired cars from the plaintiff company ostensibly for his company's 
business. The hiring agreements were always signed by B as Company 
Secretary but unknown to the plaintiffs B used the cars himself and
1/ (1887) 18* Q.B.D. 815.
2/ At p.817.
3/ [l90lj A.C.117. See also Ruben v. Great Fingall Consolidated fl906] 
A.C.439.
4/ At 124.
5/ See supra.
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not for the company'* purpose. When the plaintiffs sued for the 
outstanding charges the defendants denied liability, arguing on the 
authority of Barnett's case that a secretary is a mere servant who 
has no authority to bind the company in a contract. Lord Denning 
rejected this argument in the defendants appeal, saying:
"But times have changed. A company secretary is 
a much more important person nowadays than he was 
in 1887. He is an officer of the company with 
extensive duties and responsibilites. This 
appears not only in the modern companies Acts, 
but also by the role which he plays in the day-to-day 
business of companies. He is no longer a mere clerk. 
He regularly makes representations on behalf of the 
company and enters into contracts on its behalf which 
come within the day-to-day running of the company's 
business .... He is certainly entitled to sign 
contracts connected with the administrative side 
of a company's affairs, such as employing staff, and 
ordering cars, and so forth. All such matters now 
come within the ostensible authority of a company's 
secretary".
Salmon L.J. agreed with that decision adding that "there can be no
doubt that the secretary is the chief administrative officer of the 
2/company", - and has authority to bind the company.
While it has been sought to show that the general meeting, 
the board of directors, the managing directors, general manager and 
the secretary are organs of the company, albeit, to varying degrees, 
it is not intended to discuss the details of the operations of all 
of them. Rather,the focus of this work will be to examine the principle 
of shareholder control and the manner in which the board of directors 
directs the business of the company.
1/ At p.443
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CHAPTER 2
THE PRINCIPLE OF SHAREHOLDERS* CONTROL
1. Introduction:
The principle that shareholders should have ultimate control 
over those they have appointed to run their companies is basic to 
English Company Law. The "logical theory" enacted by Company Law 
and companies constitutional instruments is, according to P.Sargant 
Florence, that shareholders who bear the risk in the enterprise should, by 
that fact, have top control - a theory he believes, "may almost be 
described as Capitalism's Golden Rule". And, according to D.H.
Robertson, "where the risk lies there the control lies also”.
The manner and extent to which this control is exercised will be examined 
later, but first it is necessary to examine the reason behind this principle.
In his dissent note to the 1962 Jenkins Report, Professor Gower
3/explained the reason why Company Law insists on shareholders' control. -
"The business corporation is a device for enabling 
an expert body of directors to manage other 
people's property for them. Since these managers 
are looking after other people's money it is 
thought that they should not be totally free 
from any control or supervision and the obvioua
1/ P.Sargant Florence, The Logic of British and American Industry 
(1970 edition), 211.
2/ D.H.Robertson, Control of Industry (1923) 89, cited by P.S.Florence
in Ownership Control and Success of Large Companies (1961).60.
3/ Cmnd 1749 p.207.
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persons Co exercise some control are the 
persons whose property is being managed.
Hence the basic principle adopted by British 
Company Law (and, indeed, by the laws of most 
countries) is that ultimate control over the directors 
should be exercised by the shareholders. This control 
cannot be exercised in detail and from day-to-day, 
but shareholders retain the ultimate sanction in that 
it is they who "hire and fire" the directorate".
That concise explanation strikes a similar note to the observations made
by Mr.William Gladstone during the debates leading to the enactment
of the 1844 Act. "The law is so dangerous", he said "and unjust
towards a man of substance, by putting his whole property at the mercy
2/of persons beyond his control...." -
It is apparent from those two observations that the right to have 
some control over one's property is the essential logic behind this 
principle. It is essential for capitalism - and is simple reason - that 
investors who supply the capital should have a say in the way the 
enterprise is to utilize the funds. The mere existence of this 
principle is reassuring for investors and helps to encourage and sustain 
the confidence of the public in investing in companies. Whether or not 
this control is actually exercised is of secondary importance. Its absence 
would, on the other hand, almost certainly diminish public confidence in 
investment.
1/ Ibid . See also L.C.B.Gower,"Corporation Law in England and America", 
71531-56) 11 Bus.Lawyer,39, where the distinguished writer states 
the principal rights of shareholders as including those of making 
fundamental changes in the company's objects and the right to "hire 
and fire" the directorate - the latter being singled out as the "crux" 
of management-shareholder relationship in the largepublic company.
2/ Report of 1844. Evid.Q.2072, cited by Hunt.op.cit.98.
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In a recent paper on the "Function of Ownership of public 
companies", Lord Carr of Hadley in explaining this principle, added 
further dimension to it. As he put it:
"Ownership is at the heart of the capitalist 
system. The success of a capitalist economy 
or of a mixed economy such as we have in Britain, 
depends to a significant extent on the ownership 
function being actively and effectively exercised.
Where the ownership function withers away, so in
due course will that part of the private enterprise ..
capitalism system itself." -
What ownership function is is, of course, uncertain. There 
is, in general, no unanimity of views about the nature of responsibilities 
which share ownership thrust«upon the investor; this depends on the point 
of view from which you consider it and the responsibilities are not 
immutable. For the private shareholder , for example, the ownership 
function has changed from one of active involvement with and investigation 
of his company's affairs to one of increasing reliance on the opinions 
of stockbrokers and the Stock Exchange, with his interests mainly on 
the payment of dividends. To many private investors, therefore, it 
is not their business to involve themselves with their companies so long 
as dividends are paid. The only "function" the private investor can 
exercise is to dispose of his shares or to accept or reject a take-over offer.
1/ "The Function of Ownership and the Role of Institutional Shareholders". 
Booklet No. <4> in a series of papers entitled "Corporate Governance 
and Accoountability", published by the Institute of Chartered Secretaries 
and Administrators (London,1979). Lord Carr of Hadley is chairman of 
the Prudential Assurance Co.Ltd.2/ Para.l.
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To the institutional shareholders the primary responsibility 
of share-ownership is to make more profit for their own members and 
their activities and policies must be designed towards achieving this end.
To management the function of share ownership is the provision of 
essential capital and it is not within the province of shareholders to 
concern themselves with the way the business is managed, provided profits 
are made and dividends paid. To some management, therefore, the principle 
of shareholders' control is only a useful weapon to ward-off government 
interference in corporate governance, by asserting that it is for share­
holders and not the government to make policy for the company.
While such divergence of opinion may exist, about the 
functions of ownership, Company Law does make clear the need for 
shareholders to exercise a number of important functions in the company 
and this leaves it in no doubt that they have ultimate control over 
the company through their power of appointment and dismissal of directors. - 
However, these are only some of the means for control available to 
shareholders. The others will be considered later, but in the meantime 
it is necessary to examine the controversial question of tha relationship 
of ownership and control which was briefly mentioned in the opening 
paragraph of this thesis.
1/ This has been referred to as the "control function of ownership”.
See R.A.Cordon, Business Leadership in the Large Corporation (1961 ed.)
44. See below for further discussion of the concept of control.
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2. The Separation of Ownership from Management
A major controversy which has developed in relation to the 
governance of the large company during the past fifty or so years is the 
question of separation of ownership and control. Although the
thesis about this separation has come to be closely identified with the 
leading book by Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, the phenomenon had long been described by Karl Marx in Book III 
of the Capital since the last century. According to Marx, the 
historical trend is that the twin functions of the contribution of funds 
and their utilization in the process of production which at the rise 
of capitalism were often performed by the same person, tend to become 
separated with the development of the capitalist mode of production.
As he puts it:
"Stock companies in general - developed with the credit 
system - have an increasing tendency to separate this 
work of management as a function from the ownership of 
capital be it self-owned or borrowed... The mere 
manager who has no title whatever to the capital, 
whether through borrowing it or otherwise, performs 
all the real functions pertaining to the functioning 
capitalist as such, only the functionary remains and 
the capitalist disappears as superfluous from the production «,
it
1/ To Sociologists the concept of separation of ownership and control 
has two dimansions: (1) the separation of ownership and management- 
the functional differentiation, and (2) the dispersion of stock and 
the consequent split between small and big owners. See Michel De Vroey, 
"The Separation of Ownership and Control in Large Corporations",in 
Review of Radical Political Economics 7(2) Summer 1975. 1. The
scope of this thesis doesnot permit a detailed discussion of the 
concept and the reason for referring to it as only to establish 
that the owners or a substantial number of owners of shares in large 
companies are divorced from the management of the companies.
2/ Capital. Book III, Chapter 23, pp.387-388.
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This functional differentiation was facilitated by the emergence of 
the joint stock company and the relations of ownership and management 
therein.
R.Hilferding, in Das Finanz Kapital in 1910, emphasised 
another consequence of the emergence of the joint stock company - the 
dispersal of the stock. His contention was that the corporate system 
has brought about an actual concentration of power, paralleling the 
dispersion of share-ownership. Thus, the corporate system allows an 
increase of the power sphere of big capitalists who now control larger 
economic units with a reduced proportion of legal ownership. He writes:
"With the extension of the shares system, the 
capitalist ownership is increasingly transformed 
into a restricted ownership, giving nominal rights 
to the capitalist without allowing possibility to 
exert any real influence on the production process...
The ownership of a great number of capitalists is 
constantly being restricted and their unlimited 
disposition of the productive process is suppressed.
But on the other hand, the circle of masters of 
production becomes more restricted. Capitalists 
form a society in the governing of which most of them 
have no voice. The effective disposition of the means 
of production is in the hands of people who have only _, 
partially contributed to it'.' -
1/ Cited by De Vroey.op.cit.3.
2/ At p.90. See also Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in 
Industrial Society (193ft , p.42.
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Berle and Means' study In the early 1930'a revealed this phenomenon In 
U.S. companies, although their interpretation of the consequences differ 
from that of Hilferding.
While it is generally thought that "ownership" of a company goes 
hand in hand with "control", Berle and Means found from their empirical
investigation that the latter is "something apart from ownership on the
2/one hand and from management on the other". - They regard control 
as lying "in the hands of the individual or group who have the actual 
power to select the board of directors (or its majority), either by 
mobilizing the legal right to choose them - "controlling" a majority
of the votes directly or through some legal device - or by exerting
3/pressure which influences their choice". - To the authors the selection 
of directors is crucial to control since direction over the activities 
of a company is exercised through the board of directors, and so he who 
selects the board, for all practical purposes controls the company.
A fo r tio r i the individual or group which selects the board of directors 
has control, for all practical purposes, over the board of directors.
This rule conforms with the theory and logic behind English Company Law.
1/ While Berle and Means saw the dispersion of stock as leading 
ultimately to a dispersion of power, Hilferding's contention 
was that the corporate system has brought about an actual concentration 
of power paralleling the dispersion of ownership. See De Vroey, 3.
2/ At p.66. Also according to Ralf Dahrendorf , ibid, "the roles
of owners and manager, originally combined in the position of the 
capitalists, have been separated and distributed over two positions, 
those of stockholder and executive*.
3/ Ibid.
4/ According to Knight in Risk. Uncertainty and Profit (1921) 297, "the 
crucial decision is the selection of men to make decisions”.
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The crux of Berle and Mean«' book may be divided into two 
broad principlea:
1. That in the typical large U.S. company,-^ control ia divorced 
from ownership, in that the appointment of the board ia not 
influenced by, subject to or identical with the ownership to any 
significant degree for "ownership is so widely distributed that
no individual or small group has even a minority interest large
21enough to dominate the affairs of the company". - As a 
result management is left in control of the company.
2. Just as managements without substantial shareholding controls the
company so is "/t/he direction of industry (as a whole) by persons
3/other than those who have ventured their wealth". - Thus 
industry is characterised by "/o/wnership of wealth without 
appreciable control and control of wealth without appreciable 
ownership", and this it is believed leads to certain behaviourial
tendencies for large companies' managements which are markedly 
different from those which exist in owner-controlled companies. There 
is no need to go into this question as it is not directly relevant to 
our main concern here, but further examination is necessary of the 
situation of shareholders' control in large companies.
1/ And presumably, the typical large U.K.Company too.
2/ At p.78.
3/ At p.66.
4/ At p.4.
5/ Useful references on this question are to be found in Theo Nichols, 
Ownership Control 4 Ideology.(1969).chapter IV.
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According Co Berle and Means, a stockholder in Che typical 
large company has pracCically two options when it comes to the 
appointment of directors:
(a) To refrain from voting, since even if he did his vote would be 
insignificant in determing the choice of directors, or
(b) To sign a proxy transferring his voting power to
the proxy conmittee selected by 
the management. These involve no real choice at all!.
"In neither case will he be able to exercise 
any measure of control. Rather, control will tend 
to be in the hands of those who select the proxy comnittee 
by whom, in turn, the election of the directors for the 
ensuing period may be made. Since the proxy committee is 
appointed by the existing management, the latter can 
virtually dictate their own successors. Where ownership 
is sufficiently sub-divided, the management can thus 
become a self-perpetuating body even though its share . . 
in the ownership is negligible". -
Both writers drew the inference that in the typical large company "control does5 /
not rest upon legal (ownership)". =■ ' It is:
"More often factual, depending upon strategic position 
secured through a measure of ownership, a share in 
management or an external circumstance important to the 
conduct of the enterprise. Such control is less clearly 
defined than the legal forms, is more precarious, and 
more subject to accident and change. It is, however, 
none the less actual. It may be maintained over a long 
period of years, and as a corporation becomes larger and 
its ownership more widespread, it tends towards a position 
of impregnability comparable to that of legal control, a 
position from which it can be dislodged only by a virtual 
resolution"._________
1/ At p.82. 
2/ At p.74. 
3/ Pp.74-75.
Berle and Means have been criticised by many writers, 
for in te r  a lia  the interpretation which they drew from the facts 
before them, and the methodology of their analysis. As R.A.Gordon, 
writes "No systematic attempt was made to see what influence in each
company was actually exerted by the minority group nor indeed who
2 /did exert influence". -
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The fact that Berle and Means' investigation of share registers
revealed a wide dispersal of ownership in the large company is not, in
3/the opinion of C.S.Beed, - enough to support the conclusion that 
"no individual or small group was in a position to dominate the company 
through etook ownership", "Whether an individual or small group,
including institutional investors had a majority interest large enough 
to select a majority of directors if desired...could only be tested 
by referring to the experience of the companies concerned, not, as Berle and 
Means did, by attaching arbitrary theoretical significance to sizes of 
"minority interests"". To Beed, Berle and Means' finding of a
wide dispersal of ownership in large companies under management control 
could mean either:
1. That no one individual or small group could gain sufficient votes 
for control or,
1/ See C.S.Beed, "The Separation of Ownership and Control", reprinted in 
M.Gilbert, ed., The Modern Industrial Enterprise (1972). 137. Robin 
Blackburn, "The New Capitalism" in Robin Blackburn, ed. Ideology in 
Social Science (1972). 164,175; W.G.Katz,"Responsibility and the Modern 
Corporation1', (1960) J. of Law & Econs. Vol. 375; also Robert J. Lamer 
Management Control and the Large Corporation (1970), Nichols, supra; and 
R.A.Gordon, supta.
2/ At p.166.
3/ Supra.
4/ At p.80. Original emphasis.
5/ At p.139.
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2. that only a few percent of votes were required for control.
He suggests that rather than investigating the distribution of 
ownership in shares registers the more appropriate way to find out 
the control in a company is to study the voting pattern and the 2/
relationship which subsists between the shareholders and the board.
"While (he agrees with Berle and Means) that the 'bulk of the owners 
have in fact almost no control over the enterprise', the power of the 
small proportion of 'large' owners (one to five percent) remains 
undemonstrated by (their) analysis, and in the absence of knowledge of 
relationships between directors and such large owners, the 'negligible
proportion of the total ownership' held by directors themselves is
3/irrelevant to the issue”. - He suggests that the voting power in the hands 
of small numbers of relatively large owners (one to five percent) is 
enough to determine control, as indeed, it is to secure the re-election 
of directors in Australian management-controlled companies, if this 
amounts to 15 percent of the total votes.
Precious little empirical research has been conducted in this 
country into the extent of separation of ownership from control, or for that 
matter, the relationship between both. The book by Professor P.Sargant
Florence, Ownership Control and Success of Large Companies,1961.
4/has provided useful reference to many writers. - Professor Florence's 
1/ Ibid
2/ Pp.139-140. See also Nichols, at p.21.
3/ At p.142.
4/ For example, to Nichols in Ownership Control and Ideology.
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research was designed to find out the seat of control in the large com­
panies, And one of his major findings was that large companies showed some 
degree of divorce of ownership from control. In other words, "The 
control of large companies is more divorced from ownership and their 
directors are not tied down to directing only where they own substantial 
capital". -^* Also, apart from holding company-subsidiary 
relationships he found very few instances where one shareholder was able to
control the company by virtue of owning more than 50Z of the voting shares.
2/Such cases were, in fact, diminishing in number..
Florence found an inverse relationship between the size of a
company in terms of assets and the percentage of ordinary shares owned
by the board. These were 2.9Z for the smaller, 2.1Z for the medium and
1.5Z for the very large. Proportion of directors among the twenty largest
shareholders^, was: 30Z for the smaller, 21Z for the medium and 16Z for the
very large companies. The proportion of companies with no directors
holding no more than minimum qualification was, 47Z for the smaller,
3/47Z for the medium and 27Z for the very large. -
While speculation is essentially unhelpful and is to be avoided in 
this area one can only surmise that the proportion of directors' share owner­
ship and the proportion of directors amongst the highest groups of shareholders
in large companies, must have diminished further with continued dispersal
1/ Florence, referring to his earlier 'pilot' study published in the 
Statical Journal. (1947) Part 1 p.14. See Ownership Control and 
Success,at p.87.
2/ Ibid.109
3/ At p.191.
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of share ownership since Florence's investigation, even though there 
must be a definite increase in the nominal value of their current holdings. 
Indeed, Theo Nichols, in Ownership Control and Ideology, has come to this 
conclusion after re-working Florence's data.
While many company directors now have huge financial stakes
in companies' shares (a few companies like Lonrho Ltd. and House of Frazer
Ltd. may easily be recalled) it is generally accepted that this remains
a very negligible proportion of the total votes and in most cases is often
less than 1%. However, a higher proportion than this is necessary to
secure control through votes, and the minimum proportion which has been
2/suggested is about 10 percent.- The statistical basis for exercising
control with so small a proportion of votes is illustrated by Professor
3/L.S.Penrose. -
"In a committee of three people one member will 
obtain the decision of his choice - that is to 
say, he will be on the winning side in 75Z of 
the votings, if the other two members vote in 
a random manner. In a committee of five, the 
chance that one member will obtain the decision 
he wishes will be 11/16....
If a committee or electorate consists of two 
sections, a "resolute" bloc and an 'indifferent' 
random voting group, a small 'resolute' group of 
people who always vote together can 
exercise a surprisingly powerful control over
1/ For example, as at 30.9.79, out of the total issued share capital of 
Lonrho Ltd. (210,970,942), the chief executive, Mr.'Tiny' Rowland 
had interests in 26,276,845 fully paid shares. In the House of 
Frazer, the chairman Sir Hugh Frazer, as Trustee, had interests 
in 3,576,291 ordinary shares out of 27,383,000 (as of Jan.1980)
2/ Gordon, op.cit. p.39, suggests a minimum of 3Z and Bead, 15Z
3/ "The Elementary Statistics of Majority Voting", (1946), 109,
Journal of Royal Statistical Society. 53-54; see also P.S.Florence 
"The Statistical Analysis of Joint Stock Company Control", (1947)
J. Royal Statistical Society. 2, 4.
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the whole comnittee. Thus, three resolute
votes can control a committee of twenty-three
to the same extent that one vote can control a committee
of three. Furthermore, a block of twenty-three could
control, again to the same extent an electorate of over 1,000...,
These blocs have about a 75Z chance of carrying the
decision in their respective electorates, but, by
increasing the size of the resolute bloc, any specified
degree of control can be obtained. Blocs three times
as great as those mentioned would carry the decisions they
desired in nearly 96Z of the situations encountered".
From the above calculation, in a company with 1,000 voting 
shares a resolute bloc with 20 x 3 votes (6.0Z) could w i t h ^6Z probability 
carry the decisions they desire - including the appointment of the board. -
Given appropriate circumstances, therefore, any shareholder 
whether or not he is a director, if "resolute" enough, and can gather a 
reasonable amount of votes can control the company. However, as Professor 
Florence notes, "The proportion of votes directors hold is of less 
importance since, once they are directors, they exercise control more by2/the very fact that they are directors and less by ownership of votes". -
The fact that control is in the large company separate from 
ownership must not obscure the primary concern in Company Law that the 
diverse shareholders who provide the funds must be assisted to the means 
of safeguarding their investments. The means for shareholders' control 
will therefore be examined.
1/ See P.S.Florence, Ownership. Control and Success. 46. 
2/ Ibid.. 92.
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3. The Means for Shareholders' Control
While, so far, control has been considered solely in terns of 
the ability to influence the policies of the company through the 
appointment of directors, this is not an exhaustive definition. Indeed,
Berle and Means, whose definitions we have adopted, themselves observed 
that control may be exercised "not through the selection of directors, but 
through dictation to the management, as where a bank determines the 
policy of a corporation seriously indebted to it". As Berle later
points out in New Directions in the New World "No accurate definition of
9
control has ever been made (and) it is impossible to describe the process". -
The issue of shareholder^ control has never been that they
should become involved in active day-to-day management of the company and
if that was the case it would defeat the objective of appointing directors.
Thus, apart from the appointment of directors, shareholders control
is often for the most part, passive, which in the words of R.A.Gordon,
consists of "the ability to take effective action if at any time it thinks
3/its interests are adversely affected". - A chief concern for the 
members, therefore, is to ensure that the goals and policies pursued by 
the board and the company's management do not constitute a threat to or
1/ At 66.
2/ (1940) 82.
3/ At 157.
conflict with the Interests of the company. Berle and Means first
drew a contrast between the Interests of shareholders - the maximisation
of profits and freely marketable shares, and the interests of corporate
management - and wondered that If the prime motivating factors In the
control of companies Is personal gain then there might be a temptation
for the directors to use their position to maximise th e ir own interests.
While this tendency cannot be demonstrated scientifically, — ^ and while
many directors are themselves shareholders "it does not", as Nichols
observes, "necessarily follow that they will regard themselves as share-
/
holders rather than managers or administrators". —  This, therefore, 
reinforces the need for shareholders to oversee the activities of 
directors.
(i) The Techniques and Resources for Control:
Although it had been observed in Chapter 1 that the overriding 
intention behind most of the Companies Acts has been the protection of 
shareholders and creditors this must not be understood to mean that the 
provisions of these Acts have been of no relevence whatsoever, for share­
holders' control. Indeed, some of those provisions as briefly mentioned 
above and as will be further illustrated below, form part of the techniques 
and resources for control available to shareholders, and to this extent 
rules for the protection of shareholders and rules for control by share­
holders cannot be put into completely water-tight compartments. The 
relationship between both is best illustrated by the disclosure provisions 
in the Companies Acts.
1/ See Robin Marris, The Economic Theory of Managerial Capitalism (1964) 
and Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Discretionary Behaviour : 
Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm (1964).
2/ At 79
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AC Comnon Law there was no positive duty for disclosure — but
It was Inevitable, In view of the complexity of the business of the
joint Stock company that the keeping of proper books of accounts and
reports should be considered a aine qua non to good and efficient
2/management. Indeed, Eldon L.C. had stated In White v Lincoln —  long 
before it was considered a subject for legislation In the 1844 Act 
that any person standing in the relation of a "general agent", and
"manager" "Is bound to keep regular accounts of his transactions on
3/behalf of his employers". —  Thus it has often been held that directors
as agents of a company are under duty to keep accounts of their receipts
4/and payment dealings and transactions on the c ompany's behaxf. —  When 
the 1844 Act came to be passed its originators "aware of the difficulties 
and dangers of corporate enterprise, were convinced that the best pro­
tection for the public was the fullest possible publicity, extending to 
the auditing of balance sheets, while the best protection for creditors 
was the maintenance of the principle of the full liability of shareholders" — 
The ideas of disclosure and publicity have, therefore, been recognised as 
vital to enable shareholders to find out when their interest are being 
adversely affected or to prevent this occurring in the first place.
Successive companies legislations since 1844 (with a few exceptions — ) 
have "relied upon and extended the original legislative idea as an essential
1/ See 0. Akanki, "The Legal and Practical Significance of Disclosure 
and Publicity of Company Information", (1976) Vol. 13 Nigerian Bar 
Journal, 13.
2/ (1803) 8 Ves. 363; 32 E.R. 395.
3/ 32 E.R. 395, 397.
4/ See A.B. Levy, 728.
5/ Ibid. 71-72.6/ See supra pages 29 and 45.
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weapon for effective control and efficient management of companies whose 
membership became more and more fluid and widely dispersed". —
The requirements of the Companies Acts, it was pointed out in 
Chapter 1, obliges the company and directors to lay before the annual 
general meeting copies of the annual accounts, which consist of the balance 
sheet and profit and loss account and group accounts in the case of a
holding company, and the directors' report, and to maintain an accounting
2/record. —  Every member is entitled to Inspect the auditors report on
the above matters, which must be made to the general meeting. Also usually
presented to the members these days is the increasingly more Informative 
3/Chairman's report —  which, however, is not usually covered by the auditors'
report. Also every year the annual return must be filed with the Registrar
4/and is to be open to inspection by members on payment of a fee. —
Apart from those matters required by law to be contained in the 
accounts companies may by their articles specify additional matters for 
disclosure and where Table A is adopted for example, such matter as the 
amount of dividends to be declared must be disclosed to the general meeting. —
1/ Akanki p. 14.
2/ See p p . 59-64 supra.
_3/ See Cmnd 1749. para. 115.
4/ See Sections 124-126 1948 Act. 
5/ See article 52 Table A.
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4/ See Sections 124-126 1948 Act. 5/ See article 52 Table A.
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The Importance of disclosure becomes very apparent when it Is 
realised that decisions and votes on such matters as the shareholders' 
approval of the dividends recommended by the directors would usually be 
determined by what is disclosed to them in the accounts and reports. In 
addition:
"availability of financial information assists shareholders 
in determining whether they should sell their holding, 
accept take-over bid or amalgamation as a protection against 
abuse or inefficient management. It is for this purpose 
that copies of financial statements of the company have to 
be forwarded to members including debenture holders twenty- 
one days in advance of the general meeting" ...
"Indeed disclosure in accordance with the requirements of the 
law...may have the effect of preventing blanket ratification 
of acts and business proposals of bad management by share­
holders who have thus become well informed" 1/
It is generally accepted by many writers that disclosure and
publicity is a means of forewarning shareholders of possible dang« and
that "forewarned Is forearmed". Although this principle is sound in logic
its relevence to investors has, for a number of constraints been less
than adequate, unless it is supported by more effective weapons such as a
2/
Department of Trade investigation. —  The problem of difficulty of 
communication in accounts and reports have been mentioned in Chapter one. 
The other problem which is more "structural" ih nature will be examined in
1/ Akanki, p. 14. Mo doubt, disclosure in accounts serves also as 
a protection to directors by, for example, affording them 
information about the company's financial position so that they 
may avoid such irregularities as the payment of dividends out of 
capital and helping them to plan ahead. Other beneficiaries from 
disclosures include creditors, employees and liquidators. See 
Pennington p. 616.
2/ See Gower 4th ed. p. 497.
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later chapters and in the meantime, we will continue with our discussion 
of techniques for shareholders' control.
(ii) The Right to Dismiss Directors:
Until 1947, many company directors held office for life 
and could not be removed while some could only be removed by special 
resolution. The 1947 Act, and later, Section 184(1) of the 1948 
Act empowered the general meeting to dismiss directors by ordinary 
resolution. The only limitation to this power now is that if it is 
exercised in breach of an existing agreement between the company and 
the director, the company will be liable to pay damages for wrongful 
dismissal. — ^
1/ Southern Foundries v. Shirlaw [1940] A.C. 701.
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The power of dismissal under Section 184(1) has until the
past decade been regarded as absolute but the two cases of Bushell v.Faith,
2/and Re.Westbourne Galleries L t d . have revealed two ways in which the 
application of the section can be defeated:
(a) The Loaded Vote:
In Bushell v. Faith, the House of Lords was faced with the 
question of deciding the validity of a provision in a company's article 
(Art.9) which had been inserted with the express purpose of circumventing 
Section 184(1). The company had an issued ahare capital of £300 divided 
equally between the plaintiff, the defendant and B, her sister into 
100 shares each. By Article 9 in respect of any resolution for the 
removal of a director from office any shares held by that director 
would carry the right to three votes per share. At a meeting of the 
company, a resolution for the removal of the defendant from the board 
was voted in favour by the plaintiff and her sister and against by the 
defendant with the result that there were 200 votes for and 300 against 
the resolution. The House of Lords found that Article 9 was valid and 
enforceable, despite Section' 184(1). It was perfectly legitimate, 
they said, for members to incorporate by contract in the Articles such 
a provision to defeat the effects of Section 184(1).
1/
2/
¿1970/ A.C.1099.
/1971/ 1 W.L.R.1378 (C.A.). /1973J A.C.360
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(b) The "Just and Equitable" Doctrine:
In Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries Ltd. the plaintiff and N carried 
on business in partnership. Subsequently, a company was formed which 
acquired the business of the partnership. The other shareholders were N 
and his son G who were also directors. A dispute arose between the appellant 
and the other two and the company passed an ordinary resolution under 
Section 184(1) for the removal of the appellant as director. The appellant 
petitioned the Court for, in te r  a l ia , a winding-up order on the "just 
and equitable ground" under Section 222(f). Plowman J, at first instance, 
granted a wind-up order, stating:
"while no doubt the petitioner was lawfully 
removed, in the sense that he ceased in law 
to be a director, it does not follow that in 
removing him the respondents did not do him a 
wrong. In my judgment, they did do him a wrong, 
in the sense that it was an abuse of power and a 
breach of good faith which partners owe to each 
other to exclude one of them from all participation 
in the business upon which they have embarked on 
the basis that all should participate in its management.
The justification put forward for removing him was that 
he was perpetually complaining, but the faults were not 
all on one side and, in my judgment, this is not sufficient 
justification. For these reasons, in my judgment, the 
petitioner, therefore, has made out a case for a winding- 
up order".
1/ ¿1971/ 1. W.L.R.1378,1389
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Plowman J. was reversed by the Court of Appeal but the House of Lords 
restored his decision.
The ways in which the full rigours of Section 184(1) can be
evaded by the circumstances illustrated by those two cases have come under
criticism from many sources, for they "contravene the spirit, if not the
1/  2/letter of Section 184", - although, one comnentator - has justified 
them as a check to possible abuse by shareholders of their power of 
dismissal. At any rate, it is to be noted that those two cases involved 
private companies and the circumstances surrounding them are those 
peculiar to ''mail, private, quasi-partnership types of companies. They should 
not, therefore, hinder the important use which shareholders in large 
companies can make of Section 184. In particular, a clause similar to
that in Bushell v. Faith is prohibited under the Listing Agreements
3/of the Stock Exchange rules. - A public company which had such a clause 
would not, therefore, be listed.
1/ See the Editorial Note. "House of Lords Sanctions Evasion of Companies 
Acts” J.B.L.l; D.D.Prentice "Removal of Directors from
Office", (1969), M.L.R.693; Gower 4th edition, 149.
2/ Bernard J. Cartoon, "The Removal of Company Directors" (1980) J.B.L.17, 
23. See also A.B. Afterman, Company Directors and Controllers.(1970).20
3/ See Admission to Listing. Schedule VII, Part A. D.4
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(iii) The Right of Access to Books and Records.
Beside the control exercised through the appointment and 
dismissal of directors, Company L a w  further enhances the power of 
shareholders through other subtle means, as dismissal, which Is the 
ultimate punishment, is rather too drastic and cannot be employed on 
a continuing basis. The most important of these other means of control 
is shareholders' right of access to the company's books and records as 
well as interim and annual reports.
By an extension of the partnership analogy at Common Law a
shareholder had the right to inspect the corporate books and records for
legitimate purposes but a company could not be compelled to open its
books and records to a shareholder on mere suspicion that the c ompany
were being mismanaged. In other words, the low would not allow him to
go on a "fishing expedition" in the hope of discovering suspected acts
of mismanagement or fraud. — However, while the above is still law
2/in some U.S. jurisdictions, —  in the U.K. the CommonL.aw rights of
shareholders to inspect corporate books and records is now, as A.B. Levy
3/ 4/puts it, "practically extinct". —  Thus in Butt v Kelson —  Rcmer J., 
held that beneficiaries (who were entitled to be treated as though they 
were registered shareholders and having the same rights as shareholders 
in relation to directors) were not entitled to compel the directors to 
produce certain documents of the company which they wished to inspect.
JL/ See Lattln on Corporations. 344 (1971 edition)
2/ Except to the extent to which such right is curtailed. See 
Lattin, ibid; 345-352 and Gower, 505.
3/ A.B. Levy, p. 778.
4/ []952] Ch. 197.
IC is important to draw a distinction between shareholders' 
right to inspect the register and index of members and minutes of the 
general meeting on the one hand and their right to inspect minutes of 
directors' meetings and accounting records on the other hand for their 
rights in either case differ .
In accordance with Common Law Section 113 of the 1948 Act gives 
members the right to inspect the register and index of names which must 
be made available without charge for inspection for at least two hours 
each day except where the register remains closed to inspection under 
the provisions of the Act. Section 146 provides for the inspection of 
minute books which are required to be kept in accordance with the 
provisions of Section 145. The books containing the minutes of proceedings 
of the general meeting of a company, must, during business hours be open 
to the inspection of members without charge.
This is made subject to such reasonable restrictions as the 
company may impose by its articles or in general meeting, but at least 
two hours each day must be allowed for inspection. Any member is entitled 
to be furnished within seven days after he has made a request in that 
regard to the company with the necessary minutes at a charge not exceeding 
sixpence for every hundred words. — ^
1/ Section 146(2). This charge needs to be reviewed if it is to remain 
in the books at all, for it is no longer a fair assessment of the 
true costs involved.
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The above provision reinforces the decision in R. v. The 
Mariquita. —  ^ In that case a company registered under the 1856 Act had 
the following clause In its articles of association:
"the books wherein the proceedings of the company are 
recorded shall be kept at the principal offices of the 
company, and shall be open to the inspection of the 
shareholders every day of the year..." "(except on 
Sundays and holidays)”.
The deed provided that separate books should be kept of the minutes of 
the proceedings at the general meetings of the shareholders, and of the 
minutes of the proceedings of the directors. On an application for an 
order of mandamus to compel the company to grant to a shareholder 
"inspection of the books of the minutes of the proceedings of the said 
company", it was held that the clause gave shareholders only power to
inspect the books of minutes of the general meetings, and not the books
2/of the minutes of the proceedings of the directors. —
Although every company is required under Section 147, 1948 Act
to keep proper books of accounts members of a company have no statutory
3/or common law right to inspect the company's accounting records —  just as 
they have no right to inspect minutes of directors' meetings.
1/ R. v. The Mariquita and New GranadaMlnlng Co. (1858), I.E. & E. 289; 
120 E.R. 917.
2/ See S. 146, 1948 Act.
3/ Baldwin v Lawrence (1842) 2 Sim & St. 18; 57 E.R. 251
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It is clear, however, that If under the articles of association
a shareholder has a right to inspect the books that right is absolute
and the company is not entitled to refuse his request. And, of course,
the right to inspect is generally construed to Include the right to take
copies. —  ^ Thus it has been held in Mutter v. Eastern and Midlands Railway
2/Co., —  that even if a person has taken his shares or stock in a company 
for the purpose of serving the interests of a rival company or other selfish 
or malicious motive this does not disentitle him to the assistance of the 
court in enforcing the statutory rights of inspection and perusa-l of the 
company's register.
3/Also in Holland v. Dickson —  it was held that the statutory 
right given to holders of stock and debentures to inspect the registers 
of a company is not confined to an Inspection of the names and addresses 
only of the stock and debenture holders. It may be exercised without 
assigning any reason for requiring inspection, and can be enforced by an 
injunction restraining interference by the company with the stockholder 
in the exercise at all reasonable times of his statutory right, and it is 
not necessary for him to apply to the court for an order to compel the 
directors to allow inspection.
1/ Kelson v Anglo-American Land, etc. Agency p.8971 1 Ch. 13 
2/ (1888) 38 Ch. D. 92.
3/ (1888) 37 ChJfcS69.
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In view of the wideness of the power to inspect where conferred 
on members it is not surprising that although an additional power to 
inspect accounting records may be authorised by the company's directors 
the very delicate and confidential nature of such documents means that 
such a power is, in fact, rarely ever conferred.
Article 125 of Table A empowers a member to Inspect his 
aompany's books and accounts but on condition only that the board of 
directors or a general meeting so authorises. That article provides:
"The directors shall from time to time determine whether 
and to what extent and at what times and places and under 
what conditions or regulations the accounts and books of 
the company or any of them shall be open to the inspection 
of members not being directors, and no member (not being 
a director) shall have any right of inspecting any account 
or book or document of the company except as conferred by 
Statute or authorised by the directors or by the company 
in general meeting".
Although reference in that article to "book or document" might
1/
suggest a reference to registers and so on —  to which members ordinarily 
have a statutory right of access, it is submitted that the article only 
entitles the directors to refuse members access to books and further 
documents relating to accounts to which the members might wish to gain 
some access. The statutory rights of access conferred by the Act such as 
in Sections 113 and 146, 1948 Act, and Section 26, 1967 Act cannot be 
fettered or overidden by articles or by contract.
1/ That is, register of members; debenture holders; mortgages and 
charges; directors and secretaries and registers of director's 
Interests as well as annual returns.
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The power of directors under article 125 to refuse or restrict 
access to a company's accounts and books Is subject to the qualification 
that the court will order production of the documents If they are necessary 
for the purposes of litigation. Thus in Cartland v Houston and The British. 
etc. Navigation Co. Ltd.. —  ^ the company's articles of association 
provided, in te r  a lia
"The managers shall from time to time determine whether, 
and to what extent, and at what time and place, and under 
what conditions or regulations the accounts and books of 
the company or any of them shall be open to the inspection 
of the members, and no member shall have any right of 
inspecting any account or '.ook or document of the company, 
except as conferred by statute or authorised by the 
managers".
The plaintiffs, who were shareholders in the company alleged that the 
managers had taken from the Company's funds certain commission to which 
they were not entitled and had received commission from the company's 
customers on behalf of the company without accounting for them. The managers 
had complete control of the company and never allowed the members access to 
any information other than those communicated to them. In the course of 
an action by the plaintiff an application was made against the managers 
and the company for an order to produce certain documents in their possession 
or power respectively, and for liberty to inspect the same. For the 
defendants, it was argued that the effect of the company's articles was 
that the plantlffs had on becoming shareholders, contracted to deprive
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themselves of the right to require production and inspection of the 
documents. Rejecting this contention Eve, J., held that the order sought 
for could be made. To accept the defendant's contention would be to allow 
such an article to become "an engine of dishonesty". — ^
Also in R. v. The Master and Wardens of the Merchant Tailors2/
Company. Lord Tenterden C.J. held that an application by a shareholder 
to inspect a company's documents would be granted if it is shown that such 
inspection is necessary with reference to some specific matter which is 
the subject of litigation and the inspection will then only be granted to 
such extent as is necessary for that particular purpose. It will not be 
granted on mere suspicion or in order to discover information which will 
afford him ground for complaint.
The rationale for restricting members' access to some corporate
information, and so denying full publicity, it is generally agreed, is
3
based on expediency and business convenience.—  The right to inspect is 
sometimes resisted on the ground of suspicion of malicious intention on 
the part of the shareholder. It is also resisted on the ground that
1/ p. 111. In re Credit Company (1879) 11 Ch. D. 256 and Courand v . 
—  Edison Gower Bell Telephone Co. Ltd. (1888) 59 L.T. 813, followed.
2/ (1831) 2 B. & Ad. 115; 109 E.R. 1086.
3/ See A.B. Levy, op. cit; 778 and 0. Akanki, op. cit., 26.
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divulging certain types of business Information would be harmful to the 
company or Its shareholders creditors', employees', etc, interest. In 
the event, however, a member who has a genuine reason for seeking 
Information or who is simply inquisitive must surmount the up-hill task 
of proving in court that he is actuated by honest and rightful motives 
and he must be able to afford the time and expenses for such litigation.
The realities of business life today is that this is not a very likely 
prospect and in practice shareholders are able to rely for information 
on accounts only in disclosures in the directors' reports and the now 
increasingly more informative Chairman's report in the c-ompany's manual 
accounts and reports.
Directors must not only supply the requisite information to 
shareholders, but are under a fiduciary obligation to ensure that 
information given to the shareholders is factually correct. In the 
Ontario Court of Appeal case of Goldex Mines Ltd, v. Revill, — ’ 
an important and central feature in the judgement was that the dissemination 
of "misleading information" by the directors to the members violated the
1/ (1975) 54 D.L.R. (3rd) 672
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personal as well as the company's rights. As the Court stated:
"If the directors of a company choose, or 
are compelled by statute, to send information 
to shareholders, those shareholders have a right 
to expect that the information sent to them is 
fairly presented, reasonably accurate, and not 
misleading".
Thus, it was held, that a misleading annual report or information sent 
by the directors to the shareholders provided the basis for a personal 
action by a shareholder.
The reason for the above position is that a shareholder is
entitled to adequate information from which he can form an intelligent
21judgment on the matters he is entitled to vote on. - The decision 
is therefore an important guarantee that shareholders are reasonably 
able to control with a higher level of knowledge about the true state 
of facts.
The restrictions on members' rights of access to the company's 
books are to a degree conpensated for by the powers of inspection and 
investigation into the affairs of a company under Sections 164-167 of 
the 1948 Act, and Part III of the 1967 Act. However, proceedings 
under those sections are so expensive and dilatory that they do not 
provide an effective means of control to shareholders who are being
1/ At 679.
2/ See also Garvie v. Axmith /1962J 31 D.L.R. (2d) 65 at 82-7 and Re. 
Rational Grocers Co.Ltd.¿19387 3 D.L.R.106,116,followed in Goldex.
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deliberately denied access to vital corporate information. Moreover, 
like the right of dismissal access to information through inspection 
by a Department of Trade Inspector cannot be relied upon on a continuing 
basis, for this would seriously inpede the smooth operation of the 
company. In any case and for all practical purposes inspection 
and investigation by the Department of Trade is more important as a means 
of protecting shareholders from directors' fraud than as a means for 
shareholders' control.
Lastly, the difficulty of getting through information to 
shareholders is made less of a hindrance to shareholders' control by the 
requirement of their approval of many categories of important policies 
and decisions. This requirement obliges the board to present these 
matters to the general meeting, but it stands to reason that the ability 
of shareholders to decide on such matters would depend on their reliance 
on adequate mechanisms for evaluation and information. How far the 
mechanisms provided by company £nr help in the process of shareholders' 
control will be examined in later chapters. Also shareholders can insist 
that directors manage in atrict compliance with the provisions of the 
Company's constitution, which they can alter or modify as they wish by 
special resolution. The mechanism for achieving this through the general 
meeting will be the subject of a later chapter.
1/ That is, were they willing to intervene to provide information 
to shareholders as often as needed. It is now well-known that 
they are not so inclined. See Atiyah, "Thoughts on Company Law 
Philosophy" (1965) 8. pie Lawyer.20-21; John Hull, "Department 
of Trade Investigations", (1979) N.L.J.825. The Chairman of 
Prudential Assurance remarked in the 1980 Annual Report that 
the investigatory powers of the Department of Trade are less 
useful to enforcing shareholders rights than the right of direct 
action, provided the procedural difficulties are minimised. This 
was in the aftermath of their successful legal action ggainst 
the directors of Newman Industries. Further reference will be 
made to this case.
A. Shareholder» as Controllers
When the Jenkins Committee reported in 1962, it observed 
that the constraints which the Cohen Committee held responsible for the 
low level of shareholders' control in 19A7 were basically the same as 
those existing in 1962, but it was confident enough to say that Cohen's 
description of shareholders' control as 'illusory' had become something 
of an 'over-statement'. It took the view that:
"The A 9 A V  Act provides shareholders with powerful 
weapons providedthey choose to use them, and even 
if practical considerations make them difficult for 
the small investor to wield, the same cannot be 
said of the institutional investor who is not likely 
to submit to any major abuse of power by the directors 
of any company whose members include investors of that 
description. Moreover, where quoted companies are 
concerned the Stock Exchange requirements and the 
sanctions for them in the shape of refusal or suspension^ 
of quotations provide some protection".
With the benefit of hindsight it is now clear that the well- 
meant views of the Jenkins Comnittee in 1962 were rather over-optimistic, 
for while the scale of institutional shareholders, indeed, continued to 
rise even, perhaps, faster than the Conmittee may have anticipated it
is still a moot point whether or not institional investors are active
. 2/controllers in companies in which they invest. -
1/ Cmnd 17A9 para.106.
2/ The extent of Institutional shareholders' participation is to be 
examined later.
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Concerning the issue of protection by the Stock Exchange 
requirements mentioned by the Committee, it is to be observed 
that the position of shareholders in listed companies is being increasingly 
strengthened largely through constant revisions and extensions of the 
regulations now codified in the "Yellow Book". The most important of 
these obligations in the listing agreement relate to the full and prompt 
disclosure of information and to a company's cnnduct towards its 
shareholders in relation to such matters as further issues of equity, 
the share register and the general and board meetings. The Wilson 
Committee, considered the Stock Exchange listing agreement an 
important form of non-statutory regulation of the conduct of listed 
companies, noting:
"In certain important respects the listing 
requirements go some way beyond those imposed 
by the Conqtanies Acts. It is for exanple, the 
listing agreement rather than the Companies Acts 
which requires half-yearly and interim reports 
and the prompt publication of details of any j/ 
major acquisition or disposal".
The Committee found very few cases of breach of the regulations,
adding that in practice the threat of suspension, and the consequent
notoriety have usually proved sufficient to ensure compliance in all 
3/important respects. - Although the Stock Exchange regulations have, 
in general, proved an effective safeguard for shareholders the fact must not be 
overlooked that some of the requirements and the expenses for complying
1/ Cmnd 7937. Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial
Institutions (Report) under the Chairmanship of Sir Harold Wilson 
(H,M.S.O.). <1980). Paras.1129-1142.
2/ Para.1140.
3/ Para.1142.
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with Chem have caused greater problems for shareholders who attempt 
to exercise their powers of control.
Be that as it may, it is sufficient to say briefly
here that the 1962 hopes of the Jenkins Conmittee for more effective 
shareholders control have remained to a large extent, unfulfilled. It 
must be conceded, though, that institutionalshareholders' participation 
has increased to very considerable extent in recent years, so much so that any 
new and serious proposals for more effective shareholder control has, 
essentially, to revolve around them. To this end the growth of investment 
institutions and their systems of participation are examined at various 
points in this thesis and the section which follows inmediately considers 
their position in Che general profile of shareholders in the leading companies 
in the U.K.
5. Profile of Shareholders:
(i) Introduction:
In 1963, Professor Jack Revell, Cambridge University, commenced 
his pioneering survey of the pattern of ownership of quoted equities in 
the United Kingdom. Ever since that study, there has developed an
increasing interest in similar surveys by companies, academics and 
government departments to ascertain, amongst others, the distribution
1/ A very important illustration of such difficulties is the experience 
of the Burmah Shareholders Action Group when they tried to circularise 
their views amongst the company's shareholders. See Chapter 5.
2/ Published in 1966 for the Department of Applied Economics at the 
University of Casi>ridge as, Jack Revell and John Moyle, The Owners 
of Quoted Shares - A Survey for 1963.
1/  2/ of shareholdings between private - and institutional shareholders. -
These studies are important because the votes attached to these
securities (that is excluding voteless shares) give the owners legal
power to influence management in the conduct of the business and so
it is wise to know in advance who these owners are. This is of immense
significance to, among others, management in companies in times of
crisis or a take-over when the support or opposition of a solid block
3/of shares with voting rights can be crucial. - One episode which 
illustrates this is the 1972 battle by Grand Metropolitan Hotel to 
take-over Watney Mann (W.M.) which was resolved by the decisive 
swing of the solid vote of institutional investors in favour of Grand 
Met even though the numerically superior individual shareholders of W.M. 
preferred the company to remain independent.
Again the iamense importance of support by holders of large 
blocks of shares was recently demonstrated in the battle between 
Raccaland G.E.C. to take-over Decca - the ailing electronic company.
Despite several months of hard negotiations it was not until Raccal 
could count on 50.4Z of the voting shares in Decca that the bid was 
finally condaded and G.E.C. conceded defeat. In the end Raccal 
attributed its success to its power of persuasion over the U.K. 
institutions who lent their support - notably Prudential Assurance
1/ Private, refers to individual shareholders.
2/ The most importmant of these include insurance companies, pension funds, 
unit trusts and investment trust companies.
3/ See R.A.Vernon, M.Middleton and D.G.Harper, Who Owns the Blue (hips,
A Study of Shareholding in a Leading Company. (Gower Press.1973^.at pp.2-3. 
Hereafter, Vernon, Middleton & Harper.
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and Kuwait Investment Trust with a combined holding of 17|Z 
and other institutions collectively holding another 13Z.
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Of greater importance than the effect of private or 
institutional support in such take-over or other crisis situations 
is the degree of legal control which shareholders in general and 
these respective categories in particular exercise over corporate 
management.
(ii) The Pattern of Distribution
2/The latest survey, - into the Ownership is quoted shares in the 
U.K. like the previous surveys indicates that while there has been a steady 
fall in the proportion of total market value of shares held by the personal
sector since the first survey in 1963 there has been a steady rise in the
3/proportion held by financial companies and institutions. - The proportion 
for the private shareholders were 56Z in 1963, 50Z in 1969 and 40Z in 1975. 
For institutional shareholders the figures are 30Z in 1963, 36Z in 1969 and 
48Z in 1975. - 1
1/ These are discussed in the Chapter on Shareholders Participation.
2/ M.J.Erritt, J.C.D.Alexander and A.J.Watson, The Ownership of Company
Shares; A Survey for 1975, prepared by the Central Statistical Office, 
Department of Industry (H.M.S.O.) 1979. This survey also contains 
sussnaries of the broad trends in the distribution of beneficial 
vwnership since the earlier Cambridge surveys of 1963 and 1969.See 
particularly paras. 1.7. - 1.9.
3/ See Table 1. Infra.
4/ See also R. Dobbins and T.W.McRae, institutional Shareholders and 
Corporate Management, University of Bradford Management Centre 1975. 
Ricnard Briston and Richard Dobbins, The Growth and Impact of 
Institutional Investors. A report to the Research Conmittee of the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (1978) (Hence­
forth Briston and Dobbins).Although the figures cited by these reports 
have slight differences because of different methods of computations 
used by the authors,they nevertheless all indicate sisiilar trends 
in the distribution patterns. .It is not necessary to set out all these 
figures here.
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Apart from such general surveys of share-ownership patterns 
in hundreds of companies there has also been, in recent years, more 
detailed privately commissioned surveys into some individual companies 
notable amongst which are The Fisons Shareholder Survey -^and
2/Who Owns the Blue Chips? - A Study of Shareholding in a Leading Company.- 
These two surveys show a distribution pattern similar to that found by the 
earlier Cambridge study for all quoted equities, that is to say, falling 
private shareholdings and increasing institutional holdings. The most 
recent of these studies is the fourth Fisons Survey - Profile for 1979-
3/Profile for 1979 - once again indicates the gradual but 
steady drop in the percentage of total shares held by individual shareholders 
in Fisons Ltd. On the front cover of this report is a photograph of a 
gravestone which bears the inscription "The British Shareholder is not 
dead, Just Forgotten". This macabre-message was the company's reaction 
to the demise of private shareholders which had become increasingly 
evident in their surveys conducted first in 1969 and subsequently in 1972, 
1973 and 1978. In 1969 the private shareholders held 5SZ of the total 
shares. The next consecutive surveys showed a fall to 492 in 1972, 44Z
1/ Fisons Ltd. is a leading agro-che mical company in the U.K. with 
extensive international operations. The first of their surveys 
was undertaken in 1969.
2/ Vernon, Middleton and Harper (1973).
3/ At p.14.
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TABLE I
Distribution of Market Values of Shareholdings between Sectors 
of Beneficial Holder: 31 December 1963, 1969 and 1975
Percentage
*
Sector of beneficial 
Shareholder 163 1969 1975
Personal Sector 56.1 49.5 39.8
Financial companies & 
institutions 30.4 35.9 48.1
Industrial and commercial 
companies 5.1 5.4 3.0
Public sector 1.5 2.6 3.6
Overseas sector 7.0 6.6 5.6
Total: 100.0 100.0 100.0
* Classified by the category definitions issued in the 1963 and 
1969 surveys.
Source: Department of Industry Survey (197^ Table 1.1).
TABLE II
Number of Private Figong Stockholders*
1969 30,874
1978 25,319
* U.K. registered excluding American Depository Receipts. 
Source: Fisons' Profile.
CHART I Fisons Registered Ownership by Individuals
(Source: Fisons' Profile)
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TABLE III
Fisons Stock Register: Average Holdings (nominal)
1969 1978 Z increase
Individuals £420 £459 9X
Institutions £4,282 £8,967 109 Z
Source: Fisons' Profile.
TABLE IV
Distribution of Shareholdings between Categories of Beneficial 
Shareholder: Comparison between Surveys for 1963,1969 and 1975.
Category of beneficial Percentage
shareholder:
1963 1969 1975
Persons 54.0 47.4 8:1Insurance companies 10.0 12.2
Pension Funds 6.4 9.0 16.8
Unit Trusts 1.3 2.9 4.1
Investment trusts and 
financial companies
other...
w  10.0 8.7 10.0
Source: Department of Industry Survey (1979). Table 3.2.
(Note: Figures for smaller categories of beneficial shareholders- 
charities, stockbrokers and jobbers, Banks, Industrial and Commercial 
companies, the public sector and overseas sector, have been omitted.)
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in 1975, and 33Z in 1973.-' This means that over the previous
10 years, the nusher of private U.K. registered shareholders in the
company had fallen by 20Z. By contrast, it was found that institutional
investors had increased the proportion of their holding by nearly
50Z, that is, a nominal value of about £4,300 in 1969 to nearly £9,000
2 /in 1978. - The head of the company's planning group, Dr.H.Redwood
estimated that on the current trends private shareholders will own no 
more than 10Z of Fisons shares in eight years time.
Although there were peculiar circumstances which almost 
certainly influenced the trends in the ownership patterns in Fisons 
shares it is obvious that the overall picture is representative of the 
trends in large public companies in the U.K. This, in fact, is 
acknowledged by the Wilson Consnittee's Report.
A break-down of the holdings by the major institutions 
shows that for the years 1963, 1969 and 1975, insurance conpanies' 
ownership was 10Z, 12.2Z and 15.9Zj pension funds, 6.4Z,9.0Z and 
16.8Z; unit trusts 1.3Z, 2.9Z and 4.1Z. Investment Trusts, and other financial 
companies held for those years, 10Z, 8.7Z and 10Z. Apart from this 
latter group, therefore, the trend for institutional holdings was on the
1 *
1/ See Table II and Chart 1 ; (Source: Fisons Profile for 1979). 
2/ See Table III.
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increase. For pension funds, however, the figures were 54Z in 1963,
47.4X in 1969 and 37.5% in 1975.
The reason for this trend is that while institutional
investors have been net buyers of equities, private investors have
2/been net sellers. - This has strengthened the power of institutions 
vio -a -vis the other shareholders in the power structure of the company. 
Private shareholders have become increasingly insignificant.
The growth in the size of institutions can be attributed 
to the shift in investors' preference to institutions rather than direct 
personal investment in a company - the reason being to minimise risks.
For example, when the first investment trust company, the Foreign 
and Colonial Investment Trust Co.Ltd. was set up in 1868 it stated 
its objectives as being "to provide the investor of moderate means 
the same advantage as the large capitalist in diminishing risk in
foreign and colonial stocks by spreading the investment over a number 
3/of stocks. - This spreading of risks had continued to be a major 
advantage in investing in the securities in an investment institution
1/ See Table IV.
2/ See e.g. Richard Briston and Richard Dobbins, pp.9-14. See also
Dr.K.Midgley, Companies and their Shareholders - The Uneasy Relationship
(1975), p.53.
3/ See A.A.Aradud Investment Trusts Explained. Woodhead Faulkner
(Cambridge 1977) ,p. 13; See also on the origin and development of
the Unit Trust, Martin Day and Paul Harris, Unit Trusts (1974),Chapter,!.
rather than a direct investment by individual shareholders in the 
portfolio concern.
Other advantages of investing in institutions include 
the benefits deriving from professional management at low cost and 
taxation and having someone else look after the complicated business 
of investment overseeing, gearing, and the ability to buy into a 
portfolio of shares at less than its value and so be "able to sleep 
reasonably soundly in the knowledge that a part at least of one's assets 
is being looked after in a responsible way". Besides, indirect
investment in equities via institutions relieves the private investor
2/
of the difficulty inherent in ownership and control relationship. -
The practical limitation in using institutions as a secure
foxm of investment is that institutions managers do not have any
personal attachment to their investment in any one portfolio company
and their behaviours in specific instances are liable to be motivated
by considerations different from those which motivate a private
shareholder. These factors have potential influences in institutional
3/shareholders' participation in corporate administration. -
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1/ Baum and Stiles, The Silent Partners (Syracuse University Press,
N.T.1965),at 155.
2/ See the Wilson Conmittee, Progress Report pp.20 & 21.
3/ Dismissing the view that institutional shareholders can exert considerable 
pressure on boards, Dr.Midgley in "Corporate Governance and 
Accountability" (No.1.)”To Whom Should the Board be Accountable... 
and for What?" stresses (para.26) that investment managers are not 
direct investors, but intermediaries. Thus, they "may not have the 
same intensity of interest in the profitability of their investment 
as the fairly large private shareholder". It is obvious at any rate 
that since their position and earnings depend on how successful their 
investments are, they cannot but show the greatest concern for the 
efficient management of their portfolio.
The growth of institutions and their ownership of large quantities of 
ordinary shares have given them considerable voting strength to influence 
decision-making. Besides, the legal and structural framework, 
in which shareholders are required to function is such that mostly 
institutional investors, and very rarely the private shareholders, 
are able to exercise any real influence in the making of decisions or 
ensuring the efficiency and competence of management. The present 
Company Law has not yet recognised the legal and institutional constraints 
to which the private shareholder is especially subject and thus it is 
inadequate to the extent that it assumes that all categories of shareholders 
have the same rights and responsibilities in the company. The Wilson 
Conmittee entertained this critical view, pointing out that:
"Although on a strict interpretation, the obligations 
and responsibilities of institutional shareholders, 
like their rights, are no more and no less, share for 
share, than those of private shareholders, practical 
considerations demand a broader view".
1/ As discussed in Chapters 5 & 8.
2/ Conmittee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions
otherwise referred to as the Wilson Committee (H.M.S.O.) (Interim 
Report), Vol.3,p.90.para.l.
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The realities of shareholders' participation as recently 
illustrated by the case of Prudential Assurance Ltd, v. Newman 
Industries Ltd. is that investment institutions wield
substantially more power of control over corporate management than 
private shareholders do and possibly ever can. The extent to which 
shareholders, private and institutional,participate in corporate 
administration will be examined in a later chapter.
6. Conclusion:
For several centuries and until very recent years, U.K.
Compapy Law had adhered in a rather unquestioning manner to the principle
of shareholders1 control. Though, as we have pointed out, this
principle derives legal support from the notion of property rights,
its ethical and even moral justification is tenuous. It is
now popularly acknowledged that the modern large company serves a
number of interests and purposes which go beyond shareholders and their
profits. In one way or another the conduct and products of the company
affect the interests of employees many of whom must have devoted
the best parts of their lives to the service of the company, the
consumers of the company's products and services and, indeed, the generality
of the public. There have been demands, therefore, for the replacement
1/ (No.2) A980./ 2 Ch.D.841
or supplementing of shareholders' control with workers' control, 
consumer control and even public control through special government 
appointed directors or for that matter, outright nationalization.
It is beyond the scope of this work to delve into the merits
of these suggestions for an alternative form of control over companies,
through control over board's policies, but one notes with interest the
speech by Mr.Douglas Jay cited in Chapter 1 in which he promised
a "reform in the structure and philosophy” of Company Law. Although
he did not spell out what exactly he had in mind, it is obvious, in
view of the debates on industrial democracy which followed afterwards
and actively supported by the Labour Government, that any major reform
of the structure and philosophy of the present Company Law is bound
to affect the principle of shareholder control. Given the trends in the
harmonization of the U.K. company with the EEC Directives, it is to be
expected that it will not be long before shareholders alone cease to
control and that a new philosophy of workers' control will be introduced
2/in an yet uncertain form of workers' participation. -
Having examined the nature of the framework for corporate 
governance and the philosophy of shareholder control which is central to 
it, it is now appropriate to examine the relationship between those two 
important organs of the company, the board of directors and the shareholders 
in general meeting, for the way a company's business is conducted very 
much depends on the nature of this relationship/.
1/ But see George Goyder, The Future of Private Enterprise (1961). 
one of the earliest and best considered proposals for a new 
philosophy of Company Law which involves workers' control.
2/ For an attempt to propose "an up-to-date philosophy of ethics and 
social aspirations" in corporate governance, see Niel Martin-Kaye,
"The Theoretical Basis of Modern Company Law" (1976), J.B.L.235,241,
See also Goyder.ibid.
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CHAPTER 3
THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND THE 
COMPANY IN GENERAL MEETING
1. Introduction
The present relationship between the company's principal
organs, the board of directors and the shareholders in general
meeting,is a culmination of historical developments. At
Common Law there was no legal requirement for a company to have a
2/board of directors. - Even though boards of directors were already
familiar features in companies the Companies Act of 1862 was held
3/in Re. Bulawayo Market and Offices Ltd,, - not to contain any 
legal requirement for a board of directors. In that case the company 
registered under the 1862 Act passed a special resolution altering 
some of its articles of association. One of the new articles provided 
that until contrary provisions were made by the company in general 
meeting there were to be no directors in the company and the control 
and management of its business were vested in another company as 
a "manager". In a petition to have this action declared invalid, 
Harrington J. dismissed the plaintiff's argument stating:
1/ The process of development has been considered in Chapter 1.
2/ The "requirement" for a board at Common Law is considered by
Robert A. Kessler in "The Statutory Requirement of a Board of 
Directors: A Corporate Anachronism". (1958-60), 27 U.Chi.L.R. 
696 at p.704.
3/ [ 1907J 2 Ch.D.458.
......
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"There is not a word in those provisions (of the 
1862 Act) which in any way indicates that the 
Legislature at any time thought it was essential 
that there should ever be directors of a company 
at all, much less that the company should not be 
managed by a single director who might or might , . 
not be ... a registered company". -
The expansion in the scope of operation of large public 
companies and practical necessity made it imperative for companies to have 
directors or persons of whatever designation performing the functions 
of directors. This became obligatory with the passing of the Companies 
Act 1929. Section 139 of that Act required every public company 
registered after that year to have at least two directors. It was reasoned 
that the nature of directors' responsibilities and obligations in the 
business companies were such that any large company could not do without them. 
The 1929 Act made no requirements for private companies to appoint a 
director, but as the Cohen Committee reported in 1946:
"In view of the responsibilities and obligations 
placed upon directors under the Act, it is an 
anomaly that private companies need not be required 
to appoint any directors".
Following the recommendations of that Committee requiring at least one
director for private companies, all companies in this country, big or
4/ 5/small are now obliged by law - to have a board of directors. -
1/ At p.463.
2/ This same reason was given by the Cohen Committee in 1946 for 
~ requiring private companies to have a board of directors. See paras. 
55 and 174.
3/ Para.55.
4/ Section 176. This section provides that every company registered on 
or after the first of Novenfcer 1929 must have at least two directors. 
A company registered before that date and every private company shall 
have at least one.
5/ The present structure and size of boards is considered in a later 
chapter.
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Although board« of directors are now common features in 
companies the assumed inevitability for their existence has not 
gone unchallenged. The difference in the roles of directors and 
shareholders in companies is founded upon a division of powers between 
the board of directors and the shareholders in general meeting. On 
occasions when disputes arise owing to this division questions are 
raised whether the business of corporate governance would not be made 
much easier by vesting all or virtually all the powers in one organ or 
the other. Their respective authorities as decision-making organs 
and the dispensability or superiority of one over the other come into 
question - and by far the most common argument in this regard is that 
the general meeting is a pointless nuisance and a hindrance to the 
freedom of management to manage.
In defence of the necessity for a board of directors, the
view is held by some writers that the whole idea of incorporation
is based upon the understanding that a certain corporate form for the
conduct of business shall be adopted in return for the creation of a
2/legal entity recognised by the State. - In this accepted corporate 
form, shareholders are merely investors with certain defined contractual
rights in the company's constitutional instruments, while the board's
3/powers with respect to management are also clearly defined. - In
1/ See for instance Bayless Manning's review in (1958) 67 Yale L.J.
1477 where he urges a "de-emphasis of the role of shareholder 
voting", but not necessarily the scrapping of the entire shareholder 
voting machinery. The importance of shareholder participation will 
be discussed later.
2/ This is based on the "Concession Theory" of incorporation. See 
Lattin on Corporations, (1971) ed.174.
3/ See Oakbank Oil Co. v. Crum (1882) 8 App. Cas.65.
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Oakbank Oil Co. v. Crum. Che Courc emphasised the need for compliance 
with form 8tating that the powers of the board and the general meeting 
are "entirely created by the law and by the contract founded upon the 
law which allows such companies to be constituted".
2/Opponents of the above theory - contend on the other hand 
that the mandatory requirements in the Companies Act for a board of 
directors is an over-zealous response to the obvious practical advantage 
of having one. At Common Law, as has been mentioned above, shareholders 
were not compelled to have a board of directors and even where a company 
had one there was nothing to prevent the shareholders from vesting 
in the general meeting power to do those things which are commonly 
vested in a board of directors, leaving the board without any powers.
And so it is thought that the "assumption" by the law of the superior 
wisdom of the board and the need for it to have exclusive powers in 
certain matters is unjustifiable. Following from this argument Professor 
Kessler, for example, challenges the belief in some quarters that:
"the board of directors £Ls7 an ordained 
corporate priesthood not only as a necessity 
for any business which intends to assume the 
corporate form but as a body of corporate 
guardians whose pre requisites are ultimately -< 
"inviolable". '
1/ Per Lord Selborne L.C. at p.71. 
2/ E.g. Robert Kessler, op.cit. 
j/ Ibid at 701.
1/In his opinion the board of directors is a "corporate anachronism" 
which could be voted out and replaced by shareholders, transferring 
the powers to themselves or "managing agents". - He argues that the 
powers of directors come by delegation from the shareholders, and since 
directors exercise their authority as agents of shareholders it follows 
that their powers can be limited by the shareholders to the extent 
that they choose and the directors may be removed for failure to 
carry out the wishes of the shareholders. This argument is, indeed,
3/buttressed by the case of Alexander Ward v. Samyang Navigation Company. - 
where it has been held that the absence of a validly appointed board
of directors does not prevent a company performing certain management
. . , 4/matters such as taking proceedings to recover its debts. -
Although the dispensability of the board is a tenable argument 
in the case of small companies, it is clearly unreasonable to suggest 
that the modern large public companies with very extensive and 
complicated businesses can do without boards and should transfer all 
the companies' powers to shareholders. There can be very little doubt 
that boards of directors are so vital to the governance of the large 
public company that had they not existed before they would have had to be 
created anyway.
1/ Ibid at 713.
2/ Ibid. The writer, however, recognises the great difficulties which 
this would involve as illustrated by the case of Automatic Self- 
Cleanninn Filter Syndicate v. Cunninghame, and others. The power of 
the general meeting to override the boardis discussed in detail 
later.
3/ 0975/ 1 W.L.R.673.
4/ Per Lord Kilbrandon. See also p.683.
Proponents of increased shareholders' involvement in 
corporate governance, amongst whom are opponents of the board, 
are generally inspired by the quite justified concern for greater 
shareholder control over directors sometimes referred to as 
"corporateidemoracy" or "shareholders democracy". However, the 
need for shareholders' control cannot be advanced too far in the name 
of corporate democracy, to the point of interfering with the general 
management of the company's business - for this would ultimately be 
against the best interests of the shareholders themselves. The purpose 
of shareholders democracy is and should be to ensure that shareholders' 
rights to be well informed and to be represented with a reasonable 
opportunity to vote intelligently on matters that come within their 
proper concern. It is not to be taken too literally lest it 
inspiresmeasures which might ignore the practical demands of managing 
large complex businesses. Management brings to most corporate problems 
far more knowledge, training and experience than that possessed by 
the vast body of shareholders. Moreover, it is undesirable that the 
mass of shareholders should themselves take over the operation of the 
company because there are other sections of the community - creditors, 
customers, suppliers, the employees and the rest of the public who slight 
be prejudiced thereby and who would want to see the efficient operation 
of the business in the most competent hands of management and certainly 
not in the hands of shareholders. As Rdy Garrett comments:
"A publicly— held corporation is a means of 
conducting a large and usually complex business 
enterprise. Shareholders, creditors, employees, 
customers, suppliers and the general public 
generally are all concerned that such enterprises
138.
1/ "Attitudes on Coroporate Democracy * A Critical Analysis", (1956). 
Nw. U.L.R.310.
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be managed efficiently. While ahareholdera are 
unquestionably entitled to the means of protecting 
their interests, the phrase "corporate democracy" 
must not be taken literally to the point of upsetting 
the fundamental separation of powers between the 
shareholders and directors. The successful management .. 
of large corporations rests largely upon this separation. -
Likewise, a proper understanding of the relationship between the two 
organs can only be achieved through an analytical survey of the division 
of powers between the board and the general meeting.
2. The Sature of Directors' Powers
Before embarking on a discussion of the allocation of powers 
between the company's principal organs, it will be useful, first, to 
examine the legal position of the directors.
The exact nature of directors' powers depends upon the purpose 
for which the powers are exercised and the manner in which this power 
affects other persons. In an endeavour to understand the nature of their 
powers, directors have often been likened to other entities such as 
trustees, agents or servants and are deemed to exercise like powers 
to those entities none of which is exactly the same as the office of a 
director, although they each bear some close resemblance to it. As
2 /Lord Russell of Killowen remarked in Regal (Hastings) Ltd, v. Gulliver: -
1/ At 311. The Wilson Committee made a similar remark with respect
to institutional shareholders' participation. (Para.923 of the final 
report). Further reference will be made to this later.
2/ A96Z7 2 A.C.134.
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"Directors of a limited company are the creatures 
of statute and occupy a position peculiar to themselves. 
In some respects they resemble trustees, in others they 
do not. In some respects they resemble agents, in others 
they do not. In some respects they resemble managing 
partners, in others they do not".
The legal position of directors will now be examined against 
their similarities or dissimilarities with those entities.
(i) Directors as Trustees:
The office of director is often likened to that of trustee. 
Though an inadequate analogy, this description of very ancient origin has 
stuck ever since it was first applied, having been subsequently developed 
since the passing of the first Companies Act in the middle of the last 
century. The earliest forms of companies were formed by deeds of 
settlement and were managed by trustees. The deeds entrusted the running 
of the companies to the trustees and their agents and the shareholders 
remained passive while their interests were being strictly safeguarded. 
Thus as early as 1742, the directors of a Chartered Corporation who had
misapplied its funds and were in breach of its by-laws were held liable
2/as trustees for breach of trust in Charitable Corporation v. Sutton. -
Even with the passing of the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844, 
and the emergence of the modern structure in 1862, the common conception
3/of directors as trustees remained unchanged. In 1866 J.W.Smith - 
describing the features of the joint stock company wrote:
1/ At 147. He also cites Re.Forest of Dean Coal Mining Co.(1879) 10 Ch. 
D. 450 per George Jessel N.R. at 452.
2/ (1742) 2 Atk.400, 26 E.R.642
3/ Mercantile Law (1866) 3rd edition.
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"As Che management of the company Is confided by 
the deed of settlement to the directors and their 
agents, and the bulk of the shareholders must 
necessarily continue passive, the courts of equity 
are very strict in enforcing the due exeeution o f  . .  the tru s t reposed in those functionaries". -
2/In (1878), Sir George Jessel M.R. stated in Re.Forest of Dean Co.. - 
that "directors are called trustees. They are no doubt trustees of
3/assets which have come into their hands, or which are under their control..." -
Despite the popularity of this analogy, directors are not trustees in any
4/legal sense and its application must be restricted. - This point 
was emphasised by Lindley L.J. in Re. Lam’s Allotment Co. where he 
stated:
"Although directors are not properly speaking trustees, 
yet they have always been considered and treated as 
trustees for money which comes to their hands or 
which is actually under their control; and ... are 
held liable to make good money which they have mis- 6 ,
applied upon the same footing as if they were trustees". -
1/ At pp.131-132. Emphasis mine.
2/ (1879) 10 Ch. D. 450.
3/ At 453.
4/ See Re.City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. ¿19257. Ch.407, per Romes J 406 
Dr.L.S.Sealey, "The Director as Trustee11 (1967) C.L.J.83.
5/ (1894) 1 Ch.616.6/ At 631
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According Co Professor Seeley, when it is ssid that a director is
in a fiduciary relationship toward the company it "means no more than
that in some respects his position is trustee-like; it does not warrant
the inference that any particularly fiduciary principle or remedy 
2/can be applied". -
How rigorously this conception of trusteeship affects the 
directors' exercise of their powers depends on the circumstances of each 
case but sometimes the application of agency principles tends to complicate
the character of directors - a duality expressed by Lord Selborne in
3/Great Eastern Ry■ v. Turner. - His Lordship in that case described
directors as "mere trustees or agents of the company - trustees of the
company's money and property - agents in the transactions which they enter
4/into on behalf of the company". -
The position therefore is that a director is for some purposes 
a trustee and for others an agent. But as agents they stand in a 
fiduciary relationship with their principal, the company, with the same 
obligations of good faith expected of trustees of settlements.
The trustee analogy breaks down anyway, when one considers 
the directors' duty of skill and care. Directors are subject to a more
1/ "Fiduciary Relationships", (1962). C.L.J.69.
2/ At 73. See also Gower, 4th ed. 571-572.
3/ (1872).L.R.8 Ch.149.
4/ At 152. See also Percival v. Wright ¿19027 2 Ch. 421 where cases 
discussed above were referred to7
5 / Northern Counties S ecu rities v . Jackson 6 Steepla L td .¿19747 1 W.L.“ rttht:----------------  -----------------------
§ / See Gower, o p .c i t .
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flexible and generally lower standard of skill and care than trustees.
As businessmen they are expected to take greater risks than trustees 
as many of the business matters they deal with may be speculative in 
nature. A trustee is expected to be cautious and to avoid risks.
Legal title to a company's property is in general vested in the company, 
and not the directors. Legal title to property under a settlement 
is usually vested in the trustees. These distinctions are only a 
matter of detail, and it is true to say that:
"However much the company's purposes and the 
directors' duties, powers and functions may 
differ from the purposes of a strict settlement 
and the duties, power and functions of its 
trustees, the directors and such trustees have 
this undisputably in common - that the property 
in their hands or under their control must be 
applied for the specified purposes of the company ^ . 
or the settlement." -
The duty of directors to apply their powers for "proper purpose" 
and not to misapply or misappropriate the company's assets are but a few 
examples of the general fiduciary duties of directors which require 
in te r  a lia that directors should not enter into a contract which involves 
a conflict between their own interests and those of the company, the duty 
not to make a secret profit, or enter into competition with or abuse the 
confidence reposed in them by the company. While, it is beyond the scope
1/ Per Ungoed-Thomas J., in Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd, v.
Craddock ¿19687. 1 W.L.R.1555 at 1575. Also according to Professor 
Beck, "The Saga of Peso Silver Mines”, ¿19717 59, Canadian Bar Rev. 
80 at 91, "the fact that there are differences in functions does 
not warrant a less strict application of fiduciary principles to 
directors".
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of this thesis to go into details of these duties, it is, nevertheless,
to be made clear that directors ere deemed to be trustees because they
owe fiduciary duties to the company by reason of the fact that confidence
is reposed in them to manage property for others. They do not owe
fiduciary duties because they are trustees for they are not, etrio to
2/8 ensu, trustees. -
(ii) Directors as Employees:
Whether a director is an employee or not depends generally on 
whether he is a full time ("executive" or "inside") director or a part 
time ("non-executive" or "outside") director. A director cannot be 
deemed to be an employee merely from the fact that he performs the duties 
of a director such as attending board meetings but if he works full time
and forms part of the company's labour force, then he may be deemed an
3/employee. In Boulting v. A.C.T.A.T. - it was held that the two managing 
directors of the company could be regarded for some purposes as employees 
of their company, notwithstanding their managerial positions and it did 
not involve any conflict of loyalties merely because as a managing director 
they are also members of an employee's union.
1/ For details on the nature of director's fiduciary duties see the
two articles by Sealey cited supra. Beck, "The Quickening of Fiduciary 
Obligations", Canadian Aero Services v. O'Malley (1975) 53 Can.B.R.771 
D.D.Prentice "Directors Fiduciary Duties - The Corporate Opportunity 
Doctrine" (1972) 50 Can.B.R.623; Harold Marsh Jr. "Are Directors Trustees?" 
Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality (1966) 22 Business Lawyer 35. 
Gower 4th ed.p.571 and Core-Browna on Companies, chapter 27.
2/ See Regal (Hastings)Ltd, v. Gulliver A.9U2J 1 All E.R.378 at 395. See 
generally. Gore Browne 43rd edition 27-9.
3/ Boulting v. Association of Cinematograph. Television and Allied 
Technicians ¿1961/ 2 0.B.606 at 634° See also Re.Lee Behrens A Co.
IT W T c O e . ------------------------
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The question of the employee status of directors often 
depends on the particular context in which it arises and this, in 
general, is more in the area of Labour Law than Company Law.
(iii) Directors as Agents:
2/Lord Russell of Killowen in the speech quoted above - 
described directors as resembling agents in addition to trustees. Indeed, 
in respect of contracts entered into on behalf of their companies directors 
are in the eyesofthe law agents for their companies, and the law of agency 
regulates the relationship between the directors and the company. The
application of agency principles was establised by Cairns L.J. in Ferguson
3/v. Wilson ,- where he stated that:
"¿Directors,/ are merely agents of a company. The 
company itself cannot act in its own person, for 
it has no person, it can only act through directors 
and the case is, as regards those directors, merely 
the ordinary case of principal and agent. Wherever 
an agent is liable these directors would be liable; 
where the liability would attach to those principals, 
and the principal only, the liability is the liability 
of the company".
Even where directors contract in their own names, the other 
party to the contract can sue the company on discovering that it is the 
real principal. The principle of undisclosed principal applies as well 
as other agency rules of apparent or ostensible authority. The only 
qualification to the application of agency rules relates to pre-incorporation
1/ See Gore-Browne, op.cit. and Boulting v. A.C.T.A.T. Ibid. 
2/ In Regal (Hastings) Ltd v. Gulliver p .147.
3/ (1866) L.R.2 Ch.77.
4/ At p.89.
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contracts. There are two conflicting authorities here. In Kelner v.
Baxter ,-^ a director bought goods as principal and not merely as 
agent of a non-existing company. It was held that the director was
2/personally liable. But in Newbome v. Sensolid (Great Britain) Ltd. - 
a director signed a contract by writing his name underneath the name 
of the pre-incorporated business. In this case the company was held liable.
Though apparently conflicting authorities those two cases indicate 
that the criterion is not whether or not a director signed his name in a 
pre-incorporated contract, but whether the parties intended that the
director should be personally liable on the contract. If that was the
3/intention then he can be sued upon the contract. -
The position of directors is sometimes regarded as being "more 
of managing partners of a firm than one of principal and agent...", 
and,"not like that of managing partners appointed to fill that post by a 
mutual arrangement between all the shareholders". According to this view 
the powers of directors are not exercised in a principal/agent manner 
but only as is contained in the memorandum or articles of association 
of the company of which all persons dealing with the company are deemed 
to have notice. One director cannot as agent bind another or others 
unless authorised to do so, as in the case of managing directors. Directors
1/ (1866) L.R.2 C.P.174.
2/ A9547 1 Q.B.45.
3/ See Palmer's Company Law . 21st edition (1968) at p.524. See also
the recent case of Rolfe Lubell and Co. v. Keith and Greenwood A9797 
2 Lloyds Rep.75 where a director was held personally liable on bills of 
exchange accepted by Grafton Manquest Ltd. and endorsed "For and on 
behalf of Grafton Manquest Ltdi AB Director, CD Secretary".4/ Per Cozens-Hardy L.J. in Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate v. 
Cunninghamo. /1906/ 2 Ch.34, 45.
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can only bind when acting collectively as a board or an authority 
delegated by the board. As a rule, authority derives from the board 
as an organ of the company. Power is not vested in persons but in the 
company's organs.
3. The Division of Corporate Powers Between the Board of Directors 
and the Shareholders in General Meeting:
(i) Introduction;
A much admired feature of Company Law is its very flexible 
nature, in that it gives promoters considerable freedom and discretion 
in allocating the company's powers between the board of directors and the 
sareholders in general meeting. The division of corporate power between 
those two organs was established in the earliest companies by deei-ds of 
settlements. These sometimes provided that directors would have management 
powers (that is,power over day-to-day matters) to the exclusion of the 
ordinary shareholders but the usual form was that which gave the assembly 
of the proprietors acting as the general meeting full power to superintend, 
regulate and control all the affairs of the company. The effect of
this was to make the directors general powers of management subject to the
2/
ultimate control of the majority of shareholders acting in general meeting. -
1/ See examples of governing regulations cited in Chapter 1.
2/ See e.g. Charitable Corporation v. Sutton, 26 E.R.642, where Lord
Hardwicke L.C. stated that directors are "most properly agents 
to those who employ them in this trust, and who empower them to 
direct and superintend the affairs of the corporation". At p.644. 
Until the end of the 19th century it was generally accepted that 
the general meeting was the company whereas the directors were 
merely the agents of the company subject to the control of the company 
in general meeting. This view is well illustrated by the decision 
in IslesfWight Railway Co. v. Tahourdin; (1883) 25 Ch. D.320.
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After the early Companies Act it was thought that as agents directors 
of registered companies vere amenable to the control of the proprietors 
as principal who represented the general will of the corporate entity.
But it is now clear that directors are not strictly speaking agents, 
trustees or servants but occupy a position unique in itself and dependent 
on the provision of the company's constitution and, in particular, 
the distribution of powers amongst the company's organs.
(ii) The System of Allocation
The Companies Acts afford little guidance on the division of 
corporate power within the company, perhaps in tacit recognition of the 
great advantage in the freedom to allocate powers and responsibilities 
by articles according to the company's wishes and circumstances,
Thus, the distribution of powers and responsibilitiesare normally to be 
found in the constitutional instruments of individual companies. This,
for example, is expressly stated in Section 137(2) of the Ghana Companies
2/Code - which provides:
"Subject to the provisions of this code, the 
respective powers of the members in general 
meeting and the board of directors shall be .. 
determined by the Company's Regulations".
The intention is that a company should be free to allocate powers as it 
wishes and to amend them, from time to time. Certain powers which would 
normally be exercised by the board can thereby be removed from them
1/ An obvious legacy of the 18th century practice. See Du Bois,291.
2/ Act 179.(1962).
3/ In this Code the word "Regulation" clearly means the companies' 
articles and not resolutions and so avoids the difficulties which 
have sometimes been encountered in the interpretation of Article 80. 
See infra, p.181
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by appropriate alteration of the articles and vested in the general 
meeting or vice versa. But short of full compliance with the necessary 
procedure, "there is no universal rule that shareholders in general 
meeting may by ordinary resolution bind or represent the company with 
respect to anything and everything".
Under the 1948 Act certain inalienable powers are conferred 
on the general meeting.These are powers for the:
(a) alteration of the company's objects (S.5)
(b) alteration of the company's articles (S.10)
(c) increase or reduction of capital ($.61 and 66).
(d) removal of a director before the expiration of 
his term (S.184).
(e) voluntary winding-up (S.278).
(f) appointment of auditors (S.159 (1).
Most of the powers of the general meeting are quite comprehensible
2/and rarely involve any controversy. -
The Act also provides for certain powers to be exercised by
the board of directors, for example, the appointment of the company's
3/auditors before the first annual general meeting - and power to fill a 
casual vacancy in the office of auditor.
1/ Per Jordan C.J. in Clifton v. Mount Morgan Ltd. (1940) 40 S.R. 
(N.S.H.) 31 at 34.
2/ Other powers may be found in Sections 18, 131, 148,156-158.
3/ S.159 (5).
4/ S.159 (6). In comparison with the general meeting the Act appears 
to be more concerned with the imposition of liabilities on directors 
and restricting their activities than on their positive powers.
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Outside these functions for which the Act has vested express 
powers on the general meeting or the board, the two organs are entitled 
to arrange for the distribution of the remaining power between themselves. 
The articles may even confer authority on someone other than the directors 
or the general meeting.
A company's proprietors as ultimate repository of the company's
powers can allocate to the board as much or as little power as they wish.
2/
Re. Denham - is a good example of an unusual distribution of powers which 
may result from this absence of any requirement of formalities. In that 
case the articles of association of a company vested in the directors, 
the vendor to the company and its chairman," the "supreme control" of its 
management and business, also,power "to the exclusion of the general 
meetings and the boards'^ to determine the amount of dividend,and, generally, 
power to exercise any of the authorities thereby conferred on the general
1/ For example powers of management may be delegated to a service or
management company or any other company as in Re. Bulawayo Market and 
Offices Ltd, op.cit. or to a managing agent. See Lattin on Corporations 
p.254. Article 2 d of the EEC Second Directive provides that the 
memoranda and articles of a public company with a share capital must 
give information concerning, inter alia, the allocation of powers among 
bodies responsible for the administration, management, supervision, or 
control of the company. Although some aspects of the Second Directive 
were introduced in the 1980 Act this article was left out. It is 
also to be noted that the Bullock Committee also favoured a statutory 
restatement of the allocation of powers between directors and the 
general meeting. See infra. p.j.77 where their proposals are discussed 
further.
2/ (1884) 25 Ch. D. 752.
meetings and boards of directors, and in doing so to"supersede the 
authority of general meetings and boards". The articles then "subject 
and without prejudice to the authorities thereby given to Denham, 
vested the general conduct and management of the business of the 
company in the board of directors and required them to keep and 
render proper accounts and balance sheets. That style of allocation 
was described by Chitty J. as being "remarkable".
2/Again in Miles v. Sydney Meat - Preserving Co.Ltd. - 
the deed of settlement of a company were so drafted as to confer on 
the members "full powers to regulate and control all the affairs, 
management, capital, profits, dividends and concerns of the company",
with the result that "they have throughout endorsed the action of the
3/directors by adopting their reports and balance-sheets". -
To the small family company the division of powers between 
the board and the shareholders in general meeting is of little practical 
significance because the shareholders,at least the major ones,are often 
the same as the directors. To them the freedom to allocate powers by 
specially framed articles is not much use and instead the articles as 
set out in Table A are adopted. As for the large public conpany one 
would have expected that the distinct division between ownership and
management would be great motivation for preparing carefully framed
«*
articles which allocate powers between the two in such a way as to 
reflect the reality of their circumstances. But quite often this is not
1/ At 764.
2/ (1912) 16 C.L.R.50 aff'd & 9 1 $  17 C.L.R.639 (P.C.).The facts of the 
case are not necessary.
3/ Per Barton J. in (L912) 16 C.L.R. 50 at 67.
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the case and the freedom of distributing the corporate powers 
given to the incorporators exists for the most part in theory only, 
the tendency of modern practice being to adopt articles along similar 
lines to those contained in Table A. Some of the notable powers 
allocated in Table A to shareholders include:
(a) Power to determine the remuneration of directors (Art.76)
(b) Power to fix the director's share qualification, if any, 
(Art. 77).
(c) Power to increase or reduce the number of directors 
(Art.54).
(d) Power to declare dividends, not exceeding the amount 
recommended by the board. (Art.114).
The powers commonly allocated to the board include:
(a) Power to make calls (Arts.15-21)
(b) Power to forfeit shares (Arts.33-39).
(c) Power to declare interim dividends (Art.115).
2/(d) Power to pay gratuities (Art.117). -
Of greater importance than any specific power vested in
3/the board of directors is the rather omnibus Article 80 of Table A, - 
which confers a general power of management in the board. This article 
provides:
1/fimJenkins Report para.108.
2/ There are other board powers, e.g. in relation to lima, 
shares transfer, borrowing powers etc.
3/ This form of articles first appeared as Section 90 of the
Companies Clauses Consolidation Act 1845. See pJL55 infra for 
the full text of that section.
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"The business of the company shall be managed 
by the directors who may pay all expenses incurred 
in promoting and registering the company and may 
exercise all such powers of the company as are 
not, by the Act or by these regulations required to 
be exercised by the company in general meeting, 
subject, nevertheless to any of these regulations, 
to the provisions of the Act and to such regulations 
being not inconsistent with the aforesaid regulations 
or provisions, as may be prescribed by the company 
in general meeting".
Although only a model, Article 80 is adopted in haeo verba or in 
substantially the same words by very many companies. That this 
is the practice is a strong indication that companies have found it 
a useful and convenient way to allocate powers for the conduct of 
their businesses. The uniformity in the regulations amongst companies 
also has much to commend in it in so far as it results in the potential 
or real benefit of shared experiences.
The usefulness of Article 80, it has been said, lies in the 
fact that where it is adopted "the directors can do anything which 
the coup any can do". It has also been stated that a general
delegation of powers to directors as under Article 80 gives the directors
"power to do everything that the company could do except where the
2 /
authority of a general meeting is expressly prescribed". “
1/ Per Jessel M.R. in Re. Anglo-Danubian Steam Navigation v. Colliery 
Co. (1875) L.R.20 Eq. 339 at 341. See the following footnote.
2/ Per Lord Thankerton in Campbell v, Rofe $.9337 A.C.91 (P.C.). at 
99. There is some controversy whether statements such as these can 
be regarded as accurate expressions of the effect of this article, 
the precise scope of which is examined below.
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As a prime source of the power for the general management 
of a company many commentators and writers have expressed the 
view that the essence of Article 80 is to vest exclusive management 
power on the board of directors. Since it is directors and not the 
members who are responsible for the conduct of the business on its day- 
to-day basis the board alone should exercise power over such matters. 
Shareholders in general meeting are entitled to alter the articles to 
give themselves power over specific matters or remove the directors, 
but it is argued, they cannot give direction to the directors on how
to manage the business. As Samuel J.A. observed in Winth'rop Investments
21Ltd, v. Winns Ltd; -
"The shareholders may have ultimate control, 
because they can alter the articles or remove 
the directors; but they cannot interfere in 
the conduct of the conçany's business where 
management, as here, is vested in the board. 
The general meeting has power to intervene to 
resolve a deadlock other than the one produced 
by the application of power secured by the 
articles... which prevents the company's 
business from being carried on at all... but 
they have no general power to transact the 
company's business or to give effective 
direction about its management".
1/ E.g. K.A. Aickin, "Division of Powers Between Directors and 
General Meeting As a Matter of Law and as a Matter of Fact or 
Policy", (1967). Melb. U.L.R.448; B.V.‘Slutsky, "The Relation­
ship Between the Board of Directors and the Shareholders in 
General Meeting", (1968) Univ. of Br. Col. L.Rev. 81; and Cf.
G.D. Goldberg, "Article 80 of Table A of the Companies Act 
1948", (1970) 33 M.L.R., 177; and G.R. Sullivan, "The Relationship Between 
the Board of Directors and the General Meeting in Limited Companies"
(1977) 93 L.Q.R. 569. See also Gower 4th ed. 143, Pennington 4th 
523.
¿19757 2 N.S.W.L.R.666 
At 683.
2/
3/
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This view, of course, goes contrary to the much older and widespread
belief that as agents directors are bound to obey the directions of
the proprietors or a majority of them, -^or that the authority of
2 /the general meeting cannot be fettered. - The understanding of the 
true purport of Article 80 is necessary for any meaningful analysis 
of the effect of the rule in the conduct of companies' businesses.
(iii) General Management Power Under Article 80:
The first regulation which attempted a distribution of the
power of the company between the board and the general meeting was
3/Section 90 of the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act 1845.- That 
section provided:
"The directors shall have the management and 
superintendence of the affairs of the company 
and they may lawfully exercise all the powers of 
the con?any, except as to such matters as are 
directed by this or the Special Act to be transacted 
by a general meeting of the company; ... and the exercise o f  a l l  mush powers sha ll be subject to  the control and regulation o f  any general meeting specia lly  
convened fo r  the purpose.. . . "
The above provision represented the views current at that time that 
the general meeting had superior control over the board in the conduct 
of the business. In. one of the company law's earliest cases. Attorney 
General v. Da w  -/ (1741), the Lord Chancellor stated unequivocally:
1/ See Aicken, Ibid, at 449.
2/ See supra, pp.11.-13.
3/ But it may be noted that the distribution of power between boards 
and general meetings by the use of similar clauses was already being 
achieved as early as 1723, for example in the petition for Incorporation 
of the West Jersey Co. See Du Bois Footnote 80. See supra, p.
4/ Emphasis mins.
¿/ 2 Atk. 210,26 E.R.531.
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"It cannot be disputed, that whenever a certain 
number are incorporated, a major part of them 
may do any corporate act; so if all are sumnoned, 
and part appear, a major part of those that appear 
may do a corporate act, though nothing be mentioned . .  
in the charter of the major part". -
21Again Wigram V.C. in Foss v. Harbottle, - stated:
"The result of these clauses is that the directors 
are made the governing body, subject to the superior 
control of the proprietors assembled in general meetings, 
and, as I understand the Act, the proprietors so assembled 
have power, due notice being given of the purposes of the 
meeting, to originate proceedings for any purpose within 
the scope of the company's powers, as well as to control 
the directors in any acts which they may have originated.
There may possibly be some exceptions to this proposition ./
but such is the general effect of the provisions of the Statute". -
And as Berle and Means put it, 4/ management in the early large companies was
"thought of as a set of agents running a business for a set 
of owners; and while they could and did have wider powers 
than most agents, they were strictly accountable and 
were in a position to be governed in all matters of general jy 
policy by their owners".
This state of affairs changed with the passing of the 1862 Act.
In Table A of the Companies Act 1862 the relevant provision 
in the 1856 Act was reversed (though couched in substantially the same 
words as we have today under the 1948 Act, Table A) removing the board
1/ Ibid
2/ (1843) 2 Hare 461;67 E.R.189. This decision came years before the 
1844 and 1845 Acts which introduced incorporation but it was made 
clear in the deeds that the members were the company and so could 
exercise complete control over the directors and trustees. See 
Sealey (1967) C.L.J. 83, 89-90; Slutsky (1968) U.B. C.L.R.81.
3/ At 492-3.
4/ The feodern Corporation and Private Property (Revised Edition), (1968).
5/ At pp.125-126.
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from its subordinate position. This, however, is not to say that 
the power relationship between the board and the general meeting is 2/thereby made clearer. As Lord Clauson points out in Scott v. Scott —
"It must be borne in mind that the professional view 
as to the control of the company in general meeting 
over the actions of the directors has, over a period 
of years, undoubtedly varied, as may be observed 
by a critical investigation of the statements about 
the law on the matter to be found in the earlier 
editions of well-known textbooks".
Early textbooks which portray this divergence of views include Buckley's 
4/Company Law - in which the author expressed the view that the company 
in general meeting had power to direct and control the board. In 
contrast is the opinion of Lord Thring expressed in his Compendium on Joint 
Stock Companies,
"The ordinary members of a joint-stock company have 
no voice in its management, but elect directors or 
managers, to whom they commit the entire control 
of their affairs".
1/ Article 80 has its origin in Article 46 Table B of the 1856 Act 
which itself derived from Section 90 of the Companies Clauses 
Consolidation Act 1845. Art. 46 was repeated as Article 55 of the 
1862 Act which remained the principal Act until 1908, then through 
Art. 71 of 1908 Act, Article 67 of 1929 to Article 80, 1948. See 
Geoffrey Hornsey, "Some Aspects of the Law Relating to Company Control", 
(1950) 13 M.L.R.470 at 474-475.
2/ £19437 1 All E.R. 582.
3/ At 585.
4/ (1897) 7th ed. p.530.
5/ (1861).6/ Cited by Hornsey, op.cit. at 475.
These two points of view reflect the controversy which has continued 
to present times about the implications of a general delegation 
of power as under Article 80, but by far the more popular is the 
Lord Thring school of thought, although this is not necessarily a 
wholly correct interpretation.
The modern proponents of the popular view (of the exclusiveness) 
of the board's management powers rest their argument on the case of 
Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co.Ltd, v. Cunjlinghame. /1906./, 
which is regarded as establishing the "managerial autonomy" of 
directors. That case is regarded by Professor Gower as laying down 
the modern English rule on the issue, and as the learned author writes in 
his leading textbook:
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"Under an article in the terms of Table A (Article 80) 
the members in general meeting cannot give directions 
on how the company's affairs are to be managed, nor 
can they over-rule any decision come to by the directors 
in the conduct of its business. And this applies even as 
regards matters not specifically delegated to the directors 
provided they are not expressly reserved to a general meeting 
by the Act or the Articles". 21
1/ In Ghana Companies Draft Code, the Final Report of the Commission 
of Inquiry into the Working and Administration of the present 
Company Law in Ghana (1961), Ghana Publishing Corporation, Accra.
At p.107.
2/ The Principles of Modern Company Law (1969) 3rd edition, p.132. See fci 
4th edition at 146 where the wording and the author's interpretation 
seem slightly modified to the extent that he now recognises as Lord 
Kilbrandon points out in Alexander Ward Co. v, Samyang Navigation 
that the fact that a general delegation is made to the board of 
directors "does not mean that no act of management... can validly 
be performed without the personal or explicit authority of the 
directors themselves". See p.146 note 54.
159
While Cuninghame is undoubtedly sound authority, to regard 
it as laying down all there is about the rule is, as would be seen below, 
an over-simplification and is misleading. The facts of that case are as 
follows. Article 96 of the company's articles of association vested in 
the directors "the management of the business and the control of the 
company" in terms similar to Article 80 of Table A except that the 
power was made "subject to such resolutions as may be made by extra­
ordinary reso lu tion". -^Article 97(1) specifically empowered them to 
sell any property of the company on such terms and conditions as they 
might think fit. The company passed an ordinary resolution directing 
the board to sei.l the company's undertaking but the directors disapproved 
of the proposed terms on the grounds that it was not for the benefit 
of the company and declined to carry out the sale. The Court of Appeal 
upheld the directors' refusal and emphatically rejected the argument 
that directors as agents of the company must exercise their powers
subject to the rule that an agent must obey his principal - in this
2/case, the general meeting. - This was a rejection of the hitherto
prevailing view that the shareholders in general meeting constitute the
3 /company and that the directors are their agents or delegates. - 
The Court was of the view that the power to sell the company's property having 
been expressly vested in the directors by Article 97 the shareholders could 
not by an ordinary resolution usurp that power. Collin M.R. went further 
to remark in respect of shareholders' participation that if it is desired 
to alter the powers of the directors that must be done, not by an
1/ This was the crux of the case and differs from Article 80 which 
requires an ordinary resolution.
2/ See the argument of plaintiff's counsel at p.37 and his argument 
in the Court of Appeal, p.39.
3/ /1906/ 2 Ch.34. Per Cosens-Hardy L.J. at p.45.
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ordinary resolution but by an extraordinary resolution, required 
wider Article 96.
This case has also been regarded as deciding that a bare
majority cannot control the directors in their conduct of the affairs
of the company. But as Neville J. remarked in Marshall's Valve Gear Company
2/Ltd, v. Manning, Wardle and Co.Ltd., - the decision in Cuninghame 
turned on the terms of the articles which were that the directors 
should have the entire management of the affairs of the company
ft
subject to regulations, not being inconsistent with these presents
3/as may from time to time be made by extraordinary resolution".
The decision is therefore of limited relevance when the different 
wordings of Article 80 requiring an ordinary resolution are in question.
4/
In Marshall's Case,the relevant Article - vested the management 
of the company in the board in the same manner as under Article 80 
of Table A, that is, subject to resolutions as may be prescribed by 
the company in general meeting. Marshall was the majority shareholder 
and managing director of the plaintiff company which had been formed 
to exploit an invention which he had patented. The defendant conpany, 
in which the other three directors were interested, was alleged to be 
infringing the plaintiff's patent and Marshall, inspite of the opposition 
of his co-directors, as a majority shareholder, decided to bring this
1/ At p.52.
2/ ¿19097 1 Ch.267.
3/ At p.373. This was the crux of the matter.
4/ Article 55 in Schedule 1 to the Companies Act 1862 which provided:
''the business of the company shall be managed by the directors, who 
may... exercise all such powers of the company as are not by the 
foregoing Act, by these articles, required to be exercised by the 
company in general meeting...?
action in the company's name to restrain the alleged infringement. 
Thereupon the directors moved the Court to strike out the name of the 
company as plaintiff and dismiss the action on the grounds that the 
name of the plaintiff company had been used without authority.
Neville J. held that on the construction of the article, the majority 
of the shareholders had the right to control the action of the directors 
in this matter and so their motion was dismissed with costs. In his 
judgment his Lordship distinguished Cuninghame, stating that the present 
case involved no difficulty about the articles of association:
"because there is no unusual contract between the 
members of the company with regard to the powers 
of the directors... and I think that under 
(Article 55) the majority of the shareholders 
in the company at a general meeting have a right 
to control the action of directors, so long as 
they do not affect to control it in a direction 
contrary to any of the provisions of the articles which jy 
bind the company".
Those two cases indicate that the question whether or not the
general meeting can control the board of directors is too complex to be
2/resolved simply by a "Yes" or "No" answer. - The truth is that it all
3/depends on the circumstances, - and the construction of the company's
articles of association. As Greer L.J. said in John Shaw A Sons (Salford)
4/Ltd, v. Shaw: -
1/ At p.274.
2/ To explain the apparent contradiction in both cases Professor Pennington 
has suggested that both the board of directors and the general meeting 
retain parallel authority exercisable in appropriate circumstances, 
despite Article 80. See Pennington's Company Law (4th edition,1979),524.
3/ E.g. whether the matter is one which falls within the day-to-day 
management of the company or can be so defined.
4/ £9357 2 K.B.113.
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"A company is an entity distinct alike from its 
shareholders and its directors. Some of its powers, 
may according to its articles, be exercised by directors, 
certain other powers may be reserved for the shareholders 
in general meeting. If powers of management are vested 
in the directors, they and they alone can exercise the 
powers. The only way in which the general body of the shareholders 
can control the exercise of the powers vested by the articles 
in the directors is by altering their articles or if opportunity 
arises under the articles, by refusing to re-elect the directors 
of whose actions they disapprove". 1/
That statement sumnarises the rule but at the risk of saying the obvious 
the rule can, for purposes of clarity and simplicity, be broken down into 
four inter-related principles:
(1) Where the Act or a company's articles of association 
require certain matters to be done by and vests the power therefor in 
the general meeting that power cannot be usurped by the board of directors.
2/Thus in Isle of Wight Railway Company v. Tahourdin - 
a sufficient number of shareholders required the directors of the company 
to call a meeting for certain objects amongst which was to appoint a 
committee to inquire into the working and general management of the 
company and to perform certain specified matters in the management of 
the company. The directors refused to convene a meeting as required by 
the requisitionists, whereupon the latter issued a notice themselves 
calling a meeting. The directors brought an action in the name of 
the company to restrain the requisitionists from holding the meeting.
It was held in te r  a lia by Kay, J. that the part of the requisition which
1/ At p.134.
2/ (1884) 25 Ch. D.320
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went beyond the appointment of a committee was illegal, for it proposed 
to transfer the management powers of the directors to the comnittee, 
but otherwise the requisitionists were entitled to call the meeting. The 
shareholders had power to call a meeting under Clause 70 of the Companies 
Clauses Act 1845, then in force, and the Court was unwilling to be used 
to defeat the members' enjoyment of this power. The Court of Appeal in 
rejecting the board's application for an injunction stated:
"It is a very strong thing indeed to prevent 
shareholders from holding a meeting of the 
company, when such a meeting is the only way 
in which they can interfere, if the majority 
of them think that the course taken by the 
directors, in a matter in tra  v ires of the 
directors is not for the benefit of the company".
Marshall's Case , already referred to, is another example
where the Court was unwilling to act to defeat the exercise by shareholders
2/of powers expressly conferred on them by contract. -
3/Also in Foster v. Foster - the articles of association 
of the defendant company provided (inter a lia ) that every share would 
confer one vote both at general meetings of the company and at the 
meetings of the directors, and (by Article 89) that the business of the 
company should be managed by the directors. Article 93 provided that 
a director might contract with the company, but prohibited a director 
from voting in respect of any contract in which he was interested,1/ Per Cotton L.J. at 329. Note that under the 1845 Act which was then 
in force Article 90 conferred on the general meeting power to over­
rule the board.
2/ See also Neville J's remarks quoted in p.161 supra. By virtue of 
S.20(l) of the 1948 Act the memo.and articles of association are 
contracts binding on all members of the company which require them to 
observe all the provisions of the (memorandum an<tyarticles.
3/ £91*7 1 Ch.532. >
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and Atticle 99 empowered the directors from time to time to appoint 
one of their body to be managing director for such period and at such 
remuneration as they thought fit. The plaintiff who was appointed 
managing director at a remuneration was removed from office by a 
resolution at a board meeting moved by Mrs. F. and supported by the 
third director. By another resolution she was appointed the sole 
managing director at a substantial remuneration. The plaintiff opposed 
both resolutions and upon Mrs. F's appointment*demanded a poll. By 
means of her own votes there was a majority in favour of the resolution 
appointing her. In an action by the plaintiff challenging this, it was 
held in te r  a lia that the appointment by Mrs. F. of herself as sole 
managing director was prohibited by Article 93 and so was invalid, but as 
it was competent for the general meeting to waive this irregularity and 
to confirm the resolution appointing her, the irregularity was not of 
such a character as to give a dissenting minority (the plaintiff) any 
right to sue. The Court cited with approval the observation of Lord 
Davey in Burland v. Earle -^that:
"It is an elementary principle of the law relating 
to the joint stock companies that the court will 
not interfere with the internal management of 
companies acting within their powers and in fact 2/ 
has no jurisdiction to do so".
It follows from the above remark that if a matter does not
involve internal management the court will interfere. Thus in Clark v
3/Workman, - the defendant directors entered into an agreement to sell
1/ Zi90tf A.C.83. 
2/ At 93.
3/ 1920 I.R.107
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a controlling interest in the company to an outsider but the shareholders 
intervened to prevent the transaction. Rejecting the defendant's 
contention that this agreement was within their power over the company's 
internal management it was held that the transfer of a controlling 
interest in a company is not a matter of mere internal management.
Ross J. justified the shareholders' intervention in the following words:
"It was a matter involving complete transformation 
of the company - a fundamental alteration of policy 
from a policy of isolation to a policy of cooperation 
with a great syndicate in England, about which very 
little was known in this country. This operation 
could in no sense he held to be mere management".
The effect of these authorities therefore is that where the 
matter is one that can be properly undertaken by the majority in 
general meeting, for example, the making of fundamental change or 
policy, the board - and indeed the minority shareholders - cannot deny 
the majority the exercise of their power.
(2) Where general powers have been delegated to the board 
of directors as under Article 80 the effect is that the board is 
responsible for the day-to-day management of the company's business.
The shareholders cannot therefore usurp this power themselves or transfer 
it to an outside body. Thus in Tahourdin's Case the general meeting
was restrained from transferring the power over day-to-day management
2/from the board to a committee. - It could only do so if it first of
1/ At 117.
2/ One object of the resolution was "To appoint a Committee to inquire
into the working and general management 6f the company, and the means of 
reducing the working expenses, to empower such committee to consolidate 
offices, to remove any of the officers and appoint others and to 
authorise and require directors to carry out the recommendations of the 
Comnittee? (1884) 25 Ch. D. 320.
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all altered the articles or complied with the appropriate procedure. 
However, the view has been expressed that the numerical majority 
who can alter the articles can over-rule the directors without first 
altering the articles. In Gramophone & Typewriter Ltd, v. Stanley
Buckley, L.J. stated that shareholders could control the board "by
3/the statutory majority which can alter the articles", - which could be
construed to mean that a special resolution of the general meeting could
be sufficient for the general meeting to control the board without first 
4/altering the articles. - Diota in the same paragraph at any rate raised 
doubts whether his Lordship intended to convey this meaning. The point 
had been urged upon his Lordship that an English Company which owned all 
the shares in a German Company cojild control the latter in the sense that 
it must do all that the English Company directs. The court rejected this 
argument and relying on Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co.Ltd, 
v, Cuninghame stated that:
"even a resolution of a numerical majority at a 
general meeting of the company cannot impose 
its will upon the directors when the articles 
have confided to them the control of the company's 
affairs...." "Directors are not, I think, bound to 
comply with the directions even of all the corporators , , 
acting as individuals".
1/ See e.g. Buckley, L.J. in Gramophone & Typewriter Ltd. v. Stanley 
/1908/ 2 K.B. 89.
3/ At p.106.
4/ See e.g. Slutsky (1968) U.B.C.L.R. 81,88. But see Slesser L.J. in 
Shaw v. Shaw at p.143 where he stated that an alteration of the 
articles by special resolution was necessary in respect of a 
matter which fell within the ambit of general management,to wit: 
instituting action in the company's name.
At 105-106.5/
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Even assuming Che dicta of Buckley L.J. in Gramophone 6 Typewriter 
v. Stanley t does have the meaning imputed to it, there is no question 
that most judicial authority support the view that the general meeting can 
interfere in a matter of internal management only after the articleshave
first been altered to divest the board of its power over the specific subject2/matter. Thus in Imperial Hydropathic Hotel Comppany, Blackpool v. Hemp son - 
the articles of association of a company contained no power to remove directors 
before the expiration of their period of office, but authorised the shareholders 
by special resolution to alter any of the articles. The shareholders passed 
a resolution removing the directors and appointing new ones. It was held 
that there must be a separate special resolution altering the articles 
so as to give power to remove directors before a resolution can be passed 
to remove any of them. ¿This was because there was no power under the 
1862 Act as there is under S.184 of the 1948 Act to remove directors unless 
the articles had first been altered to introduce this powerJ. As Cotton 
L.J. stated:
"Now in my opinion it is an entire fallacy to say that 
because there is power to alter the regulations you can 
by a resolution which might alter the regulations, do 
that which is contrary to tha regulations as they stand 
in a particular and individual case. It is in no way 
altering the regulations. The alteration of the 
regulations would be by introducing a provision.... that 
directors be capable of being removed by the vote of a 
general meeting.... ¿Vftiat the shareholders attempted to do waaJ 
not a general alteration of the regulations of the company, but 
simply an attempt, without altering the rules for the purpose, 
to remove a director; his removal being, unless there is a 
general alteration, an illagal act on the part of those 
who attempt to remove him - by illegal I mean an act ^ .u ltra  vires and not supported by any regulation of the company". -
1/ That is, note 4 above. 
2/ (1883) 23 Ch.D.I.
3/ At 11 - 12.
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In Boschoeck Proprietary Company Ltd, v. Fuke , Swinfen Eady J.
remarked Chat "/t/he articles, until altered, bound the shareholders
2/in general meeting as much as the board", - and so (relying on Imperial 
Hydropathic Hotel Co.Blackpool v. Hampton). "Articles must first be
2/altered by special resolution before the altered articles can be acted upon". -
4/Also in Scott v. Scott - under the articles of a privata 
company, the management of the business and the declaration of interim 
dividends, were both assigned to the directors. At the company's 
general meeting certain resolutions were passed to the effect:
(1) that weekly sums calculated at the paid up capital on 
preference shares be paid each preference shareholder as 
interest free advances until the payment of the dividend for 
the current year, that such sums ba deducted from the dividend 
when declared and, if the dividend was insufficient, the deficiency 
be repaid to the company.
(2) that a firm of accountants be instructed to investigate the financial 
affairs of the company for the last two financial years.
1/ /1906/ 1 Ch.148.
2/ At 163.
3/ Ibid
4/ A9437 1 All E.R.582.
5/ Admittedly, a management matter.
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The plaintiffs contended that these resolutions were invalid. It was 
held that the resolutions were invalid as being attempts by the company 
in general meeting to usurp the powers of the financial direction of the 
company which under the articles rested solely in the hands of the directors. 
According to Lord Clauson it seemed quite clear that the first resolution 
"if it is not aimed at declaring an interim dividend, is aimed at interfering 
with the management of the business by the directors and, as such it is in 
my view wholly inoperative and the general meeting had no power to pass it". 
The second resolution was rejected as being an attempt to do by an ordinary 
resolution what was required by the Act to be done only by special resolution.
In respect of the first resolution it was argued on behalf 
of the plaintiffs that under the company's articles, as in Article 80, the 
directors were authorised to "exercise all such powers of the company, 
as are not ... required to be exercised by the company in general meeting, 
subject... to such regulations not being inconsistent with the company's
articles or provisions as may be prescribed by the company in general2/ 3/meeting". - Those words, it wax argued, limit the power and duty -
of directors to manage the business. His Lordship rejected this argument
stating that a resolution which attempts to control the directors in the
management of the business was itself inconsistent with the company's
articles and so cannot be justified. Hi« lordship did not rely on
1/ At pp.584-585.
2/ At 585.
3/ It was his Lordship's opinion that only the "duty" of directors and not 
their "right" to manage was limited.4/ See also Loreburn L.C. in Quin A Axtens Ltd, v. Salmon ¿19097 At 442.
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any authority and one finds it difficult to follow the logic of 
his reasoning. Nevertheless, it is correct to assume that under Article 
80 the general meeting is unlikely to involve itself in matters which 
relate to day-to-day management. The question then is what constitutes 
day-to-day management.
The description or definition of what amounts to management 
matters was expresed in that case in a somewhat rhetorical fashion when 
it was stated:
"How can you manage a business without managing 
its finance.... How the directors can manage the 
business if they are to be interfered with in 
such an ordinary financial matter as to how to 
deal temporarily with balances which are for the 
moment not required for the purpose of the business, 1 confess I cannot conceive?
And further:
"How you can investigate the financial affairs of the 
company without interfering with the management of 
the company's financial affairs by the directors in the 
course of managing the business, I myself am quite 
unable to see...?
It is understandable, even from the first few lines of Article 80 that 
the board and not the shareholders are responsible for the day-to-day 
control of the company. If the Courts' reasoning was to the effect that 
shareholders cannot also give general directions or recomnendations on how 
the company's affairs are to be managed or that they cannot over-rule
1/ At p.584
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any decision come to by the directors in the conduct of the business, 
then it would be difficult to agree with this. This writer agrees 
with the opinion expressed by Goldberg, that if, for example, a 
company has funds which have been taken out of the current accounts 
of its business, there is nothing in the case to say that the members
in general meeting cannot by ordinary resolution order the directors
2/to invest them in one manner rather than another. - Moreover, it 
is difficult to see why investigation into a company's past financial 
affairs should be regarded as an interference with its management. Surely, 
one must suppose that his Lordship did not intend to deprive investors 
of this very important power of investigating how their investments 
are being managed and so divesting them of their rights just
because the company's articles provide that "the business of the company 
shall be managed by the directors". The extent of interference must, of
course, be a matter of degree and, in any case, shareholders could not
3/interfere too frequently even if they so wished. -
1/ G.D.Goldberg, "Article 80 of Table A of the Companies Act 1948" (1970)
33 M.L.R.177.
2/ See p.183. Shareholders should at least be able to over-rule the 
board in major investment and policy matters, if not, routine 
financial transations.
3/ See pp 137-138supra. One difficulty here is that Courts are not likely 
to go into what constitutes "detailed" or "frequent" interference; 
the general unwillingness of Courts to delve into details of business 
management is well known. See e.g. Earle of Halsbury L.C. in Dovey 
v.Cory A 9 0 1 / A.C.477: "What are profits and what is capital may
be a difficult and sometimes an almost impossible problem to solve....
I foresee that many matters will have to be considered by men of 
business which are not altogether familiar to a Court of Law". At p.487. 
See also AtiyaH, "Thoughts on Company Law Philosophy". (1965) 8 
The Lawyer,16,20-21.
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(3) It follows from the last two points that the general
meeting can. by ordinary resolution exercise power in matters not
2/involving day-to-day management, - even though such power has not
3/been expressly vested in it by the Act or the Articles, - provided:
(a) that such power has not been expressly delegated
4/to the board, - and
(b) that the exercise of the power does not amount to 
fraud or oppression of the minority.
This principle was acted upon in Marshall's Case where the trial judge 
relying on Pender v, Lushington and Duckett v. Cover. stated 
that:
1/ But see Greer L.J. in Shaw v. Shaw El9347 2 K.B. 113,114, approving 
the view of Buckley on Companies that a special resolution is 
necessary "even as regards matters not expressly delegated to the 
directors by the articles".
2/ That is to say, non-routine matters.
3/ But cf., Gower in passage quoted in p!58 supra.
4/ For exanple, power for appointing a Managing Director: Thomas Logan v . 
Davies Q.91t> 103 L.T.419; appointing additional directors:
Blair Open Hearth Furnace Co.Ltd, v, Reigart G 9 1 $  108 L.T.665.
See also Clark v. Workman, supra and Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter 
Syndicate v. Cuninflh«™» See however. Hornsey, op.cit. who argues 
that the words in Article 80 entitle the shareholders to control the 
directors by ordinary resolution as regards those matters of management 
not expressly delegated to the directors by some other article.
5 / See Pender v. Lushington (1877) 6 Ch.D.70 Bamford v. Bamford ¿19707 
Ch.212 and Winthrop Investments Ltd, v. Winns Ltd. ¿19737 2 K.S.W.L.R. 666. According to Buckley J. in Hogg v, Gramphom ¿196~Q 1 Ch.254 
"A majority of shareholders in general meeting is entitled to pursue 
what course it chooses within the company's powers, however wrong­
headed it may appear to others, provided the majority do not 
unfairly oppress other members of the company", at p.268. See 
also G.R.Sullivan, op.cit.; at 576.6/ 6 Ch. D.70.
7/ (1877) 6 Ch. D.82.
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"the principle has been acted upon that in the 
absence of any contract to the contrary the 
majority of the shareholders in a company have 
the ultimate control of its affairs, and are 
entitled to decide whether or not an action in 
the name of the company shall proceed".
(4) Where the Act or Articles require a special procedure 
on any matter, whether delegated to the general meeting or the board, 
such requirements or provisions are enforced very strictly by the courts.
The Courts cannot over-ride the provisions of the Act and,2/a company's articles and regulations being contractual in nature, -
a Court will not vary any of its terms or seek to substitute its own
judgment for terms which shareholders have contracted to regulate their
3/relations in the coepany. - The duty of the court is to give effect to the
4/express provisions and terms of the articles. - Thus in Quin and Axtens Ltd. 
v, Salmon, the 75th clause in the company's articles of association
provided that the business of the company was to be managed by the 
directors, who might exercise all the powers of the company, "subject 
to such regulations (being not inconsistent with the provisions of the 
articles) as may be prescribed by the company in general meeting". The 
80th article stated that no resolution of a meeting of the directors 
having for its object the acquisition or letting of premises should be
1/ Per Neville J. in ¿19097 1 Ch. 267,272.
2/ That is, by virtue of Section 20(1).
3/ See e.g. MacDougall v. Gardiner (1874-75) 10 Ch.App.606: "the Court 
has no jurisdiction whatever to do that which it is for the company 
itself to do according to the provisions of the articles", per James L.J. 
at p.608. See also Bamford v. Bamford at 217.
4/ See Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate v.Cuninghams - a decision 
which re-affirms the inviolability of contracts.
5/ Æ.90J7 AJC.442.
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valid unless notice should have been given to each of the managing 
directors Messrs. Salmon and Axten and neither of them should have 
dissented therefrom. The directors passed a resolution with the 
object of acquiring and letting premises from which Salmon duly dissented.
An extra-ordinary general meeting was then held at which the same resolution 
was passed by a simple majority of the shareholders. It was held unanimously 
by the House of Lords that upon the true construction of the articles the 
resolutions of the company were inconsistent with the provisions of the 
articles*
This rather short judgment is typical of the zealous attempt 
by courts to protect the "bargain" between shareholders as set out in the 
articles in dispute but certain aspects of the case raise serious questions. 
Although it was consonant with Article 80 that the other directors should 
not over-ride the right of Salmon to dissent one would have wished the 
Court to say why the general meeting could not by an ordinary resolution 
direct the board to acquire the property. Firstly, the Court might 
have taken the view that the acquisition or letting of premises was a 
management matter as it related to the day-to-day decisionswhich directors 
have to take. On the other hand, if it was a substantial acquisition which 
was likely to have a major effect on the company's business structure 
then the general meeting ought to have been given a say in deciding whether
1/ It is remarkable that most of the cases considered under this topic 
are about two to three pages long in the reports, which will appeal 
to students not too keen on reading very long judgments. However, 
the brevity of the decisions belies the complexity of the problems 
involved.
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or not to carry out the transaction. Secondly, the shareholders' 
resolution may have been seen as an attempt by the board to use the 
general meeting as a means of defeating the rights of Salmon and the 
contractual relations between him and the company.
3/Again in Shaw v. Shaw - as a result of a dispute arising from 
the defendant's indebtedness to the plaintiff company the articles of 
association were altered so as to hand over all control of the financial 
affairs of the company and the management of its business to three 
independent persons known as "permanent directors". The defendants 
were divested of their voting rights and control in respect of their 
debts. Because of certain defaults in respect of the debts it was 
resolved by the "permanent directors" at a meeting to which none of the 
ordinary directors were summoned, that the present action be instituted 
against the two of the former directors. Before the hearing the shareholders 
at an extra-ordinary general meeting passed a resolution calling on the 
Chairman to direct that the proceedings be discontinued. It was held 
by the Court of Appeal by a majority of two to one that the action by 
the "permanent directors" was in order. According to Greer L.J., under 
the company's articles the power to give instructions for the institution 
of action was vested, not in the directors generally, but in the "permanent 
directors" alone, whose decision could not be over-ridden by the mere 
resolution of the shareholders.
1/ Quaere, whether a special resolution shouldn't be required in all 
matters affecting the fundamental character of the business rather 
than an ordinary resolution, whether or not this involves the 
alteration of the articles.
2/ Perhaps a special resolution (enough to alter the articles) rather than 
initiation through the board may have sufficed.
3/ ¿19357 2 K.B.113.
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In the final analysis it is to be noted that where powers 
are expressly conferred by constitution or contract on the general 
meeting and the board respectively neither can usurp the otherfe.
Where the Constitution is silent or there is no contract the board has 
power over matters of day-to-day management, while the general meeting has 
power over major policy or fundamental or structural change. It is clear 
therefore, that "the directors, and no one else are responsible for the 
management of the company ... (but this) does not mean that no act of 
management, such as instructing the company's solicitor, can validly 
be performed without the personal and explicit authority of the directors 
themselves". There can, of course, be no pretence that it will 
always be easy to say whether a specific matter is of a fundamental
character or is one of everyday management, but most of the time this should
2 /be easily resolved. -
It is interesting too to ask what is the relevance of the 
decisions reviewed above in the conduct of the business of large public 
companies today. For these types of companies special articles like those 
in Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate v. Cuninghame, Quin A Axten v. 
Salmon, Shaw v. Shawfand so on,are the exception rather than the rule - 
the more conmon attitude being to adopt the regulations in Table A. This, 
however, cannot be said of the thousands of small private companies which
operate today and to which these decisions are undoubtedly still of especial
3/relevance. - Two situations can insnediately be envisaged where the analysis
1/ Per Lord Kilbrandon in Alexander Ward v. Samyang Navigation Co. ¿19757 
1 W.L.R.673 at 683.
2/ As in Clark v. Workman, supra.
3/ The Department of Trade Annual Report for 1979 shows that the effective 
” number of private companies on the register in Britain for that year
was 710,662 while for public companies the effective number was 16,015.
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becomes relevant for large companies:
(1) Where there are interventionist shareholders 
wanting to wrest control from inefficient management 
or in take-over situations,-^ and
(2) Where the dominant or more active shareholders decide2/to sue the directors. -
The Bullock Report seems to have overlooked the several 
possibilities of action by shareholders to challenge the board of 
directors when it stated that "the effect of the managerial revolution 
in large companies has been to concentrate power in the hands of the
directors....Shareholders have largely acquiesced in effective control
3/by the board of directors". - This statement, although to some extent
4/true, amounts to a sweeping generalisation and G.R.Sullivan,- in his 
criticism of this and other aspects of the Report,justly remarked that 
they involved "a radical dimunition in the existing legal powers of 
shareholders". The Comnittee's proposals if and when implemented
would divest from the shareholders in general meeting and confer on the
1/ For example public companies were involved in the following cases:
Teck Corporation Ltd, v. Miller (1972) 33 D.L.R.(3 d) 288; Bamford 
v.Bamford supra; and Winthrop Investments Ltd, v. Winns Ltd, supra.
2/ As in the recent case of Prudential Assurance Ltd, v. Newman Industries 
and Others (Mo.2), ¿198Q7, 2 Ch.D.841.
3/ Cmnd 6706 at p.21.
4/ Op.cit.
5/ At p.569.
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board the right of final decision in some natters now delegated by the
Act to the general neeting The Bullock Report thus far signals
the death knell for the rights which shareholders now enjoy in the conduct• 2/of business. - While the future of the Report remains unresolved and 
until the recomnendations become law they should not at any rate constitute 
any problem to shareholders in the exercise of their powers.
Although, as has been contended, a correct interpretation of 
Article 80 precludes the general meeting from intervening or directing the 
board in management matters certain reservations exist as to why the 
power of the general meeting should be circumscribed in this manner.
From the point of view of active shareholders' participation it is wrong
that they cannot by a majority in general meeting issue directives to the
board,say,in financial matters. It is difficult to see why directors 
should not be bound by resolutions passed by a majority of shareholders
since, after all, a simple majority of members can dismiss the directors
3/at any time and without having to state the reasons. - Common sense
1 / The powers to be removed from the members include the following:
(a) the winding-up of the company; (b) changes in the memorandum 
and articles of association; (c) recommendations to shareholders 
on the payment of dividends; (d) changes in the capital structure 
of the company; (e) disposal of a substantial part of the undertaking; 
and the appointment, removal, control and remuneration of management. 
Bullock Report - pp.77-78 • The Committee also went further to consider 
how these modifications to the existing boards in the U.K. will affect 
their relationship with senior management and the shareholders.
2/ The Committee defended these proposals by referring to some U.S.
States which similarly leave shareholders only with a right of veto 
over board's proposals at best. See Chapter 8 para.30.
3/ By way of comparison in some U.S. jurisdictions, directors cannot 
be removed unless for good cause. These contrast with the U.K. 
position.
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and logic would demand that as an alternative to dismissal shareholders
should be free to adopt the less drastic course of giving them binding
directions. The remedies of alteration of articles and dismissal
of directors which' only are available now have proved to be difficult and
2/not readily available or utilized by shareholders. - On the other hand
the demonstrated willingness of shareholders to pass resolutions at
general meeting on very important or controversial matters would prove
3/to be more useful and readily available to them. -
On the grounds of policy, however, it is desirable that the general
meeting should not constantly breathe over the backs of the directors and
over-ride every decision reached by them, for if that were to happen the
4/ , .
board would cease to manage at all. - It would be very inconvenient, 
if not impossible, for the board to refer everyone of its proposals 
to the general meeting for prior approval, as it would also be for 
the general meeting to interfere by requiring the directors to perform 
particular executive acts, to engage in particular kinds of business or 
to enter into particular contracts. General meetings are much
1/ See Gower 4th ed.146.
2/ It is very difficult for interventionist shareholders to muster
enough votes to pass a special resolution and the exercise of their 
powers under S.184 is also quite difficult.
3/ There is, of course, the danger that shareholders may be insufficiently 
informed or misinformed before voting, but these are some of the 
inevitable shortcomings in a democracy - the ever present danger of 
misinformation.
4/ Jenkins Report (Cmnd 1749) para.109.
5/ Aickin, "Division of Power Between Directors and General Meeting 
as a Matter of Law, and as a matter of Fact and Policy"(1967) Mel. 
U.L.R. 448 at 463-4.
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more expensive to convene than board meetings and if they were to be 
well attended it would be almost impossible to arrive at quick decisions 
which sometimes have to be taken in modern businesses. Moreover, the 
general body of shareholders is far less competent than the experts 
on the board to consider and take decisions which would be most beneficial 
to the company as a whole.
As a matter of policy, directors must have a free hand to 
conduct the company's business and if they prove inefficient the general
2/meeting should replace them with better people who agree with their views. - 
It might also be wise to restrict in the articles the extent of the board's 
exercise of their powers such as how much they can borrow at any one time, how 
much loan to give, the value of contracts they can award and anything in excess
of those specified in the articles should be submitted to the general meeting
3/for approval. - Likewise the general meeting should be able to make 
reconmendations to the board which they may or may not act upon. This would 
ensure that Article 80 is seen, in the words of Sullivan, as "a compromise 
between securing some degree of directorial autonomy and preserving the
4/residual authority of the general meeting as the supreme organ of the company".-
1/ Shareholders are entitled to pursue only their private interests and 
to use their votes for that purpose: See N.W.Transportation v.Beatty 
(1887), 12 App.Cas.589.Pender v. Lushlngton (1897)6 Ch.D.70, see also 
Gramophone A Typewriter v. Stanley: "Corporators" are not engaged 
in carrying on the business of the corporation. "To say that they are 
involves a complete confusion of ideas ", per Buckley J. at ^1908/
2 K.B.89,105.
2/ Gramophone Typewriter Ltd, v. Stanely.supra at 98 per Fletcher Moulten L.J.se 
also Howard Smith Ltd, v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd /1974J A.C.821,837, per 
Lord Wilberforce.
3/ For example, section 47 of the 1980 Act requires the directors to secure 
the prior approval of the general meeting in respect of directors' 
service contracts for a period exceeding five years which cannot 
easily be terminated by the company. See p. 211*
4/ G.R.Sullivan, op.cit. at 577. The residual authority of the general 
meeting is considered below.
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(iv) The Phraseology of Article 80
It is to be observed thst much of the difficulty in this 
area of company lav steins from the difficulty in the interpretation 
of Article 80 and that the Article would be made clearer by adopting 
a simpler phraseology. Much of the difficulty arises in the interpretation 
of the second half of the Article wherein it is provided that directors 
shall manage:
"subject nevertheless, to any of these regulations, the 
provisions of the Act and to such regulations, * 
being not inconsistent with the aforesaid 
regulations or provisions, asmay be prescribed 
by the company in general meeting! but no 
regulation made by the company in general.meeting 
shall invalidate any prior act of the directors...."
A most confusing interpretation of that clause is that of Lord Clauson 
in Scott v. Scott. who thought that the vords "such regulations" refer 
to the articles or amendments to the articles. It is these, he says, and not 
resolutions of the general meeting that the board shall manage subject to.
As his Lordship put it:
'•'I do not take the view that those limiting words 
'subject nevertheless' and so forth, have anything 
to do with the duty cast upon the directors in the 
first two lines of the articles to manage the 
business of the company. However, that may be and 
if I am wrong in that and if I ought to treat the 
duty cast upon them to manage the business as being 
'subject to any regulation of these articles' - 
which of course it must necessarily be - 'and to
1/ £19437 1 All.E.R.582. See also QuinA Axtens Ltd, v. Salmon £19097
A.C.442 where Loreburn L.C. in a strong dictum expresses the view 
that "regulations" throughout the articles msant "articles" at 444.
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such regulations being not inconsistent with the
aforesaid regulations or provisions as nay be
prescribed by the company in general meeting' the
question is whether the company by prescribing this..
regulation if it be a regulation are prescribing
something which is inconsistent with the aforesaid
regulations or provisions. One of the aforesaid
regulations or provisions is this provision about the
business of the company being managed by the directors
and I find the greatest difficulty in seeing how any
resolution of the company in general meeting, controlling
the directors in the management of the business, can possibly ..
be justified under the terms of this article". -
It seems obvious that the words "such regulations" in Article 80 are 
used in distinction from "the aforesaid regulations or provisions" - 
of the Act, and the clause would make sense only if the words "such
regulations" are understood to mean the company's resolutions, rather
2/than articles. -
Moreover, reference to the Ghana Companies Code would 
indicate that the English legislature probably meant the word regulation 
in the second limb of Article 80 to mean shareholders' resolutions or 
"instructions" or "directions". The Ghana Code avoided the hazard in 
Article 80 by breaking down that article into simple intelligible parts 
as follows:
Section 37:
(3) Except as otherwise provided in the company's Regulations the
business of the company shall be managed by the board of directors 
who may exercise all such powers of the company as are not by this Code 
or the Regulations required to be exercised by the members in general 
meeting.
1/ At 585.
2/ See Goldberg, op.cit. at 178 and 182 and Gower 4th ed. at 145, who 
regards Loreburn's interpretation as "tautologous".
(4) Unless Che Regulstions shell otherwise provide, Che boerd 
of directors when meting within the powers conferred upon 
them by this Code or the Regulstions shell not be bound to 
obey the directions or instructions of the members in genersl.
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It is to be expected thst when the time comes for s major 
reform of English Company Lew the opportunity would be teken up to 
break the present Article 80 into subsections ss in Chens. One may 
add, however, that Professor Gower's interpretation of Article 80 
as reflected in the Ghanian section is more restrictive of shareholders' 
power of control than the case law indicates. It ought therefore to be 
possible to adopt a new phraseology of Article 80 without diminishing 
the existing powers of shareholders.
1/ Compare with the second limb of Article 80 in pp. 181 supra. 
The words "directions*or"instruction/ of the members in general 
meeting" is clearly safer than "Regulations" or even "Resolutions" 
of the company.
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THE RESIDUAL POWER OF SHAREHOLDERS IN GENERAL MEETING 
Introduction:
CHAPTER 4
Although at a general rule, a general delegation of power 
to the board undar Article 80 precludes the general meeting from detailed 
management dicta abound in several cases to the effect that in certain
2/circumstances the power may revert to the company in general meeting. -
In these circumstances shareholders exercise a residual power over
3/matters commonly regarded as exclusive to the board. - Thus it was
4/held in Foster v. Foster. - that where directors were disqualified and 
unable to exercise the powers conferred upon them by the articles the 
company in general meeting could act on their behalf.
1/ This chapter is, in effect, a continuation of the consideration of 
the relationship between the board of directors and the shareholders 
in general maeting commenced in Chapter 3. It has been made a separate 
chapter for reasons of convenience and to ensure that Chapter 3 does 
not become too long and unwieldy.
2/ See e.g. the quotation from Winthrop Investments Ltd, v. Winns Ltd.
(1975), 2 N.S.W.L.R. 66 at 682-683. cited supra in p.li4
3/ Whether the powers to be discussed hereunder are regarded as "residual" 
or "concurrent" is more a matter of preference than of substance, Segev, 
op.cit, for example, regards them as concurrent. This writer prefers 
to regard them as residual in tha general maeting in that they are not 
usually exercised simultaneously - or better concurrently - with the 
board but contingent on the appropriate circumstances. For an example 
of concurrent power see Isaacs v. Chapmen (1916) 32 T.L.R.237. See 
also Pennington, 524. Also Peter Loose. The Company Director (1975) 
regards tha Board, and not the general meeting as having the residual power 
but this seems to be the other way round: 3 - 09. However, tha situations 
discussed in the two cases which follow are "genuine examples” of 
residual powers as opposed to situations in Bamford v. Bamford and others, 
where the power comes only by default. See K.W.Wedderburn "Control of 
Corporate Litigation", (1976), 39 H.L.R. 327, 328.6/ Discussed supra
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of association of a company gave to the board of directors the power 
of appointing an additional director, and owing to differences between 
the directors no board meeting could be held for the purpose, the company
y. ttamfnrrf - a public company, by its articles of association vested
1/ [191U] 1 Ch.895.
2/ These contingencies are admittedly less likely in large public 
companies than in private companies of the sort involved in that
where the company's articles provided: "Until otherwise determined 
by a general meeting the nuai>er of directors shall not be less than 
two nor more than seven".Other articles delegated general powers to 
the board. It was held that the power of appointing additional 
directors had not been delegated to the directors so as to exclude 
the inherent power of the company in general meeting to appoint directors.
3/ This is particularly important for large companies who rely on public
issue of shares as a method of raising capital. The need for ratification 
in this regard has been pre-empted by section 14 of the 1980 Act which 
requires that the director's power to issue securities shall not be 
exercised unless they have been authorised to do so by (a) the company 
in general meeting, or (b) the articles of the company. The maximum 
«mount of securities to be allotted will also have to be authorised.
• 2/  retained the power to appoint additional directors in general meeting. -
The most conmon areas for the exercise of the residual powers
include the following:
(i) Ratification
The residual power of the general meeting has been found
very useful by directors who wish to have their actions ratified or 
confirmed by the general meeting, but the power has, however, been
occasionally abused in the process. The potential for its misuse can
be seen in cases where directors wish to have ratified the allotment
3/of shares - which they have made u ltra  v ires . For example, in Bamford
case. See also Worcester Corset
in the directors, power to allot the unissued shares. In order to
frustrate a take-over bid by another company, the directors allotted
the remaining unissued shares to a principal distributor of the company's
products. The plaintiffs, two shareholders in the company, issued a
writ against the directors and the company claiming a declaration that
the allotment was invalid on the grounds that the directors had
exercised their power not bona fide but from an improper motive, as
their primary purpose was to frustrate the take-over bid. To counter
the writ the directors gave notice convening a general meeting of the
shareholders of the company to consider a resolution ratifying and
approving the allotment. At the meeting the resolution was passed by a
substantial majority of the shareholders even though the allotted shares were
not voted. The plaintiffs claimed a declaration that any resolution passed
at the meeting was a nullity. A preliminary point which arose was whether
the allotment was capable of being ratified and approved by the general
meeting. Plowman J. held (at first instance), that it was and'that
since the allotment had been approved by the shareholders it was thereby
validated, even if the directors had acted from an improper motive in
making the allotment. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal
which added that an ordinary resolution ratifying such an issue of shares
2/by the directors is not itself an issue of shares. - The Court accepted
the following argument of the defendants Counsel: Firstly, that unlass
there were contrary provisions in the articles, the power to issue capital
3/validly created is in the company in general meeting. - Secondly, this 
power is less extensive than the company's inherent power, which is not
1/ /L96Q7 2 All E.R.655.
2/ At 228. The Court relied on Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd /l96Z^ Ch.254,
which was based on similar facts and decided on the same principle.
This case is discusssd below.
3/ Irvine v. Union Bank of Australia (1877) A.C.366 cited with approval.
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subject to any such implied limitation. Thirdly, the company as the
repository of all powers has a residual power in general meeting of
allotment, the only limitation being that it cannot except by special
resolution be exercised in such a way as to conflict with the power
expressly vested in the directors. Fourthly, since the board had
exceeded their power of allotment it was competent for the extra-ordinary
general meeting to exercise the company's residual power and this did not
involve a conflict with the director's powers. Support for these arguments
was found in the judgment of Sir Barnes Peacock in Irvine v. Union Bank 
2/of Australia - where he stated:
"Their Lordships think that it would be competent 
for a majority of the shareholders present (though 
not a majority of the shareholders of the company) 
at an extra-ordinary meeting convened for that 
object, and of which object due notice had been 
given, to ratify an act previously done by the 
directors in excess of their authority".
1/ There were in fact six points of argument but those not relevant to 
this discussion are excluded.
2/ (1877) A.C.366: Articles of company adopted the 1862 Act which
provided that subject to the powers given at meetings of shareholders, 
the directors should have powers to borrow on the property of the 
company any sum "not exceeding in the aggregate one-halfjfthe paid-up 
capital". The articles further provided that one-half of the votes of 
the shareholders called for the purpose should be "necessary" to 
enlarge, extend, rescind or alter all or any of the provisions contained 
therein. The directors excseded their borrowing powers. HELD:
The Limitation of the power of borrowing was merely a limitation of 
the authority of the directors, and was not part of the consitution 
of the company. The act of the directors might be ratified by the 
company at a half-yearly meeting, but such ratification would not 
enlarge the borrowing powers of the directors for the future.
At 375.3/
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He stated further that if the object of the resolution was to give 
the directors in future an extended authority beyond what was given by the 
company's articles then that would amount to an alteration of the provisions 
which could only be done by a special procedure. "There is a wide 
distinction", he said, "between ratifying a particular act which has been 
done in excess of authority, and conferring a general power to do siiailar 
acts in future."
It was the contention of Mr.Francis, Counsel for the plaintiffs 
and minority shareholders that the power to allot shares is a fiduciary 
power for the protection of the minority which if you allow to be 
exercised in general meeting would be exercised by persons who are entitled
to consult their own interests and who unlike the directors are not
21bound to consult only for the benefit of the company. - This underlines 
the fear about the potential for injustice to minority shareholders and 
investors by directors' misuse of the company's residual powers for the
ratification of their acts which would otherwise amount to a breach of
3/their fiduciary duties. Hogg v. Gramphorn Ltd. - a case followed by 
Plowman J. in Bamford v. Bamford, illustrates the nature of the problem.
A take-over bid was mdde for the shares of a company whose articles conferred 
on the directors a power similar to that conferred in Bamford. The 
directors, acting in good faith and balieving that their actions were for 
the benefit of their company, davised a scheme the primary purpose of 
which was to ensure that the board would retain control of the company.
1/ Ibid. But the 1975 decision in Winthrop .op.cit.now appears to 
permit the ratification of a contemplated future breach. For a 
discussion of the full implications of this decision see H.H.Mason, 
"Take-overs and Disputed Shares Issues. Ratification of the Directors' 
Acts". (1977) 51 A.L.J.89.
9/ Rjtmford v, Bamford at 223. See also Pender v. Lushington, etc. at
"  p t t -------------------------  ------------------------------
3/ /i967^ Ch.254.
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Buckley J • held that the power to issue shares was a fiduciary power 
and if it was exercised for an improper motive, the allotment was 
liable to be set aside even if it was made in the bona fid e belief 
that it was in the interest of the company. More significantly it 
was held also that the primary purpose of the scheme being to retain 
control for the directors, the issue of shares pursuant to that scheme 
was u ltra  v ires the board and invalid unless ratified by the company 
in general meeting. "If the company in general meeting elects to ratify 
what the board has done, there will be no objection", to their
unauthorised acts. But ratification will not be allowed if the matter
2/is illegal or u ltra  v ires the company. -
A fundamental question of policy arises when this power of the 
company in general meeting is related to the actual mechanics of its 
exercise. It is very essential that a public company that is dependent 
on public financing should be able to have its shares allocated by the 
board whenever they consider it fit and to do so despite their lack of 
power in the hope that the allotment would subsequently be ratified.
But it is also a known fact that in the large public companies the board 
of directors has de facto control over the general meetings and the voting
1/ At 271.
2/ Ratification is only permissible if ultra vires the directors;
Gr«nt v ^ United Kingdom Switchback Rys. (1888) 40 Ch.D.135, and 
not if illegal or ultra vires the conqTany: Ashbury Ry. Carriage 
Co. v. Riche (1875) L.R.7 H.L.653; or if it would amount to a 
fraud on the minority. See Ngurli Ltd, v. McCann (1953) 90 C.L.R.425, 
Cook v. Peeks ^91 (J 1 A.C.554 and Clemens v Clemens Bros. fL976l 
2 All E.R.268. See E.E.Palmer, D.D.Prentice and B.Welling,
Canadian Company Law. Cases.Notes and Materials (2nd ed.) 1978, 
Chapter ----
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machinery* 80 Chat when Che public ia told that the general meeting 
has ratified or confirmed violations of the articles or breaches of 
the directors' fiduciary duties the chances are there that the 
directors have actually ratified their own wrongs. Thus, when directors 
illegally allot shares to their friends or award loans to or enter into 
contracts with themselves in breach of their contractual or fiduciary duties 
they can also manipulate the "residual" power of the company in general 
meeting to approve and ratify them - and so use the general meeting to 
"whitewash" their acts and obtain approval and forgiveness for their sins.
It would seem therefore, that the contractual and equitable obligations
imposed upon directors could so easily be flouted by the activities 
2/of the management. - There is no reason to suppose that this possibility
3/is merely academic - and even though there are provisions in the Act 
restraining management from these abuses shareholders should be alive 
to their own responsibilities. It is for them to see that their residual 
powers to ratify breaches of director's duties are not usurped by management 
and used by them for their own ends.
1/ Bamford v. Bamford 0.969.) 1 All E.R. 969 at 973. In such situations 
as in Borland v. Earle ¿1902) A.C.83 and N.W. Transportation v.
Beatty (1887) 12 App.Cas.589, where the directors have de facto 
control,to seek ratification from the general meeting would as B.H. 
McPherson puts it be like Caesar appealing to Caesar. "Directors 
Duties and the Powers of Shareholders", (1977) 51 A.L.J.460 at 
469) See also R.Baxt, "Judges in their Own Cause : The ratification 
of Directors' Breaches of Duty" (1978) 5 Monash U.L.R.16, and also 
Queensland Mines Ltd, v. Hudson (1978) 52 A.L.J.R.399.
2/ See the hypothetical question posed by K.W.Wedderburn in "Going the 
Whole Hogg v. Gramphorn" (1968) 31 M.L.R .688 at 692-3.
3/ Indeed, the Jenkins Committee (Para, tit) referred to the point
that general delegation of power to management may be used by them 
for selfish ends without the shareholders realising it.
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2. Legal Proceedings in the Company's N«n*
Another comnon instance in which the residual power of the 
company may be invoked is in the institution of proceedings by shareholders 
in the name of their company. As a general rule, the commencement of 
proceedings on behalf of a company is a matter of general management 
and so vested in the board. If it were otherwise, then frequent
litigation would throw the company's business into a state of continuous
2/
chaos. - Moreover, litigation is a very expensive business to engage in.
The general attitude of courts to discourage litigation 
wherever * possible is perhaps nowhere expressed as much as in Company Law.
As a rule Courts are generally reluctant to interfere in the exercise of 
management's discretion - the right to sue in the company's name being 
assumed to be within this scope. The effect of this has been to restrict 
the "real" exercise of shareholders' power to seek redress by action.
3/Consider for instance the remarks of Mellish L.J. in McDougall' v. Gardiner - 
where he said:
"Looking to the nature of these companies, 
looking at the way in which the articles 
are formed, and that they are not all lawyers 
who attend these meetings, nothing can be more 
likely than that there should be something more 
or less irregular done at them - some directors
1/ See Shaw v. Shaw fl935.| 2 K.B.113, 134 per Greer L.J. and 143 
per Slesser L.J.; and Alexander Ward Co. v. Samyang Navigation, 
op.cit.
2/ See K.W.Wedderburn, "Shareholders' Rights and the Rule in Foss v. 
Harbottle" (1957) Canb L.J. 194,195.
3/ f!875j 1 Ch.D.13.
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may have been irregularly appointed, some directors 
as irregularly turned out or something or other may 
have been done according to the proper construction 
of the articles. Now, if that gives a right to every 
member of the company to file a bill to have the 
question decided, then if there happens to be one 
cantankerous member, or one member who loves litigation 
everything of this kind will be litigated; whereas, if 
the bill must be filed in the name of the company, then 
unless there is a majority who really wish for litigation, 
the litigation will not go on. Therefore, holding that 
such suits must be brought in the name of the company 
does certainly greatly tend to stop litigation" ¿/
This rule which restricts litigation - The Rule in
2/Foss v. Harbottle - is that if a duty sought to be enforced is one owed to 
the company, such as a complaint against a director for breach of their 
fiduciary duty or duty of skill and care then the proper plaintiff in the 
action is the company. In that case Wigram V.C. generalised that the 
result of the clauses delegating power of general management to the board 
is that the directors are made the governing body, subject to the 
superior control of the proprietors assembled in general meeting. And,
"the proprietors so assembled have power, due notice being given of the 
purpose of the meeting, to originate proceedings for any purpose within 
the scope of the company's powers, as well as control the directors in 
any Acts which they have originated”. He admitted that there may be 
exceptions to this general proposition.
1/ At 25. See also the similar judgment of James L.J. at 22-23.
2/ (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 E.R.189.
3/ See Wigram V.C. (1843) 2 Hare pp.491 -493.
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Melli&L.J. in MacDougall v. Gardiner, ralied upon Chat 
genaral proposition,-^ and explaining the rule stated that:
"if the thing complained of is a thing which in 
substance the majority of the company are entitled 
to do, or if something has been done irregularly which 
the majority of the company are entitled to do regularly, 
or if something has been done illegally which the majority 
of the company are entitled to do legally, there can be no 
use in having a litigation about it, the ultimate end of 
which is only that a meeting has to be called, and then 
ultimately the majority gets its wishes. Is it not 
better that the rule should be adhered to that if it is 
a thing which the majority are the masters of, the majority 
in substance shall be entitled to have their will fulfilled?
If it is a matter of that nature, it only comes to this, that 
the majority are the only persons who can complain that a ,/
thing which they are entitled to do has been done irregularly” . -
3/The above general rule, - is consistent with the rule that if the majority 
shareholders are abusing their powers or depriving the minority of their 
rights then the oppressed minority are entitled to seek redress by action. 
But if the complaint is that something which the majority are entitled 
to do has been done or undone irregularly, then nobody except the company 
itself can challenge the act.
The view that the board of directors under their general management 
power has exclusive control over the right to sue in the company's name 
has been rejected in many judicial and academic circles. In Danish 
Mercantile Co,Ltd, v. Beaumont, one of two directors in a company
1/ Mosley v. Alston, 1 Ph. 790 applied.
2/ At 25.
3/ The Rule in Foss v. Harbottle cannot be discussed fully within the
scope of this thesis. For detailed analysis of this rule see K.W.Wedderburn 
(1957) C.L.J.194; (1968) 31 M.L.R .688 and (1976) 39 M.L.R.327. See also 
Anthony Boyle,"Minority Shareholders' Suits for Breach of Directors 
Duties" (1980) 1 Co.Law 3, which contains a list of referenceson tha 
subject.
4/ j}95lJ 1 All E.R.925.
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V«« given wide powers of management in the following terms: "Mr.Sheridan 
shall manage and conduct the affairs of the company as he in his sole 
discretion shall think fit", and was empowered "to do all acts and things 
and execute all documents necessary to carry this agreement into effect". 
Jenkins L.J. in the Court of Appeal, agreed with the trial judge that that 
agreement did not extend to authorise the director to commence proceedings 
in the company's name.
2/Although dicta in Shaw and Sons (Salford) Ltd, v, Shaw, - 
suggest that a delegation of general management powers to the directors give
them exclusive control of corporate litigation Danish Mercantile Co. v.
3/
Beaumont makes certain that under normal articles either the board or the
general meeting can initiate, discontinue or prevent or ratify such
4/litigation. Were the Shaw v. Shaw-suggestion correct that would destroy 
the entire substratum of the Foss v. Harbottle^rule which provides that 
it is for the majority to decide whether or not to sue for a wrong 
against the company. — ^ For example, it was held in Fender v. Lushington 2J
that where the directors frustrate the attempts of an undisputed majority 
by refusing to register its votes upon a resolution, a Court being 
satisfied that a real majority decided to bring an action, will entertain 
it despite objections by the directors - until a general meeting has been
convened and the wishes of the members ascertained in a proper manner.
8/
That case was followed by Neville J. in Marshall's Case~where he stated 
that unless there was a contract to the contrary the majority of shareholders
1/ At 296-7.
2/ Supra pJ.91 .note 1.
3/ [1951] 1 AljLE.R. 925.
4/ Ibid.
5/ (1843), 67 E.R. 189.6/ See K.W. Wedderburn (1957) C.L.J. 194 200-203.
TJ (1877) 6 Ch. D. 70.8/ [1909] 1 Ch. 267.
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in a company hava the ultimate control of ita affairs and are entitled 
to decide whether or not to maintain an action in the company's name.
In Imperial Hydropathic Hotel Co, Blackpool v. Hampson, 
certain shareholders of a company were appointed directors by a general 
meeting, in place of existing directors, and brought action in the name 
of the company against the existing directors to restrain those who had 
been removed from acting. The Court held that the new directors were not 
duly appointed and so refused the relief prayed for. But as the 
plaintiffs substantially represented the wishes of the majority of the 
shareholders, the costs were ordered to be paid out of the company's 
assets, even though they had not got the company's authority to sue. In 
Danish Mercantile Co.Ltd, v. Beaumont Jenkins L.J. explained the usual 
Court practice where the right of a plaintiff to sue in the company's 
name is challenged:
"It is common practice in such cases to adjourn 
any motion brought to strika out tha company's 
name with a view to a meeting being called to see 
whether the company desires the action to be brought , .  
or not".
Assuming that the dicta in Shaw's Case is correct it is still 
possible for the general meeting to sue since it is well established 
that even minority shareholders will be allowed to sue in the company's 
name on prove that the directors in da faoto control have refused to sue
1/ See a lso  Re. Argentum Reductions (U.K.) Ltd. 0.9751 1 A ll E.R.602.
2/ (1883) 23 Ch. D.l
3/ At 930. See also Worcester Corsetry Ltd, v. Witting, [1936] Ch. 640.
196.
to redress s wrong done to the company, despite members' request to do so. 
Action would be allowed in this instance under the "Fraud on the minority" 
exception to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle.-^ Thus in Prudential
Assurance Ltd, v. Newman Industries Ltd,, a minority shareholder was
2/allowed to sue in the company's name - despite objections by the board 
of directors.
Lastly, the right to sue, not in the company's name but on 3
behalf of the company's interest has been held in Wallersteiner v. Moir /No.2/ ~ 
as residing in a minority shareholder acting in a sense as the "agent" 
of the company by way o' "derivative" action, when a "fraud" has been 
committed by those in control.
It seems clear therefore that where the common form of articles 
are adopted both the general meeting and the board of directors have 
power in appropriate circumstances to commence proceedings on the company's 
behalf.
3. Disposal of Company's Assets
Controversy exists as to whether directors have power under
general delegation to sell or dispose of their company's assets or
A  /
undertaking. For example, B.V.Slutsky - expresses the view that "in spite 
1/ See Atwool v. Merryweather (1867) L.R.S Eq.464
2/ In terms of Procedure, this case is remarkable for being the first ever 
to combine a direct/personal, derivative and representative action 
in one and the same suit.
3/ £¿9751 2 W.L.R.389 per Lord Denning M.R. and Lords Scarman and Buckley.
4/ The Duties and Powers of Management in the Company Law of Canada and 
England (unpublished Ph.D.Thesis at the L.S.E.) 1971.
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of the absence of a firm judicial decision on the point, the board 
of directors must be taken to have the right to dispose of all the 
company's assets without the consent of the shareholders pursuant to the 
general powers delegated to them in Article 80". This view is
inconsistent with a proper interpretation of the scope of Article 80
and the general power of management under it, as well as opinions expressed
2/in some academic treaties on the issue. -
Although there is, admittedly, a dearth of cases on this 
subject a few can be referred to which support the proposition that the
board can only exercise such power subject to the consent of the
3/shareholders in general meeting. Firstly, in Wilson v. Miers. - 
by a deed of settlement of a company, the powers of the directors were 
defined to be, amongst other-things, "the building or purchasing or 
hiring of steam-vessels as they should see fit", "the selling and 
letting to hire and chartering of vessels”, "the general conduct and 
management of the business of the company.... the controlling, managing 
and regulating, in all other aspects except as by those presents otherwise 
provided, of all matters relating to the company and the affairs thereof". 
The directors, thinking it expedient to sell all the vessels belonging 
to the company employed plaintiffs, ship-brokers, to procure a purchaser. 
Plaintiffs accordingly negotiated a sale of the vessels upon the terms 
fixed by the directors, with C. The negotiations, however, went off, upon 
an objection urged by C's solicitor that the directors had no power to sell
1/ At p.102.
2/ See Chapter 3.
3/ (1861) 10 C.B.N.S. 348,142,E.R.486.
198.
the whole of the vessels, except in the event of the vinding-up of the 
company with the consent of the shareholders, which had not been obtained.
It was held that the directors could contract to sell the ships.
It is noteworthy that one of the company's articles expressly
empowered the directors to sell. That, notwithstanding, they took the
prudent step of securing at an extraordinary general meeting a resolution
"that the directors be instructed to sell the vessels and realise the
property of the company with as little delay as is consistent with the
•1/interest of the shareholders... -
2/Again in Re. H.H.Vivian and Co.Ltd. - a company carried on 
its undertaking in three distinct branches, and issued debentures operating 
as a floating charge upon the property of the company. The debentures 
were secured by a covering trust-deed under which the company covenanted 
to carry on their business in a proper and efficient manner. The company 
resolved to sell to another company the stock-in-trade and plant of one 
of the branches of the business which had been carried on at a loss. In 
an action by the debentureholders, it was held that the sale could not be 
restrained, as it was not contrary to the terms of the debentures or trust-deed,
and was consistent with the carrying on of the business of the company in
3/a proper manner. In reaching his verdict Cozens-Hardy J. referred - 
to the company's article which vested the management of the business of the 
company in the board as entitling the directors to dispose of an unprofitable
1/ 142 E.R.490. In addition a Committee was appointed "to advise with the
~ directors for the purpose of carrying out the above resolution". Ibid.
2/ Metropolitan Bank of England and Wales Ltd. v. H.H.Vivian & Co.Ltd." 7i9oo5 1 «¿¿W.----------------  -------------------------------
3/ At 658.
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part of their business. This, however, did not decide whether or 
not the board had an exclusive power to dispose of the company's assets 
or whether the general meeting had a residual power.
In Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Sundicate v, Cunninghams.
a case already discussed above, the directors were held entitled to
refuse to comply with a resolution of the general meeting directing them
to sell the company's assets. The decision in that case, however, turned
on a question of construction of a special article vesting special powers
on the board. It is submitted, however, that under the usual articles the
question whether directors have power to sell a company's undertaking
would depend, firstly, on whether such a sale amounts to a fundamental
or structural change in the nature of the company's business. Where
this is the case it appears from the authorities that except with the
consent of the shareholders in general meeting the board cannot sell. This
2/
is more so if the company's business is in a very healthy condition.
On the other hand, if the sale does not threaten to alter the structure 
of the business then the directors may, as a matter of general management 
or even business prudence, decide to effect a sale. The same is true 
if the business is in such unsatisfactory condition that the directors 
consider it more prudent to sell as it certainly was in the case of 
Wilson v. Miers. As Willes J. remarked in that case:
1/ Wilson v. Miers and Clark v. Workman, supra .
2/ It is submitted that even if the directors sold in such a situation
—  at a profit but without shareholders' approval action can be taken
against the directors for acting u ltra  v ires. Where the sale is at 
a loss the action would be one for negligence or misfeasance.
2 0 0.
"The directors have the duty to protect 
the general interests of the shareholders 
according to their judgment. If the ahips could 
only be navigated at a loss, they may let, cease 
to navigate, or lay them up, or, if it would be 
profitable, sell. If they sold, they might keep 
the proceeds to be reinvested if the company 
did not choose to dissolve, or to be distributed 
in winding-up if they did.... I therefore think ,,
the general authority extended to validate the sale" -
It was also emphasised that at a period when delay might take place in 
summoning a meeting of the shareholders for the purpose of agreeing to a 
dissolution an opportunity was afforded for selling the vessels at a sum 
which it could not be hoped would validly be obtained for them at a 
subsequent period. Under those circumstances it is clearly the duty, 
as it is the interest of the directors to convert the assets into money 
at a favourable price, and retain the money in their hands until the 
shareholders decide what should be done to it.
It has been indicated in Grant v. P.K. Switchback Rye, and 
Irvine v. Union Bank of Australia, that an excessive use of limited 
powers to sell property (or borrow) by the directors can be ratified by 
the general meeting. But in Bamford v. Bamford, Plowman J. noted, in 
reference to those two cases:
"I accept however that they are not themsleves 
decisive of the question whether, whenever a 
limited power is conferred on directors, a 
residual power is necessarily left in the company.
Whether any such residual power does or does not 
exist in any particular case will depend not only 
on the general law but also on the memorandum and 2/ 
articles of association of the company in question." -
1/ At 493.
2/ £968; 2 All&*655 at C68
In order to remove any doubts the Jenkins Committee deemed 
it necessary for legislation to exclude from the general delegation 
of powers to directors any sale of the whole or substantially the whole
of the company's undertaking and assets. The Committee accepted
2/the evidence of the Federation of British Industries, - that "it is 
already standard practice among well-conducted companies to obtain
the consent of the shareholders to a sale of a substantial part of the
3/company's undertaking". - Wilson v tilers is the one case where this 
was done.
It is important to note also that the Jenkins Committee agreed 
with the evidence of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England 
and Wales that "in general the principle should be that the function of 
the directors is to manage the shareholder's business, not to dispose of 
it".
While very few would deny some form of statutory requirement 
for shareholders approve17^ it has been very difficult to arrive at a 
consensus as to when a transaction deserves such approval, especially 
because what amounts to a fundamental or structural change in a company's 
activities in each case depends on a host of factors. In relation to 
this problem, the Jenkins committee admitted that:
201.
1/ Para.113.
2/ Now the Confederation of British Industries.
3/ Para.117. See also the Bullock:. Report (Cmnd 6607) p.81.
4/ Evidence to the Jenkins Committee p.1403 para.34.
5/ Except for example, the Bullock Committee whose view of the law 
~  la that a proposal to dispose of a substantial part of the 
Company's undertaking does not require prior shareholders 
approval. Ibid. But cf. Clark v Workman. Supra.
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"it would be difficult, particularly where 
the nature of the business is gradually changing 
shape, to define the circumstances in which, and the 
point of time at which, a fundamental change would 
be said to be in the making...it would also be difficult 
to extend such a provision to the activities of subsidiary 
and associated companies and . • t. unless the provisions 
were so extended it could easily be evaded by the acquisition 
of investments in subsidiary and associated companies 
for this purpose...V -
For these reasons the comnittee declined to recommend new requirements 
for shareholders' approval in respect of fundamental changes in their
companies' activities. Instead they recommended the notification of
2/changes of activities to shareholders in the balance sheets- and that:
"notwithstanding anything in the memorandum or 
articles of association the directors of a 
company should not be able without the specific 
approval of the company in general meeting to 
dispose of the whole or substantially the whole .. 
of the undertaking or assets of the company"
The limitation in this recommendation is that even though the fundamental 
character of a company's activities may have been greatly altered, the 
shareholders may be denied the right of approval on the grounds that 
the whole or substantial parts of the company's assets or undertaking has 
not been disposed of. For example, the directors of a shipping
company with extensive landed property holdings slight feel obliged only
1/ Para.118.
2/ Para.122.
3/ Para.122 (a)
4/ Cf. Wilson v. Miers, and ipso facto the company may continue inbusr 
which are intra vires.nesses
to notify the company's shareholders of the sale of all their vessels 
while retaining the company's buildings and landed property for 
incidental businesses. It would clearly be better, therefore, to require 
that the prior approval of shareholders before any sale which would have 
the effect of changing the fundamental character of a company - that 
is - its main business and not incidental ones. Directors should not be 
free to do indirectly, that is, to alter the character of a business, 
what they cannot do directly.
Since 1962 when the Jenkins Report was published certain
qualificatinns and extensions to the rights of shareholders to ratify
the board's activities have been suggested. For instance, Lord Chorley and 
2/Eric Wolff - in 1963 reconmended that directors negotiating for the 
transfer of all the assets or a substantial part of the shares of their 
company be regarded as agents of the shareholders to whom they are under an 
obligation to report on all stages of the negotiations. The Institute^of 
Chartered Accountants in a memorandum submitted to the Board of Trade in 
1969 recommended by way of a qualification to the Jenkins Cosmittee 
proposals that shareholders' approval is not necessary where the sale 
is to an organisation in which the company has directly or indirectly 
at least 75Z interest.
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1/ Note that under Section 16(1) (a) of the 1967 Act the directors'
report is required to contain particulars of any significant changes 
in the fixed assets of the company - perhaps in response to the 
proposals of Lord Chorley and Eric Wolff. See below.
2/ "Commercial Law and Company Law" in Law Reform Now. G.Gardiner 
and A. Martin, ed. (1963), 150, 191-103.
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Until the passing of the 1980 Act the principal rule for 
regulating the disposal of companies' assets has been the Stock 
Exchange Listing Agreement — requiring the notification to the
Quotations Department without delay in te r  a lia "particulars of
2/acquisitions or realisation of assets" —  and any decision by the
board "to change the general character or nature of the business of
3/the company or of the group". —  Compliance with these regulations 
are mandatory as a condition for the Listing of companies, and except 
for the inevitable limitations in the alertness of shareholders, these 
provisions would substantially prevent in (large) listed companies 
possible abuses by directors in unconscionable disposal of the company's 
assets. The Stock Exchange Listing Agreements, it is generally agreed, 
is not a substitute for statutory regulation. It is therefore 
gratifying that the 1980 Companies Act has introduced new rules in 
these matters, albeit, the relevant section deals only with trans­
actions with directors and connected persons.
Under Section 48 of the Act the approval of the general meeting 
is required for any contract to transfer to or acquire from, a director 
of a company or its holding company, or anyone connected with such a 
director, a non-cash asset exceeding in value £50,000 or 10Z of the
1/ Admission of Securities to Listing. Issued by Authority of 
the Stock Exchange (1979). Schedule VII. Part A.
2/ Para.5 (a).
3/ Para.5 (f).
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company's net assets, whichever is the smaller. —  ^ Any contract entered
2/into in contravention of this section will be voidable by the company —  
but may be affirmed by the general meeting. The effect of Section 48(i) 
is to prohibit a company from entering into an arrangement whereby:
(a) a director of a company or its holding company or a person 
connected with such a director acquires one or more non-cash 
assets of the requisite value from the company; or
(b) the company acquires one or more non-cash assets of the 
requisite value from such a director or a person connected 
with such director,
unless the Company has first approved of the arrangement in question by 
resolution in general meeting. An arrangement made with a director of a
1/ This apparently leaves directors and connected persons with the 
freedom to acquire non-cash assets of up to either £50,000 or 
10 per cent of the total assets. To some companies this would 
represent a substantial proportion of the total assets 
and the new section seems thus less drastic than might be 
expected.
2/ Exceptions to contracts voidable under this section are set out 
in subsection (3). These are:
(a) Where restitution is no longer possible or where the company 
has already been indemnified for the loss;
(b) Where a third party's rights are involved who have acquired 
their rights for value and without notice, or,
(c) Where the arrangement is affirmed within a reasonable 
period by the general meeting.
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company's holding company or a person connected with such a director must 
not only be approved by a resolution of the general meeting of the 
company in question but also by resolution of the general meeting of the 
holding company.
There are a number of issues which are raised by the section
but left unresolved by the Act. For example, the term "arrangement"
used by the section is nowhere defined by the Act but the term has been
defined in Manning v. Eastern Counties Railway —  ^ though in a different
2/
context, as "a very wide and indefinite one". —  Accordingly, Victor 
3/Joffe —  has suggested that it would include not only agreements enforce­
able in law but also de facto agreements or transactions not identifiable 
as agreements or contracts e tr io to  sensu. Evidence of a specific oral 
or written agreement is also not necessary to constitute an "arrangement” , 
provided the conduct of the company and some other person demonstrated 
that that person and the company had accepted mutual obligations.
Also it is a question of fact to be determined in each case 
whether, and if so, when the arrangement is concluded, the parties to it 
and its precise terms. So is the question of severance of the objection­
able parts out of a contract embracing other matters.
1/ (1844) 13 L.J. Ex. 265; 152 E.R. 1185
2/ At p. 253; E.R. 1192
3/ In The Companies Act 1980 : a practical guide, (1980) 9.203.
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Although the Act Is silent on the point It seems that the 
section would cover Indirect or circuitous arrangements, the purpose 
of which Is ultimately to achieve the sort of transfer prohibited by 
the section. However, where, for example, a non-cash asset Is acquired 
by a third party from a company and then acquired In good faith by a 
director of the company or of its holding oompany or by a person 
connected with such a director, from the third party, the director's 
or connected person's acquisition of the non-cash asset will not fall 
within the prohibition. The position would be the same In the case of 
a bona fide acquisition by the company from a third party, of a non­
cash asset acquired from a director or connected person.
Although the Act does not specifically mention it, it is obvious 
that unless the articles otherwise provide, the arrangement can be approved 
by ordinary resolution.
In contravention of the section, the director and the connected 
person and any other director of the company who authorised the arrangement 
or any transaction entered into in pursuance of the arrangement shall be 
liable:
(a) to account to the company for any gains which had been made 
directly or indirectly by the arrangement or transactions; 
and
(b) to indemnify the company for any loss or damage resulting 
from the arrangement or transaction. This liability affects 
the persons concerned jointly and severally.
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Limited defences are provided by subsection (5) which states 
that where an arrangement is entered into by a company and a person 
connected with a director of the company or of its . holding company 
in contravention of the section the director will not be liable under 
sub-section (4) if he shows that he took all reasonable steps to secure 
the company's compliance with that section. Also a person so connected 
or the director in question shall likewise not be liable if he shows that 
at the time the arrangement was entered into, he did not know of the 
relevant circumstances constituting the contravention (S.48(5)). The 
section does not over-ride any other liability which may be imposed else­
where in the Companies Acts or under the general law. —
It is to be observed that the company is not required by the 
section to make a copy of the proposed arrangement available for inspection 
by the members prior to the meeting nor even at
-•.... the meeting itself. It is to be expected, however, that
the directors would disclose this in the notice of the meeting to the 
shareholders, or if the arrangement came too late for this, at the meeting 
itself. It would be more appropriate at any rate, to send copies of the 
arrangement to the members at least several weeks before the meeting in
1/ A company which is a wholly-owned subsidiary within the meaning 
of Section ISO, 1948 Act is exempted from the provisions 
(S.48(6)). So is any body corporate which is neither a 
company within the meaning of the 1948 Act nor required to be 
registered under Part VIII of that Act.
order to allow them enough time to make a well-informed decision on 
how to vote. This section, no doubt, represents a major step In ensuring 
for shareholder*the power to prevent directors or their close family 
members or associates from misappropriating the oompany's assets, as 
indeed most unreasonable disposal of corporate assets in the past have 
been for this purpose. Wherever the general meeting considers the 
"arrangement" beneficial to the company their approval should, one 
expects, be easily obtained.
4. New and Further Scopes for the Exercise of Residual Powers by 
the General Meeting
(i) Substantial Contracts : (A New Scope for Shareholders Approval)
Apart from the traditional areas in which the approval of the
general meeting is generally detfmed essential, new impetus has been
introduced by the 1980 Act to the necessity for shareholders' approval
in two significant areas. One of these in Section 48 discussed above
and the other is in relation to substantial contracts entered into by
a company with directors or other outside interests. One important
principle of Company Law is that a director must not enter into a
contract in which his personal interest and that of his company may
conflict. If he does, then the contract will not be valid unless it
is ratified by the company in general meeting. But as the 1948 Act
provides qualifications to this (for example, that it will be valid
if permitted by the company's articles —  ^and by enabling the
2/
interested directors to vote on the question) —  the severity of the 
JV For example Article 84 of Table A.
2J That is, after disclosure under Section 199 and Section 16(1) of 
the 1967 Act.
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Che requirement for disclosure to end retificstion by the general 
meeting is mitigated.
The Stock Exchange rules have attempted to prevent possible 
abuses by directors avoiding to submit the transaction in question 
to the general meeting. One example is where companies enter into 
long service contracts with directors. Typically, these contracts are 
rarely in the interest of the companies and the terms are usually 
weighted in favour of the directors, particularly as regards the 
remuneration, the right to terminate, rights over patents and inventions, 
restrictive covenants and so forth. It is, therefore, clearly important 
that the general meeting be entitled to know the terms of these contracts 
particularly where they are for an unduly lengthy period and to reserve 
the power to approve or reject them. Thus, the Stock Exchange Listing 
Agreement requires that any service contract of ten years or longer 
duration granted by the company or any of its subsidiaries to any
director or proposed director of the company must be made subject to2/
the approval of the company in general meeting. ~
In order to prevent the frustration of the will of the
3/general meeting the Stock Exchange rules - provide that the articles
1/ See C.D.Baker, "Disclosure of Directors' Interests in Contracts", 
(1975) J.B.L. 181 and John Birds "Excluding the Duties of 
Company Directors", (1976) 39 M.L.R.394.
2/ Para.11(a). Para.11(b) provides that copias of all service
contracts should be made available to the shareholders from the 
date of the notice convening the ACM and 11(c), it is to be stated 
in the notice that such contract will be available for inspection.
Sched.VII Part A. Articles of Association, D(2).
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of association of a listed company must exclude the right of a director 
to vote on any contract or arrangement in which he has a "material 
interest". — ^
While the Stock Exchange regulations are far-reaching one 
wonders if the restriction period of 10 years is not too high. It 
would be enough for a company to enter into a service contract for 
five years without having to submit it for the general meeting's approval, 
but if the period exceeds five years, then the general meeting must 
be entitled to know about it and to give or withhold their approval 
to it.
The 1977 White Paper "The Conduct of Company Directors"
indicated a preference by the Labour Administration for this view and so
proposed "that for all companies, director's service contracts for
periods longer than five years shall not be valid unless approved by the
2/
company in general meeting". —  This point was taken up by the Government 
and is now contained in Section 47 of the 1980 Act.
That section provides that unless the term is first approved 
by a resolution of the company in general meeting, a company must not 
incorporate in any agreement a contractual term of the type specified in 
sub-section (2). This includes any term by which a director's employment
1/ Exceptions may be allowed to companies only with the consent of 
~  the Quotations Committee.
2/ Cnnd 7037 p.5. Cf. the S.E. Listing Agreement which provides for 
ten years.
with the company of which he Is a director Is to continue, or may be 
continued, otherwise than at the Instance of the c-ompany (whether under 
the original agreement or under a new agreement entered Into In pursuance 
of the old agreement), for a period exceeding five years, during which 
the employment:
(a) cannot be terminated by the company by notice; or
(b) can be so determined only in specified circumstances.
The prohibition also applies to any such term in any agreement between a 
company and a director of its holding company involving the director's 
employment within the "group". —  ^ In this case the term must first be 
approved both by resolution of the company in general meeting and by 
resolution of the holding company in general meeting. It is provided in 
sub-section (3) that where a person is, or is to be, employed with a 
company under an agreement which the company cannot terminate by notice, 
or can be terminated only in specified circumstances, and more than six 
months to the end of the current employment the company enters into a 
new agreement, the result of which is to extend the period of a director's 
employment to a total period of more than five years, the new agreement 
must be approved by the company in general meeting.
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1/ "Group", in relation to a director of a holding company, means 
the group which consists of that company and its subsidiary. 
"Employment" includes employment under a contract of service 
and contract for services. See S.47 (7) (b) and (a).
In order to allow sufficient time for renewal of contracts 
the section permits a new agreement for another five year period of 
employment to be entered into during the last six months of the original 
employment.
Also in order to ensure that the members are not deceived into 
giving their approval to a prohibited contract, it is provided that the 
necessary resolution shall not be passed unless a written memorandum setting 
out the proposed agreement incorporating the term of the contract is 
available for inspection by the members, both at the registered office of 
the company not less than 15 days before the meeting and at the meeting 
itself. It is the final terms of the proposed agreement that must be filed 
and not merely its draft terms. And by requiring the filing with the 
Registrar the Act ensures that all members, whether or not entitled to attend 
and vote at the general meeting, are able to discover the terms of any pro­
posed agreement before the general meeting at which the approval is sought.
It is not indicated what type of resolution is required for the 
approval but it seems that an ordinary resolution would suffice unless the 
articles of association require otherwise.
Lastly it should be pointed out that it is only the prohibited 
terms in the director's contract of employment that is rendered void in the 
event of contravention of the section. The Act does not render the rest of 
the contract invalid. The section also does not affect the usual right under 
Section 184 of the 1948 Act to dismiss directors or the company's liability 
thereunder for damages for wrongful dismissal. Also certain types of companies 
are excluded from the operation of the section and these include a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of any body corporate, and any body corporate which is not a company 
within the meaning of the 1948 Act or registered under Part VIII of that Act. -
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1/ Section 47(b)
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(ii) Contribution to Political Parties : (A further scope for 
Shareholders' Approval)“"
The increasing dominance of large companies in public life 
has seen the close involvement of some vith political parties and other 
pressure groups. In recent times questions are being asked as to how far 
the owners of these companies - the shareholders - may control the 
expenditure of corporate funds in furtherance of the policies of political 
parties or pressure groups or organisations.
Initially, the extent to which companies may go in spending 
their money on non-comnercial activities was limited by the operation of 
the u ltra  v ires doctrine. This requires that a company may only undertake 
or incur expenditure in connection with such businesses as are authorised 
by the company's constitution or which are reasonably incidental to carrying 
out its authorised objects or which otherwise contribute to the profitable 
performance of its business. On the application of this principle certain 
acts of corporate benevolence to charities, educational establishments and 
so forth have been held justifiable. It has been held, for example, that:
"/*/ railway company.... might send down all the 
porters at a railway station to have tea in the , .  
country at the expense of the company".
-  For Example, Evans v. Bruner.Co.Ltd.A921/ 1 Ch.3^9. A company passed 
a resolution authorising directorsto distribute]^ such universities 
or other scientific institutions in the UK as they may select for the 
furtherance of scientific education and research..." HELD. Valid. Also 
in A.P.Smith Mfg. Co.v. Barlow A9537 346 U.S.861, a company dcaation 
to Princeton University challenged by a shareholder was held valid.
The power of the company to do this was regarded as a "major though 
unwritten corporate power" and in the Court's opinion a "solemn duty".
2/ Per Bowen L.J, in Hutton v. West Cork Ry. (1883) 23 Ch.D.654.
Although company benevolence to employees and charities 
may be justified as being of a long-term advantage to the company 
the desirability of contributions to political parties is much more 
suspect. The problem becomes very worrisome in view of the dubious 
and surreptitious manner in which some of these contributions are 
made and the wave of scandals which contributions, kickbacks and bribes 
especially by multinational companies have generated in recent years.
In view of the way the public has reacted to these activities it is 
necessary that such partisan donations represent the democratic 
intentions of the company in general meetings and not just those of 
management. Shareholders intervention in this regard should, of course, 
be limited only to contributions of a partisan nature and other expenditure 
intended to further the company's business should be accepted as part 
of the general management concern of the board, provided the expenditures 
are not outrightly ultra vires or illegal. It is necessary for Company law 
to afford shareholders the right to ratify or withhold approval from 
partisan donations of which they disapprove.
The issue of political contributions has not featured 
much in company litigation and in the absence of clear judicial authority 
on the point, it is not surprising that Professor Lord Wedderbum 
considered it one of the areas in which the present Company Law has 
proved inadequate — Perhaps the most important case in which this 
question has been considered is the House of Lords decision in Morgan
1/ See Tom Hadden, Company Law and Capitalism, second edition,317-320.
2/ Hansard (House of Lords) 25 June 1979 at.Col.1265.
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The Caeca: In 1949 Che Labour ParCy ExecuCivev. TaCe & Lyle
iaaued a statement of policy which threatened Che naCionalization 
of sugar refining industry in Britain. The statement gave the board 
of directors of the defendant company cause for concern and they 
accordingly decided to "take every legitimate step to oppose the 
nationalization". After they failed to persuade the Labour Party 
against the nationalization an extra-ordinary general meeting of 
the company's stockholders was held at which the following resolution 
was passed:
"Believing as we do that nothing but harm to 
workers, consumers and stockholders alike can 
spring from the nationalization of the sugar 
refining industry, the members of the company 
hereby empower the board of directors to do 
everything in their power to meet the threat 
of the nationalizers...”
Accordingly, they contributed more than £15,000 to pro-Tory 
organisations to mount a propaganda campaign against nationalization. 
This action (a case stated) was instituted by the Inland Revenue 
Department and two questions were raised for determination:
1. Whether the donation is u ltra  v ires, and
2. Whether, if u ltra  viree, it is tax deductable.
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The Tax Comnissioner found that the expenditure "was money wholly and 
exclusively laid out for the purposes of the company's trade and 
was admissible deduction from its profits for income tax purposes...''. 
Appeal by the Inland Revenue Dept, against this finding was rejected 
by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords which found that the 
payments had been made in the honest belief that it was necessary to 
preserve the company's assets from expropriation, and so to enable the 
company to carry on its business and earn profits.
It is easy to think of several reasons why companies may wish 
to contribute funds to political parties. For example the removal 
of prices and dividend restraints, favourable export policies, to mention 
a few, but the 'real' likelihood and imminent threat of nationalisation 
which actuated the board of directors of Tate & Lyle are less present 
today. Undoubtedly, the Labour Party, particularly the left of the
party is a constant threat of nationalization to many industrialists 
and businesses and the intimate relationship between the party and the 
unions to whom employers stand in awe means that the "enemies" of the 
Labour Party are the "natural allies" of employers. The Conservative 
Party has always stood to benefit from this and by a not surprising
coincidence receives an imnensely disproportionate part of companies'
2/
contributions to political parties. -
1 / But the threats of future nationalization by a Labour Government
that have been issued by some prominent members of the Labour Party 
is bound to cause some anxiety in some business circles.
2/ A recent survey by Labour Research found that from March 1977 to 
March 1978, 378 companies contributed £1,439,594. Of this £771,000 
went direct to the Conservative Party and £172,000 went direct to pro- 
Tory organisations like the Economic League and AIMS. In contrast the 
Liberal Party got none at all.
Objections to the sponsorship of the Conservative Party 
by companies is always very quickly countered by the opposing argument 
that the Labour Party gets the unions' financial backing as well.
The weakness of this justification,if it is such is that contributions by 
unions come from the voluntary contribution of union members.
The Trade Union Act of 1913 requires that a trade union which wishes to 
make political payments must set up a separate political fund, into
which must be paid only special contributions paid as a separate political
2/levy by the union menfcers. - Every member of a trade union thus has 
the right to contract out and become an exempt member, relieved from 
contributing to the political fund. The shareholder on the other hand 
is not consulted by the directors when computing the profits and deciding 
what proportion of it to donate to a party and worse still he is 
not consulted as to what party to support. The board, it is assumed, 
has to do the thinking for him and as a general management matter 
determine the party whose assistance would further the long-term 
interest of the company. This seems like pushing the idea of the board's 
superior business judgment to its extreme limit and some other justification 
has to be adduced to show why the majority of shareholders in general 
meeting should not be allowed to determine among themselves which 
political party should get their financial support or whether to offer 
any at all. And by an analogy with the right of an exempt member of the
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1/ Professor Wedderburo dismisses the argument, in justification of political 
donations in Parliamentary Debates (H.L.) 25 June 1979.
2/ The Trade Unions political funds are administered by the Certification 
Officer and his 1978 report shows that 73 trade unions have political 
funds and 19Z of the 10 million members decided to contract out of 
the political levy.
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Trade Union to contract out of contribution to the political fund it ought 
also to be possible for minority or dissentient shareholders to opt out 
of their companies' contributions to political parties. The case for 
minority shareholders may be met in two ways.
Funds donated to political parties should normally be deducted 
from the amount which is available for dividends and members who notify 
their companies of their objections should then have their proportion of 
that amount added to their dividends so that in the end the amount given 
out as such donation would be seen a s  having received the direct or 
even tacit approval of the other shareholders.
An alternative approach would be to stipulate that any company 
which intends to contribute money to political parties must set up a special 
fund into which shareholders may voluntarily contribute. If there is a 
convincing reason that it would be in the interest of the company to support 
any particular party or political purpose one expects that shareholders 
would freely contribute to such a fund.
During the Standing Committee's debates of the Companies Bill 
which was to be the 1967 Act several members argued in favour of giving 
shareholders a say in companies' contribution to political parties, in 
addition to the Clause being then debated requiring disclosure of such 
contributions in the annual accounts and reports. — The then Minister
1/ See for example, speech by Mr. Ben Ford, M.P. in Parliamentary 
Debates (H.C.) Companies Bill (H.L.). Standing Committee E, 
Eleventh Sitting (1967) Colunns 544-545.
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of State, Department of Trade, Mr. George Darling, expressed his support 
for the requirement for disclosure: "Contributions out of funds of a 
company for purposes that have nothing to do with the company's activities", 
he said, "must be disclosed to the shareholders. They should know what 
is going on and what the directors are doing with the company's money.
This is part of Company law and we take a firm stand on that point". — ^
The Minister refused, however, to lend his support to the proposal that 
dissentient shareholders should as in trade unions be entitled to contract 
out. He said:
"we cannot control political expenditure of companies 
in this way. One cannot apply the trade union approach 
to companies. One cannot have the definition without 
going the whole way of trade union law. One cannot 
spatchcock trade union law into the Companies Bill." 2/
One would have liked the Minister to offer reasons of substance 
why a method of contribution used by the trade unions cannot be applied 
by companies, but the reason he gave amounts to a desire for retaliation 
against the Labour Party who benefit from trade unions' contributions. This 
was that "if we are to spatchcock trade union law into Company law on this 
point... we should [also] bring up to date the 1913 [trade union's] rules", 
and introduce very strict conditions about disclosure of all the contributions 
that the union may make outside the activities of the union itself which
3/would Include their own contribution to, say, the Labour Party. —  Accordingly, 
this question was omitted in the 1967 Act, and in view of the vested interest 
involved and the way in which most people appear to have accepted the status 
quo it now seems little more than academic to argue in favour of more democratic 
methods of contributing corporate funds to political parties.
1/ Col. 553.
2 / Col. 557.
3/ See Col. 558.
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Our contention here, It must be emphasised, Is not that 
contribution to political parties is illegal. On the contrary it is 
perfectly legitimate for a company to make such a contribution if 
empowered by its articles of association and if the expenditure is 
reasonably incidental to the carrying on of the company's business 
provided that as required under Section 19 of the 1967 Act particulars 
of contributions for political purposes must be disclosed in the 
directors' report. That section requires that if a company or its 
subsidiary have made donations for charitable or political purpose of 
an amount exceeding 50 pounds the director's report must disclose cer­
tain particulars such as the identity of the party, the amount of money 
given and the identify of each recipient of donations for political 
purposes.
The problem of companies' contributions to political parties 
has often been treated by textbook writers with brevity, if at all. It 
appears to be generally accepted that the requirements in the 1967 Act 
for disclosure in the company's annual accounts of details about such 
donations has brought to conclusion all there is to say about the 
question. It is contended here, however, that the rights of Investors 
to be consulted before the donations are made and to dissent from such 
donations if necessary, is of great importance although Parliament in 
]967 did not treat it as such. It is important because, for example,
222
if too large a sum la given out this might reduce the amount of dividends 
available and it would be too late for shareholders to do anything about 
it at the general meeting before which the accounts in which the dis­
closures have been made are laid. Besides, some companies are known to 
have resorted to devices in order to avoid disclosure. One company 
which felt disinclined to allow such publicity when the 1967 Act was 
passed simply cancelled its registration as a registered company in 
order, as The Times reported "... to stop snoopers finding out more 
about us than they need do". — ^
The remedies commonly suggested for shareholders who disagree
with the spending of their companies' money in this manner are the usual
2/familiar ones: "they can dismiss the directors", -  and "they
1/ 11 April 1973.
2/ Lord Harmer-Hicholls, Hansard (H.L.) 25 June 1979, 1271
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can raise the natter (in general meeting or the Press?).... They 
can sell their shares individually and invest in another company".
In other words, votewith their feet! It is cotmnon knowledge that 
although the remedy of dismissal is often assumed to be available 
to shareholders for numerous reasons, some of which have been discussed
2/in Chapter 2, it is rarely an effective one. -
To leave shareholders only with the remedy of selling off amounts to 
ignoring their interests entirely and lends support to the view that 
they are merely lenders of capital without any rights of participation.
A solution to this rarely explored legal problem is to ensure that payment 
by companies for party politics is made only after the approval of the 
company has been obtained in general meeting, and it is as well that
statutory regulations be introduced for effective compliance by those
3/concerned. There is truth in the findings of Barbara Shenfield - 
that most companies which make political donations view it as a matter 
of business judgment and in the absence of shareholders' objections will 
almost certainly continue to make gifts to political parties. Unless 
shareholders are given this right to object very little will be achieved 
by a few Labour Party or Trade Unionists shareholders raising largely 
fruitless protests at A.G.Ms against political gifts. It is, at any 
rate, gratifying that in the meantime a few companies are, as Barbara 
Shenfield notes, planning to obtain the formal consent of their 
shareholders to making political gifts - though,of course,this cannot be 
a substitute for the statutory right to be consulted.
1/ Viscount Trenchard,ibid,1281.
2/ The way in which the late Sir Eric Miller of Peachey Properties Ltd. 
doled out contributions to charities including Jewish organisations, 
may be recalled. See Peachey Property Co,Ltd..Dept, of Trade Report,1979.
3/ Company Giving (1970) pp.517-518.
4/ Political donations were not one of her primary concerns in the book.
PART II
THE MECHANISM FOR CORPORATE ADMINISTRATION 
(The Legal Position)
This Part consists of a description of the legal machinery 
for corporate governance at a formal level only: in other words, the 
rules, processes and procedures which Company Law establishes for 
regulating the conduct of shareholders in general meeting and the 
Board of Directors and the exercise of thëir respective powers.
This description is undertaken in order to provide the necessary back 
ground against which the nature and extent of participation by the 
corporate organs can be analysed. While shareholders function only 
through the general meetings, directors are actively involved both 
at these general meetings and at board meetings. It is a known fact 
which is further illustrated in this work that the operation of these 
organs does not run in strict accordance with company law theory, 
and this leads to critical examination of existing mechanisms. How­
ever, in the Chapter which follows immediately the primary concern 
will be to describe and analyse the bare legal requirements paying 
particular attention to certain inadequacies concerning the rules 
relating to the attendance of meetings, proxy rules, requisitioning 
of meetings and so on, which make it difficult for shareholders' 
rights to be enforced and enjoyed. Chapter 6 adopts the same 
approach in considering the rules which regulate the conduct of 
boards of directors.
225
CHAPTER FIVE
SHAREHOLDERS IN GENERAL MEETING”
1/
1. Introduction
The principle that a company is a separate legal entity 
independent of the shareholders makes it necessary for the legal 
position of shareholders to be clearly distinguished from that of 
the Company. The shareholders are not the company; rather they 
have definite rights in its property and operation, definite oblig­
ations toward it and to some extent, definite responsibilities with 
regard to it. This is so even if one shareholder owns the majority 
of the shares. In principle, it may be said that even if one share­
holder owns all the shares his rights and duties are to be disting-
2/
uished from those of the company,*- although in some cases the
corporate status may be disregarded and the shareholders' acts may
3/
be treated as those of the company and vice versa.
The rights of shareholders are usually exercised in general
1/ In Chapter 2 the Resources for Shareholders' participation in
corporate governance was discussed. In this Chapter it is intended 
to consider the Process of their Participation.
2/ Salomon v. Salomon A Co. (1897) A.C. 22.
3/ This is described as "lifting the veil" of incorporation. See
—  Gower, 4th edition, Chapter 6. See also Clive M.Schmitthoff,
"Salomon in the Shadow", (1976) J.B.L. 305, in which he argues that 
while "Salomon v. Salomon is still law ... it has been dethroned" 
from its position of importance due to the increasing willingness 
of the courts to lift the veil of incorporation.
2 2 6.
meeting«. This applies to such matters as the election and dismissal 
of directors, amendment of the articles, alteration of capital, 
approval of dividends and re-organisation, consolidation, merger and 
voluntary liquidation.
The general meeting is intended to be the means by which
the members exercise control and direction over the management of the
company. Though the rules for the regulation of a company's meetings
is basically a matter for the constitutional instruments of each
individual company, there is in practice great uniformity amongst
companies because of their adoption of the common pattern in Table A.
Thus, for example, in conformity with article 52 of Table A most
companies provide the business of the annual general meetings to
include, the declaration of dividend, consideration of accounts,
consideration of directors' and auditors' reports, election of
directors, appointment and remuneration of auditors and any special
business which may be brought up. This form is invariably adopted1/
by most companies, as if it were a statutory requirement. It may 
be said, however, that the absence of any uniformity could create 
results which would perhaps be more of a nuisance than contributing 
in any material manner to the effective participation by the share­
holders. Moreover, for Listed Companies, the need to comply with 
Stock Exchange Regulations also means that there is less room for 
wide variations. In recognition of the need Professor Gower
1/ Uniformity is perhaps a good thing except that the peculiar
circumstances in some companies would demand special provisions 
to cater for those circumstances.
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for example, recommended in the Ghana Companies Code that most rules
relating to companion general meetings should be laid down in the
1/
Code itself in order to make for greater uniformity.
The nature of these rules are now to be examined.
2. Types of General Meetings 
(i) Annual General Meetings:
By section 131 of the 1948 Act the holding of an annual 
general meeting (AGM) is a mandatory requirement for every company. 
That section provides that every company must in each year hold a 
general meeting as its AGM in addition to any other meetings in that 
year, and must specify the meeting as such in the notices calling it. 
Not more than 15 months shall elapse between the date of one AGM of 
a company and that of the next. It suffices, however, if the first 
AGM is held within, eighteen months of formation even though this is 
not in the first and second year of its incorporation. If there 
is failure to hold such a meeting the Department of Trade may, on 
the application of any member, call or direct the calling of, a 
general meeting in addition to other reliefs which it may also grant. 
Failure to comply with those requirements renders the company and
1/ See p.4 of the Final Report of the Commission of Enquiry into
the Working and Administration of the Present Company Law ofGhana, 
(1961). (to be cited sometimes as Final Report).
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every officer of Che company who is in default liable to a fine not
1/
exceeding the "statutory maximum" under the 1980 Act.
2/
By section 14(1) of the 1976 Act every company is required
to appoint at each general meeting before which accounts are laid an
auditor or auditors to hold office from the conclusion of that meeting
until the conclusion of the next such general meeting. This is the
only statutory duty for the AGM and none of the Companies Acts provides
any further list of matters to be dealt with at this meeting. It
is thought, however, that those matters which recur annually are
proper businesses for the AGM. These are set out in Article 52 
3 /
above.
It is for the Directors, under their general management 
power in Article 80, to call the AGM. In default, the Department 
of Trade may on the application of any member call it on such terms 
as the Department considers fit and may direct that one member
1/ S.131(5). The term "statutory maximum" is defined in Section 80 
(interpretation) as £1,000 or any other sum fixed by order under s. 
61 of the Criminal Law Act 1977. Henceforth, reference to the 
statutory maximum shall convey this meaning.
The Department of Trade Annual Report for 1979 indicates that for 
that year there were 4 prosecutions under this section all of 
which ended in conviction. There was no prosecution in 1978 
while all 10 prosecutions in 1977 ended in conviction.
2/ See also sections 17 and 39 of this Act.
3/ At p.?26 .
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present in person or by proxy, shell constitute e meeting.
The AGM is a general meeting and anything which can be done 
at any general meeting can as well be done at the AGM. The import­
ance of this meeting is that it affords protection to the members, 
being the one occasion when they can be sure of having an opportunity 
of meeting the directors and questioning them on their annual reports 
accounts and the company's overall performance and prospects. This 
occasion also offers them the opportunity of appointing the directors 
to whom for the time being are charged the running of the company.
It provides the occasion to re-elect those retiring directors more 
sympathetic to their views or generally more honest and competent, 
and to dismiss those of whose performance or policy they disapprove. 
Shareholders who feel sufficiently motivated to want to move their 
own resolutions find the annual general meeting the best occasion 
for this. It would save them the time and expense of having to 
requisition an extraordinary general meeting which the directors may 
feel inclined to oppose and which might be less well attended.
1/
The directors, whether they like it or not must hold one AGM 
each year¿and some militant shareholders might find that rather than
1/ Section 131(2). The Department of Trade Annual Report for 1979 
“  shows that nine applications under this section were received by 
the Department during that year. Of these, six were not 
proceeded with and the remaining three were refused. For 1978 
there was no application under this section at all, while for 
1977 of the three applications received only one was approved 
and the other two refused. This suggests that the section is 
of little avail to members.
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requisition an extraordinary general meeting (EGM) a wiser course is
to conserve their resources and keep their powder dry until this
occasion, for any business which can be done at an EGM can also be
1/
done at an AGM, provided that where special business is contem­
plated its nature and details must be specified in the notice calling 
the meeting.
Directors cannot normally postpone an AGM once it has been2/
convened, but may adjourn it. This is to ensure that they do not 
attempt to prevent an opportunity for shareholders' debate or to avoid 
a show-down. A meeting may, however, be postponed where, for example-
it has become clear that the accounts intended to be laid at the AGM
3/
would not be ready in time, or where it has become clear that no 
quorum would be available. There is, however, no reason to expect 
company meetings would be postponed where a company is under the 
management of diligent directors and the need may arise only in 
extreme cases. The inconvenience to members and the expense in 
time and money of convening another meeting is so much that most 
large companies would Irish to avoid the need if possible and it is 
very seldom that AGMs are postponed.
y  Meaning, any business other than the usual business of a 
general meeting as set out in article 52.
2/ Smith v. Paringa Mines Ltd. /"1906/ 2 Ch.193.
3/ See Cmnd.1749, para.457.
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(ii) Extraordinary General Meeting
The AGM is sometimes used to pre-empt the need for an EGM
by doing at the former( non-routine matters, and even the passing of
special or extraordinary resolutions. But more often companies hold
their EGMs immediately after the AGM even though this procedure is
unnecessary as the AGM could have covered those matters held over for1/
the EGM. Aside from the Statutory meeting, any meeting other than
the AGM is called an EGM, and companies' articles commonly provide2/
for the directors to call such meetings whenever they think fit.
Management would much wish to exercise this power only where pressing
circumstances demand it and certainly not when the matters sought to
be brought before the meeting do not meet their liking. Section 132(1)
provides that the directors must convene an extraordinary general
meeting of the company on the requisition of members holding at the
date of the deposit of the requisition not less than one-tenth of
the paid-up capital carrying voting rights. If the directors do not
within 21 days of the deposit of the requisition proceed to convene
3/
a meeting, the requisitionists or a prescribed number of them may
1/ See Gower, 475 and Midgley (1975) p.50.
2/ Article 49, Table A. This power must be exercised bona fide: 
Pergammon Press Ltd, v. Maxwell, [1970] 2A11 E.R.809.
3/ Those representing half of their total voting rights. S.132(3)
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y
convene the meeting.
A requisition for EGM must state the object of the meeting 
and, unless the articles otherwise provide, it will be impossible to
3/
insist of any other matter being included in the notice of the meeting. 
As all business at an EGM is Special business they must all be 
specified in the notice.
2/
The power of shareholders to requisition a general meeting is 
obviously important as one which ensures for them an adequate opport­
unity for participation in corporate administration. Where the 
management is conducting the affairs of the company in a manner 
unsatisfactory to the members or where they, the members, have a 
positive contribution of their own to offer they can secure their 
involvement by availing themselves of the provisions of section 132 
despite any oppositions from a reluctant board of directors. But 
sometimes directors' oppositions and other organisational problems 
which requisitionists encounter can be frustrating. For instance,
1/ The company is required to pay all reasonable expenses and will 
recover the money from the defaulting directors: S.132(5). 
Extraordinary general meetings may also be convened under article 49.
2/ The most common object is to pass resolution to increase the 
—  capital. Others include alteration of articles, alteration of 
Directors, borrowing powers, redemption of preference shares, etc.
3/ In Ball v. Metal Industries .1957 S.C.315, a resolution was
proposed at an EGM for the removal of a director from office under 
S.184. HELD: The proposed resolution was incompetent, as the EGM 
was convened on a requisition which did not include among its 
objects the removal of the director, and since it was not other­
wise open to a shareholder under the company's articles to 
propose such a resolution except at an ordinary meeting.
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management may seek to evade the requsitionists' attempt by giving
notice for a meeting at a distant future instead. The Jenkins
Committee considered this problem and reconmended the amendment of
the section to enable the requisitionists to convene a meeting if
one has not been convened by the directors for a date within say,1/
twenty-eight days of the notice convening the meeting.
For the very large public companies there is even a greater
problem. The number of requisitionists required is holders of not
less than one-tenth of the paid-up capital, carrying voting rights, or
any of them representing more than half of the total voting rights.
In large companies this number can be very substantial, running into
thousands. In view of the geographical dispersal of shareholders
alone it would be almost impossible for dissident shareholders to
run around collecting a sufficient number of signatures. Even if
they were so inclined, the expenses at the end of the exercise might
even exceed the benefits and unless there are enough rewards in
anticipation, not many shareholders would be bothered to participate
2/
in the process. These problems can, of course, be avoided if the
3/
articles require a smaller number of requisitionists, but companies
1/ Para.458.
2/ The general attitude of shareholders toward participation is to 
~  be examined later.
3/ For example, section 297(1) of the Ghana Companies Code provides 
—  that the directors of a public company must on the requisition 
of members of the company holding not less than one-twentieth 
of the shares of the company forthwith proceed duly to convene 
an EGM of the company. This requires just half of that 
necessary under s.132, even then the author of the Code,
Professor Gower, regards holders of l/20th of the shares too 
large for large public companies. See page 212 of the Final Report.
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have been unable Co avail theiaselves of this opportunity because
of the common adoption of Table A, and so, the higher proportion
1/
of shareholders required under it.
Additional powers to convene an EGM is afforded by section 
135 which provides for requisition by the Court either of its own 
motion or on application from any director of the company or a member 
entitled to vote at the meeting, where for some reason it is 
impracticable to call a meeting of the company or to conduct the 
meeting in accordance with the provisions of the company's Constitution. 
The meeting requisitioned by the Court is then to be conducted in 
accordance with the rules set down by the Court, which may include 
a direction that one member should form a quorum.
To prevent the victimisation of Auditors who disagree with 
2/
management, the 1976 Act provides a right for an auditor who resigns 
to requisition a meeting for the purpose of the meeting, receiving 
and considering his explanation of the circumstances connected with 
his resignation which he may wish to bring to the attention of the 
company.
The Companies Act 1980 contains an innovative provision
1/ Article 49 requires the same number of re->uisitionists as that 
“  provided by S.132, which is holders of not less than one-tenth 
of the paid-up capital carrying voting rights.
2/ Section 17(1)
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which imposes an obligation on directors of a public company to1/
convene an EGM in the event of serious loss of capital. Section 
34 provides that where the net assets of a public company fall to 
half or less of the amount of the company's called-up share capital 
the directors must within 28 days from the day on which that fact 
comes to their knowledge, convene an EGM for a date not later than 
56 days from that day. The purpose of the meeting would be to 
consider whether any, and if so what, measures should be taken to 
deal with the situation. Any director who knowingly and wilfully 
authorises or permits the failure to continue after the meeting should 
have been held is liable to a fine not exceeding the statutory 
maximum.
A big problem under this section is the question of valua­
tion. Because of the application of different accounting rules by 
different companies it will not be easy to determine when a company's 
assets have fallen to the level envisaged by the section. Moreover, 
in the days of inflation half of a company's share capital may not be 
too large a sum, so that in real terms the dimunition in the
company's assets could be much greater than first meets the eye from
2/
the bare statistics.
The "novel" attempt by section 34 to boost the role of share­
holders in general meetings as a primary organ of policy and decision-
1/ Section 34, which is introduced in compliance with the Second 
~  Directive of the E.E.C.
2/ Some of these fears were raised in Committee but not resolved. 
—  gee Standing Committee A. Debate on the Companies Bill 1979, 
4th Sitting, Col.204.
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making in companies is much welcome, but what actual contribution 
itwill actually make to shareholders control remains to be seen.
(iii) Statutory Meeting
Every public company limited by sharas is required under
section 130 of the Act to hold a general meeting of the members of the
company, to be called "the statutory meeting", within a period of not
less than one month and not more than three months from the date at
which the company is entitled to commence business. The Statutory
meeting is usually the very first meeting in the life of a public
company and its usefulness rests on the fact that it is the first
1/
opportunity for the shareholders to know how the company stands.
Besides this, this general meeting is of no practical significance
from the point of view of shareholders' participation, particularly
as it comes up only once in the life of a company. Even then, the
necessity for it has often been avoided in the past by promoters who
start off by incorporating a private company for which a statutory meeting is
not required and then later on converting it to a public company.
For these reasons arguments have for long been made for the abolition 
of the Statutory meeting at no cost to the efficienct conduct of 
business as no ostensible harm seems to have resulted from its
1/ These are to be gathered from the disclosures in the Statutory 
~  Report. S.130(3) enumerates matters to be specified in the
Statutory report; these include (a) total number of shares allotted 
(b) total amount of cash received (c) abstract of receipts of the 
Company and payment made (d) names, addresses and description of 
directors and auditors, and (e) particulars of contracts.
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avoidance in Che past.
Doubts about the usefulness of the Statutory meeting have
now been resolved in the UK with the recent implementation of the EEC
Directive on reclassification of companies under the 1980 Act which
repeals S.130 of the 1948 Act. Previously, the 1948 Act defined
private companies while public companies formed the residual category.
But under the new Act the reverse is now the case and a Statutory
1/
meeting would be unnecessary for Public Companies who satisfy the 
requirements for registration. Promoters who wish to form a public 
company should now be able to do so straightaway without having to go 
the round-about way of first forming a private company and then later 
going public. The inconvenience in this process far exceeds the 
presumed advantages of the statutory meeting. Nor would the change 
under the 1980 Act on its own diminish the standards of accountability 
of promoters and directors since the new provisions to regulate 
the registration and re-registration of the Public Limited Companies
are stringent enough to protect shareholders from the dangers which2/
the statutory meeting was supposed to prevent.
1/ A "Public Company" is defined by section 1, 1980 Act as any 
company limited by shares (or by guarantee) and having a share 
capital, whose memorandum states that the company is to be a 
public company and in relation to which the provisions in the 
Act for registration or re-registration as a public company 
have been complied with.
A private company is now any company that is not a public 
company. Thus, section 28, 1948 Act is repealed.
2/ These provisions are contained in Ss.3-13 of the Act.
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3. Notice
If a shareholder is to play any useful role by his presence
in general meetings, it is essential that he should receive adequate
notice of the meeting which leaves him enough time to prepare for it.
The law therefore insists that, prima facie, all shareholders entitled
1/
to attend should be served notice of the meeting.-
The rules about notice are governed partly by the Companies 
Acts and partly by the articles. Section 133(1) of the 1948 Act 
provides that any provision of a company's articles shall be void in 
so far as it provides for the calling of a meeting by a notice shorter 
than 21 days in writing in the case of an AGM, or a meeting for the 
passing of a special resolution, or 14 days notice in other cases. 
Section 133(3) makes an exception, to the effect that a meeting may 
be deemed to have been duly called, even though convened on shorter 
notice if it is so agreed by a majority in number of members having 
a right to attend and vote at the meetings and holding not less than 
952 in nominal value of the shares giving a right to attend and vote; 
provided that in the case of annual general meetings all the members 
entitled to attend and vote must agree if a shorter notice is to be
valid. In the case of a special resolution the members must agree
2/
to that specific ' resolution being passed on short notice.
1/ See Young v. Ladies' Imperial Club /*1920]  2K.B.523; cf. Smyth v .
—  Darley (1849) H.L.Cases See also S.14(7) 1967 Act which
gives the auditors of a company the same rights as members to 
receive notices, to attend and be heaniat general meetings when 
the business of the meeting concerns them in their capacity as 
auditors.
2/ Section 141(2).
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These exceptions are .useful mostly to private companies with a small 
membership for which the formality of a notice would serve no purpose. 
Indeed, it nay be possible for such companies to dispense completely 
with the need for a notice if they meet the requirements of the 
above sections. However, the very different nature of large public 
companies makes it unrealistic to expect that sufficient number of 
shareholders would be found to agree with the dispensation of notice. 
If they were so easily accessible and responsive then that would be 
indicative of their close involvement in the affairs of their 
companies, but there is no evidence to suggest that this is the case. 
For such companies, therefore, proper notice must be sent to all those 
entitled to it.
A member holding a class of shares has a right to attend
a meeting if such a right has been conferred by the articles or terms
of issue but where precluded by the articles or terms of issue from
1/
voting he is not entitled to any notice.
Service of notice on the members entitled to it is to be 
conducted according to the regulations prescribed by individual 
companies but where a company's articles do not make provisions on 
this matter the notice has to be served in the manner in which notices
are required to be served by the model articles in Table A for the2/
time being in force. These are articles 131-134.
1/ Re Mackenzie /1916/ 2 Ch. 450.
2/ Section 134(a)
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Article 131 requires the notice to be served personally 
or to be sent by post to the members' registered address. Service 
of notice by post is deemed to have been effected at the expiration 
of 24 hours after posting a properly addressed prepaid letter containingy
the notice.-
Article 132 provides for the sufficiency of a notice to
joint holders where only the holder first named in the register is2/
actually notified. Also notice to persons entitled to shares by 
devolution in the event of death or bankruptcy, etc. of the first 
holder is sufficient if given in a manner in which the first holder 
was entitled to be notified. By way of summary, article 134 enum­
erates those to whom notice of every general meeting shall be given 
as including:
(1) every member except those who cannot be contacted 
unless at great costs to the company
(2) every person upon whom the ownership of shares 
has devolved, and
(3) the auditor for the time being of the company.
1/ It is not stated whether this includes second class mail but 
even in respect of first class mail this section is now 
unrealistic because they are not always received within 24 
hours of posting.
2/ Article 133.
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This article ends by specifically stating that no other person shall
1/
be entitled to receive notices of general meeting.
It is usually provided that cn accidental omission to give
notice to a member or non-receipt of notice shall not invalidate the
2/
proceedings. Article 50 requires the specification of the place,
3/
day and hour of meetings.
Compliance with the requirements for valid notice is
4/ 5/
crupulously enforced by the Courts. For example, in Cannon v. Trask,
Baron V-C. restrained directors from holding an annual general meeting
earlier than was usual in order to prevent new shareholders from voting.
The shareholders had no vote until three months after registration of
6 /
their shares. Also in Adams v. Adhesive Property Limited, requisit-
ionists were restrained from holding a meeting at a time which could 
result in many shareholders being unable to vote.
1/ This provision does not appear to serve any useful purpose because 
non-menbers of the company who are sufficiently interested in 
attending a general meeting, e.g. the Press, would rely on other 
sources for notice about forthcoming meetings. Moreover, most 
Listed Companies are obliged to advertise notice of general 
meetings "in at least one leading London daily newspaper".
S.E.Listing Agreement, Para.H.l.
2 / Art.51.
3/ Reference to day means clear days: Re Hector Whaling /l936y Ch.208.
4/ See e.g. Normandy v. Ind Coope A Co.Ltd, [ i908/ 1 Ch.84.
5/
6/
(1875) L.R.20 Eq.669. 
(1932) 32 S.R.(N.W.S.) 398
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An essential part of the notice is a statement of the 
business to be transacted at the meeting. In respect of special
y  2/
businesses, the general nature of the business is to be specified.
It is not sufficient to notify, for example, that an alteration of 
the articles is to be proposed. The nature of the alteration has 
also to be specified.
If an AGM is called solely for the purpose of transacting 
3/
ordinary business, the notice need do no more than describe it as
an annual general meeting. But if anything else is to be done in
aidition, its general nature must be stated. Thus, in Choppington
4/ ------------
Collieries v. Johnson, a notice which specified the business of a
meeting as being "to elect directors" was held to have sufficiently
specified the nature of the business to elect up to the number of
directors permitted by the articles.
No business can be transacted at any meeting which is not 
put on the agenda in the way described at the time the shareholders 
are informed thereof, and a resolution passed without such commun­
ication would be void, for shareholders are entitled to know what to 
expect at a meeting. But it is a matter of judicial construction to 
be determined in every case whether any particular notice is to be 
regarded as giving sufficient information, and as covering the sub­
stance of the matter before it and the courts are very liberal in
1/ That is, any business other than ordinary business. See below. 
2/ Article 50.
3/ These are matters set out in Article 52, see p.226.
4/ /1944/ 1Ali£.” .762. But in Bailie v. Oriental Telephone Co,Ltd,
“  ¿9157 1 Ch.503 a notice of a resolution for the approval oE some
improperly paid remuneration was held insufficient because it
failed to state the amount.
construing notices. There is a tendency to uphold the resolution if 
the substance could be gathered and understood from the notice, if it
were read as a businessman would understand it in the ordinary sense.
If, however, the effect of a resolution will be to enable the directors
to obtain a benefit, the purpose for which the meeting is called will
not be deemed to have been properly stated unless the intended benefit2/
is also disclosed. It is absolutely important for shareholders to
3/
know what they are called up to approve.
1 /
4. Special Notice
The requirement for Special Notice was first introduced by
section 3 of the 1947 Act. It is a technical term used in section
4/
142 of the 1948 Act for a notice to the company to be given by a
party who proposes to move certain types of ordinary resolution at a
forthcoming general meeting. A special notice is required on a
motion for the appointment of an auditor other than the retiring one 
5/ 6/
or not to appoint one, for the removal of a director and for any 
resolution appointing or approving the appointment of a director over
1/ Choppington Collieries v. Johnson, ibid; see also Alexander v. 
Simpson (18891 43"Ch'.D.139 at 147.
2/ Hutton v. West Cork Ry. (1883) 23 Ch.D.654.
3/ Goldex Mines Ltd, v. Reville [VilS] 54 D.L.R. (3rd) 672.
4/ That is, not to the members.
5/ Section 160 6/ Section 184 (2)
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70 years old.
The proposer of any of the above resolutions must give notice 
to the company of his intention to move it, not less than 28 days before 
the meeting. The company must then give notice thereof to the members 
at the same time and in the same manner as it gives notices of its
meetings, or if this is not practicable, may advertise it in a news-2/
paper having an appropriate circulation, or in any mode allowed by 
the articles but not less than 21 days before the meeting. If on the 
other hand, the directors call the meeting less than 28 days after the 
Special Notice is served on the company, then the notice is still 
valid.
The limitation in this requirement is that a proposer of a 
resolution requiring the Special Notice is unlikely to have seen the 
accounts and directors' reports before the AGM is actually held. It 
is possible that there are subsequent disclosures contained in those 
documents but unknown to him which renders his proposed resolution 
unnecessary. This possibility does not, at any rate, render the 
provisions unnecessary.
5. Procedure at Meeting 
(i) General
With the increased number and dispersal of shareholders it 
1/ Section 185(5).
V
2/ See Admission of Securities to Listing. Schedule VII, Part A;
~  Articles of Association; H.l.
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is possible that there are subsequent disclosures contained in those 
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5. Procedure at Meeting 
(i) General
With the increased number and dispersal of shareholders it
V  Section 185(5).
2/ See Admission of Securities to Listing. Schedule VII, Part A;
~  Articles of Association; H.l.
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has become increasingly difficult for a simple shareholder or group
of shareholders in any large company to elicit the support of their
own fellows when introducing resolutions on their account. Even
1/
the ability and opportunity to do so is now merely theoretical.
It is desirable, said the Cohen Committee,
"to devise provisions which will make it 
difficult for directors to secure the 
hurried passage of controversial measures, 
and as far as possible to encourage share­
holders carefully to consider any proposals 
required by law to be put before them by the 
directors". 2/
In endeavouring to help shareholders overcome their difficulty the 
Committee recommended the granting to a certain minority of them the 
right to request the circularisation of their views and statements, 
because
"the machinery by which the shareholders can 
be approached is in the hands of the company 
and we believe that with reasonable safe­
guards this should be made available to the 
members". 3/
The Comnittee's recommendation in this regard was implemented and is 
contained in what is now Section 140 of the 1948 Act, which section 
represents a major step ..toward advancing shareholders' participation 
in companies' general meetings.
1/ Cmd.6659, para.124. 
2/ Ibid.
3/ Para.128.
That section provides that a company shall on the requisition 
in writing of such number of members as specified and at their expense 
circulate statements not exceeding 1,000 words in length with respect 
to any business to be dealt with at any meeting, including any 
resolutions intended to be moved. This right is open to members 
representing not less than one-twentieth of the total voting rights 
of all members having a right to vote at the meeting or not less than 
one hundred members holding shares on which there has been paid up an 
average of £100 each - which amounts to at least £10,000. The section 
gives the opposition a right to use the company's machinery for the 
dispatch of circulars whether in support of their own resolutions 
or in opposition to any resolutions proposed by the board, provided 
the requisition is deposited not less than one week before the meeting 
This section recognises that since directors may circulate their 
propaganda and canvass shareholders'votes at the company's expense it 
would be unfair not to extend the same facility to dissentient sharer 
holders. The alternative to a shareholder would involve huge personal 
e:cpeuses and because of the sheer size of most companies he would find 
it extremely difficult to bring his own point of view to a wide section 
of shareholders. Nevertheless, the assistance available under 
Section 140 does not add up to much because the requisitionists are 
expected to bear the cost of circularisation unless the company resolves 
otherwise. Only very rich and determined dissidents would thus be 
minded to engage in this sort of costly exercise. Moreover, the 
limit of 1,000 words is unduly restrictive.
Even where a determined shareholder has surmounted all these
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hurdles the directors may frustrate his efforts by applying to the 
Court to be relieved from their obligation to circulate the represen­
tation on the ground that the section is being abused to "secure
1/
needless publicity for defamatory matter".-
The general effect of these provisions can be summed up with 
Gower's description that they are
"heavily weighted in favour of the existing directors"
"even as regards matters requiring to be under­
taken in general meetings. If one believes 
that companies should function democratically 
it is obviously vital that something should be 
done to improve the position of the members in 
this respect". 2/
Although there is a paucity of cases on this problem the
shortcomings in Section 140 have been ably illustrated by the events
3/
which transpired in Burmah Oil Company Limited in 1978. Before the 
company's Annual General Meeting for that year the appropriate number 
of requisitionists gave notice under Section 140 of its desire to put
1/ Section 184(3) 1948 Act.
2/ See the Final Report (of the Commission of Enquiry into the Working 
and Administration of the present Company Law of Ghana) 1961, p.117. 
Section 158 of the Ghana Companies Code provides additional right 
for a member to have his statement circulated if it is not more 
than 1,000 words, provided a written request and the statement is 
deposited with the company not less than 10 days before the meeting, 
and he deposits a reasonable sum to meet the company's expenses in 
circularising it.
3/ The events are noted by J.M.L.Stone, "An Uncertain Aspect of Share- 
—  holders' Protection, (1980) N.L.J. 152, 153-154. The author is 
Honorary Treasurer of the Burmah Shareholders Action group (BSAG) 
and what follows is essentially based on his account of the episode.
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before the members at the forthcoming general meeting a resolution, and 
for the company to circulate an accompanying statement. The requi- 
sitionists deposited a sum of money in accordance with Section 140, 
on a "without prejudice" basis, pending determination of the correct 
sum which was actually payable to the company for distributing the 
representation. After the AGM, Buraah sought from the requisitionists 
the staggering sum of £16,592 for expenses incurred. The company was 
advised by leading Counsel on the interpretation of Section 140 and 
took the wide view that it had to
"be analysed in the circumstances of the 
company's constitution, its obligations 
to the Stock Exchange, the City Panel 
or other bodies if relevant, its statutory 
obligations and its practice".
Burmah's Counsel maintained that the words "to give notice" in Section
1/
140C4) have to include complying with, for example, the Stock Exchange 
Listing Agreement, in accordance with which the Company is obliged to 
send out a proxy card, and that if a company has to take steps which 
are "ancillary to the notice" the cost to which a company is put in 
taking those steps have to be borne by the requisitionists. He went 
further to suggest that the expense of carrying out normal administrative
1/ Section 140(4) provides "a company shall not be bound...to give 
~  notice of any resolution or to circulate any statement unless... 
there is deposited or tendered with the requisition a sum 
reasonably sufficient to meet the company's expenses in giving 
effect thereto".
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processes such as numbering and matching proxy cards, had to be paidy
for by the requisitionists.-*
The Burmah Shareholders Action Group on behalf of the 
requisitionists argued on the other hand that a sharehclder has a 
basic contractual right to ensure that the company's constitution is 
duly performed and that the provisions of the article relating to the 
convening and holding of meetings are honoured irrespective of the 
circumstances; that the expense incurred by a company in complying 
with its basic obligations under its articles and under the companies 
Acts must not be visited on requisitionists exercising their rights 
under Section 140 simply by virtue of the requisition, and that it 
would be an extraordinary and nonsensical consideration of the section, 
if at the same time as extending the rights of shareholders it imposed 
greater financial burdens on them than existed prior to its enactment.
Mr. Stone notes from his review of the episode that the 
wording of Section 140
"is such that a large company, seeking to 
take advantage of the marginal lack of 
clarity, can defeat one hundred bona fide 
requisitionists in  limine by making demands 
for the tendering or depositing of excessive 
sums as prerequisite to the giving of notice
1/ The full list of costs claimed by the company included the following:
~  (i) the cost of printing the notice of resolution (ii) the cost of
printing the new proxy cards relating thereto, (iii) the cost 
of nunbering and matching of the new proxy cards with the 
existing ones, (iv) the cost of collating the notice of resolution, 
BSAG statement and new proxy cards with other documents,and (v) 
the additional cost of inserting the notice of resolution, new 
proxy cards and BSAG statement (but not the Chairman's letter) 
into envelopes.
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of resolution sought by them".-
1/
It is remarkable that he was not prepared to go so far as to say 
that Burmah's interpretation of the section was not made bona fide or 
that it was wrong. His purpose was merely to argue that the mis­
understanding resulted from the failure of that section to reflect unequiv­
ocally the intentions of the Cohen Committee which it was meant to be enacted. 
This writer agrees that the Burmah interpretation was correct even 
though it putfrequisitionists in an unenviable situation. Indeed,
proceeding under Section 140 is fraught with such inestimable handicaps2/
that Professor Gower has advised against it.-
It is to be regretted that the Jenkins Committee did not 
as Gower did for Ghana recommend amendments to Section 140 to make 
its effective utilization possible. They appeared not to have envisaged 
the type of problem which arose in Burmah. Section 157(1) of the 
Ghana Code provides that 41
Company shall at its own expense, on the request 
in writing of any member entitled to attend and 
vote at a general meeting, include in the notice 
of that general meeting notice of any resolution 
which may properly be moved and is intended to 
be moved at that meeting and, at the like request, 
include such notice and statement of not more
1/ At p.154. It is to be noted that an initial payment of a prelim-
—  inary "without prejudice" deposit as was made in this case is a 
convenient arrangement which requisitionists might become 
encouraged to take advantage of.
2/ 4th Edition, at 537. The BSAG is reported to have recently proceeded
—  again under Section 140 to notify about 150, 000 Burmah Shareholders 
of the Company's request to the Gbvernment urging them to return the 
Bank of England's one-fifth holding in BP to Burman. The Bank 
acquired the 20.15 per cent stake in B.P. at the time of its rescue 
operation of Burmah in 1975. See Financial Times, May 28 1980.
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than 500 words with respect to the natter 
referred to in the proposed resolution or 
any other business to be dealt with at 
that meeting...'.'
Provided the resolution and statement are lodged with the company not 
less than six weeks before the meeting, any member entitled to attend 
and vote can insist of their being circulated at the company's expense. 
Hie provisions of this section substantially eliminate the restrictive 
effects of Section 140 and it is hoped that the Ghanian experience 
will serve as a guide for future reform.
It may happen that a director falls into disfavour with the
board, perhaps, due to his disagreement with them on certain issues
or his scrupulous determination to safeguard shareholder! interests
by opposing policies which conflict with them. In the event of a
1/
resolution to remove such a .director at a general meeting there are 
provisions supplementing Section 142 which entitle him to state his 
case to the members. He is entitled to notice of the resolution 
and may make representations which he may require to be circulated 
to the members. If this has been done the company must in the notice 
of the meeting state that representations have been made and must 
send a copy to every member to whom notice of the meeting is sent.
If the representations were received later and could not be sent 
with the notice or the company defaulted in sending them, the director 
or auditor may require them to be read out at the meeting. Hie Court
1/ Or auditor, if that is the case.
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may, on the other hand, order that these provisions be dispensed with
if satisfied that they are being abused to secure needless publicity1/
for defamatory matter. While this restriction has been necessary 
to prevent the publication oflibellous material it, nevertheless, 
severely limits the opportunity for members to be informed of any 
shady behaviour or improprieties which might have led to the victimis­
ation of a diligent director. It is hoped that the Courts would only 
exercise this power where the representation is clearly designed by a 
disgruntled man to discredit the company and its officers before he 
quits. It should not be used to stifle opposition.
(ii) Quorum
A quorum must be present before any business can be done at
a meeting. A company is free to stipulate its own quorum as it deems
fit. Article 53 of Table A requires three members present in person
for a public company and two members present in person or by proxy for
2/
a private company. It is sufficient that there is a quorum at the
3/
beginning of a meeting when it "proceeds to business".-  Generally,
4/
at least two persons must be present throughout a meeting. One 
person cannot normally constitute a quorum or a meeting except at a 
class meeting where he holds all the shares of that class and where
1/ S.184(3). See also S.160(3) which relates to written represen- 
—  tations by a retiring auditor.
2/ See also S.134(d).
3/ Re Hartley Baird Ltd./l954/ 3 A LI* E.R. 695.4/ Re London Flats /1969/ 2 ALIE.R. 744., M.Harris Ltd. 1956 S.C.207.
the Court or the Department of Trade Order otherwise provides under 
S.135 or 131 of the Act.
"Presence" at a meeting,prima facie, means present in person 
and not by proxy unless the articles otherwise provide.
Article 54 distinguishes between a meeting aalled on the 
demand of members and one convened by the directors. While the former 
stand dissolved the latter shall stand adjourned for a week if within 
half an hour after the time appointed for the meeting a quorum is not 
present. Obviously, if members who requisitioned a meeting are not 
themselves present to form a quorum there is little point in 
adjourning it and it should rightly be dissolved. If at any adjourned 
meeting recalcitrant minority shareholders use the quorum requirement 
to frustrate the wishes of the majority by deliberately absenting them­
selves, the Court will break the deadlock by calling a meeting under 
section 135.
The continued acceptance of aquorum of say three members for 
many large companies which operate today to decide affairs affecting 
the interests of some thousands of other shareholders is one of the 
ridiculous anomalies of Company Law. A general meeting of only three 
shareholders occuping a hall arranged for hundredsor thousands makes 
a farce of the notion of shareholders' control. A more realistic 
approach would be to stipulate a quorum of a certain percentage of 
the total shareholders, say 10Z. If this can be achieved the AGMS 
would be transformed into a lively forum for important debates, but
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it is unlikely that such a provision, if made, can be implemented.
(iii) Voting Rights
Where a company's articles are silent and Table A does not
apply, every member of a company originally having a share capital
shall have one vote in respect of each share or each ten pounds of
1/
stock held by him. As most large companies have articles similar
to Table A it seems that in most cases every member present in person
is entitled to a vote on a show of hands or one vote for each share
2/
he holds, on a poll. No member is entitled to vote at any general
meeting unless all calls or other sums prasently payable by him In respect
3/
of his shares in the company have been paid.
A company may choose to confer voting rights on its shares
4/
in whatever manner it chooses. As D.Votaw writes:
"Not all shares carry a right to vote.
Some have no vote at all: others get to 
vote only on special issues; still others 
vote only when the corporation is in 
financial difficulty. The voting rights 
with regard to a particular share will 
depend on the terms of issue...Nevertheless, 
a company without any voting shares would be 
an anomaly and usually at least one class or 
series of shares have the voting right". £/
1/ Section 134.
I f  Article 62.
3/ Article 65.
4/ D.Votaw, Modern Corporations, (Prentice-Hall), 1965. 
5/ At;64-65.
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It is particularly common to deny voting rights to preference shares
1/
or to limit the right to some specified contingencies. Voteless 
shares may even be issued, denying the shareholders the important 
right of participating in the determination of the affairs of the 
company.
The question of "voteless shares" was considered at length2/
by the Jenkins Committee . Opposition was raised by witnesses before
the Committee against its use, some of the arguments being that it
would perpetuate inefficient management if shareholders were unable
to vote out unsatisfactory directors. More generally it .'as argued
that voteless shares amount to a "de jure" severence of ownership from
control which frequently arises, de facto from the indifference by 
3/
shareholders.-  The majority report of the Jenkins Committee was, 
in spite of the more convincing argument of the opposition, persauded 
to recommend the retention of this class of shares on the grounds of 
their convenience for the raising of funds without altering the 
company's voting structure and on the basis of the argument that its
abolition would be an "unwarranted interference with freedom of
4/
contract".”  They recomnended, firstly, that all concerned should be 
exhorted to ensure that voteless shares are clearly designated and,
1/ For example, when dividends are in arrears.
2/ Paras. 123-136. See also Lord Chorley and Eric Wolff in Law 
~  Reform Now (1963), op.cit at 188.
3/ Para. 126. 
4/ Para. 128.
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secondly, that all shareholders should be entitled to receive notices 
of general meetings and the Chairman's statement. One wonders, what 
use it is for a shareholder to receive notice of a meeting in which he 
cannot vote, for whatever impression he gets from reading the Chair­
man's statement there is no way his opinion would be made known or the 
company benefit therefrom since he cannot attend, much less vote on 
any resolution. A suggestion that non-voting shareholders should be
entitled to attend meetings was rejected on "grounds of administrative
1/
difficulties". The minority, in their Note of Dissent,-  took the 
view that the development of non-voting equity shares is "undesirable 
both in principle rnd practice" and inconsistent with the declared 
principle of the Jenkins Report itself as well as its predecessors 
that ultimate control over the directors should be exercised by the
shareholders in order to "strengthen the already high credit and
2/
reputation of British Companies".
The question of non-voting shares is still very much one 
which evokes controversy as it offends the very principle on which 
business corporations rest: that those who supply the risk capital 
should be able to determine what they want to do with it. So long 
as shareholders’ rights can be restrained by factors such as these 
the responsiveness of corporate management to their needs cannot be 
guaranteed.
I f Cmud 1749 page 207. 
2/ Cmd.6659 para.5.
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The Stock Exchange has taken some steps towards diminishing
the impact of voteless shares in the corporate scene by requiring
that "where the capital of (a) company includes shares which do not
carry voting rights, the words "non-voting" must appear in the
1/
designation of such shares", in the articles of association.
Where the equity capital includes shares with different
voting rights, the designation of each class of shares, other than
those with the most favourable voting rights, must include the words2/
"restricted voting or limited voting". Adequate voting rights must
3/
in appropriate circumstances be secured to preference shareholders.
Compliance with these regulations should at least serve as a caveat
emptor in respect of non-voting shares or shares with restricted
4/
voting rights and so reduce the incidence of innocent buyers.
What is left of the fight - and a substantial one at that - 
toward the total abolition of these types of shares has long been taken 
up by the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF), who have 
already scored a considerable success in Lloyds Bank.
1/ Articles of Associa tion (Schd.VII Bt. A) Para.K.I.
2/ Ibid, Para. K.2.
3/ Ibid., F.l.
4/ Recent figures published in the Financial Times 30 April 1980, 
p.7. indicate that of the 86 companies with non-voting shares 
listed on the Stock Exchange only 46 note the restrictions which 
apply on each class of shares as required by the regulations.
The other 40 companies do not.
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Lloyds Bank had operated a voting system based on a 115-
year old article which gives every shareholder one vote per share to
a maximum of 500 votes. Sixty per cent of Lloyds' shares are owned
by institutions which became increasingly incensed that the rule
diluted their effective voting power to less than 25 per cent. Their
dissatisfaction came to a head at the 1979 annual general meeting
when the Post Office pension funds demanded a change in the rules to
one share one vote. For over a year the pension funds continued to
exert pressure on Lloyds but to no avail. The board only began
arranging for the change when further pressure applied by a special
Committee set up by the NAPF. At its general meeting on June 19 last,
attended by 30 of the Bank's 80,000 shareholders the necessary changes
to the articles were at long last passed on a show of hands with only
1/
a few dissensions. The NAPF hailed this as a welcome precedent and 
expects to carry the struggle through the list of forty guilty 
companies which it has compiled.
The NAPF has also approached the Stock Exchange Quotations 
Department to help in the abolition of these shares and it is expected 
that a recent study undertaken by the Council for the Securities 
Industry (C.S.I.) would make some further recommendations for their 
abolition. It is to be hoped that the report of this body will 
provide enough basis for their statutory prhibition in the next 
Companies Act.
1/ The shareholders were compensated by a one for 20 scrip issue to 
** a maximum of 25 per shareholder. This is thought an equitable 
compensation for the loss of 'relative' voting rights, although 
there were some dissatisfaction expressed about the terms by 
small shareholders.
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(iv) Voting:
Voting at general meetings is usually on a show of hands.
In fact, under Table A votes cannot be conducted through post and
1/
attendance by person or prosy is essential. There is a presumption
l !of one vote per member unless the resplutions provide otherwise. 
Generally, proxies cannot vote on a show of hands. The 
articles of association may provide a different apportionment of 
votes . The company's register may be referred to where needed to 
find out the number of shares held by each member and,consequently, 
the number of votes to which he is entitled on a poll.
Quite often a vote by show of hands is sufficient to deter­
mine the issue, but in some controversial cases or where voting by 
show of hands gives a false picture of the true opinion of the 
meeting an appropriate number of aggrieved shareholders as specified 
in the articles may demand a poll.
The Chairman's declaration of the result on a show of hands
is normally undisputed and in the case of a special and extraordinary
3/
resolution such declaration shall be conclusive.
1/ This provides an opportunity for oral discussions before 
~  decisions are reached.
2/ Ernest v. Lona Gold Mines (1897) 1 Ch.l C.A.
3/ S.141(3). See also Mac Dougall v. Cardiner (1875) 1 Ch.D.13 
~  and Foss v. Harbottle (1843) supra.
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(v) The Right to Demand a Poll
The right to vote generally includes the right to demand a 
poll, but the members' rights in every case would depend on the 
provisions of the company's articles. However, any provisions in a 
company's articles would be invalid in so far as it would have the 
effect:
(a) of excluding the right to demand a poll at a general 
meeting on any question other than the election of the Chairman of 
the raeetiig or the adjournment of the meeting; or
(b) of making ineffective a demand for a poll on any such 
question which is made
(i) by not less than five members having a right to vote at 
the meeting; or
(ii) by a member or members representing not less than one- 
tenth of the total voting rights of all the members having the right 
to vote at the meeting; or
(iii) by a member or members holding shares in the company 
conferring a right to vote at the meeting being shares on which an 
aggregate sum has been paid up equal to not less than one-tenth of 
the total sum paid up on all the shares conferring that right.
y
In addition a proxy can also demand or join in demanding a poll, 
and a demand made by him as a proxy for a member shall, for these 
purposes be the same as a demand by the member.
1/ S. 137(2)
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(vi) Conducting a Poll
A poll duly demanded must be taken at such time and in such 
manner as the Chairman may direct having regard to the articles and 
the Act. In matters which can easily be proceeded with, such as the 
election of a Chairman or for an adjournment, a poll must be taken once 
demanded. If however, the question is one of great importance, a poll 
demanded shall be taken at such future time as the Chairman directs and 
the meeting may proceed to other business upon which no poll has been 
demanded pending the takin*- of the poll.
The Chairman cannot close the poll while votes are still 
coming in unless the hours during which the poll is to be held had been 
specified. But he may declare the poll closed after a reasonable 
time, when ever in his opinion no more voters are expected to turn up. 
Votes are usually taken in writing and a record is kept of how many 
votes each shareholder is entitled to give and actually gives. A 
shareholder who was not present or did not vote at the meeting may 
vote on a poll. He is free to use his voting rights in any way he 
pleases and need not cast all his votes in the same way. Where any 
voter is improperly excluded the result of the poll is rendered invalid.
Where a poll takes place at a later date than the meeting 
the resolution will not be deemed to have been passed until the 
result of the poll is declared, and the meeting will be regarded as 
continuing until then.
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Where there is an equality of votes, whether on a show of
hands or on a poll the Chairman of the meeting at which the show of hands
takes place or at which the poll is demanded shall be entitled to a1/
casting vote.-
Whereas direct presence is required for a member to be 
entitled to a vote on a show of hands, there is no apparent reason why 
he should not be able to vote on a poll by a postal ballot. Since 
voters on a poll are not required to have been at the meeting at which 
it was demanded, it should be made possible for members who are unable 
to attend but are interested in registering their voters on the matter, 
to do so by postal ballot. In this event it would be necessary to 
allow a period of say two weeks during which all postal ballots should 
have been sent. This way a much greater number unable to attend or 
send a proxy might be able to participate in the decision making process.
(vii) Proxies at General Meeting
At Comnon Law a member could only attend and vote at general 
meetings, in person. But with the development of industrial capit­
alism from small scale to large scale enterprises and the changed 
circumstances, it became impracticable for the shareholders to attend 
in person. The right to appoint an agent or proxy to attend and vote 
at general meetings on the members' behalf was therefore developed in 
order to make these meetings more democratic and this has been given
1/ Article 60
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statutory recognition since the Companies Clauses Act, 1845.
Article 67 of Table A recognises the right to appoint a 
proxy, stating that
"On a poll votes may be given either 
personally or by proxy",
and companies articles usually contain similar provisions, so that
members who cannot attend and vote personally can appoint a proxy
1/
to act on their behalf.
A proxy need not be a member and in the case of a private 
company, has the same right as the member to speak at the meeting.
He is not entitled to vote except on a poll.
In order to bring the existence of this right to the aware­
ness of shareholders it is required by section 136(2) that in every 
notice calling a meeting of a company having a share capital shall 
appear with reasonable prominence a statement that a member entitled 
to attend and vote is entitled to appoint a proxy, that one or more 
proxies may vote instead of him (if the articles allow this) and that 
a proxy need not be a member. Failure to comply with the section
is punishable bFa fine not exceeding one-fifth of the statutory 
maximum.
1/ See S.136(1). Representatives of corporate shareholders have 
—  the status of members, not proxies. Art.74 and S.139.
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Any provision which would have Che effecC of requiring Che 
deposiCion wich Che company of an insCrumenC appoinCing a proxy or 
any ocher insCrumenC showing Che validicy or oCherwise relaCive Co Che
appoinCmenC of a proxy, more Chan 48 hours before a meeting or1/
adjourned meeting shall be void. Where inviCaCions Co appoinC a
2/
proxy has been issued Co some members aC Che company's expense, 
all oCher members muse also be sene such inviCaCions, oCherwise 
officers guilty of defaulc are liable Co a fine noC exceeding one- 
fifch of Che sCaCuCory maximum. This would ensure ChaC management 
do not discriminate against shareholders who are likely Co oppose 
their position by refusing Co send them inviCaCions.
The denial of the right to speak for a proxy in public 
companies is hard to justify. It was initially designed to ensure 
ChaC shareholders do not appoinC paid advocates or legal practitioners 
to delay the meeting by lengthy harangues, perhaps on technical issues 
which may be of no value to the meeting. The weakness of this 
argument is that a member who felt so inclined could achieve the s.ime 
purpose by simply transferring one of his shares to his legal repre­
sentative who would then be able to attend as any other shareholder.
1/ S.136(3).
2/ This was held permissible in Peel v. London and North-Western 
Ry.Co. ¿1907/ 1 Ch.5.
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It seems therefore that the injustice in the exclusion of the right
of a menier to speak through his representative, acting as a proxy,
far outweighs the advantages expected to be derived from it. In the
absence of any justification for this provision its continued existence
1/
in the Law cannot be supported.
Under the ordinary proxy forms, shareholders are invited 
by the directors to appoint them to vote on their behalf. For those 
shareholders who complete their forms they do so without fully 
realising what their signatures involve and the nature of the resol­
ution they will be used to support, and proxies once submitted are 
rarely withdrawn. For this reason the Cohen Committee considered 
the desirability of the "two-way proxy" as an alternative, and
found it a practical move toward giving greater reality to share-
2/
holders' control of directors. The Committee, nevertheless,felt it 
would not be practicable to impose the "two-way proxy" system on 
companies by legislation, because of possible complications and 
peculiarities which might exist in different companies. Instead, 
they decided to leave the matter to the regulations of the Stock
1/ Indeed, the Cohen Committee called for its removal: stating that a 
proxy should be entitled to speak as well as vote, "if not, the 
right loses a great deal of its value; moreover, in the absence 
of such a provision the Chairman would experience great 
difficulty in the conduct of the meeting". Para.133.
2/ At para.132.
2 6 6.
Exchange Committee which had been in force since 1943. The Stock 
Exchange rules on the two-way proxy required as a condition for 
obtaining permission to deal in new securities, that every company 
should undertake to word proxy forms in such a way that a shareholder 
or debenture-holder may vote either for or against the resolutions in1/
question in all cases, where proposals other than of a purely routine-2/
nature are to be considered.
Under the present rules all Listed Companies are always
required to send proxy forms to all those entitled to vote and should
3/
provide for two-way voting. The company's articles must not preclude
two way proxies and corporate shareholders may execute proxy for.is
4/
by the signature of an authorised officer.”  Preference shareholders
are to be given "adequate voting rights ... in appropriate circurn- 
5/
stances",”  which obviously includes the right to vote by proxy.
The above are conditions for quotation and must be implemented 
by all Listed Companies. To this extent the Stock Exchange Rules have 
moved further than Company Law to increase the members' power of 
control over directors - but they have no statutory sanctions, which
1/ That is, all business at an EGM and those outside Art.52.
y  Further, the proxy statement must be unambiguous and clearly 
couched.
3/_ Schd.VIII Pt.A. Listing Agreements, Para.12.
4/ Schd.VII Pt.A. Para. L.l.
5/ Ibid., para.F.1.
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only legislation can impose. Perhaps, it is this difficulty of
enforcing the Stock Exchange Regulations which accounts for the fact
that as recently as last April there were still as many as 86 Listed1/
Companies which had not complied with the requirements.-
(viii) Resolutions
Decisions taken by companies are normally in the form of
2/
resolutions. There are three kinds of resolutions under the 1948 
Act, namely, Ordinary, Extraordinary and Special resolutions.
An ordinary resolution, as the name suggests is one passed 
by a bare majority. It is not defined by the Companies Acts but it 
is a resolution sufficient to effect any transaction within the powers 
of the company which are not required by the articles or the Act to 
be effected by an extraordinary or Special resolution.
y  As per the list compiled by the Quotations Department of the 
Stock Exchange. The Date-Stream Computer lists over 100 such 
companies. Figures given in The Financial Times, 30 April 1980,
2/ Cf. Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition (1978) Vol.7,
580, which lists four types - the fourth being resolutions 
requiring special notice. This separate categorisation 
seems unnecessary, since an ordinary resolution, for example, 
does not cease to be such merely because it was on special 
notice: for instance, an ordinary resolution for the dismissal 
of a director, though on special notice is, nevertheless, 
an ordinary resolution.
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An^extraordinary resolution is one passed by a majority
of not less than three~fourths of such members voting in person or
by proxy at a meeting of which notice specifying the intention to
propose the resolution as an extraordinary resolution has been duly2/
given. Extraordinary resolution is commonly required for,inter alia, 
3/
insolvency.
There is no particular reason for continuing to retain this 
type of resolution. Clause 77(A) of the aborted 1973 Bill proposed 
a substitution of a special resolution for every case where extraordinary 
resolution is required. Although this amendment was not taken up 
in the 1980 Act its demise cannot be very far off.
A Special resolution is one passed by a three-fourths majority
(as an extraordinary resolution) at a general meeting of which not less
than 21 days notice, specifying the intention to propose the resolution4/
as a special resolution has been duly given.-  The twenty-one days
notice may be dispensed with and a lesser period specified if so
agreed by a majority in number of voting members, who together hold
not less than 95 per cent in nominal value of the shares giving a right
to attend and vote or representing not less than 95 per cent of the
5/
total voting rights at the meeting of all the members. Special 
resolution is required for any fundamental or important constitutional
1/ Articles which require more than 75 per cent are probably invalid; 
see Avre v. Skelsey's Addhnant Cement Co.Ltd. 11904} 20 T.L.R.587.
2/  S . 141.
3/ S.278(i)(c). Others include matters coming under ss.245, 303(l)a,
~  306 and 3A1.
4/ S. 141(2).
5/ Ibid, but see the proviso.
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change such as
(1) Change of name (s. 18)
(2) Alteration of objects (s.5)
(3) Alteration of articles (s.10)1/
(4) Reduction of capital (s.66)
Proposed resolutions oust be set out verbatim in the notice
2/
and a copy filed with the Registrar within fifteen days.
The question recently arose in Re Moorgate Mercantile Holdings 
Ltd., whether a special resolution can be validly passed in a form
differing from that in which it was notified to the members of the 
company. In that case, the company sought confirmation by the Court 
of a special resolution for the cancellation of its share premium 
account, amounting to over flm, which it had lost in operations.
Shortly before the notices convening the extraordinary general meeting 
ware posted, the company issued a few more shares at a premium of about 
£321 and had correspondingly increased the amount of the share premium 
account to be cancelled by the special resolution. But as this new 
addition could not rightly be regarded as lost, and there was no other 
valid reason for cancelling it the Chairman vas advised to propose the 
same resolution in an amended form reducing the share premium account
1/ Others include voluntary winding up (s.278(1)(b) and authorising 
sale of assets by Liquidator in exchange for shares (s.287).
2/ Ss.141, 143.
3/ ¿*1979/123 S.J.551; noted in (1980) 1 Co Law 36.
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to about £321 instead of cancelling it altogether. No member or 
creditor of the company opposed the subsequent petition for the 
Court's confirmation of the resolution, but the Court asked for 
argument from an amicus curiae. Slade J. held that he had no juris­
diction to confirm the amended resolution on the ground that the 
wordings of section 141(2) do not allow for amendments. In the 
course of his judgement, he enunciated seven principles applicable to 
special resolutions:
(1) A valid notice of "the intention to propose the resolution" 
must identify the resolution, by specifying either its text or its 
entire substance.
(2) To be validly passed, as "the resolution" so notified, it 
must be the same resolution as that specified by the notice.
(3) This does not preclude the correction of errors, or other 
changes in the text, so long as there is no departure from the sub­
stance of what has been notified.
(4) The statutory definition leaves no room for departing from 
this substance, even on the de minimis principle - as this case 
indicates.
(5) It follows therefore that an amendment can properly be 
proposed only if it involves no departure whatever from the substance 
of the circulated notice.
(6) The required contents of the notice should be contained in 
a single document, and
(7) Amendments, like other departures from the statutory 
requirements, can nevertheless be validly made with the unanimous
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agreement of the shareholders concerned.
1/
This decision seems at first glance to conflict with the2/
earlier authority of Torbock v. Lord WestburyT which decided that the 
terms of a special resolution can be amended provided that the 
resolution as amended remained within the scope of the notice. It 
is to be noted, however, that that case was based on Section 51 of the 
1862 Act which spoke of "notice specifying the intention to propose 
such resolution" whereas S.141(2) of the 1948 Act speaks of "notice 
specifying the intention to propose the resolution". Re Moorgate 
has now established that the substitution of "the resolution" for 
"such resolution" in the 1948 Act is not merely semantic.
Slade J. based his apparently inflexible interpretation on 
grounds of public policy. The 1948 Act, he said, requires the passing 
of a special resolution for special purposes. Since the legislature 
clearly intended that members should receive precise notice of what 
is intended no subsequent change of plan can be permitted.
"If amendments were allowed, there would 
be a risk of unfair prejudice to some of 
the members (notably those who were not 
present at the meeting and so able (sic) 
to change their votes), and of em­
barrassment for the Chairman in 
deciding whether a particular amendment 
was permissible". 3/
1/ S. 143(4). See also Re Pearce, Duff 4 Co. /“196Q/1 W.L.R. 1014 
—  and Re Duomatic Ltd. ¿1969/2 Ch.365.
2/ A 902/2 Ch .8 71.
3/ (1980)1 Co.Law, 36, 37.
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Lastly, resolutions to appoint two or more directors in a 
public company must be proposed separately unless a resolution to 
appoint the 'package' is approved unanimously. —  ^ This is to ensure 
that members can vote for the director they want without their votes 
counting in favour of another in the package of whom they disapprove.
A General Remark on the Effectiveness of the General Meeting.
It would be useful by way of conclusion to this chapter to
evaluate the effectiveness of the general meeting as a mechanism for
shareholders' democracy and, in particular, to explore the question
whether, and if so, how far the members who are not satisfied with the
information furnished in the annual accounts and other "formal" channels
of communication can put questions to the directors and demand explanation
of or information concerning the company's state of affairs. The general
meeting as a machinery for shareholders' participation is, as has been
seen, firmly under the control of the directors and the Chairman and it
follows that the processes for questioning and so on which it affords
cannot be successfully enjoyed unless with the full co-operation of the
Chairman and the directors. And because the sort of questions which
discerning shareholders tend to raise are by their very nature often
embarrassing to the board it is hardly surprising that "the Chairman
and directors are generally unfavourable to such requests, and are often
2/disinclined to give the explanation asked for".—  There is very little
1/ S.183.
2/ A.B. Levy, 647
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that the general meeting can do about this for In general shareholders 
have no legal right to demand an answer to any question. As suctv debates 
in general meetings very seldom lead to practical results in securing 
information which had not already been given in documents submitted to 
the meeting.
It is to be noted by way of comparison that under German Company
Law — ^ a shareholder is entitled to require the board of management to
provide the general meeting with information about the company's affairs
and its relations with associated undertakings to the extent that such
information is necessary for the proper discussion of the matters on the 
2/agenda. —  The board may, however, refuse to give any information if, 
but only if,
(i) in the opinion of a prudent business man its disclosure would 
be likely to cause considerable harm to the company or to an 
associated undertaking;
(ii) it relates to the acceptability of balance sheet items for 
tax purposes or to the calculation of particular taxes;
(iii) it relates to any difference between the value at which 
assets are entered on the balance sheet and their higher 
relisable value;
(iv) it relates to the methods of assessment and depreciation 
employed in preparing the balance sheet, provided that the 
annual report explains such methods sufficiently clearly to 
provide an understanding of the state of the company's 
assets and trading position;
1/ The material on German Law here derives from H. Wurdinger, German 
—  Company Law, R.R. Pennington, ed., (1975), pp.55-56.
2/ S.131(1) Aft G.
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(v) the disclosure would make the board of management liable to 
prosecution.
If the board of management refuses Information on any of the 
above grounds a shareholder may demand that his request for the information 
and the reason for refusal be recorded in the minutes. He can then apply 
to the court for a ruling as to whether the refusal of information was 
justified. If the general meeting passes a resolution on any matter in 
respect of which Information was refused, an application can be made to 
the court to rule on the justifiability of the refusal by any shareholder 
who declares hia opposition to the resolution in the minutes. Such share­
holder may also apply to the court to invalidate the resolution if the 
refusal to give information was not justified. — ^
If the board of management has provided information to a share­
holder or to the supervisory board outside the general meeting, any share­
holder may require that such information shall be given to him at a general 
meeting, even if it is In no way connected with the agenda of the meeting.
In view of the statutory rights of the German shareholder to 
require corporate information, it might be tempting to propose the extension 
of similar rights to the U.K. shareholder. It is submitted, however, that 
under the existing structure of corporate governance in the U.K. such a 
proposal would be ill-advised and comparison with German} in this area 
would be unhelpful as their existence there can be directly attributed to
1/ S.243(4)
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Che relatively weaker position of the German s hareholder as against the 
board of management. For example, the need to give wide power to require 
information may be justified in Germany by reason of the fact that the 
shareholders cannot as in the U.K. dismiss members of the top management. 
Moreover, were such a provision to be introduced into the U.K. to require 
directors to supply information to shareholders on request, it would be 
difficult to enforce. A number of reasons can be put forward why it would 
be difficult under the existing mechanisms for shareholders to insist upon 
and obtain additional Information in the general meeting.
Firstly, the board might just refuse to give the explanation 
demanded on the ground that to do so would involve the divulging of 
confidential information that could have disruptive effects in the shares 
market — or be taken advantage of by competitors, or perhaps encourage 
protests from employees or even from consumers. Similarly information 
might be denied on the ground that the question relates to the day-to-day 
administration of the company and so is outside the concern of the inquirers.
Secondly, the directors or the Chairman of the meeting might 
simply give an answer that begs the question but is, nevertheless, an 
answer and then quickly move on to another question or the next point on 
the agenda. Alternatively, it would be fairly easy for the question to be 
avoided altogether unless the voices of dissent are so strong as to make 
it virtually impossible for the Chairman or directors to dodge Che issue.
1/ If price sensitive information is given to some shareholders it would 
be in the directors' interest to make it available to the other share­
holders as to do otherwise would expose them and possibly the recipient 
of the information to risks of liability for insider trading. See 
Sections 65-67 of the Companies Act, 1980.
2 7 6 .
Thirdly, the board might simply have recourse to the majority 
at the general meeting to defeat the request for additional information 
by voting out the issue. Thus only extraordinary circumstances and 
suspicion of grave irregularities are likely to secure a vote from the 
majority ordering explanations to be given when the directors oppose the 
motion or if the Chairman is plainly hostile to the request. — ^
To sum up it can be fairly said, therefore, that the legal 
mechanism for participation in corporate governance available to share­
holders does not amount to much since the board of directors has immense 
influence in the exercise of their powers. The constraints which make 
the general meetings rather ineffective will, however, await discussion 
in Part III.
The purpose of this chapter has been to present the legal 
process for shareholders' control against which the de facto position 
of corporate governance can be assessed. But before that the next chapter 
will consider the legal process for board's operations.
1/ See A.B. Levy, 647
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CHAPTER SIX
BOARD MEETING
1. Introduction
As required by the 1948 Act every Public Company must have
1/
at least two directors and every private company, at least one*. In
addition, every company must have a Secretary but a sole director
2/
must not also be the Secretary. These provisions represent, among 
other reasons, an attempt to prevent any one man having too much power 
in a company and the fraudulent machinations which tend to occur under 
an autocratic regime of a one-man management. The dangers that a
company may encounter under a one-man management, albeit,in a private
3/
company, are aptly illustrated by Re H.R.Harmer, Ltd.~ The facts of 
that case, in so far as they are relevant here were as follows: H, 
the father, had founded a company of which he held virtually the whole 
shares. By a subsequent arrangement he transferred to his two sons 
C and B major beneficial interests in the company but a minority of 
votes. His wife also had shares but these were often voted according 
to H's direction. By the company's articles, H was appointed govern­
ing director for life, but no special rights were attached to that 
office. C and B each became a life director and their father was 
appointed Chairman of the Board of Directors with a casting vote.
1/ S.176; that is, those registered on or before November 1 1929.
I f The Secretary may be a director's wife.
V  £958/ 3 ALIi.R. 689.
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The father considered that he was entitled to disregard resolutions
of the board as long as he held the voting control. He assumed powers
which he did not possess and exercised them against the wishes of C
and B. As a result of these actions the sons petitioned for an order
1/
under Section 210 complaining that the company was being conducted 
in a manner oppressive to some part of the members, including them­
selves. Roxburgh J. accepted that a case had been made out for the 
order and his judgement was upheld on appeal. However, an arrange­
ment was worked out whereby the father would be employed as a consult­
ant only, and should not interfere in the affairs of the company 
except in accordance with the resolutions of the board. As a "face­
saving device" he was appointed life "president".
In legal principle, the administration of the company is 
vested in the board of directors collectively and the board of
directors must, as a general rule attend to decide on these matters
2/
at board meetings. This principle ensures that through the direct 
presence of directors and the mutual exchange of ideas in board 
deliberations, the collective wisdom of the board is available to the 
company on important matters before making decisions. Channell, B. 
described this principle as follows in D'Arcy v. The Tamar, Kit Hill
3 /
and Callington Ry.Co.
1/ An alternative remedy to winding-up in cases of oppression.
2/ The presence of every director is not necessarily required for a 
director is not bound to attend every board meeting, but he ought 
to attend whenever in the circumstances he is reasonably able to 
do so s per Romer J. in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. 
#925; AC 407.
3/ (1867) L.R. 2 Ex. 158.
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"Without saying that the board are bound 
to meet at any particular place, yet when 
an authority is given to a less nucber to 
bind the whole body, they must meet in 
some place where all may be present, and 
may have the opportunity of expressing 
their assent or dissent". 1/
In that case the company's articles of association vested
the "management and superintendence of the affairs of the company"
on the board of directors. Another article provided the mode in
which this was to be done: they were to hold meetings at which was
present, a quorum of three and questions at such meetings were to be
determined by a majority of voters. The Secretary affixed the seal
of the company to a bond, after having obtained the written authority
of two directors at a private interview, and at another private
interview^the verbal promise of a third to sign the authority. In
an action to enforce this bond against the company, it was held that
the company were not liable as their seal was affixed without lawful
authority. Said Martin B. "it is quite clear that the directors
2/
are to act together, and in a meeting", but this had not been done.
2. Procedure for Board Meetings
The proceedings at board meetings are regulated by the
1/ At 162-163.
2/ At 161. See also Re Portugues Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd 
(1839)42 Ch.D.160.
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company's articles and other rules which the directors may have made
1/
for themselves. Article 98 of Table A, for example, provides that
"Directors may meet together for the dispatch of business, adjourn and
otherwise regulate their meetings as they think fit". Also any
director may call a board meeting at any time and the Secretary must
2/
do so at his request. Resolutions are passed by a majority of
3/
voters and in the case of an equality of voters the ChairmaiT exercises 
his second or casting vote.
(i) Notice
At times, it may be impracticable for the board to meet 
formally to discuss a matter upon which a decision is needed, and, in 
order to enable the board to consider matters under such circumstances, 
articles usually provide that a resolution in writing signed by all
the directors entitled to receive a notice of a board meeting shall
4/
be effective as if passed at a board meeting. This dispenses with
a formal meeting. But under normal circumstances due notice must
5/
be given of board meetings, otherwise the meeting is irregularT
6/
Thus, for example, in Re Homer District Consolidated Gold Mines
1/ Re Haycraft Gold Reduction and Mining Co. /jVOOjl Ch.230.
2/ Ibid.
3/ Elected under Article 101. If no Chairman is elected or if a 
~  Chairman is not present within five minutes from the time
appointed for comnencement, the directors may choose one of their 
number to act as Chairman for the meeting.
4/ Article 106.
5/ Re Homer District Consolidated Cold Mines (1888)39 Ch.D.546.6/ Ibid
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a board meeting was held at 2 O'clock on a few hours' notice to two 
other directors who did not attend, of whom one did not receive his 
notice until the following day, and the other gave notice that he 
could not attend till three. It was held that the meeting was void.
It has also been held in Young v. Ladies' Imperial Club
1/
Limited, that the omission to summon an absent menfeer of a Committee 
invalidates the proceedings of that body. In addition the notice 
must state the object of the meeting with sufficient particularity.
For most large companies, the times and places of meetings 
are designated by the articles and so there is no need for notices 
of each separate meeting. Where also by the articles all powers
are vested in certain directors then other directors not entitled to
2/
any vote at the meeting need not be given any notice. It is very 
unusual, though, these days to find public and, in particular, listed 
companies whose articles restrict the powers of directors in this 
manner.
(ii) Quorum
Unless a number is fixed by a company's articles or by the
1/ $920 Ji K.B.523. See also in re Portugués Consolidated Copper
Mines Ltd. supra.
2/ See Shaw v. Shaw /Í935Jl K.B.113.
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board, the quorum for a board meeting of a public meeting is two.-
Where there are no provisions in the company's articles, a majority
of the directors, of two or more can validly act, unless the number
2/
to form a quorum is established by the usual board practice.-
A quorum must be made up of disinterested directors who are
entitled to vote on the particular resolution before the board.
Where a director has an interest in a transaction which is to be
3/
discussed at the meeting, he may be excluded by the articles from 
voting or being counted in the quorum. If two directors are inter­
ested in a combined transaction one cannot vote or be counted in a
quorum to approve it for the other. Nor can the transaction be
4/
articifically split up so as to defeat this requirement.-
If the number of directors of the company is less than the
quorum required by the articles, no valid board meeting can be held,
unless the articles give them power to act notwithstanding the 
5/
vacancies, but a subsequent meeting of the board with an effective6/
quorum may ratify an invalid resolution of the board.
1/ Art 99.
2/ See Lyster's Case (1867) L.R. 4 Eq.233; Cork Tramways Co.v.
”  Willows (1882) 8 Q.B.D. 685.
3/_ Eiq.art.84.
4/ Re North Eastern Insurance Co.Ltd. /¡.919J 1 Ch.198; Re Grey mouth
—  Point Elizabeth Ry and Coal Co.“2X904/ 1 Ch.32, followed.
5/ Re Scottish Petroleum (1883) 23 Ch.D.413.6/ The absence of a quorum at a meeting does not affect outsiders
—  because of the Rule in TUrquand (Royal British Bank v.Turq„and 
(1856) 6E.4B.327 Exch.Ch.) according to w m c h  cney atè not 
obliged to ensure that the internal regulations of the company have 
been complied with.
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(iii) The Validity of Directors' Acts
Companies' articles often authorise the directors toy
delegate any of their powers to committee of directors and to appoint2/
one or more of their body to act as managing director. The board
cannot through such delegations abdicate its power to act in any
particular matter, nor can it deprive itself of power to control the 
3/
company's business
The board cannot delegate a power which it does not have 
itself. A director acting alone cannot bind the company unless he 
excersis a power specially delegated to him. And by Section 179, 
a provision requiring or authorising something to be done by or to a 
director and the Secretary is not satisfied by its being done by or 
to the same person acting in both capacities.
Directors cannot act without a resolution of the board
meeting but when a resolution in writing is signed by all or a
4/
majority of the directors that will suffice, unless the articles 
5/
provide otherwise.
JV E.g.articles 102-105.
2/ Arts.107-109.
3/ Horn v. Faulder & Co. ¿190 99 L.T.524.
4/ But see Re Portuguese Copper Mines (1889) 42 Ch.D.160 at 167 where
“  Fry L.J. suggests that directors have to "meet in order to think", 
because the collective opinion expected of a board as contemplated 
by the Act is one arrived at at a board meeting after oral 
discussions.
5/ Art. 106.
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Directors must not exclude from their meeting any of their
body and unless the company has by resolution declared that it does not
desire a director to act, an excluded director can obtain an injunction
1/
restraining his continued exclusion.-*
3. Conclusion
The wide discretion which Company Law allows companies in
the regulation of board (and for that matter, general) meetings, gives
rise to considerable laxity in compliance with these rules and in
some cases actually operate against the effective involvement of the
corporate organs in the performance of their proper roles in the
company. For example, the law leaves it to the director!to regulate
their own procedure for their meetings, to elect a Chairman for such2/
a period as they think fit and to vest in him the right to exercise 
certain powers at these meetings as they think fit. This discretion 
has, however, been abused in the past by Chief Executives in a number 
of cases, especially where they also happen to be Chairmen of the 
boards. In some companies, board meetings are not called at all
because, unlike the Annual General Meeting there is no obligation
3/
to do so,-  so the Chief executive runs the company as a "one-man 
show". As a result, the ostensible attempt by sections 176 and 177
1/ Pulbrook v, Richmond Consolidated Mining Co. (1878) 9 Ch.D.610. 
2/ Art.101.
3/ One wonders if article 106 does not actually discourage the 
—  calling of a board meeting. That regulation permits the 
dispensation of one if a resolution in writing is signed 
by all the members entitled to attend.
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of the 1948 Act to secure corporate governance through the machinery 
of the board is rendered ineffective.
In some other companies, despite the requirement of Section
145 (1) of the Act requiring that every company must record minutes
1/
of all proceedings of its directors on such minutes are ke t.~
Flagrant violations of this section were rife in Dowgate and General
2/  ------------------------------
Investment Ltd., a company investigated by the Department of Trade.
Obviously, the threat of a fine of £5 for every day during which non- 
compliance with the section continued had not been sufficient deter­
rent against violatibns. But the old penalty under section 145(4) 
has been repealed and is now punishable by a fine not exceeding one- 
fifth of the statutory maximum or, on conviction after continued 
contravention, a default fine not exceeding one-fiftieth of the 
statutory maximum which is encouraging.
Another major concern is the question of access to minutes
of board meetings, where minutes are kept at all. If anyone is to
exercise any degree of influence or control over the way the company's
affairs are conducted it stands to reason that the least that could
be expected is that they would be conversant with the investment
and other policies of the company. It is well known that the annual
3/
reports contain no useful information in this regard. The board
V  Section 145(1) requires that every company must cause minutes 
of all proceedings of general meetings, and board meetings to 
be entered in books kept for that purpose.
2/ Report of Department of Trade Inspectors (HMSO) 1979.
3/ See e.g. Derriman, Company-Investor Relations, (1969). The 
—  effect of restriction of information to shareholders and 
directors must await further discussion in Part III on the 
de facto structure of participation.
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often argues that such information of confidential nature could 
not be disclosed in annual reports but in confidential documentsy
accessible only to directors. Only the directors would have such 
access and knowledge about the policies pursued by the company, the 
way that decisions are reached and the details of the conduct and 
performance of the company. That being so, grave concern is 2/
aroused by the recent decision in Conway v. Petronius Clothing Co.Ltd. 
in which it was held that although directors have a common law right they
have no statutory rights to Inspect their Com^ppy's books of accounts
3/and other documents. —
In that case the plaintiffs, all being directors of P.Ltd. 
attempted to inspect the books of accounts and other records of the 
company. Their intention was to investigate suspected misapplication 
of the assets of the company by M.Ltd., a holding company which had 
control of P.Ltd. and Q who in turn was in effective control of M.Ltd. 
Their attempt was frustrated by the board of directors of M.Ltd. and 
so they instituted proceedings against the two companies, Q and two 
other directors for an order, in te r  a lia  for the production of the 
documents in question and percussion to take copies thereof. The
1/ See p.lo8 supra, on the members rights of access to books and 
records.
2/ ¿1978171 W.L.R.72.
3/ Minutes books were not specifically mentioned in the case, but on
—  the authority of M*.Cu8ker v.M*Rae 1966 S.C.253, it would appear
that the same rules apply. In that case it was held that a director 
has a Common Law right to inspect minutes of board meetings, but 
no statutory right. Both the director and a named Chartered 
Accountant were allowed access to the minutes both of the General 
and Board meetings. This case is important for giving a number 
the right to appoint an exp ert (an accountant in this case) to 
inspect and explain to him details which otherwise would make 
no sense to him.
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dependants contended that the plaintiffs' motive in seeking inform­
ation and copies of documents was to render assistance to certain of 
P.Ltd.'s trade competitors and further that inspection should not be 
ordered at least until the result was known of a forthcoming general 
meeting of P.Ltd. at which a resolution for the removal of the 
plaintiffs as directors would be considered. The defendents' con­
tention was accepted and the order refined. In so doing the Court 
applied the decision in B u m  v. London and South Wales Coal Co. and
1/ ----------------------------------------------------------------- t r ~
Risca Investment Co.~ and the Australian case of EAnan v. Ross.
In the former, the plaintiff brought an action to obtain inspection 
of and take copies of documents belonging to a company of which he 
was a director. The documents were in c.he custody of the company's 
solicitor. On the question whether a director has a right to see 
and take copies of documents belonging to his company, North J., 
held that he had such right not only at meetings. He emphasised 
the inconvenience that would arise if it were otherwise, from the 
delay and obstruction at meetings, and that the very object of a 
directors' having access to such documents was that he might be 
able to prepare himself to act at meetings. In the course of the 
judgement, he observed that it was necessary that confidence should 
be reposed in a director that he would use his knowledge for the 
benefit of his company,
"and if a company had not confidence in
their directors their course was to remove them". 3/
1/ (1890)7 T.L.R. 118
¡2/ (1922)22 S.R. (N.S.W.)351.
3/ At 119.
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In Edmatt v. Ross, Street C.J., having referred to Burn's 
Case stated:
"The right to inspect documents, and if, 
necessary, to take copies of them is 
essential to the proper performance of 
a director's duties, and, though I am 
not prepared to say that the Court might 
not restrain him in the exercise of this 
right if satisfied affirmatively that his 
intention was to abuse the confidence 
reposed in him and materially to injure 
the company, it is true nevertheless, that 
its exercise is, generally speaking, not a 
matter of discretion with the Court and that 
he cannot be called upon to furnish his 
reasons before being allowed to exercise it.
In the absence of a clear proof to the 
contrary the Court must assume that he will 
exercise it for the benefit of his company". 1/
2/
Although no statutory right is conferred by the 1948 Act —  on a director
to compel the delivery of documents for his inspection, the author-
37ities Indicate the existence of a Coiacon Law right to inspect.-  
That being so Courts retain a residue of discretion whether or not 
to order inspection - which discretion must be sparingly exercised, 
unless as in the Conway case there are reasons to suppose that the 
right might be abused or where the directors' removal from office 
seems imminent. Otherwise, refusal of the right to inspect would 
seriously threaten the right of directors to be actively involved in 
the performance of their duties and so put the monitoring and
1/ At 361.
2/ Certainly not by section 147: Plaintiff's contention in Conways 
v.Petronious was based on the existence of a right under this 
section. TKe section requires every company to keep proper books 
of account default of which is punisnable by a fine or imprison­
ment. The DOT Annual Report for 1979 shows that there were 7 
convictions under this section last year.
3/ Indeed the Court in Conway acknowledged the existence of this right 
at Common law which is "merely implicitly recognised" by Section 147, 
1948 Act.
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supervisory functions of the board in serious jeopardy, more so, if
he is a special interest or minority shareholder nominee. —  ^ The
decision in Conway must ben seen, therefore, entirely in the particular
circumstances of the case and not as limiting generally the right of
directors to inspect documents belonging to their company. In any case,
by reason of Section 12(6) of the 1976 Act (and as Professor Gower has
put it), the decision in Conway is "no longer good law so far as account
2/
books are concerned". —  That subsection requires that the accounting 
records of a company must be kept at the company's registered office or 
at such other place as the directors deem fit and "shall at all times be 
open to inspection by the officers of the company". This right is absolute 
and it seems unlikely to be denied even where a directors' or officer's 
motives are suspect. It seems therefore that Conway is now only good law 
in respect of other corporate documents minus the books of accounts.
Having described the legal structure of corporate governance in 
the last two chapters the nextPart is designed for a consideration of 
the de facto situation. This will provide the necessary basis from which 
the adequacy of the existing framework for participation is to be 
evaluated.
1/ There is a discussion of nominee directors in Chapter 9. 
2/ P. 504. Emphasis mine.
PART III
THE MECHANISM FOR CORPORATE ADMINISTRATION # H E  DE FACTO
-------------------Fqsï tW  ----------------------------
In this Part it is designed to examine the extent to 
which the corporate organs actually perform the functions ascribed 
to them in theory. Chapter 7 considers the extent of directors' 
participation in corporate governance, and Chapter 8 the extent of 
shareholders' participation.
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CHAPTER 7
BOARDROOM PARTICIPATION
1. The Practice
The legal theory about participation by the board of 
directors, it will be recalled, presupposes the supremacy of the 
board over all the company's officers. Power to manage the company 
belongs to the board as a body. The directors are expected to act 
collectively as one body and one director may act alone only under 
the authority of the board. The board is empowered to appoint any one 
of their body to be chairman or managing director to whom they may 
delegate some of their powers but the board does not by so doing rid 
itself of its authority over such officials. It is required to 
appoint other corporate officials and managers into the non-directorial 
echelons on the company's management structure; to make policy save those 
of major structural or fundamental importance, relying on advice from 
management and to ensure that policies formulated by it are discharged 
by management. While the above description fits the role fulfilled 
by boards in small companies it does not present an accurate assessment 
of the de facto system of operation of boards in large public companies. 
Whereas it is usually provided that "the business of the company shall 
be managed by directors...", in practice directors, as a board, seldom 
manage the business in large public companies. As J.Baker writes:
lAn Directors and Their Functions - A Preliminary Study.12.(1945).
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"Under the system of directorstes which has 
developed ... among large, listed companies 
directors are unable to 'manage' corporations 
in any narrow interpretation of the word... Directors 
do not and cannot 'direct' corporations in the sense 
of operating them".
This assessment of the nature of participation by the board is shared 
by many other writers on the subject, and it highlights a notable 
feature in the governance of the large company in contrast from the 
small private concern.
The realities of boardroom participation reveal a divergence
from the model presupposed by legal theory which has been variously
2/described by writers as a "skew" between belief and reality; - a
3/  L  /divergence between"theory and practice" - or between "myth and reality".
As a matter of fact, but not in law, the typical board in large companies 
does not select management and it neither sets business policies nor 
manages the business for these are management -^and not board functions.
1/ See for example, R.A.Gordon, Business Leadership in the Large 
Corporation (1961); M.L.Mace. Directors : Myth and Reality (1971) 
R.E.Pahl and J.T.Winkler, "The Economic Elite : Theory and Practice" 
in Stamworth and Giddens, Elites and Power in British Society (1974).
2/ Melvin Aron Eisenberg, "Legal Models of Management Structure in the 
Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors, and Accountants", (1975) 63. 
C*1.L.*.375.
3/ Pahl & Winkler, supra,
4/ Mace, supra.
5/ Meaning the executives.6/ See supra.
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Two of the moat influential studies of boardroom participation 
were published in 1945 in the U.S. In Business Leadership in the Large 
Corporations. Robert A. Gordon found that there was little or 
no indication that the boards of large companies initiated decisions, 
specific or general, in both financial and non-financial matters. He 
writes that although the board's approval function was more important 
than its initiating activities, "even with respect to approval, many 
boards in these large companies are almost completely passive", and 
that the final approval function was usually exercised by the Chief 
Executive in conjunction with either his immediate subordinates an
executive or finance committee of the board, or a few influential directors
, 2/acting as his informal advisors.- In his preface to the 1961 edition he 
writes:
"Granted the legal authority of the board and 
the unquestioned influence of some individual 
directors, it is still true that the essential 
business decisions are made chiefly by salaried 
executives, not by the board of directors as s 3 . 
formal body". -
4/
In the other study published in 1945, John C. Baker, - 
similarly found that major policies in production, marketing, finance 
and personnel were usually formulated by the executives and not even 
formally confirmed by the board, while in such matters es addition of new
7/ See supra. V  See PP-1287146.
1/ At VIII.
4/ Directors and their Functions, supra.
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products, preparation of operating budgets and negotiation of collective 
bargaining agreements, the board's role was limited to receipt and 
consideration of after-the-fact reports.
One of the most incisive studies of the functioning of boards
undertaken in this country is that of two sociologists, Pahl and Winkler 
2/published in 1974. - The main aim of their research was to study how
3/directors perceived and negotiated their roles. - They found in the
4/process, that the ability of the board to formulate policy was limited - 
but they recognised its importance as a "legitimating institution". As 
they put it:
"To be sure, the final yea or nay at a board 
meeting may be seen as the decision point, 
and may so appear in corporate histories...
But the board action we have observed are 
better interpreted we feel, merely as ratifications 
of decisions made earlier and elsewhere, sometimes
1/ At 131-132. J.K.Galbraith in The New Industrial State (1968) advances 
this argument further by claiming that the direction of the corporation 
is not really set by the board and the managers, many of whom sit on 
the board, but rather by what he regards as the "Technostructure".
See Chapter 6.
2/ "Economic Elites: Theory and Practice", supra. Other notable U.K.based 
studies on boardroom participation includetSir Walter Puckey, The 
Boardroom : A Guide to the Role and Function of Directors (1969); 
R.t.Tricker, The Independent Director. A Study of the Non-Executive 
Director and of the Audit Committee (1978), and P.S.Florence, Ownership 
Control and Success of Large Companies (1961). In the context of 
industrial democracy see Eric Batstone, Industrial Democracy :
European Experence (1970).
3/ Part of the research involved following each executive director of 
the companies studied, through one complete day of work and observing 
and recording his activities and interaction.
4/ The study confirmed the critics argument "that directors are not 
necessarily taking the decisions imputed to them" ; p.103.
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by much more junior men, aboue which Che board 
had no practical alternative. The distinction 
between "making" and "taking" decisions is relevant.Boards o f  d irectors are, we fe e l , best conceived 
as decision-taking institutions that is, as legitimating .. 
institutions, rather than as decision-making ones". -
The writers identified two types of boards: pro-forma boards and
2/functioning boards. - They reported that pro-forma boards function 
in practice neither as a decision-making nor as a consultative body 
but exists only to conform with the requirements of company law. In
some cases these boards do not meet even though fictious board resolutions
3/and minutes are kept. - Pro-forma boards in these companies become 
merely superfluous or an encumbrance on the company. This occurs 
when a company is dominated by one man whose personal approval is 
required for every action of any significance or when it is controlled 
by a small cabal, which might be formed by a small number of executives 
who work in close physical proximity and are thus "in continuous executive
4/
session", in the case of a superfluous board. - A board becomes 
an encumbrance, according to their definition, when it is in part filled 
with men who are seen by those in effective control of the company, as 
irrelevant to its functioning. In companies with pro-forma boards, the 
rule is, according to the authors, that no board meetings are held and if 
they take place at all, are merely for the purpose of ratifying decisions 
taken earlier by the autocrat or the top management cabal.
1/ At 110.
2/ Described in pp.104-107.
3/ This is a very obvious violation of Section 145(1). .
4/ See also S.P.Florence, Ownership. Control and Success of Large 
Companies, (1961), 80.
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The other type of board identified by them ; the "functioning 
board", they described as one which plays some role, albeit small, in 
the operation of a company. This role, at the minimum, consists 
in ter  a l ia  in the power to veto some types of management proposals. 
Companies with this type of board are characterised by regular board 
meetings which is the focus around which all other corporate and 
individual time scheduling is oriented. In such companies preparatory 
meetings and other activities by managers are very much evident before 
the board meetings.
, Even in the so-called functioning boards the preparatory
activities and pre-board meetings organised by management, are ironically 
the basis of the board's weakness because they anticipate the questions 
which are likely to be raised at board meetings and by skilfully 
structuring the information available to the board are able to pre-empt 
possible opposition at board meetings. By sealing off any source of 
contradictory information management is able to manipulate the board 
successfully.
In his book, Directors : Myth and Reality, based on empirical 
research in the U.S. Professor Mace constructs a model of boardroom 
participation which, though not of universal application, is quite 
typical of boards of large public companies. The author found that
boards perform the following functions:
1/ As Pahl and Winkler study subsequently revealed, the practice in 
boards in the U.K. is not dissimilar to what Mace found in the U.S.
An earlier writer, George Goyder in The Responsible Company (1961) 
had written that the American and German board practices differ 
from the British Boards, p.19. While the German situation is 
obviously quite different there is, from the evidence available, 
not much difference between the American and British boards.
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( 1)
©
To provide advice and counael.
To serve as some sort of discipline, and 
To act in crisis situations;
and he dislodged the commonly held belief in the board's effectiveness
based on the view that it:
"establishes the basic objectives, corporate 
strategies and broad policies of the company..., 
that it selects the president and that it serves 
as a forum for asking discerning questions about 
the company".
Evidence was adduced on each of these points and he argued that none 
of those functions is in fact performed by the board. "Management", 
as one of his executive interviewees told him, "creates the policies.
We decide the course we are going to paddle our canoe in. We tell our 
directors the direction of the company and the reasons for it... We communicate 
with them. But they are in no position to challenge what we propose to do".
Such empirical evidence as that referred to above leaves the 
legal theory on board's participation gravely faulted and lends some support
to the conclusion that the common notion presupposed by law about the role
2/of boards in large companies is unrealistic. - The question which 
immediately arises is who then does the managing, appointment of officials, 
setting of policy and generally directing the operation of the business 
since the board does not perform these functions. The question has been
1/ At 14.
2/ Incidentally, there is no definition by Company Law of the word 
"manage" when it is said that the board is to manage the business 
of a company. This point is taken up by Prof. Dtflev F.Vagts in 
"Directors : Myth and Reality", (1976) 31 Bus. Lawyer 1227,1230.
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partly answered by those who have pointed out that it is management 
and not the board that does the managing; but that is only half- 
truth and does not completely answer the question. The answer is 
that the problem of operating large companies is extremely complex 
that quite often it is impossible to say that one man or one body 
of persons has responsibility for decision or policy:
"The process of formulating policy can begin at 
the top level with a group of senior managers or 
the board itself; it can then involve the whole of 
the managerial hierarchy, or a group of companies, 
subsidiary boards and their managers;it might 
then work its way back up to board level for a 
final decision or for the seal of approval. Many 
internal and external pressures may affect those 1 .
involved in devising a policy and taking a decision". -
To understand the nature of the structure of decision-making in companies 
one must ascertain the nature of the alleged functions of the board and 
how the board is organised to discharge them.
2. The Functions of the Board
What is general^regarded as the "role" of the board resolves
into managerial and supervisory functions - and this is a distinction
2/
which is rarely drawn by analysts of the boards powers. -
1/ Bullock Report (Cmnd 6706), pp.67-68.
2/ By contrast under German Company Law this distinction is clearly 
drawn. See R.R.Pennington, ed., German Company Law. European 
Commercial Law Library No.3.1975.
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"Are directorial and managerial rolea identical?" 
asks Sir Walter Puckey. "If not, how do they differ?" His
answer is that both roles are "too closely related"; his evidence 
being that when for instance "senior company executives are promoted 
to director status they often think and act as executive managers
while sitting at the board table. They are board executives rather2/than directors". - Many writers especially in the management 
sciences do not sufficiently keep these two roles apart and by
lumping both roles together demonstrate the same shortcomings as
3/
in the legal theory.- The Bullock Report exhibited a tendency to adopt 
this approach when it drew up a list of matters for which boards 
usually have ultimate responsibility to include
(a) appointing senior managers, reviewing their 
performance and fixing their remuneration;
(b) setting the company's objectives and strategic 
plans and ensuring that adequate machinery exists 
in the company for planning;
(c) controlling the financial affairs of the company 
including the approval of capital programmes and 
capital expenditure, and allocation resources between 
operations.
1/ The Boardroom, supra.
2/ At xi.
3/ See e.g. Harold Koontz, The Board of Directors and Effective Management 
(1967), Chapter 2. But see George ftull. the Directors' Handbook (1969) 
at 37. In a letter to The Times a reader challenges the view by 
Prof.Moore, Deputy Principal o£ the London Graduate School of Business 
Studies that directors and managers are synonymous. The readerpoxrectly 
disagrees with.this writing that "one of the fundamental fallacies in 
commerce and industry" is the belief that members of the board are 
super managers. "It is true that they are generally appointed to a 
board as a result of a career in management, but it should not be 
assumed that their function remains that of a manager". The Times 
June 29,1978.
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(d) agreeing Che company's organisation Co meet
Che objectives and delegating auChority for certain 
functions within the company;
(e) considering policy on take-overs and mergers;
(f) monitoring and evaluating performance;
(g) setting overall guidelines for employment and 
personnel policies.
The Report, however, immediately qualifies the above position 
by stating that:
"although it may have overall responsib ility  
in these areas, the extent to which a main 
board exercises detailed control of policy is 
inevitably limited. In most companies it is the 
apex of decision-making hierarchy and the focus 
of managerial authority. It cannot exercise 
detailed influence over every aspect of the company's 
affairs and it is largely reliant on the proposals and 
policies put to it by management".
Although the board performs some of these functions directly as a body 
it "performs" others only indirectly by its approval of policies initiated
and presented to it by management. Those functions which the board may
3/perform directly as one body are examined below. -
1/ At 66-67.
2/ At 67. Emphasis is mine. It is clearly important to draw a distinction 
between matters which the board has responsibility for and matters which 
the board as a body do themselves perform.
3/ But compare the remark of the distinguished American scholar, Prof.
C.C.Brown, that "Most boards of directors... don't know exactly what 
they are supposed to do".Putting the Corporate Board to Work,(1976),5.
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The nature of the board'• functions is described in the 
opening lines of Guidelines for Directors, issued by the Institute of 
Directors as follows:
"Primarily the board of directors establishes 
policy and controls management. To achieve this 
the board has two main responsibilities.
(1) to set up and maintain the most suitable 
executive structure, and
(2) To ensure that the board itself is so constructed
that it can supervise efficiently the carrying out of the ,, 
company's long-term objectives".
It has been established that the board does not set policy, but the 
factors which make the board unable to establish policy do not affect 
its ability to establish control over or supervise management. Indeed, 
the board is enabled to do this by retaining power to select and monitor the 
company's executive structure and to ensure that the board itself is so 
constituted as to be able to exercise its supervisory functions efficiently. 
Thus, the functions of the board as described in the Guidelines for Directors 
may be set out as including the (a) selection and removal of executives, 
and (b) supervisory/monitoring functions.
Mace's findings indicate that even these functions are of 
very little consequence. He found that even though the board selects or 
appoints the Chief Executive (C.E.O.) it is,generally, not responsible for 
the appointment of other executives. Even with respect to the Chief 
Executives the board is rarely responsible for their appointment except
1/ (1974)
2/ At 13.
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in cases of disaster or in a sudden emergency when the board is 
suddenly propelled into a decision-making function. Selection of 
the chief executive is, therefore, only a de jure function of the 
board, the de facto power being in the incumbent C.E.O. Usually, 
an out-going chief executive will have a great deal to say in the 
selection of a successor and would under normal circumstances not 
leave the matter to the board. According to Juran and Louden,
"Some C.E.O's have resorted to the "sealed 
letter" method of selecting their successors 
in an emergency. They have named their successors 
and the reasons for their choice but have not 
amounced this. Instead, they have recorded it in 
a sealed letter which is not to be opened unless 
they meet with some sudden emergency".
Regarding the board's supervisory or monitoring function, 
the statement of one chief executive responding to Mace's question on 
the issue is quite illustrative:
"When the board is monitoring the management, it is 
watching what is going on. As long as it is happy 
with what is going on, whether the member asks abrasive 
questions or whether they don't ask... is really 
unimportant. But if the company starts faltering, 
and it becomes obvious for one reason or another 
that the company doesn't have proper management, a group 
of outsiders needs to make the key decisions - whether to 
change the management". 3/
1/ The Corporate Director. American Management Association (1966). 
2/ At 104.
3/ At 28.
The fact that most boards are often powerless and the consequences which 
tend to follow the complacency of directors have been highlighted in a 
number of Department of Trade Reports.
The Lonrho saga is a case in point. News about 
this company first hit the headlines in March and April 1973 when eight 
Lonrho directors attempted to remove the managing director and chief 
executive, Mr. "Tiny" Rowlands from executive office. He took legal 
action to prevent the board from implementing this proposal until such 
time as a shareholders' meeting could give its decision on the matter.
The Court action failed and the eight directors agreed to defer action 
until after an extra-ordinary general meeting called for 31 May 1973.
At this meeting Lonrho shareholders supported Mr.Rowland, and the 
eight directors who had sought to remove him were themselves dismissed.
The principal complaint by the eight directors against Mr.Rowland 
were brought out in a series of affidavits during the court action.
They were:
(1) That Mr.Rowland either entered into important 
transactions on behalf of the company without the 
approval of the board, or that in certain instances
he misled the board as to the nature of the transaction 
in order to obtain approval for it; and
(2) That some of the transactions were improperly entered
2/into for the benefit of directors. -
1/ Lonrho Ltd,.Department of Trade Report (H.M.S.O.) 1976.
2/ There were several other criticisms against Mr.Rowlands, but it 
is not necessary to set these out here.
3 0 3.
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Mr. Allan HqrnUb, Q.C. and Sir William SI innings, CBE, C.A. were 
appointed inspectors by the Department of Trade under Section 165(b) 
of the 1948 Act to investigate the affairs of the company. Their 
report was very critical of the way the company had been conducted 
and Mr.Rowland was on a number of occasions in the report criticised 
for being wholly or partly responsible for withholding information 
from the Lonrho board or from shareholders, or of giving them misleading 
information. One of the company's directors in his evidence at the 
investigations had this to say about the situation which existed on 
the board:
""Tiny" (was in charge of the management of Lonrho).
It was patently obvious very soon after one joined that 
he was the moving spirit in the whole thing, and that 
he was the one in the end to whom most decisions went . . 
one way and another".
And as for the chairman Alan Ball,
"It became fairly obvious that he was not - although 2/ 
supposedly chairman, Tiny was the boss".
Mr. Rowland's view of the role that a boatd should play 
was summarised by him as follows:
'....We had established a pattern of behaviour... 
and so I assume that the way we were carrying on, 
most companies were carrying on. I always thought 
and heard that Harley Drayton..." has decided that 
.... " and the people used to troop into his 
various investments, 17 or 18 companies, and Harley 
would say "Well, we are going to sell this, we are
1/ At 10.05 Evidence of Major Mackenzie 
2/ Ibid.
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going to buy this, snd incidentally, 
he has got this, and I have done that", 
and this was the pattern and the right sort of 
behaviour, and the rest was sort of Christinas 
tree decorations".
However,not all Lonrh o directors were prepared to play the "Christinas 
tree decoration" role and they promptly resigned. One director gave 
his reasons for resigning as follows:
"As a non-executive director, the second 
reason for my resigning is /thatj... I have 
felt for a long tint... that Tiny pays little 
heed to any advice or any views which his 
co-directors might offer him and that the company 
is run more as Tiny's private empire than as an ,, 
important public company". -
Tiny himself admitted this fault and some of his co-directors volunteered 
to educate him on how to run a public company, but apparently their 
advice had little impact.
The Inspectors held Mr.Rowland "primarily responsible for the
policy that was followed in the company", "which reflects a course of
3/conduct that we condem". - They nevertheless acknowledged the man's 
achievements:
"Lonrho as it is today is very largely 
Mr.Rowland's creation. He is a man who 
has vision, negotiating ability, determination
1/ At para.10.30.
2/ 10.36 Mr. Caldecotts reasons for resigning. The first was his
disagreement with the policies of the management.
3/ At 12.62.
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and personality in unusual measure, coupled 
with unbounded energy to apply his talents.
He has a determination to get his way... when he 
decides that he wants something, events move at 
a great speed. The application of these talents 
externally in the comoercial development of the 
group have been the basis of its success, but turned 
inwards and applied in relation to the Board's control 
of the group or his own personal affairs they have led .. 
to the criticisms set out in our report”. -
"The lesson is that a company needs a Board that can 
provide an independent check on its executive, that 
it is fully and fairly informed of the group '.a affairs; 
that is in a position to monitor the actions of the 
executive and that, in consequence, is in a position 
in the event of some unexpected happening ... to give 
shareholders an immediate and convincing account of the -, 
situation".
The Lonrho Report and the report into the affairs of the late
3/Sir Eric Miller, £n Peachey Property Corporation -  illustrate 
ho*-’ redundant a board becomes under an autocratic, one-man management.
The latter was also an investigation under Section 165(b) 1948 Act 
by Rayman Ridwell Q.C. and Stanley Sammll F.C.A.,inspectors appointed 
by the Department of Trade. To the outside world Sir Eric Miller, 
chief executive and chairman of Peachey, was well known as a rich man 
in his own right. He seemed to know every important dignitary worth 
knowing and everyone assumed that his style and his connections were 
explanation enough for the gifts and all the money he was throwing around, 
including a champagne party given by way of a surprise at No.10 Downing Street
1/
2/
3/
At 12.134.
At 12.136.
Peachey Property Corporation Ltd, Department of Trade Report,1979. 
(H.M.S.O.).
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to nark Prime Minister Harold Wilson's resignation. He ran huge bills 
at the Churchill Hotel at the company's expense, took loans from the company 
without security, entered into agreements for which huge commissions 
were paid as if he was acting on the board's authority and generally 
used the company's money as if it belonged to him. It was not possible 
to know when Sir Miller was running expenses in his own name and when he 
was doing it in the company's name. Within the company his fellow 
executive directors seem to have concluded that it was not for the 
likes of them to ask the reasons for each transaction that came to 
their knowledge. They were not, as one explained to the inspectors;
"men in the Miller mould*! What he gave them to sign,they largely signed.
Mr. Thompson, latterly the only continuing executive director, "never 
aspired to know what was going on in the higher reaches of company policy..., 
he played no effective role on the board since it was not in his nature 
to question the decisions or the conduct of the chairman". Asked
by the inspectors: "Are you saying that effectively the board meetings 
were merely a rubber stamp for...the expenditure?", he answered tersely, 
"Yes". 2/
3/The report, regarded by some as generous to a fault, - perhaps 
because of Sir Eric Miller's suicide which made it impossible to receive 
evidence from the principal witness, concluded:
1/ Para.43.
2/ Para. 44.
3/ The Guardian. Editorial, January 31 1979
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"We have tended to exonerate each member of the 
board from any heavy responsibility, though 
we must later make some individual criticisms.
It is not inconsistent for us to criticise the 
board as a whole as being unduly compliant, uncritical 
and gullible, at certain times and in certain respects. 
The board had a weak construction, which is not to say 
that its individual components were necessarily weak. 
Each member, if he had his time over again, would 
doubtless be a tower of strength against a dominating 
chairman. The most important lesson is for future 
directors, since a repetition of the 'Peachey Affair' 
might attract a less compassionate appraisal".
With due respect, the sentiments expressed by the Inspectors 
in the last two sentences might be just wishful thinking, for this is 
not the first time that able and competent directors have remained 
docile whilst the chief executive plunders the company and it is the 
contention in this thesis that unless the basic structure for board's
operations is modified, the 'Peachey Affair" might still repeat itself.
2/For example, in First Re-Investment Trust Limited - a company whose 
affairs were investigated by the Department of Trade and reported 
in 1974, the directors of a listed company, all experienced city 
businessmen, were found to have stood by while the chairman was able 
fraudulently to purchase the company's assets for himself at a price 
which represented only a fraction of their true market value. Although 
all the directors were found in breach of their duties the Inspectors 
were also compassionate on some of the directors whom they considered 
less guilty. - 1
1/ Para.69.
2/ Australian Estates Co.Ltd. Etc. Also referred to as First Re-Investment 
Trust Ltd..Department of Trade Report (1974) H.M.S.O.
3/ See para.272
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Th« fact that in these companies, the majority of, if not all 
directors,were competent businessmen and that it took a relative 
"outsider", to expose the mis-management raises serious questions.
And one must ask why the boardihave so often remained passive until 
some catastrophe jolts them into action. An attempt is made in the 
next section to answer this question.
3. The Reasons the Board Does Not Manage
For over half a century now it has become widely acknowledged 
that the decision-making power in companies rests, not with the owners 
but with management, who they appoint to oversee the operation of the 
company. Management exercises both power over the day-to-day administration 
of the company and over those other functions traditionally associated 
with ownership. Similarly, the power conventionally attributed to the 
board of directors are quite often exercised not by the board par ae
but by management acting as the board. Generally, the "non-management"
3/directors - on the board have little or no say in the making of board 
policy, decisions or, indeed, day-to-day management. In general, only in 
a very restricted sense does the de facto structure of corporate governance 
correspond with the de ju re structure.
1/ This is not necessarily "outside directors" but directors outside 
the "cabal" that surrounds the chief executive such as was Lord 
Mais in Peachey and Mr.Mills in First Re-Investments Ltd.
2/ The reports discussed above are only a few of the numerous cases 
that have been investigated by the Departments, and examples are 
not hard to come by. See also the reports on Hartley Baird Ltd., 
Ashbourne Investments Ltd. A useful list of other reports is set out 
in a Table by Tom Hadden in (1980) 1 Co. Law, 14-16, with a brief 
note on the nature of the inspectors' report on each company 
investigated and the action taken. 
y  That is, non-executive directors.
Although much research has been undertaken to ascertain the 
reasons for the drift of power of ownership to management, 
relatively little has been done to investigate the reasons for the drift of 
decision-making power of the board to management. The reasons for the 
drift become apparent from an analysis of the internal structure of 
the board especially with reference to its size, composition and the 
several constraints which inhibit the proper exercise by some directors 
of their powers.
(i) Structural Problems
2/In Company Law directors are appointed by the shareholders, - 
but in practice boards have almost complete freedom to determine how 
they are constituted. Limitations on the scope to which a board may 
design its own composition (except the initial directors at formation) 
is largely voluntarily imposed by them and even though the shareholders 
have legal powers so to do, they rarely limit the authority of board or 
modify their composition by special articles. This leaves management 
free to arrogate to itself power to perpetuate itself and has seriously
undermined the provisions of the Act relating to the composition and
3/conduct of the board. -
It is important to consider the composition of boards because 
a board's effectiveness in corporate administration depends in te r  alia
1/ See references on this in Chapter 2.
2/ Except that the board may fill casual vacanciesorappoint additional 
directors. Art.95.
3/ See, for example, Arts.98-109, Table A.
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on its size, the balance of "executive" and "non-executive" mendiera 
their qualification, and ao on. A combination of aome or all of theae 
factors helps in determining the de fa c to role of the board.
(i) The Problem of Size:
As the law does not fix a maximum number of directors for 
companies the number in each company depends on individual needs. The 
Bullock Committee in 1975-76 analysed the boards of The Times 1,000 
companies with a view to finding out the size range of company boards
2
and how many of them had non-executive directors and in what proportion. - 
The study showed that of the companies studied only 46 had more than 
15 directors, and over 755 had ten or less. The analysis confirmed
the common generalisation that small companies tend to have small boards
3/of directors while large companies have large boards. - Of the 184
companies with under 1,000 employees only 15 had a board with more than
10 directors. On the other hand 97 of the 155 companies with over 10,000
4/employees had a board with more than 10 directors. -
1/ These terms are sometimes referred to, respectively, as "insiders"
and "outsiders", "full-timers" and "part-timers". However, definitions 
for classifying directors into these categories vary and are sometimes 
vague. See for example, C.S.Vance.Boards of Directors: Structure and 
Performance (1964), 5 and cf. Harold Koontz, The Board of Directors and 
Effective Management(1967) 122-134.
2/ See Bullock Report,pp.63 and 64.
3/ These figures are supported by the recent Kora/Ferry Internationals 
Boards of Directors Study,1980.
4/ What is an 'ideal' .size of a board is debatable.Whereas Harold Koontz 
(at p.121) believes thirteen to be a good number, Sir Walter Puckey 
thinks even that number is too large.A 1978 survey by the Institute 
of Directors and Booz Allen & Hamilton found that most directors of 
300 companies interviewed, considered 12 to be the maximum number of 
directors for the effective running of a large company - which comes 
close to Harold Kootnz's figure.This is a matter that is usually determined 
by the needs of each company and at any rate the latest figures available 
show that the average number of directors in U.K.companies is 9.
(The Kom/Ferry Internationals.Boards of Directors Study 1980). The 
Bullock Report proposed a minimum number of 11.Details ofthese proposals 
have been discussed in Chapter 1.
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A> a general proposition, it is important that in order to 
operate efficiently and effectively a board should neither be too small 
to permit proper representations of varied experiences and points of 
view and not too large and unwieldy to allow adequate free discussion of 
issues before it. But where a board is weak by reason of size this 
has often been because it is too large and unwieldy.
A large board may result out of a desire to afford representation 
of varied outside interests as, for example, in financial companies where 
it may be desirable or even essential to have directors drawn from as 
wide a source as possible in the hope that they could bring their 
knowledge and possible custom into the board or that the board could 
through their influence secure assistance from outside. A board may also 
seek specialist representation, product representation and racial or 
geographical representation. In addition, a variety of interests may be
2/represented on a board depending on the company's history or background. -
For example, in many cases of mergers and consolidations the board of a
3/merged company by retaining the former directors - and other ownership 
interests might become larger than desirable. A certain category 
of people whose presence unnecessarily leadsto large boards are entrepreneurs 
and founders of companies. Because of their earlier capital investments
1/ See H. Koontz,119.
2/ See Pahl and Winkler,op.cit. 105-106.
3/ Usually such arrangements are entered into in order to win the support 
of the existing directors in the merger or take-over bid.
4/ For example, a minority or nominee shareholder whose support has
been instrumental to the successful outcome of the merger arrangement.
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and emotional attachment to the company these executive directors are 
usually unwilling to retire from the board to make room for outsiders 
and younger people who are scarcely trusted as being capable of carrying on 
the business. The best that could happen in such companies is that the old 
man retains his seat while fresher and younger people are appointed into 
the board, and this ultimately adds up to a larger number than desirable.
There are compelling reasons for the type of executives 
described above to seek representation, at least, as a temporary measure 
even though this might inevitably lead to an excessively large board.
It is reasonable to expect that majority shareholders - corporate or 
individual-vould seek to be represented on the board for this sustains 
confidence that their interests would be more adequately protected by 
seeking a place on the board. In the case of a take-over the new owners would 
seek to retain the old management especially when* this is one of the 
most valuable assets of the company taken over. These retained directors 
add up to a substantial number.
Other interests that commonly get places on the board include 
major suppliers and directors of related companies who may influence 
business toward the company. So also are senior members of the company's 
legal, accounting, or technical advisers.
1/ A remarkable example of the unwillingness of an ageing director  to step down i s  the case in  Re.H.R.Harmer ¿1959.7 1 W.L.R.62., and also  the chairman of DECCA who clung to o ff ic e  u n til h is  recent 
death.
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The problem with an over-sized board is that not all the directors 
are sufficiently 'employed' in undertaking those basic functions which an 
active board should perform. Communication between the directors is 
poor and there is a tendency for some directors to be simply complacent or 
devote less attention to policies and other matters in the hope that some 
others are performing these functions. Usually, the executive directors 
are left to do all the initiating jobs and the board only meets to approve 
their proposals. On the other hand, a "moderately" sized board ensures 
that board meetings are not unwieldy, allows for free discussions and 
enables the sense of the meeting to be more easily ascertained, by 
eliminating verbosity and encouraging the members to actively partake 
in deliberations and so contribute to issues.
(ii) Other Constraints:
Apart from the general problem of size which precipitates 
a docile board or a one-man dominated board, there are a number of other 
constraints which affect a director or group of directors on a board, 
leaving the exercise of the board's powers in a few hands. The non­
executive directors are particularly affected by and vulnerable to these 
constraints but the executives are not totally free. The constraints 
include the method of appointment and lack of security of tenure for 
directors as well as limitations of time and information.
(a) Method of Board Appointments:
The method by which directors are appointed is such that when 
they get onto the board they become economically or psychologically 
dependent on the company's executives, particularly the chief executive, 
and this is irrespective of whether the appointee is an executive or non­
executive director. Sir Walter Fuckey writes that:
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"The ambition of most managers is to attain board membership, and
when they do it should indicate, I believe, that they have earned • it by
*
superior management skill". They would naturally not do anything to 
jeopardise their position. The fact is that executive directors do not 
demonstrate their superior skill qua directors. Their skills are 
exercised at pre-board management meetings and briefings, and 
generally, proposals are in a "finished form" by the time they get to the board. 
The executive director is unlikely to adopt a different line from that 
presented to the board by the chief executive on whom he is dependent for 
both his promotion to the board and even his retention of his job. The 
position and attitude of executives on boards yore described to Mace as 
follows:
"The vice-president inside-director type is in 
precarious position at board meeting. He just 
can't say anything in disagreement with his 
boss, so what he usually does is sit quietly and 
wait until he is called upon to speak. -
Insiders don't ask questions or raise issues 
at board meetings because their points of view 
and contributions have all been expressed at 
meetings of management prior to the board meeting.
All the insiders have been through the monthly 
performance review. Rarely - no, never - does 
the head of one operating group raise a question 
at the board meeting concerning the performance 
of another operating group. He would not do that 31 
at a board meeting".
1/ Juran & Louden called these "rigged" meetings. They report one 
described to them by an interviewee: "Before a board meeting, I 
get together with the rest of the management team, which includes 
some inside directors. Our management meetings have a good deal 
of freedom of discussion, and we do get real challenges to everyone's 
views, including mine. However, we also agree that the differences 
in the management team should be cleared up before we go into the 
board meeting and that we should present a united front to the board. 
This is what actually takes place". At 174.
2/ At 119-120.
3/ At 120.
* At p. xii.
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In some companies such attitudes are institutionalized:
"... We have a sort of rule round hare - 
we've even formalised it in a sense.
Mow, we fight like cats at the management 
meetings. But if any of our key inside people 
on the board feels strongly opposed to something 
the president is asking the board to approve - 
and again, this doesn't happen very often - rather 
than go to the meeting and vote for it contrary 
to his judgment, he just doesn't go to that particular 
board meeting. This is sort of a screwy idea, but 
that's the way its done here".
Non-executives are, in this respect, only marginally better. 
Usually they are persons who have full-time jobs elsewhere such as executive 
directors in some other companies and so their non-executive directorships 
are only part-time. A non-executive director is, therefore, less
economically dependent on the instant company than his executive colleagues,
2/on the same board. - However, some non-executives are appointed even 
though their skills are irrelevant to the company and sometimes for 
reasons which have nothing to do with the contribution they can make to 
the business. It may be just "because they*?* old friends of the chairman, 
because they are the company's solicitor or accountant, because they are
well-known and prestigious, because a merchant banker thought an outside
3/name would be useful at the time of going public, etc." - Although 
these reasons do not warrant strong economic ties, they certainly make the 
directors psychologically tied to the chief executive, who can always
1/ Ibid.
2/ The Korn/Ferry survey shows that on average non-executive directors 
earn £4,422 a yearj £28,380 for executive directors. A 1979 survey 
by the Bank of England considered £7,500 to be the maximum remuneration 
for non-executives. Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin. Dec.1979.
3/ Pahl & Winkler, 106. The Korn/Ferry Survey confirms that these 
reasons are still factors for non-executive appointments.
count on the loyalty of his friends, colleagues, etc, to go along 
with him on the board and "rubber stamp" policies or proposals 
submitted for their consideration.
(b) Security of Tenure;
The problem of security of directors' appointments is related 
to their economic dependence on their board appointments. This affects 
the effectiveness of a board in the sense that directors who are 
dependent on remuneration from their directorships are unlikely to 
adopt an attitude at board meetings which would put their appointments 
at risk; nor would they resign in disagreement over unwise policies 
adopted by the board. More importantly as most directors owe their 
appointments to the chief executive, they are also liable to be removed at 
his instance at any time, for "(i)n general the chairman and chief 
executive /in U.K. companies axtj inclined to regard board appointments 
as very much their prerogatives almost in the same way as Prime Ministers 
regard Cabinet making....”
Usually in making his choice of a director, particularly the 
non-executive the chief executive takes into consideration whether a 
candidate can be counted on not to "rock the boat". One of Professor 
Mace's respondents told him:
* 317.
1/ "The Board of Directors - A Survey of its Structure, Composition
and Role”, Management Survey Report, No.10 BIM 1972.
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"In Che companies I know, Che ouCside directors 
always agree vich management. That's why they are 
there. I have one friend that's just the greatest . . 
agreer that ever was, and he is on a dozen boards...." -
It has become an accepted "ethic" of the directors' profession that the 
chief executive has complete power of control over the board and is not to 
be challenged at board meetings. Members of the board who elect to 
challenge the C.E.O's powers are advised to resign or do so before 
being asked, as opposition to C.E.O's is considered "unethical". For 
directors who care enough it is better to save your honour than face 
dismissal for failing to "toe the line". V
(c) Limitation of Time;
The law requires that a director is not bound to attend
every board meeting although he should endeavour to attend whenever in
3/the circumstances he is reasonably able to do so. - The effect of 
this is that some directors rarely attend board meetings and even some of 
those who do, spend very little time to prepare for such meetings and 
generally the amount of time spent by some directors is deplorably 
inadequate for such an important body.
The 1980 Korn/Ferry International Survey on U.K. companies 
shows that on average boards meet ten times a year. If a board is to be 
effective and if its members are to exercise due care and prudence in
1/ Mace, 99.
2/ This was a recourse adopted by many directors in Lonrho Ltd. and 
many other DoT Reports. So did Angus Murray, the non-executive 
director who first alerted the Prudential Assurance Ltd. to the 
conspiracy in the Newman Industries Board after he failed to persuade 
his colleagues to the right path. The Financial Times, March 3,1980. 
described him as "The man who stood up for his principles".
3/ Re. City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. ¿1925/ AC 407.
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directing the effeira of a company, it is difficult to see how 
under normal circumstances, board responsibilities can be discharged 
without at least 12 meetings a year. Since board meetings last only 
a few hours the indication is that only a few boards spend up to 40 hours 
(an equivalance of one working week) for meetings every year.
Ironically, it is sometimes suggested that board meetings 
are meant to be short,ususally not more than a few hours - boards are 
not "debating societies" it is argued, and it is evidence of lack 
of homework on the part of the executives if an issue tabled by them 
to the board becomes a subject of protracted debate lasting several hours.
The limitation of time factor makes it impossible for the 
typical board of modern large companies to "manage" the business in any 
true sense. Most businesses are too complex to be managed by persons 
who devote only an average of ten days a year - for certainly, such 
complex organisations concerned with complex choices and policies cannot 
be "managed" on a part-time basis.
There are, admittedly, circumstances where regular, such
as monthly meetings may not be required for a board to maintain appropriate
2/contact with a company, its plans and operations.-' For example, regular
meetings may be supplemented by enough special informal meetings to give 
a director adequate contact with the company. Also companies with wholly
1/ See Eisenberg, 379; Mace 185.
2/ Where there are such informal contacts, frequent board meetings become 
unnecessary except where simultaneous action by all directors is desired.
executive boards may need only a few regular board meetings each 
year. In some of such cases, a board meeting may actually not be 
necessary at all since what is really held is a "management meeting".
Again, a number of companies operate through executive and other 
committees, so that the real work of the board is done by these 
committees. In this event the whole board may find it unnecessary to 
meet more than say, quarterly.
However, there is another side to the above argument.
Firstly, special informal meetings cannot and should not supersede or 
replace board meetings as the decision-making forum for directors, and 
so cannot derogate from the necessity for board meetings. Secondly, 
holding management meetings in place of board meetings appears to encourage 
an "evil" which board meetings are supposed to forestall, that is 
"managerial autocracy". Thirdly, where a substantial part of the 
board's work has already been done by committees, there is a danger 
that non-executive board members would abdicate their directorial 
responsibilities and be kept further in the dark, as they are usually 
not members of such special committees. This would defeat the potential 
advantages of having them on the board in the first place.
The time constraint particularly inhibits participation by
non-executives because they generally have less time to devote to each
1/  2/of the several companies on which they sit. - This is one weakness -
1/ Perhaps, this accounts for their higher average number of attendances 
per year which stands at thirteen as against ten for the whole board, 
(Kom/Ferry). However, they are less likely to spend time in between 
meetings for the company's business and they are not usually at the 
management's preparatory meetings.
2/ That is, from the point of view of active board supervision.
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in Che system of interlocking directorates which, though now popular 
amongst large companies, exposes the non-executive directors to easy 
manipulation by the executives and managers who know more than they 
about the companies.
Given the other constraints which together with time limitation 
face them, directors need to meet more frequently than they do at present 
if they are to be able to change the growing conception of the board 
as being largely*ymbolic - a "rubber stamp" rather than a "rudder".
(d) Limitation of Information
Management's power to control, structure and manipulate 
information reaching the board is one of the serious constraints against 
the board's effectiveness in carrying out its monitoring or supervisory 
functions. In most largecompanies there is a "conscious collusion among 
the management.... to present a united front to the board” .
This strategy of information control is one which according to Pahl and 
Winkler is generally adopted by employees to preserve their autonomy
via-arvi8 their organisation and, in relation to the board, is employed to
2/the greatest effect. -
It is obvious that if the board is to discharge its functions 
adequately all relevant information has to be at its disposal. The type of 
information required includes both general and specific information,
321.
1/ Pahl and Winkler, 109. 
2/ At 113.
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general information in this sense, meaning those about the state of the 
business as a whole, and specific information, those demanded on specific 
objectives, major expenditure, investments and so on. The entire board 
and the non-executive group in particular, is not in any position to 
gather this information by itself. In the first case, general information 
is accumulated gradually through informal channels, like general experience, 
visits to company facilities, occasional briefings, periodic committee 
meetings and so on. In the second case, specific information on specific 
issues demands careful research into data. However, the basic data and the 
tools for data processing and analysis are in the hands of the management 
and the board's needs for specific information can be met only by management. 
But the extent to which the management and some chief executives can go 
to keep information on operating details away from the board is inmense.
A chief executive may go so far as to impose a censorship on his subordinates 
and to ensure that the "over-enthusiastic" or inquisitive non-executives 
are kept at bay.
Juran and Louden report the experience of an outside director 
who at the first meeting he attended, found that the information package 
was actually chained to the table, so that it could not be removed by 
the directors. In some more generouscircumstances the information package 
remains on the company's premises and is not to be removed by the directors. 
In such circumstances, the only opportunity for directors to study the
1/ At 265.
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information package ia at the board meeting itaelf. Aa the uninformed 
director cannot poaaibly examine the information contained critically 
within the limited time available, it ia acarcely surprising that they 
nod their heads in approval to virtually all the proposals.
Managements' manipulative exercises are also commonly achieved 
through the use of conmittees as circumvention devices. Where a board 
makes use of a working executive or management committee, that committee 
usually discusses board matters in the absence of other directors, notably 
the non-executives who are thus circumvented in the information traffic. 
This grouping of insiders with information into committees in which the 
ignorant non-executives are not represented has become a legitimate system 
of restricting the flow of information from the board and so ultimately 
weakens it.
This policy of deliberate restriction of information is often 
defended by executives. It is usually their contention that a distinction 
should be drawn between the functions of the board and the functions 
of the operating management. If a board is allowed access into every 
kind of information, they argue, members might get into operating matters 
and this ultimately would undermine the authority of those entrusted 
with the management of the company. Some executives feel that certain 
plans may be of a confidential nature and that government security
1/ 95 to 99% of items put to the company's board,according to Pahl &
Winkler, go through on the nod. At 110.
2/ By contrast it is expressly provided under German Company Law (S.107(3)) 
that such devices cannot beused to exclude employee representatives 
from the supervisory board. Other manipulative devices sometimes 
used are described by Mace in "The Changing Role of Directors in the 1970s"
(1976) 31 Bus.Lawyer 1209. For a most humourous description of 
manipulation in Boards and Committees, see C.Northcote Parkinson,
Parkinson'a Law : or the Pursuit of Progress (1979) edThe Chapter 
on "Directors and Councils or Co-efficient of Inefficiency",p.31.
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regulations in defence work in some cases demand restriction on information. 
It might be dangerous, it is thought, to make such information available to 
non-executives who have only a smalljcommitment to the company and whose 
allegiance to other outside interests may outweigh their interest to 
the company. In addition, it is feared that a dissident or majority 
group might use such confidential information to attempt to gain control 
or take-over the company.
Another main reason that has been identified for the board's 
difficulty in getting important information is the fact that it has no
staff of its own to evaluate, receive or gather information directly and
2/so it has of necessity to rely on executives. - If the executives 
refuse to cooperate with a non-executive director who seeks additional 
information from those presented to the board meeting, he has to take the 
necessary steps himself to get at them. But very often a non-executive 
director would not know what relevant additional information he should 
request, nor where to find it. Should he wish to demand information by 
legal action the fact that he is not sure of what exactly he wants would be 
a problem.
The whole question about the limitation of information goes 
beyond the problem of access by non-executives because even if the
information were available to the chief executive it is often considered
3/"just plain bad manners" - to ask discerning questions at board meetings.
1/ The use of employee directors is particularly liable to be opposed
on similar grounds, but the rule in Bents Brewery Co.v. Hogean A945J 2 All 
E.r. 570, prevents abuse by employee directors of information obtained 
from the board for purposes of collective bargaining. The general duty 
of directors not to abuse their confidence is also a deterrence to this 
form of abuse.
2/ See Eric Batstone, Industrial Democracy : European Experience (1970) 
pp.19-20.
3/ Mace, op.cit.54
This therefore involves, once again, the issue of independence of 
directors, their subordination and subservience to their chief 
executive bosses, as well as "business ethics".
When one considers that a board is the highest authority 
in a company's management hierarchy and that all the members are 
elected representatives of shareholders even if in theory only, it 
becomes the more imperative that every director, executive or non­
executive, must be allowed unlimited and unrestricted access to all 
available information on every material aspect of the company. Since 
the board has the authority to appoint lower management one expects 
that the directors and not management should have to make rules about 
access to information about plans and operating data. It is an irony that 
the reverse is the case now and that executives in practice determine 
the amount and nature of information which gets to the board. The policy 
of giving only the barest minimum of information to the board conflicts 
with the principles of Common Law, which gives directors the right 
to all information about the company's operations.
4. Conclusion
It will be apparent from the above analysis that whether or not the 
board effectively participates in corporate governance depends on the 
degree to which the directors are inhibited by the several constraints 
described and this varies from one company to another according to 
individual circumstances. This means, of course, that not all boards
1/ See e.g. Conway v. Petronious Clothing Co.Ltd. 1 W.L.R.,
and the text accompanying its discussion in Chapter 6 and also 
M'cjster v. M'Rae 1966 S.C.253.
3 2 5.
326.
are ineffective, depending on the presence of the constraints to a 
greater or lesser degree. But because the conventional conception 
that all boards "manage" does not stand the test of empirical analysis 
one begins to see more clearly vhat Melvin Aron Eisenberg has described 
as the "dysfunctional consequences" for Company Lav. These consequences 
are instanced:
"For example, by proceeding from the assumption 
that officers play a subordinate role to the 
board, the rules governing the authority of 
officers frequently embody an unrealistically 
restrictive view of an officer's power of 
position. Standards of care, by the same token, 
often seem to be pitched to the outside director 
rather than the executive, as if the former were 
really running the business. In duty-of-loyalty 
cases the courts have often given disproportionate 
weight to the fact that outside directors have 
approved a transaction in which executives are 
interested, while the legislature have sometimes 
gone so far as to provide that approval by outside 
directors is sufficient to sterilize an otherwise 
infected transaction".
The limited scope of this thesis does not permit an exhaustive discussion 
of the dangers which emanate from this "skew"betveen law and reality 
but one only has to look at the very lax state of the law of director's 
duty of skill and care and the numerous instances of breach of fiduciary duty 
revealed in the Department of Trade Reports and in court cases to know that 
the danger is real. It cannot be overemphasised that unless the basic
1/ 63 Caa.L.R. at 383.
2/ At 384. See also Leech and Mundheim, "The Outside Director of the 
Publicly Held Corporation" (1976), 31 Bus.Lawyer,1799 at 1804.
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structure of director's participation in corporate governance is 
reformed all other attempts would be mere cosmetic or a ''quack-cure” 
for the problems of boardroom participation which would fail ultimately 
to eradicate the disease.
CHAPTER 8
SHAREHOLDERS*PARTICIPATION IN CORPORATE ADMINISTRATION
1. The Attitude of Shareholders Toward Participation
Although In theory shareholders exercise the ultimate right to 
control the company by their vote at general meetings a number of surveys 
stretching over several years have now shown that In practice this Is not 
so: shareholders are generally Ignorant and too "passive" and "apathetic" 
about exercising their ownership functions and playing any significant 
part in the affairs of their companies. In effect, participation by the 
shareholders In the running of their companies is the exception rather 
than the rule. In the large public company shareholders are too many and 
too dispersed to perform the ownership functions. Apart from the problem 
of "quantity" which renders it impossible to have a gathering of everyone 
or a majority of the shareholders in a large company to attend general 
meetings, — another reason which has been suggested for the rarity of
shareholders' participation is their attitudes of general disinterested-
2/ness toward general meetings. —
The most recent and detailed illustrations of these findings
3/are contained in Who Owns The Blue Chips —  and Dr. Midgley's book,
4/
Companies and Their Shareholders - The Uneasy Relationship —  - the 
1/ See Sargant P. Florence, op. cit. 213.
I f Despite implied suggestions in recent studies to the contrary, it is 
to be observed from the historical analyses in Chapter 1 that the 
"traditional" lethargy of shareholders isn't a recent phenomenon for 
as far back as 1854 their general disinterestedness toward general 
meetings was already a cause for concern.
3/ By Vernon, Middleton and Harper (1973).
4/ (1975).
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former corroborating the lackadaisical attitude of shareholders and 
the latter, their low attendance at general meetings.
In Who Owns the Blue Chips, the authors found a correlation 
between the method by which a shareholding was acquired and managed and 
the degree to which shareholders took active part In participation.
They found that Inheritance was a common cause for acquisition of shares 
and even where shares were purchased directly by their owners this, In 
many cases, was done with Inherited money. — ^ The personal Interviewees 
commonly gave as their reasons for buying shares the following:
2/
"I wanted to do something with the little money that I had saved", —
and "1 was given some money and my father thought It would be a good
3/Idea if I bought some shares with it". —  Some shareholders' attitudes 
were influenced by family background and personal contact. For example, 
some Interviewees whose relatives were involved in stock exchange invest­
ment were Influenced toward similar Investment. Some others were 
influenced by opinion expressed by supposedly more knowledgeable persons, 
and at times in very unlikely circumstances. One person described the 
circumstances whereby he came to be a shareholder In these words.
"1 used to go to and from the office in the train and I used 
to read all about shares in the paper. I used to listen to 
the businessmen talking and I thought that this was a good 
thing and I decided to save and get into the share business. 
I was a clerk and I had no Intention of being a clerk always 
and so I made up my mind to get some shares. When I heard 
the men in the train say that such and such was a good share 
I bought It." 4/
1/ See Chapter 6. 
2/ Aft p.84.
3/ Ibid.
4/ Aft 84-83.
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A few shareholdings were said to have been started as a hobby. 
One shareholder stated:
"I retired recently and I needed something to give me a 
full-time exercise. Something I would enjoy and give me 
some mental stimulus"; 1/
and another
"I was sick in bed after a coronary for about three months.
A stockbroker friend suggested that I pass away the time 
with a little flutter on the stock market". 2/
It is unlikely that any "full time exercise" or "mental stimulus" 
will derive from share ownership unless the shareholder takes active part 
in general meetings and follows up developments in the conduct of the 
business and takes keen interest iu whatever information comes through 
from annual reports, press releases, and so on. One wonders also whether 
the anxiety generated by sharp rises or falls in the value of shares in 
the stock market would do much good to a coronary convalescent. The evidence 
gathered by the authors, however, indicate that shareholders who are 
personally active and interested in investment were more likely to have 
attended a general meeting or Voted by proxy during the previous two years.
1/ Page 85. 
2/ Ibid.
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But they add
"It is difficult to distinguish interest in the management of 
the Company as such from interest in the shares purely as a 
financial investment, but it seems that a minority of active 
shareholders display some concern about their companies. Not 
surprisingly, this does not normally extend to the point of 
taking a day off to go to London to attend a general meeting." 1/
There is little doubt that the principal motivation for share 
ownership is the desire to make profitable use of money saved or received 
as a windfall. Share acquisition is essentially financially motivated 
and the expectation is the satisfactory return on the Capital. Share­
holders generally do not expect to get involved in the business of running 
a Company or questioning those in charge of its management, nor are they 
Inclined to do so. Vernon, Middleton and Harper, found that a large 
number of shareholders took no interest in their portfolio and knew 
virtually nothing about them. The view of most of these shareholders 
was summed up in this remark:
"1 don't know anything about my shares and as long as they 
bring in an income I am perfectly happy". 2/
1/ At p. 123. Some writers often attempt to distinguish the interest 
of shareholders in Corporate Management from interest in their 
investment but this distinction is of little consequence because 
anyone interested in the good performance of their investments 
would naturally be interested in ensuring good management performance. 
Nor is Interest in management for its own sake such a popular hobby!
2/ A* p. 113.
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While a very high proportion of the interviewees indicated 
that they read the Company's circulars and documents the shareholders 
had a wide range of reactions to them. According to one:
"I read the company circulars and the reports very carefully 
and I also look at the comments in the press". 1/
Another stated:
"It depends on how busy I am. Sometimes I put them straight 
into the waste-paper basket. Other times I read them through",
and another:
"I do feel there is a shocking waste of money and effort in all 
the stuff that goes into the reports. I am not in the least bit 
interested in seeing what the factory in East Africa loolelike." 2/
This attitude of disinterestedness reflects Itself in share­
holders' attendance and voting at general meetings as in other control 
activities.
Midgley's findings on the activities of shareholders indicate a 
fall in the trends in attendance at Annual General Meetings. Of the 37 
companies whose attendance records he investigated, Midgley found that 
the average attendance at AGM's for 1969 was 80 shareholders. Although a few
1/ Afc p. 122.
2/ Ibid. T.A. Lee and D.P. Tweedie in The Private Shareholders and The 
Corporate Report. (1977) have found that while the annual report 
appears to provide shareholders with a considerable amount of 
information most shareholders do no more than merely skimming through. 
Only 28Z read both Account and the Balance Sheet. Chapter 5.
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large popular companies such as Guinness, I.C.I. and Marks and Spencer 
had over 100 shareholders in attendance the median attendance was only 47. 
Even this number substantially consisted of the companies' directors and 
employee shareholders - in fact, some companies with the highest attendance 
figures had many employee shareholders in attendance. Other factors that 
had some influences on attendance at meetings include the popularity or 
public image of the company, the location of the meeting and the existence 
of some adverse publicity, ginger group activity, scandal or other 
cataclysmic events. — The general trend in attendance at AGM's in the 
last 10 or so years before the survey in 1969 indicated that the level of 
attendance of all shareholders entitled to vote had, in fact, deteriorated 
slightly.
Guinness Ltd., had the best percentage attendance of 362 members 
out of 38,878 and this could be accounted for by the popularity of this 
company's "Guinness Stouts" and other products and the fact that the 
company made a point of making members welcome at meetings.
The provision of hospitality for shareholders has decisive 
effect on the level of attendance and the conduct of general meetings.
For example, Alex Rubner reported that when a new Chairman was appointed 
to Bowater Paper and he cancelled the free lunch which had traditionally 
followed the AGM's, shareholders attendance dropped frno an average of
1 / The highest number of attendance encountered by Midgley during 
his survey was where shareholders were opposed to proposals to 
re-elect a director. See pp. 37-38.
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1/ 7/
3,000 to 350. —  In respect of the same Company James Derriman —  refers
to how the Company had taken shareholders by special trains from many parts 
of the country to attend the ACM in different mills and factories or in 
the Royal Festival Hall. The withdrawal of these free services followed 
the passing of the Finance Act, 1965 under which expenses for entertain­
ments were no longer allowed for taxation purposes. Midgley reports that 
the attendance for this company's AGM for 1967 came down to only 103 - some 
of whom probably included a number of invited non-members such as the 
Press and the Company's Auditors.
Extra-ordinary general meetings tend to be less well attended 
than AGM's especially as most companies hold their EGM's immediately
3 /
after the AGM. —  Although an appropriate number of shareholders may
requisition an EGM, the legal right to do this is rarely exercised because
6 /of the considerable expense involved in time and money. —
Again, although shareholders have a legal right to appoint a 
proxy this right is rarely exercised. — Indeed, to Berle and Means, the
1/ See Alex Rubner, The Ensnared Shareholder. (1965) 133. But he criticises 
such hospitality as "a fatuous disposition of mind" which is essentially 
a patronising attempt by directors to divert shareholders' interest 
from high dividends. This criticism is rejected by James Derriman, 
Company - Investor Relations. (1969).
2/ Ibid. 106.
_3/ The wastefulness of this practice has been drawn out in page 231 supra.
4/ See supra. Chapter 5, p.233
5/ The right to vote by proxy is examined in p. 262«
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right to vote by proxy marks the beginning of the weakening of share­
holders' power of control over the direction of the enterprise. Although 
designed to enable the absentee shareholder to attend and vote at general 
meetings through someone else of his own chcd.ce "in reality...
The proxy is almost invariably a dummy chosen either by the 
management [or other body] seeking to assume control. The 
proxy machinery has thus become one of the principal instruments 
not by which a stockholder exercises power over the management 
of the enterprise, but by which his power is separated from 
him”. 1/
The obligation under the General Undertaking of the Stock Exchange for 
listed Companies to provide their voting members with proxy forms has 
not had any remarkable effect in generating greater use of proxies.
Midgley reports that in Companies where no proxy form was provided 
members did not on their own submit any. Even where forms were provided 
by the Company the level of submission varied considerably according to 
the ease of completing and submitting it. A form which is printed on a 
page of the Company report and which could be cut out, inserted in an
envelope and addressed was much less likely to be returned than a detachable,
2/stamped addressed postcard. —
Further reasons which have been suggested for lack of enthusiasm 
by shareholders in corporate governance is the fact that most shareholders, 
including the business-like and intelligent are unlikely to attend to the 
business of any one Company in which they have shares, because they also 
have shares in many other companies in all of which they could not possibly 
be closelyinvolved. Moreover, the vast majority of shareholders usually hold
1/ The Modern Corporation. (1968), 129. 
2/ At 51.
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a very small proportion of the total voting capital and so one member's 
vote could not possibly have any Impact on the decision reached were he 
to attend the general meeting. — As for the appointment of a proxy this 
has always been regarded as a formality, not only by shareholders, but 
even by corporate officers, as Mldgley's survey indicates. He reports 
the statement of a Secretary who told him that:
"The Issues and return of proxies for the normal routine items 
of an AGM, is of course, a pure formality, as the resolutions 
are almost Invariably dealt with on a show of hands: one can, 
therefore, perhaps forgive the 90 per cent who do not trouble; 
one interesting fact, however, is that of the 820 who returned 
their cards, 343 failed to stamp them!" 2/
The fact is that directors do not normally wish shareholders
to be actively involved in the conduct of the company. In a letter to 
3/the Financial Times —  a writer derides the conduct of the Chairman of 
Lonrho Limited at their last AGM in which he was reported as answering 
questions "brusquely". The writer came away from their AGM depressed by 
the attitude of the "platform" to critics. "Sycophantic pleasantries 
from the floor were lapped up. Critics were given short shrift, pertinent 
questions were considered impertinent,the chief executive was mute".
4/This attitude was corroborated by another writer —  who said he had 
attended many AGM's at all of which he had spoken, commented on proposals 
and sometimes had criticised excessive auditors' remuneration, while the 
majority of other shareholders neither expressed their support nor dissent.
I f  See Florence, 216-217.
2/ Midgley, 51.
3/ 15 May 1980.
4/ Financial Times. May 28 1980.
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However, he often meets with "harsh criticism, after meetings for 
exercising shareholder rights".
In short, most Chairmen are apt to believe that it is when 
shareholders take active interest and turn out at AGM's in large numbers 
that you look out for trouble. —  ^To guarantee shareholders' passivity and 
minimise their intervention in the "programmed" format of general meetings 
directors have striven to maintain a bare minimum level of profit and 
pay dividends at regular Intervals, even though this may be only a fraction 
of, say, the auditors' fees. The history of businesses in post-war period, 
particularly the behaviour of businesses in the 1950s show this clearly. 
With the increase in Consumer demand and the relaxation of government 
control during that period directors were enabled to pay shareholders 
rising dividends without generating strong incentives to Intervene in the 
affairs of the Company. The divorce of ownership from management became 
very glaring. The director
"regarded the company as his company. Dividends and lip service 
had to be paid to shareholders once or twice every 12 months, 
but for the rest of the year management, often fiercely loyal 
to the concept of "Our Company", preferred to ignore shareholders 
and to get on with the job." 2/
Whenever directors need shareholders' votes they are able to use
3/the Company funds to communicate with them and solicit their support. —
1/ Derriman, op.cit. 94. Or else some Chairmen regard shareholders who 
~  attend as mere "cranks" and "busy bodies". Florence, 219.
2/ H. Redwood, "The Fisons Shareholder Survey". Long Range Planning, 
April 1971, 3.
y  Peel v London and North Western Rly Co. i 19077 1 Ch. 5.
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The Company circular or report would usually request the shareholder to 
expreas support for the management proposals by returning the completed 
proxy forms. And because the directors are usually the ones who fire the 
first shots in a proxy battle, they can generally count on receiving 
enough proxies in their favour to defeat any opposition.
It is, therefore, only very rarely that there is a dissentient 
shareholder or group of shareholders willing or able to take on management 
in the proxy battle. All these problems which confront shareholders 
in the modern company are well described by Maugham, J in Re: Dorman 
Long & Co. Ltd., and Re South Durham Steel & Iron Co. Ltd. — *
"In these days, in many of the cases that come before me, only a 
fraction of the persons who are concerned can get into the room 
where the meeting is proposed to be held, and in the great majority 
of cases the proxies given to the directors before the meeting begins 
have in effect settled the question of the voting once and for all.
It is perhaps not unfair to say that in nearly every big case not 
more than five per cent of the Interests Involved are present in 
person at the meeting. It is for that reason that the Court takes 
the view that it is essential to see that the explanatory circulars 
sent out by the board of the company are perfectly fair and, as far 
as possible, give all the information reasonably necessary to enable 
the recipients to determine how to vote ... In a sense, in all these 
cases, die dice are loaded in favour of the views of the directors. 
The notices and circulars are sent out at the cost of the Company, 
the board have had plenty of time to prepare the circulars, all the
1/ [1934/ Ch. 635, 657-658.
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facts of the case are known to them, proxy forms are made out in 
favour of certain named directors and, although it is true that 
the word "for" or "against" may be inserted in the modern proxy 
form, the recipients of the circulars very often are in doubt 
as to whether the persons named as proxies are bound to put in 
votes by proxy with which they are not in agreement".
It is of course, management's practice to determine most matters 
on a show of hands and the occasion rarely arises where they might consider 
"rigging" the proxy votes. Observations of the actual mechanics of 
shareholder control leads Dr. Midgley to write in a recent paper:
"The low level of shareholder participation points to what might 
be described as the procedural facade of company control rather 
than to lack of responsibility on the part of shareholders, though 
fecklessness is often attributed to shareholders by those who find 
it convenient to perpetuate this myth. In fact it is probably 
nearer the truth to say that shareholders are realistic rather than 
irresponsible about formal control procedures. For most companies, 
in most situations, the ritual of the Annual General Meeting and 
the voting machinery provides little more than a pointless charade, 
and shareholders, private and Institutional find other means of 
exercising Influences.. .  1/
The extent of these influences is considered later.
1/ Dr. K. Midgley "To Whom Should The Board Be Accountable... And For 
—  What" in Corporate Governance and Accountability" (No.l ). (1979)
15, 17 and also Midgley "How Much Control do Shareholders Exercise?" 
Lloyds Bank Review (1974). 37.
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2. Shareholders' Activism.
On a number of occasions, some major financial institutions 
with a large concentration of share ownership - and votes - have been 
able to challenge the Management of the Portfolio Companies, but as will 
be seen below intervention by Institutions is an 'off-stage' affair. On 
some other occasions the votes of small private shareholders have been 
mobilised by "ginger group" activists and umbrella organisations like 
the Shareholders Protection Association, The Association of Investors Ltd. 
and so on. Outstanding in the organisations which have emerged to 
champion the cause of the private shareholders in this country were the 
Investors Protection Facilities Limited formed by Sir Julian Hodge in 
1955 and Shareholders Association Ltd formed by Miss Freda Spurgeon in 
1964. In The Ensnared Shareholder. Alex Rubner, recalls one of Sir 
Julian's most spectacular interventions as follows: —
"This modern Welsh wizard contrives to obtain a higher purchase 
price from company raiders. His biggest success was in 1957 when 
Massey-Ferguson sought to obtain control of Standard Motors. The 
Chairman of Standard Motors backed the offer, and Massey-Ferguson 
started with the initial advantage of owning 25Z of the 25m votes. 
Hodge was able to rally 12m votes against the bid, and this beat 
off the attack. Later Massey-Ferguson tried to obtain control 
through the back-door... but again Hodge's intervention aborted 
the attempt". 2/
1/ Julian Hodge is reputed to be one of the most active "nationally 
known Champlon(s) of minority shareholders in Britain. His most 
frequent appearances were made during take-over bids and his 
biggest success, according to Rubner, was in 1957 when Massey- 
Ferguson sought to obtain control of Standard Motors. See Rubner, 
139. (Pelican Edition).
2/ Ibid
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In Ruhner's 
not very effective —  ^
formation.
general view, however, the "ginger group" was 
as Hodge began to "mellow with age" after its
Midgley also recounts how Sir Julian's and Miss Spurgeon's 
ginger groups soon ran into difficulties. In the case of the latter, 
she relinguished her leading role in the ginger group after six years of 
efforts. The reasons, as Midgley writes is that
"she was disillusioned with what she referred to as 'the 
collective apathy of most shareholders', the failure of the 
Association to be self-supporting and the unhelpfulness of 
officialdom' which makes enforcement of company law such a 
farce that exposing fraud is virtually a waste of time". 2/
She is reported to have later joined what she referred to as a 
partnership of "Company Doctors" having come to understand that prevention 
of mismanagement through the board is better than cure via shareholder 
activisms, ex post facto .
1/ Ibid. See also Peter MacMahon 'Shareholders Put To The Test' 
Social Audit, (1974, 4.
2/ Companies And Their Shareholders. 7].
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1/ Ibid. See also Peter MacMahon 'Shareholders Put To The Test' 
Social Audit, (1974» 4.
2/ Companies And Their Shareholders. 7].
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The demise of those two groups did not at any rate mark the
end of ginger groups for there is a proliferation of them, amongst which
is the BSAG in Burmah • — It is, however, by no means surprising that
shareholders' Intervention have commonly arisen where the issue at
stake involves far larger sums of money than the very large sums needed
first to attract the shareholders' attention and support or in take-over
2/
situations. Peter Macmahon recalls —  . the occasion when two shareholders 
in Burmah Oil Company invested about £70,000 in a campaign to oust the 
management in the belief that under a new management with new policies the 
company's share would have gained an upward revaluation of at least £2 per share. 
The principal backer of this scheme who owned 850,000 Burmah shares stood to 
gain a lot from its success.
In 1972-73 the small shareholders in the shipping group P & 0 
successfully voted against the proposed merger with Bovis. Even then a 
vast majority of the P & 0 shareholders were ignorant of the issues involved 
in the take-over bid. A survey of the shareholders carried out by The 
Sunday Times concluded that
\ l  The activities of this group was referred to supra p .247• Others 
like the Battersea Redevelopment Action Group in Morgan Crucible 
Ltd have been in the news lately. The Financial Times. June 30 1980 
reports, that Morgan Crucible Co. was planning to take legal action 
against the Ginger Group for continuously opposing the Company's 
redevelopment plans and challenging the Chairman at AGM's. An 
injunction was sought to restrain the group from attending the 1980 
AGM. The attempts by a "ginger group" to reconstruct the board of 
Milford Docks, the troubled Port in South Wales is reported in the 
Financial Times. Jan. 8 1980.
2/ In "Shareholders Put To The Test", Social Audit. Vol. 1, No. 4 
Spring (1974), 2,3.
i
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"...the great majority of them had not the faintest clue, at 
any given moment, who they were voting for, or why, or whether 
it would cost them money or gain it. 1/
Besides their impact in take-over situations the only other way 
in which private shareholders have been able to influence their companies' 
managements' decisions is indirectly through the effect of their sale or 
purchase of shares, thereby influencing the value of the shares. A weak 
share price exposes the company to a take-over or merger andithe prospects 
of these make management more amenable to shareholders' feelings. However,
Hie net result of this form of Intervention is always uncertain and may
2/not always be advantageous to the shareholders. —  Moreover, where a 
company has enough retained earnings for self-financing it is less dependent 
on and less affected by the difficulties of a weak share market.
While the impact of small shareholders has thus been minimal in 
intervention cases the same cannot be said of Institutional Shareholders. 
The erstwhile belief that Institutions are no more active than private 
shareholders are, can no longer be supported. But because their inter­
vention has never been universally acknowledged or even deemed desirable, 
the extent to which they do or should participate in corporate governance
1/ Cited by Peter Macmahon, Social Audit, Ibid, at p.3. It is obvious 
that in some cases shareholders are also actuated by sheer instinct 
to support management Irrespective of what the issues are. It may 
be recalled that in the Lonrho Affair of 1973 and the Newman case 
in 1975 the general meeting had given their unreserved support to 
the Chief executives even though later revelations were to confirm 
the criticisms of the opposition.2/ See The Wilson Report, para. 896.
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has never been agreed in the literature. —  Indeed, it is yet to be
2/fully explored. -  The next parts of this chapter will therefore 
examine the mechanism and extent of Institutional shareholders' 
participation in corporate governance.
3. The De Facto Position of Institutional Participation.
Although the vote is obviously of great importance, undue 
emphasis seems often to have been devoted to it as the machinery for 
shareholders' control. It is true that aside from matters falling within 
the day-to-day administration of corporate affairs, management cannot, at 
least in theory, lawfully take any decision or pursue any policy unless 
and until such decision or policy has been approved by a vote of the 
board of directors and in matters Involving major or fundamental changes 
by a vote of the shareholders in general meeting. There are, however, 
instances in which management takes certain courses of action on which 
there has been no vote or which may only be subsequently ratified by vote.
The erroneous equation of the vote with power to participate
3/in corporate decision-making has led to frequent assumptions —  which
1/ Some managers of investment institutions do not see it as their function 
to Intervene in the running of Companies; See Midgley, 5Ct Wilson Report, 
901. See also "Pension funds Should Concentrate on Pensions and not try 
to run British Industry" The Guardian April 28 1979. The contrary is by 
far more popular.
2/ See e.g. Richard Brlston and Richard Dobbins, The Growth and Impact of 
Institutional Investors. A report to the Research Committee of the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. (1978), who 
call for further study on this topic, pp.5. 54-77.
y  See below.
are not completely true either in relation to the Individual private 
shareholders' or Institutional shareholders' participation. These 
assumptions will be examined against the actual mechanics of institutional 
participation.
Studies of the role of institutional Investors —  ^have come up
with the conclusion that apart from a few controversial instances such as
the events leading to the dismissal of Sir Bernard Docker from the Chairmanship
of B.S.A. Ltd., institutional shareholders are no different from private
shareholders as regards attendance and voting at meetings. Institutions,
it Is said, prefer to use "velvet gloves" and too often give automatic
support to management and their proposals. They are believed to live
2/
by the so-called "Wall Street Rule" —  - an euphemism which describes the 
attitude commonly adopted by institutions summed up in this statement.
"When we buy into a corporation, we buy management. We, 
therefore, support management as long as we are in a corporation.
If we don't like management, we sell". 3/
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XJ For example, Midgley, op.cit, Mark Weinberg, "Industry and 
Shareholding", paper prepared for a Seminar held on June 4 
1971 and published by the Industrial Education and Research 
Foundation; Dobbin and McRae, op.cit. Chap. 2.
2/ See Baum and Stiles, The Silent Partners, op.cit. 63-66 and 
Midgley, 77-81.
3/ See Baum and Stiles, ibid.
346.
Midgley cites the remarks of a company secretary who told him that 
"... it has not been the practice of the larger institutional stock­
holders in this country to attend or participate in the meeting." — ^
Of course, there is no use in attending a general meeting, since manage­
ment already has the institutions' support and it is more convenient in
t
that case to send in proxy cards to support management's proposals.
Institutions often claim, as an excuse, that they are in the 
business of investment and not the management of companies in which they 
invest. This was the essence of the Insurance Company Association's 
evidence before the Wilson Committee, in which they explained that
"their activities as Investors should not be considered in 
isolation from their primary function of providing a service 
to policy holders. Their role as investors is the result of 
the service they provide, not the object of their existence, 
and this fact is reflected in the prudential constraints Imposed, 
externally and internally on their investment policies." 2/
Similar sentiments were expressed by the National Association of Pension 
Funds who stressed in their evidence that
"their investment policies must be judged in the context of their 
duty toward pension scheme members. The objective of a pension 
fund is to maximise the rate of return by investments which involve 
an acceptable level of risk and have regard to the nature of the 
liabilities. As trustee funds bound by legal restraints they 
cannot take too wide a view". 3J
1/ Midgley, 50.
2/ Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions. 
—  Progress Report, (1979), p.22, para. 75.
3/ At para. 77.
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Adolf Bede, 
states the weakness of
in Power Without Property — ^ typically over- 
institutions in the following passage:
"There is ample evidence for the proposition that the 
institutional holders of c.ommon s tock do not use and do 
not wish to use, the voting power of the stock they have 
accumulated. They do not get together to concert action.
They do not as a rule enter into proxy fights. They almost 
invariably vote their stock for the management slate. When 
they seriously dislike the managements of corporations in 
which they have holdings, their policy is to sell. Therefore, 
they say, "We cannot be considered part of the power pyramid", 
and they say it in all sincerity." 2/
Remarks as these provide the critics with the bases for charging 
institutional investors for not intervening in Corporate affairs. Were 
the attendance and voting at general meetings the only modes of intervention 
or participation this charge would be true, but as there are other 
approaches open to them Institutions in actual fact wield more power than 
they have openly admitted. To see the vote as the only weapon in their 
arsenal is to ignore the interplay of many potent forces that come to play 
behind the facade and which institutions apply with utmost effectiveness.
1/ (1960)
2j p. 55. See also R.A. Gordon, op. cit, who claims that 
"insurance and investment companies and certain other types 
of institutions are frequently not in a position to exert 
much influence through ownership". At p. 36.
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It ignores the conmercial imperative for investors to maintain the 
closest attention to and concern in the administration of the business 
enterprise as well as the enormous influence from informal contacts 
and other individual or collective measures which institutions have now 
been known to exert in order to achieve desired objectives. These 
factors are considered below.
4. Factors That Motivate Institutions To Participate 
The Obligations on Institutions:
Although investment institutions as a rule like to have a 
reasonable spread of their assets in different companies and in the case 
of the larger ones, to not more than 5 per cent, the latest figures 
available (1975) indicates there were already 23 holdings by insurance 
companies of more than 5 per cent in the 165 U.K. companies which then 
had equity capital with a market value of more than £40 million. —
Under such a situation in which there is a lot at stake, institutions 
are obliged to ensure optimum use of their investments by an efficient 
and competent management.
Predicting the future role of institutions in corporate manage­
ment in the 1970's Dr. U. Redwood of Fisons Ltd., underlined this commercial 
imperative when he wrote in 1971 that
"The increasing concentration of share ownership through 
the medium of the institutions is gradually organising share­
holders into a potentially cohesive movement. This movement
1/ See Wilson Report, 897
Is forming reluctantly, almost involuntarily. The more 
traditional institutions do not particularly want to 
exercise an active voice in industry but the pressure 
of competition and the responsibilities which institutional 
management carries on behalf of its own prime investors, 
are propelling the movement inexorably towards the use of 
its growing power to Influence management. 1/
Speaking on the same theme in 1979 the Governor of the Bank 
of England in an address to the Institute of Directors described the 
inevitability of intervention very concisely:
"In a situation where institutions hold approaching SO per 
cent of total listed United Kingdom equities, and where in 
some companies the holdings of the major institutions are 
sufficiently large for it to be impossible to dispose of 
their holdings without sharply adverse price movements, it 
may well be a matter of simple self-interest to seek Improved 
performance, which in turn may well coincide with the national 
interest". 2/
1/ The Fisons Shareholders Survey. (1971) p.3. See also Briston 
and Dobbins, 56.
2/ The Rt. Hon. Gordon Richardson "The Joint Stock Company - Adapting 
“  To Change", in The Director. Feb. 1979, 63, 64.
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It has become increasingly necessary for institutions to judge 
management performance and take whatever measures they deem appropriate 
in the circumstances. As institutions generally tend to undertake long­
term investment it is not in their Interests that shares should be 
immediately disposed of even assuming such recourse were readily available 
in a troubled company. If a portfolio company gets into serious difficulties 
institutions with substantial holdings can seldom dispose of them unless 
at considerable financial loss. Even when the difficulties are less 
evident it is in the interest of at least the large institutions, if not 
the whole Company, to commit their resources to trying to improve a 
Company's management, rather than slmpl/ disposing of their holdings, 
as shares sold by one institution are almost invariably taken up by 
another. —
Apart from purely commercial considerations there is also a 
legal obligation on managers of investment institutions to Investigate 
the company both before and after investing in it and this is an obligation 
owed to all their own members. Briston and Dobbins write that:
"In order to protect theinterest of policy holders and 
pension fund contributions, insurance companies need to 
involve themselves in corporate management alongside 
representatives of employees and consumers. Investment 
trust companies and unit trusts have similar responsibilities 
to their shareholders and unit holders. 2/
1/ Wilson Committee's Report, para. 898 
2/ Op.cit. at 54.
351',
Directors and managers of investment companies are not unmindful of legal 
action by their own shareholders who suffer losses in their investments 
as a result of questionable transactions and negligence to safeguard 
their investments. — ^ For this reason alone, managers of investment 
institutions would hardly feel safe to abandon every aspect of the 
affairs of the portfolio company entirely to its incumbent management, 
unless they are satisfied with the policies currently being pursued. Nor 
would they readily cast their votes in support of management's proposals 
unless they are satisfied about its efficiency.
One important instance in which this obligation would arise 
is where there is a proposal for a structural change to the business, for 
example, a disposition of a major or valuable aspect of the company's 
business or a replacement of the entire board. While institutional 
shareholders' reluctance to intervene might be excused in cases of the 
latter kind on the grounds of difficulty in finding suitable replacement 
for the dismissed directors, reluctance can hardly be excused in cases 
of the first kind. In this respect there is a clear fiduciary obligation 
on Institutions to use their best judgements to ensure that a vital part 
of the Company's business is not siphoned away. It is submitted, that 
a case can be made out against the directors of institutions by their 
own shareholders, policy or unit holders for consequent damages, resulting
1/ See Hey ting v Dupont A 9647 1W.L.R. 843 where the Court of Appeal 
left open the question whether Controllers should be liable for 
misfeasance without fraud. Pavlides v Jensen A956J Ch. 565, 
however, remains an obstacle to derlvativeaction but the recent case of 
Prudential Assurance v Newman Industries (No. 2) [198Q/ 2 Ch. D.841 
may open new scope in this area.
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from failure to fulfil this obligation. 1/
5. Methods of Intervention 
1. Informal Contacts.
Perhaps the commonest way in which Institutions involve
themselves in corporate governance is through the informal contacts which
2/they have with management of portfolio companies. —  Institutions often 
try to avoid confrontation with the board of directors in companies in 
which they have invested as this tends to undermine confidence in that 
company and so do more damage than the one they sought to correct in the 
first place. Their preference is to act "behind the scenes".
Midgley reports one investment manager he interviewed as stating
that his insurance company had over a period of 18 months to December 1971
intervened in 25 cases but little publicity was given to the interventions.
One large pension fund which testified before the Uilson Committee
reported that it held talks with 300 companies on a regular basis, making
at least one visit a year to each. The Committee, however, thought this
3/
tiie exception rather than the rule. —
1/ The problem for the plaintiff would, however, be how to prove 
causation. Also De minimis non curat lex. But as Eisenberg 
submits, (57 Cal. L.R. 1,50) "unless an institutional investor 
is prepared to sell every time a structural change is proposed, 
it is under a fiduciary, obligation to use its best judgement 
in voting on the matter".
2/ See A.A.Arnaud, Investment Trusts Explained, op.cit, (1977), 118 
3/ Wilson Committee Report, para. 900.
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Judging from the evidence available and the figure of 300 
cited to the Wilson Committee, (their reservations about it, notwith­
standing) one is inclined to believe that institutions have merely been 
publicity-shy, not generally Inactive. It has often been argued that 
publicity in cases of intervention would be counter-productive, but one 
wonders whether Companies' equities in the U.S. have any special immunity 
against adverse publicity. Judging by the huge publicity received by 
cases of intervention in that Country — ^ one is inclined to believe that 
the relatively smaller publicity in this country may not be so much-for
fear of its adverse effect on equities as what Professor Gower has
2/
referred to as the "national characteristic", —  in this respect, the 
tendency of Britons to be too "diplomatic" in situations likely to evoke 
controversy and publicity.
Secondly, institutions, it would appear, show a marked preference 
for informal, behind the scene, contacts where there is a strong likelihood 
that any moves initiated by them is likely to be defeated by a board backed 
up with a huge bulk of votes. For this reason they were never able to 
confront openly the domineering Chairman and Board of DECCA about the
3/need for change, until events decided the recent take-over by RACAL. —
1/ Of which the most celebrated is the crisis in Montgomery Ward that 
culminated in the retirement of Sewell Avery. This episode is 
discussed by Baum and Stiles, op.clt, 70, Midgley, 78, Gower (1955-58) 
11 Business Lawyer, 52 and Eisenberg 57 Cal. L.R.l.
2 / See Gower, Ibid, 39, 53.
3/ On this point see the Financial Times. Jan. 19 1980. The events 
leading to the take-over of Decca by Racal was mentioned briefly 
in Chapter Two. Wide newspaper coverage was given to this episode. 
Apart from the numbers already cited, See also the Financial Times 
for Jan. 26, Feb. 2, Feb. 5 and the announcement of Racals successful 
bid in Feb. 15,1980 .
lilis, notwithstanding, a number of recent cases have now established 
beyond any doubt the willingness of institutions to come out openly 
to oppose management where informal contacts and prodding prove futile.
The first is the "novel" action by the Prudential Assurance 
Company against two directors of Newman Industries, Messrs Alan Bartlett 
and John Laughton. — ^ The action arose from the two directors' conspiracy 
and attempt to "trick and mislead" shareholders of Newman Industries into 
accepting a deal which was not in the financial interest of the company.
The deal involved a take-over by Newman of assets of Thomas Poole Gladstone 
China (TPG). T.P.G. which had a 2^.6% holding in Newman was itself 33% 
owned by Strongpoint (S), a company wholly-owned by Messrs Bartlet and 
Laughton. In June 1975, a deal was constructed and signed by Laughton 
without approval from Newman Shareholders to buy a package of T.P.G.' 9 
assets. These assets excluded the Newman shares and a £100,000 debt 
owed by S. In consideration Newman was to assume all TPG's liabilities amounting 
to £1,117,000 and a payment of £325,000 in cash. Later that month Mr. Bartlett 
sent a circular to Newman Shareholders which the Prudential, a minority share­
holder, claimed had been Intended to Induce the approval of the scheme, designed 
to benefit T.P.G. at the expense of Newman. Despite objections by the Prudential 
and one of the Newman's non-executive directors to the scheme the two 
directors went ahead and were able to secure the approval of the general
1/ Op.cit. The two men were the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of Newman 
Industries Ltd. respectively. The celebrated case which took nearly 
five years to complete was delivered in a 250 page judgement over a 
period of one-and-a-half days. Costs for the action was estimated 
at £750,000 and the two directors were expected to pay damages of 
at least £450,000. This case, Involves at any rate, more of 
directors' frauu than mismanagement.
354.
355.
meeting. 1/ The Prudential instituted the action.
The trial judge Mr. Justice Vinelott observed that a shareholder 
reading the "tricky and misleading circular" would be quite unable to 
form any assessment of the merits of the transaction in question.
The accounting firm of Deloitte & Co. who were asked by Newman 
to value the TPG package, were misled by the dishonest statements or 
concealments of material facts by Mr. Bartlett and Mr. Laughton and 
increased their valuation from £235,000 to £325,000 after a telephone 
conversation with Mr. Laughton - a figure far in excess of the true market 
value of the assets. The Judge remarked:
"He (Mr. Bartlett) knew that if the true facts as to the 
financial position of TPG, and the market value of its 
assets became known to the Newman board and shareholders 
there would be no prospect that they could be persuaded 
to accept them at a price sufficient to enable him to 
salavage TPG and avoid embarrassing disclosures of the 
use made of TPG's and Newman's money...
"Having embarked upon the scheme it was carried through 
with the cooperation of Mr. Laughton by means which 
involved the deliberate deception of the board and 
shareholders of Newman". 2/
1/ In a way, this compares with the fact that during the Lonrho crisis 
in 1973 the company's general meeting passed a vote of confidence 
on Mr. Tiny Rowland and his policies and dismissed the eight directors 
who had opposed his policies and yet these directors were quite justified 
in doing this from the legal point of view.
2/ As reported in Hie Times Feb. 20 1980.
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It was held that the Prudential and other shareholders had 
suffered damage as a result of the conspiracy. Prudential prevailed but 
at a greater personal cost than most private shareholders can afford.
The second case of intervention is that of the National 
Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) in Allied Breweries. The events involved 
started when Allied Breweries obtained shareholders' approval to Increase 
its authorised capital by 25 per cent, but then used that spare capital 
to issue shares for the take-over of J. Lyons. The N.A.P.F. one of 
Allied's large shareholders argued in objection that such a large 
diversification of Allied's business into J. Lyons — would have needed 
the prior approval of the shareholders. While the talks were still going 
on N.A.P.F. closely monitored companies seeking to increase their 
authorised capital by 25 per cent or more. It won assurances from the 
boards of such companies as Metal Box and Unigate that they would not do 
as Allied. The dispute between Allied and N.A.P.F. eventually led to the 
introduction of changes to the Stock Exchange regulations imposing tighter
controls on directors who make big acquisitions without seeking shareholders
2/approval. —
1/ Food manufacturers, Hoteliers and Caterers with International 
Operations.
2/ The new regulations are contained in the revised "Yellow Book", 
the Stock Exchange's list of regulations governing quoted 
companies. The regulations require prior shareholders approval 
if the company to be acquired had assets or pre-tax profits 
amounting to 25% or more of the enlarged group. In addition, 
the shareholders would have to approve take-over where the price, 
either in shares or cash, equals a quarter or more of the bidder's 
assets or earlier equity base.
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A third example, is the highly publicised intervention, again, 
by the NAPF in Lloyds Bank which led that Company to abolish its anti­
quated article which permitted the issue of shares with restricted voting 
rights. —
These cases show the readiness with which large institutions are 
now prepared to come out openly to Intervene in portfolio companies. The 
Prudential Case, in particular, has broken new grounds and proved that 
institutions do not always vote with their feet. But it is still far 
from certain that institutions would be prepared to act in every case of 
management's wrongdoing. As The Times Editorial surmises:
"If it is a matter of managerial incompetence, rather than 
the issue of 'tricky and misleading circulars', the questions 
for the fund manager will be what they have always been; 
whether to stand and fight or sell the problem on to someone 
else". 2/
Be that as it may, one can only wonder whether action as that taken by the 
Prudential can be motivated by general good to all shareholders or only by 
special benefit hoped for irrespective of incidential benefits to others.
(ii) Presence and Silence as Signs of Approval
It is not only by positive action that investment institutions 
can participate in influencing the direction of the company. Their mere 
presence has a way of affecting the management of the Company. Most
1/ See p. 257 àupra.
2/ The Times. Feb. 20, 1980.
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investment Institutions are very reputable financial experts whose 
business judgements and associates are well respected and their presence 
in any company is regarded as a sign of approval in that Company. Smaller 
investors often feel that if the larger and reputable institutions are in 
one company then such a company must be a safe place to invest and its 
management must be trustworthy. This way more potential shareholders 
are attracted. — It is generally believed that if the management were 
inefficient or if the profitability of the Company were in doubt, then 
Institutions would not be there in the first place or that they would 
pull out their investment as soon as things go bad. This would be a 
signal for smaller shareholders to no the same. By their presence, 
therefore, institutions create a good impression about the Company and 
literally give it a good name!
Even their silence can in certain circumstances be demonstrative 
of institutional shareholders' support for management's formulations or 
proposals. For Instance, at the 1979 AGM of Mercantile Investment Trust 
Company a resolution was tabled by dissentient 'rebel' shareholders calling 
on the company to comnit a corporate hara k i r i t that is, for voluntary 
liquidation, unitisation or an agreed bid. The resolution was heavily
1/ There is, however, no concrete evidence to suggest any Inclination 
amongst U.K. institutions toward a concentration in "favourite" top 
companies as there is in the U.S. See Briston and Dobbins pp.2-3 
and passim. But Pension Funds say they are now being forced by 
circumstances to concentrate upon those companies with a large 
market capitalisation in which there is a viable market. See Wilson 
Committees - Interim Report. Vol. 3, p.142, para. 48(1).
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defeated. — The remarkable thing about the case was that only 36 per 
cent of the shareholders voted while the Institutions who owned 60 per 
cent of the equity, unwilling to support the dissentient shareholders 
abstained from voting. However, the apparent lethargy of the institutions
was seen as a warning to the M.I.T. board, even by the act of abstention,
2/that they had to put its house in order. —
Where management has established in shareholders confidence in 
their efficiency, it is usual for the latter, including the institutional 
shareholders to allow management freedom to manoeuvre by not challenging 
them even if the specific proposals involved in an instant case is neither 
easily comprehensible nor commercially feasible at least in the short run. 
Silence in such circumstances constitutes tacit approval. However, such 
a "declaration of neutrality" would have the effect of discouraging other 
shareholders, particularly private shareholders, who as in the MIT Company
had possibly hoped to challenge management with institutional shareholders
3 /support. —
1/ The facts which led to the tabling of the special resolution were that 
the Company has for long been undergoing liquidity crises and the group 
led by one Mr. Christopher Campbell has constantly applied pressure on 
the board to devise a scheme to reduce the huge discount in the 
Company's share price. With the defeat of last year's special 
resolution the same group adopted a different tactic at the 1980 ACM 
by proposing an ordinary resolution urging the company to "take all 
appropriate steps necessary" to reduce the discount between the share 
price and net asset value. See the Financial Times March 13 1980.
The result of this proposal is not available to this writer.
2/ See The Lex Column, Financial Times. 25 April 1979. See also the 
Montgomery Ward - Sewell Avery - Wolfson episode referred to, supra.
_3/ Inaction in these circumstances amounts to tacit support for management 
It does not abrogate their power which simply goes by default to the 
entrenched incumbent management.
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(iii) Collective Action
Investment institutions have often demonstrated a singular lack 
of enthusiasm for cooperative action with private shareholders even 
though this is possible and desirable in principle. In practice 
institutions are quite reticent about such cooperation and tend to be 
apprehensive over the possibility that 'ginger group ' leaders might fail 
to handle situations with the necessary finesse and tact and that 
undesirable publicity will result. — ^ But between themselves institutions 
do sometimes act by concerted action, and, indeed, have a long history of 
cooperation.
Cooperation amongst institutions dates back to the early 1930s 
when the Association of Investments Trusts and the British Insurance 
Association's Investment Protection Committee (I.P.C.) embarked on the
collective protection and promotion of the interestof shareholder
2/members. —  The initial pre-occupation of both associations was to protect 
their members' Interests in the face of boards of directors undertaking capital 
re-organisation in the wake of the 1929 crash,and,in latter years the protection 
of members against government action as in taxation matters. In more recent times 
the primary concern has been how to improve the quality and efficiency of 
corporate management through institutional shareholders' intervention.
The Institutional Shareholders Committee (I.S.C.) and the different 
institutional shareholders' I.P.C's have been important vehicles in 
achieving this objective.
1/ See Midgley, 78.
2/ An earlier attempt by a group of investment institutions to set 
up a Shareholders Protection Association in 1864, proved futile.
See J.B. Jeffreys, op.dt., Chapter 10, p. 401.
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At the Initiative of Lord O'Brien, former Governor of the 
Bank of England, a Working Party — was created by the Bank in 1972 
whose terms of reference were:
"To examine and report upon a possible structure and 
method of operation of a central organisation through 
which institutional investors in collaboration with 
those concerned, would stimulate action to improve 
the efficiency in industrial and commercial companies 
where this is judged necessary." 2/
The Working Party submitted its report in December 1972 and all the 
representatives with the exception of the British Insurance Association 
(B.I.A.) agreed to establish such an organisation. The B.I.A., whilst 
agreeing to cooperate in individual cases, felt unable to be a member 
of an organisation of the sort proposed because it did not wish to 
appear as accepting the prime responsibility for monitoring and improving 
the management of companies and also because it was reluctant to join an 
organisation that it felt was likely to be prejudicial to the control 
of any investigations by the institutional shareholders of the companies 
concerned. However, after some compromise alteration to the structure 
and method of operation of the organisation had been agreed, the B.I.A. 
finally felt able to join. The Institutional Shareholders' Committee 
was thus created in 1973.
1/ The membership consisted of representatives of the Bank of England, 
The Accepting Houses,Committee, The Association of Investment Trust 
Companies, The Association of Unit Trust Managers, The British 
Insurance Association, The Issuing Houses Association, The National 
Association of Pension Funds and an observer from the Committee of 
London Clearing Banks.
2/ See Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin. (1973), 20. Emphasis Mine.
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Although It Is commonly assumed that the l.S.C. has been actively 
Involved In the affairs of companies In which the members are represented 
It has not always been easy to find out the extent of their Intervention. 
The I.S.C. Is very conscious that cooperation of company management very 
much depends on the absence of publicity and, In fact, made it absolutely 
clear right from the onset that no public statements will be made about 
any of the activities of the case committees - the administrative organs 
through which the I.S.C. operates. However, some details were made 
available to the Wilson Committee which throw some light into the extent 
of their intervention. It was indicated that between the I.S.C's 
formation in 1973 and 1979 it had dealt with 37 cases, of which seven 
led to formal case committees and 19 were thought more appropriate for 
independent action. The remaining 11 had either already gone too far 
for anything to be done in reprieve or had been overtaken by events such 
as a successful take-over bid. —
The I.P.C'8 handle most cases of intervention and like the 
I.S.C., operates through case committees. The insurance companies, 
pension funds and the unit trusts each have their own I.P.C's organised 
and staffed in conjunction with the relevant trade association and 
consists of senior investment managers. The insurance I.P.C., the 
oldest of all, for example, has 17 members, three of whom are elected 
each year, and a permanent secretariat of 10. On the other hand, the
investment trusts do not have a formal IPC as such, but form ad hoc
2/
committees to perform a comparable function. —
1/ Para. 912. 
2/ Para. 909.
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Judging by its activities through its I.P.C. the NAPF has 
proved itself to be a force to be reckoned with when it comes to 
intervention in companies' affairs. This might well be accounted for 
by the fact that it is a majority shareholder in some of these companies 
in which it has intervened. — ^
6. Conclusion.
This picture of increased institutional shareholders activities 
is salutary and gives room for optimism about the future role of share­
holders in corporate governance. It indicates that despite their 
traditional reluctance to intervene institutions could ^ et through 
their increased equity concentration and power help in the corporate 
decision-making process and thereby Improve their lot and that of 
weaker and smaller shareholders. Accordingly, the final part of this 
thesis will examine how an Improved performance by Shareholders and 
the Board might be achieved.
1/ Their intervention in Allied Breweries and Lloyds Bank have already 
been noted. Mention may also be made of the Equity Capital for 
Industry which has most of the major institutional long-term 
Investors as shareholders. Its prime purpose is to make funds 
available for companies in immediate need of capital, but it has 
always been envisaged that it could have a secondary role as a 
vehicle for affective action with shareholders, creditors, etc, 
if circumstances demand.
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PART IV
THE PROPOSALS FOR AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK 
FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE.
The U.K. Company Law is at the moment undergoing changes 
with such frequency as has never been witnessed before. So far, none 
of the "piece-meal" legislation has affected the organisational structure 
of companies significantly but it is to be expected that this will come 
about in the near future. Having in mind the likelihood of major 
legislation to modify the "structure and philosophy" of the present 
law, especially if a Labour Government succeeds the present Administration, 
this Part will examine some proposals for such an alternative organisational
structure.
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CHAPTER 9
PROPOSALS FOR MORE EFFECTIVE SHAREHOLDERS' 
PARTICIPATION
1. Introduction
It is important to state here that the proposals to be 
considered below concentrate on how shareholders can make better use 
of their existing power of control. They are not proposals for increasing 
shareholders' powers. This, of course, is no" to say that it is not 
important to increase or advocate the increase of shareholders' power 
of control. Quite the contrary, for Company law is a very dynamic 
subject in need of constant revision and its provisions, including those 
relating to shareholders control, are not in a state of finality.— ^However, 
one observation of the Jenkins' Committee which is very apposite in this 
area is that legislation can only proceed on the basis that if enacted 
would be of "real value to the persons receiving it One must
also bear in mind the warning of successive Company Law Revision Committees 
about "the undesirability of imposing restrictions which would seriously 
hamper the activities of honest men in order to defeat an occasional 
wrongdoer, and the importance of not placing unreasonable fetters upon 
business which is conducted in an efficient and honest manner".—  Also
1/ See Prof. Kahn-Freund "Company Law Reform" (1946) 9 M.L.R. 235. 
See also Cmnd 1749 para. 9.
2/ Cmnd«1749 para. 13.
_3/ Ibid. para. 11, citing the Greene and Cohen Committees.
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to be considered is the question whether any proposal to increase 
shareholders' rights "would involve an amount of work disproportionate 
to its value" which would make it impossible for the company's business 
to be "managed at all".—  ^ These are some of the points which have to 
be weighed in deciding whether to give shareholders greater power of 
control but the main interest here lies in a different direction.
2. The Proposals;
For a very long time now there has been much exhortation to
private and institutional shareholders to involve themselves more in
corporate governance in the belief that through organised action can
they be able to affect the decision-making process. One of the best
considered calls for greater shareholder activities is the proposal
by the Confederation of British Industries (C.B.I.) contained in the
2/Watkinson Report.—  It expressed the view that --------------------
------  "the shareholders cannot disown the responsibilities of the
Company of which they are members" and suggested that
"Shareholders, as the owners of the business, have a 
responsibility that extends beyond the actual buying and 
selling of shares. They must exercise this responsibility 
more fully in the future and be provided with the proper 
information on which they can form their judgment in so 
doing". 3/
y  Ibid, paras. 13, 14.
2/ The Responsibilities of the British Public Company (Final Report). 
C.B.I. (1973),
3/ Para. 25.
It encouraged all types of shareholders to question Chairmen and 
board members at general meetings, and to write letters to companies 
in any matter which affects their interests. The report, on a most 
significant note, called out on Institutional Shareholders to "take 
a leading role and set an example to the whole body of shareholders".—  ^
This is a role which institutions have continuously been called upon 
to play but which up until recently they have showed little inclination 
to assume. As was shown in the last Chapter the exhortations are now 
bearing results.
In point of fact, the institutions have by themselves done 
a lot to perpetuate the belief that they are neither keen nor able to 
involve themselves with company management owing to a number of reasons 
as the Wilson Committee reported:
"In theory they could act collectively in influencing company 
management, but such centralisation would have disadvantages 
and they regard the present system, where the institutions 
usually act independently, as a method of decision-making 
better able to cope with the uncertainties that are always 
present in a particular situation. Individually, they do 
not have the Staff or expertise to become closely involved 
in the running of the companies they invest in, and they do
1/ Para. 26. The Miniscer of Trade, Mr. Cecil Parkinson, expressed a 
similar view recently. "We believe that ... institutions should 
be concerned not just to step in when things go badly wrong in the 
Companies in which they invest but also as major shareholders to 
keep up an active pressure on companies". Parliamentary Debates 
(H.C.) Feb. 26, 1980. See Financial Times Feb. 27, 1980.
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not feel they could justify to their shareholders and 
depositors the administrative cost of setting up such expertise. 
Moreover, it would be improper for a quoted Company to give 
inside information to an institutional shareholder that was not 
available to other shareholders. Their approach is to assume 
that companies should be left to run their own affairs on most 
matters, and that the true discipline on inefficient management 
is the discipline exerted by the Stock market, and the con­
sequences of changes in performance and prospects on a Company's 
share rating". X/
Having become familiar with the realities of institutional participation 
one can no longer be persuaded by these excuses for non-intervention by 
institutions. Surely, there might be genuine fears by institutions about 
running foul of the law against insider trading if they come by secret 
information while seeking to monitor management. After all, an important 
factor is fulfilling their primary obligation to their own members is the 
ability to move in and out of an investment and this ability will be 
jeopardised if they became tainted with secret information. In answer
¿/ Wilson Committee's Progress Report, p.26.
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to this it is to be pointed out that the new law on insider trading
has been so carefully worded that only in cases of obvious violations
would institutions be in fear of breach of the law. Indeed, the
government have been at pains to emphasise that the law is merely
designed to act as a deterrent and that convictions under it are
unlikely.-^/ The mechanism for enforcing it leaves one in no doubt 2 /about this.—
Besides, there are institutional mechanisms to make inter­
vention less onerous or hazardous for institutions. The most important 
of these is the use of Case Committees for investigating Companies.
The existence of a case Committee is usually known only to the consulted 
institutions of the relevant I.F.C. and there is no obligation on all 
those holding shares in the Company to join or support it. This means 
that the intervention can be undertaken discretely. Also institutions 
who elect to stay out unrepresented retain their freedom to deal without 
any risk of being accused of insider dealing.
Acting through the I.P.C.s and the I.S.C. also considerably 
reduces the amount of time and money which would be involved if only 
one institution or private shareholder or a group of them decided to 
take up the issue on their own.
1/ See the Financial Times, Feb. 27, 1980.
2/ Final Report, para. 552. (Wilson Committee.)
370
It is sometimes argued that the effect of greater institutional 
intervention than there is at present would further enhance the chances 
of institutions being able to benefit themselves at the expense of the 
smaller and private Shareholders.—  ^ In answer to this it is to be 
noted that institutions usually monitor managements' performance by 
in-house analysis of published information, by reports from, and 
discussions with, Stockbrokers and by direct contact with the companies.
There is nothing in these methods themselves which either increases or
decreases the chances of getting privileged information. Admittedly,
21however, most large institutions, as the Wilson Committee reports,—  
usually maintain small staffs of financial analysts, actuaries, 
accountants and economists, etc, at great expense. It is only natural, 
therefore, that they should be able at any time to form a more enlightened 
appraisal of the available information than private shareholders or even 
smaller institutions. In this respect companies can do a lot to protect 
the smaller shareholders by ensuring that the price-sensitive information 
is released to all shareholders simultaneously and that financial journalists 
and analysts are briefed frequently to ensure that the value of the 
shares relative to other companies is well represented so that small 
shareholders who deal can do so at a fair price. Indeed, large institutions
1/ See the Final Report, para. 904. 
2/ Para. 899.
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might even find this source of information attractive. The advantage 
of this would be that "reliance by institutions on stockbrokers' 
analyses (would reduce) demands on managements time as well as on the 
institutions' own analytical resources".— ^
3. Potential Uses of Institutional Power.
It was urged upon the Wilson Committee that there is a danger
in increased institutions' participation of creating two classes of
shareholders - those who exercise the privileges and responsibilities
of Ownership, (the institutions) and those who do not (the small private
shareholders). Although conflict is certainly not inevitable given the
proprietary right of individual shareholders to use their vote as they
2/
please,—  it is by no means certain that in every case where institutions
\J Para. 906.
V  See N.-W. Transportation v Beatty. (1887) 12 App. Cas.589. But see
Clemens v Clemens Bros. Ltd.. /19767 2 All E.R. 268 where a shareholder 
having a dominant power in the Company (55Z) was held not entitled as 
of right to exercise her majority votes in any way she pleased so as 
to injure other shareholders. Her contractual right was subject to 
equitable consideration which made it unjust for her to use it 
oppressively against a minority shareholder so as to ensure that 
she (the minority shareholder) would never get control of the company. 
It is unlikely, though, that the principle in this case will restrict 
the freedom of shareholders in the large company to use their votes 
in any manner and for whatever motive they desire.
3 7 2.
exercise the responsibilities of Ownership, conflict will necessarily 
result. And while the relative imbalance between institutional and 
private shareholders has potentially inequitable consequences to the 
detriment of the latter, it is true that they also stand to benefit by 
a more effective use of institutions' power.
In general, a substantial community of interests exists 
between institutional and other shareholders. It is, for example, in 
everybody's interest that weak or inadequate management should be 
challenged and that efficient management should not be allowed to rest 
on its laurels. In undertaking this function the institutions will be 
acting in a way which is advantageous to all shareholders, big or small.—  ^
However, differences might exist between the different classes of 
shareholders in say dividend policy. Institutions would normally adopt 
a long term view, while the private shareholders are often more interested 
in imnediate returns on capital. Secondly, for all the optimism that the 
risks are negligible, institutions might through greater access to 
companies gather price-sensitive information. Thirdly, there might be 
conflict when the volume of institution's holdings necessarily lead them 
to challenge the entrenched rights of private shareholders. The recent 
events in Lloyds Bank may be recalled.
1/ Wilson Committee Report, para. 905.
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Another obvious use which institutions can make of their 
powers is in the appointment of non-executive directors. Special 
shareholders nominee directors become relevant for two reasons.
First, there is a considerable communication gap between boards of 
directors and company members. This is because the annual accounts 
and reports for reasons which have been considered are neither read 
nor easily comprehensible to even highly educated people. The attempt 
to correct this by requiring an ever increasing amount of disclosure 
is roundly criticised by those who rightly in this writer's opinion 
believe that what is needed is much simplified information "specially 
tailored to the needs of the ordinary shareholder".—  ^ Secondly, 
although directors are, as of now, supposedly elected by shareholders 
this is not true de facto . It is management's own nominees that are 
usually approved by shareholders who rarely take any part in the 
nominations. It ought, therefore, to be possible to evolve a special 
machinery through which shareholders can thus be genuinely represented.
1/ This is one of the suggestions of the Chairman of BAT Industries 
as reported by the Financial Times, June 19, 1980. He welcomed 
"changes to simplify and clarify" presentation of corporate 
information, but is "less enthusiastic about adding to reporting 
responsibilities" which means that "already complicated reports 
and accounts will become much more expensive and perhaps less 
useful". However, his idea of minimising expenses by sending 
statutory information only to those who wish to receive it would 
be a dangerous move, whose full consequences cannot yet be fully 
envisaged but it will certainly make shareholders far more apathetic 
and removed from details about their companies affairs than they 
already are now.
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An idea which immediately suggests itself is the introduction
of Cumulative Voting, a system commonly used in many jurisdictions in
the United States to enhance the chances of proportional representation
of shareholders' on the board. The system gives each shareholder as
much votes as the number of directors to be appointed times the total
number of shares he holds.—  ^ Its application, to an extent, helps to
prevent the situation which now operates in many U.K. companies whereby
all the seats on the board can be filled up by management or a substantial
2/
shareholder— who coomands more than 50 per cent of the votes cast at 
the meeting. Although the idea has been debated in this country for a 
long time now, Cumulative voting is not available for U.K. Companies 
and it is difficult, if not impossible, for an ordinary private share­
holder to pull together enough votes to appoint a director of his choice. 
The only shareholders who are influential and powerful enough to do this 
are the institutions. Their chances are even better if there is an 
agreement by a number of them to act by collective action.
The desirability of shareholder board representation through 
institutional shareholders power is acquiring wide recognition and support. 
J.M. Keynes, in a 1928 address first postulated the idea that
1/ See "Should Cumulative Voting for Directors Be Mandatory? - A Debate". 
(1955-56) 11 Bus. Lawyer, 9.
2/ Often substantial shareholders' votes are aligned with Management.
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"Co-operative action between insurance offices, and a 
committee representing them might be able to play the 
part of the reasonable, well-informed shareholder able 
to make his views and wishes felt, which is at present 
so signally lacking in the existing scheme of things". 1/
The case for minority shareholders' nominee was give a 
boost by Lord Chorley's and Mr. E. Wolff's proposals in 1963 that 
quoted and other large public companies should have one director
specifically appointed by the members to look after their interests
2/generally and to report to them as an "Ombudsman". —
Fifty years after Keynes, Briston and Dobbins suggested
that
"By protecting their interests as shareholders financial 
institutions represented on the board may indirectly promote 
the welfare of smaller investors". 3/
In his statement accompanying the 1977 Annual Reports and Accounts, 
the Chairman of Prudential Assurance included the following sentence:
1/ "Principles of Investment Policy", an unpublished address to 
the National Mutual Life Assurance Society, London, 25th Jan. 
1928, quoted by Alex Rubner, op. cit, 150-151
In Law Reform Now, (1963) op. cit. p.193.2/
3/ P. 62.
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"Institutional investors seem likely to develop closer 
contacts with industrial managements, and to do more 
to promote a better mutual understanding of the common 
long term interests of investors and the companies in 
which they invest".
Despite this abundant optimism one should add that unless and 
until a special code of responsibility is introduced or legislation 
enacted by Parliament for this purpose there is no guarantee that 
institutional shareholders or their nominee directors would always 
consider private shareholders and their own members' interests on an 
equality basis. To Prof. Pennington it is sheer delusion to think that 
instituions "champion the cause of the small shareholders" by adopting 
"seemingly altruistic positions" for example, in deciding to take legal 
action against directors^ - or, one may add, in their nomination.
The desirability of institutional shareholders' nominee was 
also emphasised by Mr. Edmund Dell, former Secretary of State for Trade. 
Addressing a meeting of the National Association of Pension Funds in 
Edinburgh in April 1979, he put up a firm defence of the status quo by 
urging the institutions to preserve their present role and structure 
eschewing concentration, and resisting calls to intervene in industry.
\J R.R. Pennington, The Investor and The Law, (1968), 412.
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1/ R.R. Pennington, The Investor and The Law, (1968), 412.
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Instead of that, Mr. Dell advocated that institutions should seek an 
improved role for non-executive directors who will sit on the board 
to monitor the conduct of m a n a g e m e n t W h i l e  it is apparent from 
evidence that the N.A.P.F. clearly rejected the argument in defence 
of the status quo in so far as they do actively intervene, it is to 
be hoped that they take heed of Mr. Dell's proposed alternative.
The role of small shareholders' protector is one which the 
Wilson Committee also thrusts upon institutions when it accepted the 
general view that "one of the most appropriate ways for the institutions 
to discharge their responsibilities as part-owners will, ... be to 
ensure that Company boards include a number of competent ¿non-execut ivq7 
directors".^
Not every one, though, supports these suggestions for special 
nominee directors. Shortly after Mr. Dell's speech some institutional 
investors were quick to voice their resentment at the suggestion openly 
Frances Cairncross, a financial columnist of The Guardian, reports her 
experience at a Conference on the power and responsibility of the 
institutional investors in which a Chairman of one of Britain's biggest
1/ See The Guardian, April 28, 1979, and the Financial Times Editorial, 
April 27, 1979.
l j  Final Report, para. 917.
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industrial companies argued forcefully for a scheme to link non­
executive directors with institutional shareholders through a new 
City Committee. He was promptly attacked by the Chief executive of 
one large Assurance Company and the investment manager of another.— ^
Suggestions for an increased role for shareholders derive
mostly from comparison with the European experience, especially
Germany, but the Wilson Committee criticised this comparison as being 
2/"unfavourable"—  and pointed to some basic differences in the relation­
ships between institutions and industry in the U.K. and European countries, 
where direct intervention by financial institutions in the decision-making 
process is quite commonplace. The Bow Group, for example, in their 
evidence to the Committee proposed "the creation of non-executive 
supervisory boards including representatives of institutional shareholders,
to oversee company management and to influence the appointment and 
3/removal of directors".—  But this was opposed on the grounds that the 
international comparisons with Europe were misleading:
"in Germany for instance the bank's close involvement with 
industry through equity holdings is sometimes regarded as a 
disadvantage and the greater intervention £in the U.K..7 by 
institutional shareholders would strike at the roots of the
1/ The Guardian, April 28, 1979.
2/ Final Report, para. 892.
3/ Progress Report, p. 26-27 (para. 89). Emphasis, mine.
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limited liability concept, which stimulated the growth of 
industry by enabling companies to raise capital from anonymous 
investors and by severing the link between ownership and 
management". 1/ This argument was accepted by the Committee.
With due respect, one begs to defer from the above view for 
two reasons. Firstly, there is a greater danger that if company law 
persists in the belief that it is only by increasing emphasis on 
publicity and disclosure provisions in the statutes which publicity is 
often incomprehensible to the average shareholder it is this rather 
than greater institutional shareholders' intervention and shareholders'
control, that will help to perpetrate the "mistrust felt by the man in
2/the street for securities".—  Greater institutional participation is 
more likely to increase public confidence in the limited liability 
system than discourage it by helping to sustain an understanding that 
Ownership, if well organised, can still exercise their basic right of 
control over directors.
. 3/Secondly, while the Wilson Committee rightly observed—  that
1/ Ibid. In the Final Report the Committee accepted this argument 
in general. See paras. 892-895.
2/ Atiyah "Thoughts on Company Law Philosophy", (1965) 8 The Lawyer, 
16, 18. Mismanagement and some types of government policies have 
been known to have greater influence on investment attitudes. See 
e.g. Fison's Ltd,s Profile For 1979 where some of these factors are 
discussed.
1/ Para. 895.
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Che relationship between investment institutions and industry in the 
U.S. is not closer than that between them in the U.K., it failed to 
address itself to the effect of the "important institutional differences 
between the two systems". These include the "higher standards of 
disclosures enforced by law on public companies, the use of audit 
conmittees and the greater leverage given to individual shareholders 
by the use of class actions and contingent legal fees", available in 
the U.S. but not in the U.K. As the U.K. shareholder is not exposed 
to such institutional control mechanisms as his U.S. counterpart it is 
only reasonable that control through special nominee directors would 
be a welcome alternative. This need not imply the setting up of a two- 
tier board system as such nominess can serve under the unitary boards 
as presently constituted. To deny them this entirely clearly puts them 
in a worse situation than their U.S. or German counterparts.
The use of a special shareholder nominee director raises
a number of questions, particularly as regards his relations with the
rest of the board and the precise nature of his functions.—  ^ The
Wilson Committee considered this problem and warned that such directors
2/should not be seen as representatives of the appointing institutions.—
1/ Reservations about his relationship with other shareholders 
mentioned supra p. 376.
2/ Para. 917.
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The legal position of a nominee director has always been 
considered an "invidious one". On the one hand, he is appointed 
usually for a singular purpose - to promote the interests of those 
to whom he owes his appointment. On the other hand, he is subject 
to the over-riding fiduciary duties of directors to promote the 
interests of the whole company. The appointment of nominee directors 
to company boards was approved by Lord Denning M.R. in Boulting 
v A.C.T.AT. — of which he remarked:
"There is nothing wrong with it. It is done everyday". But 
then he cautions, "Nothing wrong, that is, so long as the 
director is left free to exercise his best judgment in the 
interest of the company which he serves". 2/
It is precisely this balancing of interests that gives rise to problems.
3/In Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society v Myers —  it was held that 
a nominee director appointed by a Holding Company on the board of its
1/ A9637 2 Q.B. 606.
2/ Atp626. Nominee directors like other directors can enter into
agreement which binds the board but any agreement by such director 
to vote in accordance with the agreement between him and his 
nominators would be unenforceable, as to how they shall vote at 
a future board meeting. See Gore Brown, Chapter 27-28.
3/ A9597 A.C. 324.
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subsidiary is in breach of his fiduciary obligations if he so used 
his power as to frustrate the business of the subsidiary in order to 
help his appointors. Yet, it is quite clear that if a nominee did 
not do as he is directed he would lose his office. Indeed, it is not 
unknown for nominators to procure undated resignations from nominees 
and these can easily be completed to remove disobedient nominees.
Moreover, a nominee director can be dismissed by ordinary resolution 
under section 184 by the nominator almost as easily as the appointment 
was made in the first place.
The contradictory (legal and moral) obligations of nominee 
directors have become familiar especially on the German scene in relation 
to worker directors and their position is likely to assume added dimension 
if and when employee representation is introduced into the U.K. — The 
German-type two-tier board system it may be noted, is expected to minimise 
the areas of conflict and the dangers of disloyalty by representative 
directors by keeping separate the supervisory and management groups but 
In practice conflicts often arise. Under the German system the Labour or 
personnel director (Arbeitsdirektor)is in a particularly odd position. 
Every company in the Coal and Steel business is required to appoint the 
labour director, usually somebody who is acceptable to the employee 
representatives on the board of management. He is charged specifically 
to promote industrial relations and all aspects of safety and welfare of
1/ Already there is some concern about the possibility of such 
—  conflicts. See for example, D.D. Prentice,"Employee
Participation in Corporate Government. A Critique of the 
Bullock Report." (1978) 56 Canadian B. R. 277, 295.
employees. It has been argued that the dual role of the labour director 
as an employee and as a member of the board of maij^ement creates divided 
loyalty. The Biendenkopf Commission -  which looked into this question 
indicated to the contrary that despite the methods of their selection 
labour directors have never been expected and have never in fact sided 
with their appointors against the collective view of the executive boards. 
The report elsewhere Indicates unamlmity in decisions of the supervisory
board. In fact, in two-thirds of the companies surveyed the neutral
2/member had never been called upon to break a deadlock. —  In the remaining 
third where the casting vote had been used it was more often in favour of 
shareholders than employees.
1/ Biendenkopf Report on Co-determination (1970) English Translation (1977) 
paras. 60-61 cited by Tom Hadden, Company Law and Capitalism. (1977) 
p .450.
2/ See Tom Hadden, ibid, 455. The composition of German company boards 
are carefully structured so as to minimise conflict but this has 
not prevented occasional dissatisfaction. In a recent court action 
in Karlsruhe, Germany, 9 big companies and 29 employee associations 
challenged the 1976 Co-determination Act arguing that the Act by 
giving employee representatives numerical equality on company 
supervisory boards infringed the constitutional rights to private 
property, freedom of association and freedom to conduct business.
The court rejected all the counts, emphasising that the Act's 
provisions for numerical equality did not amount to parity because 
of the second tie-breaking vote given to the Chairman. Since he 
was invariably drawn from the shareholders' side, the court noted, 
the ultimate control of shareholders over their company was unaffected 
by the new make-up of supervisory boards under the Act. Despite 
the 50-50 representation of employees and shareholders on the 
boards, the workers were in effect at a disadvantage. Herr Otto Esser, 
president of the BDA (employers' federation) though disappointed 
with some aspects of the decision saw it as a re-affirmation of 
the right of management to manage. See the Financial Times. 2 March 
1979.
Although the German type of board representations has been
marked more by success than by failure and occasional conflicts are
easily contained the dilemma In which employee directors sometimes find
themselves should not be underestimated. Professor Detlev Vagts reports
two decisions in which German Courts have been called upon to decide on
1/  2/such cases of conflicts. —  Hie first case —  concerned the Metal Workers 
Union's strike in 1955. Before the strike one of the employee members of 
the supervisory council had been active in urging the workers to go on 
strike and after the strike began he became Chairman of the strike committee 
and played an active role on the picket line. The other employee members 
of the Council also supported the strike, though less actively. The 
court found that this behaviour was in breach of their duty of loyalty 
to the company, since they had been chosen not just "to represent special 
workers' interests but to conduct their functions solely for the good of 
the company and its employees while taking account of the common welfare".
1/ Prof. D.F. Vagts, "Reforming the Modern Corporation Perspectives 
from the German", (1966-67) 80 Harv. L.R. 23 at 82.
2/ Judgement of January 20 1956 in 11 DER/BETRIEBSBERATER 240 Landgericht 
München), aff'd Judgement of September 19, 1956 in id. at 999 (Ober- 
landers gericht München), noted by Vagts in 80 Harv. L.R. 74-75.
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In the second case —  , members of the supervisory council of 
the Hamburg Electricity Works appointed by the City of Hamburg (one of 
the stockholders), resisted a rate increase felt by the other share­
holders to be essential. The court took the view that the primary duty 
of a member is to the company, not the person who appointed him, and 
that he is not only legally free to disregard instructions given to him 
by the shareholders who selected him, but must put the company's interests
The apparently contradictory obligations of representative
directors was considred by the Bullock Committee in the context of industrial
democracy including the duty not to disclose confidential information which
could be damaging to the Company. It admitted the existence of difficulty
in certain situations such as where employee directors come by information
relating to an Impending plant re-location, redundancy or closure of a
company. The credibility of the employee representatives, said the Committee,
would be severely impaired if while they possessed such vital information
they keptquiet and failed to disclose it to those who would be gravely
3/affected by its implementation. —  As such the Committee took the view
1/ Judgment of January 29 1962, 36 BGHZ 296, 307 noted by Vagts, 
ibid, p.82.
2/ In fact the decision went against the dissentient shareholders 
~  on a procedural ground.
3/ See also D.D. Prentice, op. cit. 56 Can. B.R. 277, 299.
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Chat it was "essential to the success of board level representation 
that employee representatives, should be In close touch with their 
constituents. They must make It their regular job to report on what 
the board Is doing or proposing to do and why".—  ^ Though aware of the 
difficulties that would thereby arise the Committee offered very little 
by way of recommendation except to leave It to the board to determine 
by themselves what Information Is to be treated as confidential believing,
hopefully, that "breaches of confidentiality as a result of board level
2/
representation [would be] extremely rare". —
On the question of directors' duties in general the Bullock 
Committee proposed that all directors "should have the same legal duties 
and liabilities", the basic duty being to act In"the best interests of 
the company" balancing a number of interests. It drew a parallel between 
employee representative director and nominee directors, appointed by a 
specific shareholder Interest", and proposed that their "Job will be the 
same as it is now: to weigh up the differing and conflicting Interests in
the Company in order to reach decisions which they genuinely believe to
.. 1/be in the Company's overall best interest .
1/ P. 87 para. 49. 
2/ P. 90 para. 57. 
3/ P. 85 para. 39.
387
Although U.K. Company law has yet to resolve the contradictory
position of nominee directors, there Is little doubt that the conventional
notion of the "Interests of the c ompany" has been too inflexible and
rather dogmatic on this score and the view now prevalent is that directors,
irrespective of the special interests they represent should be allowed
enough room for manoeuvre in balancing the apparently conflicting interests. — ^
In the New South Wales case of Re Broadcasting Station 2 G.B. (Proprietary)2/-Ltd. —  Jacobs, J. held that the appointment of nominee directors is not 
"reprehensible unless it could also be inferred that such nominees would act 
in the interests of [their nominators] even if they were of the view 
that their acts were not in the best interest of the company".
Moreover, "it is to ignore the realities of company
1J See e.g. Vagts, in 80 Harv. L.R. 23 at 75. In relation to employee 
representatives, the Bullock Committee's answer on this score is 
that it would be "unreasonable and unrealistic" not to expect them 
to argue strongly at board level for the interests of their 
nominators. "Indeed one of the objectives of putting them on the 
board in the first place is to make sure that the employee's voice 
is heard at the very highest level of the company". However, "an 
employee representative would be in breach of his duty if he voted 
in a particular way solely because of the instructions of his trade 
union. He must be a representative, free to express his opinions 
and to reach his own conclusions about which policies will work 
for the greater good of the company, not a delegate, told how to 
vote by his constituents". P. 85 para. 40. The test therefore is 
whether a nominee is acting on his own initiative or whether he 
is acting on instructions from his nominators. If he has not been 
specially mandated the representative may lawfully pursue the 
interests of his nominators. See D.D. Prentice, op.cit; pp.297- 
298. The idea is that a director must not fetter his discretion.
2/ (1964-65)N.S.W.R. 1648. See also Levin v Clarke (1963) 80 W.N. (N.S.W.)
organisation and it would make the position of a nominee representative 
director an impossibility if it were the law that each director must 
approach each company problem with an open mind". Special nominee 
directors must therefore be accepted now as a normal feature of the boards of 
large companies, and further use of them are to be encouraged.
Whilst no one interest out of several in a company is exactly 
the same as another they all have one thing in common - that the interests 
of particular groups will be ultimately enhanced with the fortunes of the 
company itself. In the uncommon event of a serious dispute likely to 
lead to the disintegration of the company nominee directors must disregard 
the special interests they are supposed to represent and act in every 
case in the general interest of the company; afterall, the overall 
interests of all depend on the continued existence of the company.— ^
This in no way defeats the purpose of appointing a nominee. But also 
the mere fact that a nominee director puts emphasis on safeguarding the 
interests of those he represents does not automatically amount to a
disregard of his fiduciary obligation to the company. As Latham C.J.
2/pointed out in Mills v Mills- it should be remembered that directors
1/ But see Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society v Myers, supra. 
This case is, however, an exception to the general rule.
2/ £1938/ 60 C.L.R. 150 (Australian High Court).
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are
"not required by the law to live in an unreal region of 
detached altruism and to act in a vague mood of ideal 
abstraction from obvious facts which must be present to 
the mind of any honest and intelligent man when he 
exercises his powers as a director". \J
This advice should mollify antagonists of nominee directors.
In order to clarify the exact position of nominee directors 
it will be useful to have a provision explaining the general fiduciary 
obligations of directors along the lines of Section 203 of the Ghana 
Companies Code. Sub-section (3) provides:
"In considering whether a particular transaction or course 
of action is in the best interests of the company as a whole 
a director may have regard to the interests of the employees, 
as well as the members, of the company, and, when appointed by, 
or as a representative of, a special class members, employees, 
or creditors may give special, but not exclusive, consideration 
to the interests of that class. 2/
J./ At 164.
2/ Emphasis mine.
It is common knowledge that as at now some nominee directors 
have not been able to do anything on their boards to further the 
interests which they were supposed to represent due mostly to practical 
difficulties, — ^ but also for fear of liability for breach of duty. There 
is every reason to believe that a law setting out the scope of directors' 
duties as in the Ghanian Code will be great Impetus to any meaningful
representation which is both helpful to the special interests represented
2/and the over-all interests of the company. —
4.Proposed Method For the Appointment of Shareholders Representative Directors.
3/A number of other practical difficulties —  which are raised 
by the proposals for special shareholder representative directors may be 
considered here. The most important question relates to how such 
representatives are to be appointed but also important is how they can 
be removed or dismissed and the general questions of their accountability 
and so on. Quite apart from the fact that these matters, or at least
some of them can be settled in the articles of association of the different 
4/companies —  it is difficult to devise a scheme which will be applicable
1/ See e.g. John Thackray "America's Changing Boardrooms"
Management Today, May 1978, 58, 61.
2/ Other practical difficulties like the method of appointment of 
~  different shareholders' nominees are matters which can be settled 
in the articles.
3/ That is, beside their legal duties as discussed above.
4/ It is possible for an arrangement to be made by special provision 
”  in the articles of association giving power to a shareholder or 
class of shareholders or indeed a major creditor, to appoint some 
or all the directors of a company, subject to the ultimate control 
of the general meeting. See the Bullock Report, p. 83 para. 33, 
and infra.
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to every large company in view of the obvious variations which exist 
amongst such companies. However, It would be useful to consider first, 
though briefly, the two methods of appointment of representatives 
directors which have been applied in some jurisdictions and in the context 
of industrial democracy on the Continent.
(a) Classification of Shares and Directorships
Special provision may be made for the appointment of a special 
shareholder representative by creating classes of shares with identical 
rights but a right being conferred separately on each class to elect 
designated directorships. For example, If a board consisted of five 
directors positions, A to E, each class of shares may be entitled to 
elect and remove one of these directors. Thus a minority shareholder 
or group of shareholders who holds class A of the issued shares would be 
entitled to appoint (and remove) director A. — ^
(b) Another method which is more suitable for large public companies is2/the cumulative voting system, —  its main feature being that instead of 
the "straight" voting system whereby a shareholder is entitled to cast 
one vote per share for each vacancy and so enabling a bare majority to 
elect the full board, minority shareholders are afforded the opportunity 
of electing a number of directors in proportion to the strength of their
1/ See A.B. Afterman, Company Directors and Controllers (1970), p. 29, 
—  who provides a model article which can provide this sort of power.
A company may be able to adopt such an article in the U.K. but it is 
more suitable for small companies than large ones.
2/ Brief mention has been made above of the effects of this voting 
system.
shareholdings. Thus a minority shareholder with say 10 per cent of the 
equity capital is assured of filling at least one out of ten vacancies 
if he voted all his shares for one nominee.
The cumulative voting system is a notable feature in the U.S. 
but is largely unknown under English law. The main argument in its 
favour may be summarised as follows:
(1) It is the fairest system for minority shareholders because it 
, affords them board representation in proportion to their
shareholding;
(2) It maintains the principle of majority rule in that provided 
they voted their shares properly they will be able to elect 
a majority of the board;
(3) It allows the minority or special interests groups a "voice" 
on the board to press forward their points of view.
(4) It provides a channel of communication through the nominee 
on the board to the shareholders.
On the other hand the system has been criticised on the following
grounds:
(1) The election of partisan directors is Incompatible with the basic 
function of the board to represent all interests in the company;
(2) It creates disharmony on the board which can diminish management's 
performance;
(3) It increases the risks of a partisan director divulging confidential 
information;
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(4) It encourages situations which might make the Company more 
susceptible to take-over, or battle for control by a faction 
of the board.
(5) It leads unfairly to the minority gaining control if the majority 
falls to cumulate their votes properly. — ^
The opponents of the emulative voting system tend to exaggerate 
the point that representative directors will necessarily be trouble-makers 
and be disruptive to the smooth operation of the board. On balance,however,
the arguments against the system seem to have prevailed and it certainly
2/does not now command in the U.S. the popularity which it once enjoyed. —
Professor Gower has underlined the unpopularity of advocating 
3/emulative voting in the U.K. —  He explains that its absence in England 
is due to two reasons. Firstly, it is an "obstacle to complete and 
immediate majority control", and secondly, it conflicts with the basic 
English view that "boards of directors as supervisory managers,... should 
be united in policy and outlook with the rest of management, rather than 
as representatives of divergent interests overseeing the managers". Even 
at the time of his writing, the learned Professor apprehended that the
1/ See Afterman, op. cit., 33-36.
2/ See L.C.B. Gower, "Corporation Law in England and America", (1955-56) 11 
“  Bus. Lawyer, 39, 53; "Some Contrasts Between British and American 
Corporation Law", (1956)69 Harv. L.R. 1369, 1390-91. See also C.C.
Brown, Putting The Corporate Board to Work, (1976), pp. 23-24.
3/ Ibid.
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above view was already somewhat "anachronistic", but it is clear that this 
is more so in the present times when the demands for special interests 
representations have become more widespread and more serious, especially 
in relation to employee representation on boards.
Since the methods for the appointment of representative directors 
discussed above are generally not available in the U.K. and seem unlikely, 
it would be useful to consider the method of appointment operated under 
the co-determination system on the Continent and those considered in the 
Bullock's Report and the references therein to shareholders' representation.
The Bullock Committee opined that the extension of genuine
Industrial democracy can only be achieved "if there is a direct representation —^
of employees on company boards in just the same way as there is direct
2/
representation of shareholders on boards at present" —  With due respect 
the above statement begs the question whether at present directors are 
in practice "direct" representatives of shareholders. It has been our 
contention in this thesis that nearly always directors in large companies 
are the nominees of the Chief executives or the board and that although 
their nominations are "approved" by the general meeting they cannot in 
all reality be considered "direct shareholder representatives". Our 
proposal therefore is to devise a scheme which allows investors to be 
directly represented.
1/ Original emphasis.
V  P. 71 para. 1. My emphasis.
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In Germany, for example, membera of Che supervisory board, one 
of the three principal organs of corporate governance, other than 
employees' representatives are appointed by the general meeting. The 
Biendenkopf Commission reported that the appointments there are, in fact, 
made not by the individual shareholders but by banks and institutions.
This is because "many small shareholders there deposit their shares 
with banks and other financial institutions which may then secure the 
election of a representative on the supervisory board".—  Thus, one in 
four of the total number of seats on the supervisory boards under the 
co-determination system are held by banks —^ who are in essence agents of 
the diverse numbers of small shareholders whose shares they hold.
A major shareholder may also appoint himself into the supervisory 
board by using his own votes. Even minority shareholders are afforded an 
opportunity for direct representation by clauses which entitle them to 
submit proposals for resolutions to general meetings for consideration,
which may include a resolution allowing them to appoint a representative
3/to the supervisory board. —  To ensure election through this method, 
though, the minority would have to count on the support or co-operation of 
the majority or other shareholders if his resolution is to go through.
It might be tempting to dismiss any analogy with the German 
practice as unhelpful on the ground that the U.K. unitary board system
1/ See Tom Hadden (1977), op.cit., *+H9. 
2/ Ibid.
3/ SS. 127 and 137 (AKt G).
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cannot incorporate a mechanism designed for the appointment of shareholders'
representatives to a supervisory board. The reports by Eric Batstone and
P.L. Davies which were heavily relied upon by the Bullock Committee have
now established that no fundamental distinction exists between the U.K.
governing structure and the Continental models, and that the U.K. companies
maintains a de fa c to two-tier system in so far as there is a separation
between the "management" and supervisory functions of the board, albeit,
a difficult distinction to maintain in practice. — Accordingly, P.L.
Davies has argued that as is the case under the Danish system it is not
necessary to make any laboured distinction between one-tier and two-tier 
2/systems. —
Under the Danish law companies with capital of Kr. 400,000 or 
3/more are as P.L. Davies notes, —  required to have two organs:
(1) a shareholders' meeting and
(2) a board of directors with minority employee representation and 
a management of one or more members appointed by the board.
Although a majority of the board must consist of persons who 
are not managers of the company, a complete separation of 
personnel between board and management is unnecessary, neither 
is a complete separation of functions between both.
1/ Eric Batstone and P.L. Davies, Industrial Democracy : European 
Experience (1976), 22.
2/ P. 53.
3/ P. 55.
The Law provides that "the management shall be in charge of the current 
management of the c ompany" and"the board of directors shall secure a 
warrantable organisation of the company's activities", but in respect 
of setting fundamental corporate policy the board and management share 
responsibility. It is obvious therefore that direct shareholders' (or 
other interests', for that matter) representations, like .employee 
representation under the Danish system would not require the establish­
ment of a supervisory organ. Indeed, the advantage of maintaining 
representative directors on a unitary board would be to prevent or at 
least minimise the dangers of circumvention of such representatives which 
is not unknown under Continental practices.
Applying the above analogy of European systems of board 
representation to the U.K. companies, therefore, it should be provided 
that a proportion of the board of every public limited company, say at 
least 40 per cent, must be comprised of non-executive directors who are 
to be directly appointed by shareholders in general meeting. In other 
words, where a company has, for example, ten directors at least four of 
them must be non-executive directors who will be appointed at the nomination 
of shareholders.
The remaining directors who will be predominantly but not solely 
executives are to be appointed under the present system whereby a list of 
names is presented by the chief executive, usually after consultation with 
the board, at the general meeting. A biographical note about each candidate
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wi ü  be circulated to the shareholders who shall approve the nominations 
or decide otherwise. Judging by the present system little opposition 
seems likely to arise in respect of such candidates.
The method of appointing the other group will be somewhat more 
complicated. We propose, however, that the law should require that a 
representative director (who must be non-executive) shall be appointed 
at the nomination of a shareholder or group of shareholders. It should 
then be left to the articles to spell out the procedure by which such 
appointments will be made. Such a clause might, for instance, require 
that a candidate for appointment to the office of a non-executive 
representative director shall be nominated by:
(a) a shareholder or group of shareholders holding not less than 
10 per cent of the issued share capital of the Company having 
a right to vote, or
(b) not less than 100 shareholders of the company holding not less 
than 5 per cent of the issued share capital of the company 
having a right to vote.
While senior executives are to be appointed as executive 
directors, nominees for appointment as non-executive directors will be 
expected to come from outside the company. Thus they could as in Germany 
be the representatives of banks or institutions or senior executives from 
other companies or other reasonably qualified persons. In addition a
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majority shareholder will retain the right to appoint himself using 
his own votes and at his own nomination, provided that in this case 
he has satisfied requirement (a) above.
It will be expected also that institutions (including groups 
of institutions) will more readily secure the appointment" of their 
nominees under requirement (a) above while private shareholders and 
ginger groups will avail themselves of requirement (b).
In order to prevent one shareholder or group of shareholders 
dominating or monopolising the appointment system it should also be 
provided that no shareholder or group of shareholders shall have more 
than one representative director at any one time, provided that where no 
nominations have been made to fill a vacant office by other shareholders, 
a second representative may be elected by a shareholder or group of 
shareholders having a right under the proposed article to do so.
The elections shall be by majority vote so it is clear that it 
will not always be possible for every nominee to get appointed subject, of 
course, to the rule that each shareholder shall have only one representative 
director at any one time.
A director whether executive or non-executive may be dismissed 
by ordinary resolution as under the present system, without prejudice to
too
his rights to claim compensation for wrongful dismissal. —'
This proposal obviously involves some practical difficulties 
and in particular raises two questions:
(1) whether private shareholders would take any interest in making 
any nominations and in seeking a representation, and
(2) whether institutions will not dominate the process thereby 
-acquiring further privileges than they already enjoy.
With regard to the first question it is to be pointed out that 
no satisfactory answer is possible as to whether private shareholders 
will take any interest until the proposal actually takes effect, but 
we believe that it can only increase shareholders' enthusiasm if they 
realise that there is an opportunity to secure a board representation. 
Ginger groups, in particular, should be able to appoint non-executive 
nominees if they command the support of a sufficient number of members or 
voting equity which will be more likely than not.
1/ Section 184(6), 1948 Act. Cf. Section 120(1) of the Australian 
Uniform Companies Act which empowers the nominators of the 
dismissed director to appoint his successor. For a discussion 
of the full scope of that section see AFterman, op. cit. pp. 20-21.
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It must be admitted that where vacancies are keenly contested 
by institutional investors, ginger groups and individual shareholders 
would not stand much chance of having their nominees elected unless.there 
is a higher level of attendance at general meetings and interestedness on 
the part of small private shareholders in participation. The desire and 
prospects of appointing a representative to the board should, however, 
bring about greater co-operation amongst private shareholders and groups 
of shareholders and encourage participation through collective and more 
effective channels as investment institutions and ginger groups. This 
would in turn lead to greater exercise of shareholders' power both 
individually and collectively than there is at present.
The answer to the second question is that the requirement against 
having more than one director at a time will be a protection against the 
domination of appointments by one investment institution. It would ensure 
on the one hand that an institution wishing to do so can have a direct 
representative while, on the other hand, not denying from the private 
shareholders any right which they actually enjoy under the present system. 
But in view of what has been said above regarding the relative levels of 
participation by both groups of shareholders it is indeed likely that 
institutions would avail themselves more of the right to appoint nominees. 
However, the presence on the board of institutions' nominees need not 
necessarily be against the interest of other shareholders. Already there
1/are now a number of companies on whose boards institutions are represented —
1/ See infra, p. f-**
and this writer is unaware of any case where such representatives have 
been antagonistic to the interests of other shareholders not represented.
We have already considered the legal duties of nominee directors 
above but in respect of their accountability representative directors, it 
is submitted, should be required to report to all the shareholders in general 
meeting and not just to their nominators, although accountability to these 
is presupposed. This should be in addition to the general duty of the 
board at present to present to the annual general meeting the annual 
accounts and reports. The shareholders will be afforded the opportunity 
at the general meeting to receive the report of the representative directors 
and to put questions to them.
In making the above proposals regard has been had to the Bullock 
Committee's proposals about the accountability of representative directors 
within the broad context of industrial democracy. This thesis does not 
however deal with the general question of employee representation and how 
its introduction will affect the system of shareholders' representation.
This question has been extensively covered by the Bullock Report. The 
point which is to be stressed here is that it is important to ensure that 
any genuine system of shareholders' representation (with or without the 
issue of employee representation) must permit the nomination of representatives 
by the shareholders themselves and not by the management. The result of the 
failure in Germany to ensure this has been highlighted by Professor Rodiere 
who described the German supervisory board as being "an honorary gathering
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of distinguished people, neither capable nor inclined to exercise any 
real control", —^ even though charged in law with supervising the 
activities of the management board. Also P.L. Davies,citing the report 
of the German Government Commission headed by Professor Biendenkopf, 
writes that
"except where one or a few shareholders control a company, 
the managing board has a decisive say in the selection of 
shareholder representatives to the supervisory board.
Moreover, management sees the task of those elected as 
being not to represent the interests of the shareholders 
but to advise the company. In such circumstances the 
supervisory board ceases to be an instrument of super­
vision of management and becomes a mere provider of advice". 2/
If the system of genuine shareholder representation which has been advocated 
here is developed and encouraged by comfjftiies (with or without compulsion 
by statute) now or in the immediate future this would facilitate a fairly 
adequate system of shareholder representation within the context of industrial 
democracy when it is introduced, eventually.
But for the present the advantages of the shareholders' nominee would 
be to provide an essential link between shareholders and management instead of 
the wide gulf or "divorce" which now exists between these two organs. He 
would ensure that shareholders' views are easily communicated to the board 
where most policy decisions are taken, and through the nominee the board's 
views can be communicated to the shareholders on a more informal level than 
the general meetings. He would also serve as a link between the groups of 
shareholders he represents, if this is the case, and so help to improve 
communication and, presumably, co-operation amongst shareholders.
1/ Cited by P.L. Davies, Industrial Democracy, (1976) p. 57. 
2/ Ibid, at 58.
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5. Nature of the New Relationship Between Directors and Shareholders.
Increased shareholders' intervention does not imply that 
institutions have to interfeçin the day-to-day management of the 
company and question every investment and other policies of the board. 
Indeed, as the Wilson Committee pointed out too close a contact between 
institutions and company management might be counter-productive in that 
management would be apprehensive about taking risky, long-term investment 
policies which might make little sense to the less imaginative outlook 
of financial analysts. Also too frequent interference would be costly 
in management's time, and "¿Answering too many questions or conducting 
too many interviews with outsiders could detract from managements' 
performance to the detriment of the business".—  ^ There is also the , 
increased chances of institutions coming into contact with confidential 
information.
All these potential disadvantages of contact, can however be 
minimised if institutions relied more on the study of published information. 
This may be supplemented by establishing regular personal communication 
with the companies in which they invest. An increasing number of 
companies that gave evidence before the Wilson Committee accept this
1/ Para. 903.
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type of relationship, initiating meetings with substantial shareholders 
themselves, sometimes individually and sometimes by way of a general 
presentation. They believe that "by listening to their views and 
keeping them informed they gain the stability of sympathetic long-term 
holders of their shares and a valuable sounding board".—  ^ The advantages 
of such a relationship, though real, are not easily quantifiable.
6. Conclusion .
While institutional intervention would be most effective if 
a number of them acted by collective action, this need not always be 
the case and situations might arise where an institution might have to 
act alone, even adopting a point of view which is not identical with that 
of other smaller institutions or private shareholders. Indeed, to an 
extent, the success of some institutions depends on their ability to out 
perform their competitors. Differences between groups of shareholders 
might in fact be to the advantage of more efficient management by providing 
a wider range of options to the solution of the company's problems.
1/ Para. 901.
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Private shareholders need also to become more active through 
ginger groups, and here again the signs point to an increasing trend.
The role of the A.G.M.s might also be developed by introducing 
the method of giving advanced notice of shareholders' questions as in 
the House of Commons and the answers circulated to the shareholders 
before the A.G.M.s, in which supplementary or ex tempore questions 
should be allowed. Through their effective organisation and such 
changes, shareholders might yet transform companies' general meetings 
into lively forums for important debates.
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CHAPTER 10
THE PROPOSALS FOR MORE EFFECTIVE 
DIRECTORS' PARTICIPATION
1. The Role For Boards.
The purpose of this section is not to prescribe a role  
for the board but to explain, in the light of their structure and 
constraints described earlier on,the role which boards are designed 
to perform in the large public company and from there to examine how 
its performance can be achieved.
Any corporate organ that operates under any of the constraining 
conditions described above can rarely be able to "manage" the company's 
business or make business policy. "It can be useful in providing advice 
and counsel to the chief executive's office, playing a formal role in 
the approval of major corporate projects, and providing a modality for 
the exercise of influence and control by non-executives, but for the 
most parts these functions are either relatively unimportant or can be 
easily located elsewhere".— ^ Although the board has proved incapable of 
formulating policy it has the capability to monitor and supervise
1/ Eisenberg, 63 Cal. L.R. 402. By its functioning as a "modality 
for the exercise of ... control" he means that outside interests 
and "minority" shareholders are able to take-up non-executive 
directorships in order to avoid the high risk of liability for 
executive directorships. No legal or other evidence exists to 
substantiate this as a reason for a preference of non-executive rather than 
executive directorships.
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Management by ensuring that policies taken by the board are executed 
to the last letter and not manipulated out of recognition by the 
executives.
Notwithstanding their unsuitability for policy-making, 
non-executive directors on a board are essential for the proper 
discharge of its supervisory functions. Indeed, it could not be 
otherwise, for executives cannot be expected to monitor and supervise 
themselves. This would be better done by outsiders whose appraisal 
of all executive performances would be more detached and disinterested. 
Even though U.K. companies boards operate a unitary board system, the 
experience of the supervisory boards in the German two-tier system^ 
has been useful in trying to develop the supervisory role of boards 
here.
Under German Law —2/ the management and supervisory functions
of the board are kept separate and vested in two distinct organs: the
1/ Other European countries which operate the two-tier system include 
France, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands.
2/ S. 76(1) AKt G. The main source of information on German Law is 
R.R. Pennington, ed, German Company Law, (1975).
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board of management (Vorstand) and the Supervisory Council (Aufsichsrat) 
respectively. The management board has the power and the duty to manage 
the company's undertaking without reference to the wishes of the general 
meeting and its independence cannot be restricted by the company's 
regulations. The board must "manage the company on its own responsibility". 
The concept of "management" under this law is quite wide but roughly 
corresponds to those which have already been identified as proper 
management functions for board executives in this country. —  ^ In 
Germany they comprise the organisation of production and the preparation 
and execution of long-term planning for that purpose and consideration 
of the whole trading, investment and earnings policy of the company.
Such routine matters like keeping of books and records, drafting the 
annual report, convening general meetings, putting proposals to the 
general meetings as to the application of the profits shown by the 
company's balance sheets and any other business specified in the 
company's regulations fall under "management matters" and are known
collectively as "management of the business" or "management of the
2/company". —
The principal powers of the supervisory boards are, on the
other hand, the appointment and dismissal of the members of the management
board, the supervision of the management and the approval of the annual 
3/ .accounts. —  Like the management board the supervisory board also
1/ But what constitutes "manage" is nowhere defined by the law here. 
2/ Pennington, ibid., 45.
3/ Ibid, 48.
operates independently of the general meeting. Managerial functions 
cannot be conferred upon the supervisory board and it cannot give 
directions to the management board in respect of such matters. It 
can, however, make certain acts of the management board dependent on 
its approval - usually as a pre-emptive step by exercising a veto 
power.
In particular the supervisory board must be kept informed by 
the management board about its trading policy and all important matters 
of management of the company's business. — ^ The supervisory board is 
entitled to require information on such matters from the board at any 
time.
The supervisory board has the right to inspect the company's 
books and correspondence and to verify the state of the company's assets.
It must convene a general meeting and draw up an appropriate 
agenda if the company's interests so require. Members of the management 
board who are guilty of breaches of their duties may be dismissed by the 
supervisory board; the board performs this function on its own 
responsibility, and does not require the approval of the general meeting.
1/ S. 90 AKt G.
2 / S. 101(2) AKt G
The supervisory board is further empowered to litigate in the company's 
name to enforce claims for damages against members of the management- 
board for breaches of their duties. —
The supervisory board is responsible to the company for the
diligent exercise of its supervisory powers, in the same way as members
of the board of management are responsible for their management of the
2/company's business. —
The supervisory board has its own Chairman, who presides over 
meetings, making sure that the decisions of the supervisory board are 
not influenced in any way by the Management board. Likewise, the 
supervisory board, as a supervisory organ, is inherently incapable of 
giving direction to the board. Although the supervisory board only has 
power to dismiss directors on the management board, this may be done 
only if there are substantial grounds to do so, such as a breach of
duty by a director, his incapacity for management or loss of confidence
• . 3/in him by the general meeting. —
The separation of functions between both boards is strictly 
enforced and no member of the supervisory board may be appointed to the
1/ S. 112. AKt G.
2/ S.116 AKt G.
2J S. 84(3) The general meeting cannot direct the Supervisory Council 
to dismiss any director on the board of management. But the 
Supervisory Council may dismiss a management director in order to 
give effect to a well founded wish of the Shareholders.
management board of the same company and vice versa.
Variant forms of the German-style two-tier board system have
been adopted by many European Countries, and the indication is that the
new structures have been largely successful. — With the entry of
Britain into the E.E.C. the demands for the adoption of the German
system gained momentum. The high point in the debate on the
introduction of the two-tier system came during the Bullock Committee's
consideration of the question of employees representation at board level 
2/in the private sector«- The Committee's remit was:
"Accepting the need for a radical extension of industrial democracy 
in the control of companies by means of representation on boards 
of directors and accepting the essential role of trade union 
organisations in this process, to consider how such an extension 
can best be achieved, taking into account in particular the proposals 
of the Trade Union Congress report on industrial democracy as well 
as experience in Britain, the E.E.C. and other countries. Having
1/ Except in France. See Bullock's Report, p. 74.
2/ That is, as far as domestic developments are concerned. At the
Community level there is the Proposed Statute of a European Corporation 
which also closely follows the German model. See Hans Claudius Ficker 
in (1971) J.B.L. 167, 174-177 and J.C. Davies "The European Company: 
a Stumbling Block”, (1972) 116 Sol. J. 227, 228-229.
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in the control of companies by means of representation on boards 
of directors and accepting the essential role of trade union 
organisations in this process, to consider how such an extension 
can best be achieved, taking into account in particular the proposals 
of the Trade Union Congress report on industrial democracy as well 
as experience in Britain, the E.E.C. and other countries. Having
1/ Except in France. See Bullock's Report, p. 74.
2/ That is, as far as domestic developments are concerned. At the
Community level there is the Proposed Statute of a European Corporation 
which also closely follows the German model. See Hans Claudius Ficker 
in (1971) J.B.L. 167, 174-177 and J.C. Davies "The European Company: 
a Stumbling Block", (1972) 116 Sol. J. 227, 228-229.
regard to the interests of the national economy, employees, investors 
and consumers, to analyse the implications of such representation for 
the efficient management of companies and for Company Law". 1/
The Committee received several proposals in favour of the introduction 
of industrial democracy along the German lines, but after considering 
the differences in industrial developments in both countries came to the 
belief that the fact that the two-tier system has proved a success in 
Germany, was no guarantee that it would also succeed in the U.K. "In 
our view ... an attempt to impose the rigidity of the statutory two-tier 
system on British companies at the present stage in their development 
could be damaging to their efficiency and could restrict their ability
in the future to alter their structures at top level to meet new demands
2/on their business". —  Any attempt to draw a sharp distinction between
management and supervisory functions to be vested in two distinct bodies,
they thought, would as in France lead to considerable disruption to their
3/management structure or would be inoperable. —  They therefore proceeded 
to propose a system of employee representation based on a modified form 
of the present unitary board. — Some companies have already introduced 
employee directors to their boards but on a voluntary basis. —
1/ Page V.
2/ At p.73.
3/ At p.74.
4/ At p.77.Details of the recommendation were mentioned in Chapter One.
5/ See for example the case of Bonser Engineering Company as reported 
"* in The Director, June 1978, 44.
Since the reason for seeking "outside" representation on the 
board is to increase its influence over policy-making and the supervision 
of executives then the same purpose will be achieved by means other than 
a two-tier board Structure. —  ^ The present unitary board system with 
necessary modifications will achieve the same objectives. This has
been substantially achieved in the U.S. largely due to the stringent
• . . .  2/ regulations and activities of the Securities and Exchange Commission —  -
notably, the increasing use of non-executive directors and audit Committees.
This "wind of change" which has been blowing in the U.S., changing the
_1/ This is no longer mandatory under the Fifth European Community
Directive 1972. But it has been said that U.K. Companies de facto 
operate a two-tier system. As Eric Batstone writes,there is 
evidence to suggest "that the distinction between a supervisory 
and a management board is a difficult one to maintain in practice 
since the effective fulfilment of either role demands close 
involvement with the other", in Eric Batstone and P.L. Davies, 
Industrial Democracy: European Experience. Two reports prepared 
for the Industrial Democracy Committee (1976) at 22 (HMSO).
2/ See 31 Bus. Lawyer, 1208.
3/ The use of Committees and the different types is not fully 
discussed in this thesis. On that see D.M. Saunders, "The 
Executive Committee in Corporate Organisation - Scope of Powers" 
(1943) 42 Mich. L.R. 133. See also R.I. Tricker, The Independent 
Director, 1978. Harold Krontz, op cit. 170.
«1 5 .
attitudes of corporate managements and directors have been felt in 
the U.K. with increasing intensity in recent years.
2. Trends in Non-Executive Directorships In The U.K.
Surveys in recent years have indicated a trend toward
a greater non-executive representation on all boards, although
resentments do exist against their use. — In 1970 only 25 per cent
of the Times top 1000 companies had non-executive directors. In
1975-76 the Bullock Committee reported that nearly 25 per cent of
the Companies in the current Times 1000 had no non-executives but
that the overwhelming proportion of the companies had between one and five
non-executive directors. A little over 10 per cent had more than
2/five non-executives. —
3/In the most recent survey undertaken by the Bank of England —
in 1979 designed to find out the extent to which popular preference for 
. • 4/non-executive directors —  has been translated into practice, and using 
the same list of companies in The Times 1,000 it was found that the use
1/ See e.g. "The Pros and Cons of Non-executive Directors" in the
Financial Times, Feb. 19, 1980. See also Financial Times, Nov. 15, 1979.
2J The Bullock Report, p. 64.
3/ "Composition of Company Boards", Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin,
Vol. 4, Dec. 1979.
4/ As well as Audit Committees.
416 .
of non-executive directors has become more widespread since the 
previous Bullock Committee's survey. The proportion of companies 
with three or more such directors had risen from just over a third 
to just over half, whereas those without any had fallen from 25 per 
cent to 12 per cent. More significantly, the survey found that the 
larger companies tended to have a large number of non-executive 
directors. Of the top 250 companies 63 per cent had three or more 
and 34 per cent had five or more. Of the remaining 750 only 19 per 
cent had five or more while 13 per cent had none. 9 per cent of the 
top 250 had no non-executives. In an accompanying statement the Bank 
remarked:
"It has become more widely recognised that companies can benefit 
substantially from the advice of experienced and detached outside 
directors who, while not involved in the day-to-day running of 
the business, nor dependent on it as a principal source of income, 
can offer advice and guidance on long-term strategy and help to 
scrutinize management-performance". 1/
Similar sentiments are often expressed in the letters and 
financial columns in the popular press, in journals, in academic and 
business Conferences and Seminars as well as in speeches by distinguished
*U7.
personalities in the City.
The advance in the use of non-executives has evidently
been as a result of the relentless campaign particularly from the
City, in its favour over recent years. Notable among the proponents
of the virtues of non-executive directors is the British Institute
of Directors which launched its campaign early in the '70s. — In
an illuminating article entitled "The Powerful case for Part-Time
2/
Directors", —  the late Sir Maurice Dean, who ran the Institute's 
non-executive director service, in 1976 explained how part-time 
directors can bring a wealth of experience and insight to Britain's 
boardrooms. Speaking on behalf of the Institute he expressed the 
view that a reasonable proportion of non-executive directors is an 
essential constituent of a well constructed board, although this role 
is often misunderstood and in fact opposed in some quarters. In order 
to achieve fuller understanding of the non-executives' role, he thought 
it essential to formulate a definition and evaluation of his duties.
_1/ It is interesting to note, by way of comparison that the spread 
in the use of non-executives in the U.S. is attributed to the 
campaign by the American Institute of Management: Harold Koontz, 
129; Juran and Louden, 175.
2/ The Director, June 1976, 52.
*U8.
Many other proponents of the introduction of non-executives 
have also expressed the view that it is imperative to spell out clearly 
by Law the duties of non-executives if they are not to constitute a 
clog in the machinery, causing more problems than they solve and 
becoming easy targets for criticisms. — The role of non-executives, 
it has been continuously emphasised is not to replace but merely to 
complement the full-timer or executive board member. To be able to 
perform these functions well the framework for boardroom participation 
must achieve an over-all structural balance which would permit a freer 
information traffic, board independence and easy access to all necessary 
tools for the performance of their functions.
3. Potential Contributions of a well Balanced Board.
There are obvious advantages in a board being well balanced 
in terms of its executive and non-executive composition to act efficiently 
and effectively. However, the difficulty of having a well balanced 
board is not so much as to the numerical mix of both types of directors 
as to the extent of individual contributions of directors in terms of 
their skills, how much time they can devote to the business, their allegiance
y  Thus, the White Paper "The Conduct of Directors" Cmnd. 7037
(H.M.S.O.), 1977, attempted to set out special functions which 
the non-executives are to perform in company boards, such as 
resolving conflict of interest problems involving directors.
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to the company and a host of other imponderable and unpredictable 
factors. Executives and non-executive directors each have special 
attributes which benefit the board.
The primary advantage of the executive director on a board 
lies in his familiarity with the business, and with his superior 
knowledge of the company's operations and his involvement in previous 
actions taken as well as his personal incentive to see the company 
succeed. — With these the executive director can make much intelligent 
and highly motivated company policy. He is usually more available for 
company board meetings and presumably has the time to give necessary 
study and deliberation to company matters.
There is a common feeling among chief executives that
"You ought to have several inside operating and functional 
executives on the board when the company is a large, diversified 
operation. The reason is that if questions arise with regard to 
marketing, finance, or the problem of an operating division, or 
subsidiary, or what have you, there is an executive at the board 
table to whom you can turn and say, "All right, now here's a 
question. You answer it ...". 2/
1/ These involve technostructural incentive which are not easily 
quantifiable or identifiable. But see J.K. Galbraith's 
Economics and The Public Purpose (1973), Chapters 10 and 11.
2/ Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality . p.112.
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Another advantage of having executives on the board is 
that such exposure serves as an education in top management practices 
which is quite important for top executives especially the incumbent 
of the post of Chief executive.
Also where a board includes a number of outsiders the mixing 
of both executives and non-executives increases their acquaintance 
with one another and so ensures that the job of choosing a new successor 
is done in a harmonious atmosphere and so eliminating tension in 
periods of transition.
Against those advantages it is to be pointed out that a 
board which consisted solely or predominantly of executive or inside 
directors can easily become introverted and the potential disadvantages 
in such a board cannot be easily overlooked. On such a board there 
will be no independent member to ask the awkward questions which 
executives dare not ask and no one will be there to act as a "window 
on the world". A board that is solely or predominantly executive would, 
therefore, fail in the important duty of supervising and monitoring 
management in its conduct of the business of the company, and would 
easily become a "rubber stamp" for sanctioning the dictates of the 
Chief executive and the tiny cabal that surrounds him.
Freed of the constraints which may inhibit their performance 
non-executives have much to contribute to the board's effectiveness 
through the special attributes which they bring with them, and these 
are generally qualities that the executives lack. These essentially 
are their psychological and financial independence and "outside look" 
which entails drawing on their experience outside the company and their 
awareness of other factors external to the company. But they need not 
be unnecessarily antagonistic or obstructionists in their pursuit of 
information as this would undermine the rapport which should normally 
exist in a company and "make good management virtually impossible". —^
In order to enjoy the full contributions of a non-executive
director on the board it is highly essential that he remains independent
of the Chairman and his co-directors. Accordingly, it is important that
the methods of appointment of non-executive directors are free from any
ties or links which might jeopardise the element of independence, but the
evidence available suggests that this has so far not been sufficiently
ensured. The Korn/Ferry International Survey —^ found that the main source
of introduction to the Company of the non-executive directors was most
3/often the Chairman followed by the directors. —  This reinforces the
1/ See Niel Martin-Kaye, "The Theoretical Basis of Modern Company Law",
(1976) J.B.L. 235, 243.
2/ Boards of Directors Study 1980.
2/ For very large companies 53.29% of non-executives were introduced by 
Chairman; 29.61% by Directors; 2.63% by Shareholders and 3.95% by 
Advisers.
commonly held belief that most non-executive directors are chosen "on 
the old boy network". This should not necessarily imply that the 
Chairman and the board sacrifice efficiency for the appointment of their 
friends. Indeed, the same Korn/Ferry survey shows that the main grouping 
of non-executive directors who serve in large companies comprise mainly 
of the Chairman and managing directors of other companies, followed by 
employees' or shareholders' representatives. Most of them came from the 
accounting, banking and legal professions but they also included 
politicians. Although it was not mentioned in the study it is likely that 
some large companies have academics from diverse areas of knowledge on 
their boards. It is to be hoped that as an increasing number of companies 
realise the potential advantages of having outsiders on their boards the 
actual contributions of such appointees continue to justify the expectations. 
One hopes also that those responsible for introducing such appointees —^
2/
will broaden their "catchment areas" so as to include those constituencies —  
whose needs can be satisfied or better appeciated through a board represent­
ation. In this regard it is to be noted that the proportion of shareholders' 
representatives in relation to the total number of non-executives on the 
boards of large companies as indicated in the Korn/Ferry Study is rather 
too low at just over 6 per cent. ^  Still lower is the proportion of
1/ See the proposals for non-executive appointments in p. 390 supra.
2/ Such as employees, consumers, suppliers and so on.
3/ For the largest group of companies the background of non-executives 
were as follows: Chairman 32.89%i Managing Directors 8.55%; Financial 
Directors 3.9%; Banking 1.32%; Law 1.97%; Previous Employees 1.97% 
and Shareholders' Representatives 6.58%.
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those appointed on the introduction of shareholders which stands at 
2.63Z. — The indication, therefore, is that there is a real scope for 
the appointment of a larger number of shareholder representatives than 
there is at present and one hopes that this opportunity will be taken 
up by shareholders and company boards.
4. Board Committees.
Only a brief mention can be made here about the use of
Comnittees and the potential contributions they can make to the
. 2/performance of the supervisory function of boards. —  The reason for 
this is that it is a matter of detail for each company whether the 
supervisory element is to be improved by a given proportion of balance 
between executives and non-executives, the use of one type of conmittee
1/ See footnote 3 in page 422.
2/ For a most detailed study of the use of Audit Committees in the U.K. 
see R.I. Tricker, The Independent Director. A Study of The Non- 
Executive Director~and of The Audit Committee (1978) Chapter 6.
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or the ocher or even whether to adopt a two-tier board system, that 
is, in the absence of legislation setting out specific requirements. — 
In addition, it is thought that the need for information for non­
executives can be met by the provision of staff assistance to such 
directors. While this might be desirable in principle the potential
contribution of this has to be weighed against the inevitable increase
2/in administrative costs and bureaucracy. —
The use of non-executive directors has come to be seen as 
closely involving the use of the audit committee, an association which 
derives from the U.S. and Canadian practices developed in recent years
whereby the boards of public companies appoint an audit comnittee
. . . 3/composed wholly or substantially of non-executive directors. —  In
those countries the main functions of the audit committees are to
review the financial statements and to review the audit arrangements
and the company's financial controls, working closely with the auditors
who are normally invited to attend its meetings. They have often been
found useful in strengthening the influence of non-executive directors
. 4/and the position of the auditors. —
\ j  See Temple Lang, 12 C.M.L.R. 155, 166-167.(1975). 
2J See Eisenberg, 63 Cal. L.R. 375, 389-90. (1975). 
3/ See Cmnd 7037 (1977).
4/ Ibid. Para. 21.
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Despite its growing popularity amongst U.K. companies 
the Kom/Ferry Internationals survey has found that the audit committee 
ranks a distant fourth in the types of committees used by large 
companies with a turn-over in excess of £500 million. — The 
figures were 61*11 per cent for Executive Committee, 52*78 per 
cent for Remuneration Committee, 38*89 per cent for Financial Committee 
and 36*11 per cent for Audit Committee. Although it was generally 
agreed that the role of the committees includes the monitoring of 
company performance it was found that "the role of the Audit Committee
in monitoring companies and executive performance was not always possible..."
2/because of the predominance of executive directors in them. —  This finding 
adds increased momentum to demands for the appointment of more non­
executives in those companies in which the supervisory and monitoring 
elements are currently lacking for executives cannot be left to supervise 
themselves.
5. Pressures For Structural Change and Trends In Law Reform.
The pressure for change in the structure of boards as part 
of the wider demands for the reform of Company Law is due to several
1/ At pp. 11-12
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factors which are not altogether consistent with one another. Prof.
Tricker — identifies five different concerns for requiring change
. . 2/which include —  :
1) a concern about corporate control and the authority of directors,2) a concern about the prerogative of management and the power to 
decide,
3) a concern about accountability,
4) possible effects from Britain being part of the European 
Community, and
5) particular concerns being expressed within the auditing profession.
It is the first of these concerns that this thesis examines.
The concern for corporate control has been prominent for a 
long time now and even though the Companies Acts of 1967, 1976 and 1980 
covered some aspects of this problem the structural framework in the 
system of control has been little affected despite promises of more 
comprehensive legislation. There have, however, been a lot of pressure 
and legislative initiatives though these have often met with failure, but
1/ The Independent Director (1978).
2/ At p. 5.
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events in recent years have given increased momentum to these attempts 
which bore some result in the 1980 Act. Firstly, a succession of 
highly critical reports by Department of Trade Inspectors condemning 
the practices of directors has done much to address public attention
to the unsatisfactory state of boardroom practices. — Secondly, the
2/1977 White Paper on the "Conduct of Directors", —  indicating an 
inclination toward the encouragement of the use of non-executives and 
audit committees added renewed interest in board structures. The 
White Paper expressed the opinion that "non-executive directors can
perform a useful function in helping to resolve problems of conflict
. 3/of interest as well as in other ways". —  A flurry of proposals and
. 4/ 5/recommendations by such bodies as the CB1 —  and BIM —  have also
had marked influence. So has been the Wilson Committee's Report.
"The pressure for change" for the purpose of enhancing 
corporate control, according to Tricker, "come from the wish to regulate 
the authority that directors exercise by extending the existing corporate
1/ Some of these have already been discussed in Chapter 7.
2/ Cmnd 7037. (1977).
3/ Para 20.
UJ "The Responsibility of the British Public Company", (Final Report) 1973.
5/ The Board of Directors, Management Survey Report No 16 (1972):
British Institute of Management.
framework". — ^ The board has, therefore, to be regulated in such a 
way that it is enabled to carry out, not a "managerial" function 
which it is not suited to perform but a supervisory and monitoring 
function, which, it has been argued, it can perform. The appropriate
framework in which this role can be achieved should be the goal of
2/future legislation. —
The most important and articulated initiatives at statutory
regulation to strengthen the supervisory functions of boards through
the use of non-executives are due to the several efforts and "sturdy
individualism" of Sir Brandom Rhys Williams, M.F. In 1970 he introduced
a private member's Bill in which he recommended that all major public
companies should have at least three non-executive directors. A great
defect in that Bill was that it failed to recommend any particular
functions or responsibility for the non-executive directors. A further
3/clause introducing specific functions —  led to opposition which defeated
4/
the Bill. In 1976 the M.P. drew on North American practice —  to
I t At p. 5.
2/ See p. 433 infra.
3/ That "The non-executive directors shall make a statement annually 
of their view of management of the company and the use of the 
Company's assets, together with such information as they consider 
material for the appreciation of the efficiency and the propriety 
of the conduct of the Company's affairs".
4/ It is obligatory for every company seeking a quotation on the New York 
Stock Exchange to have an audit Conmittee and at least three independent 
directors. Two are required under the American Stock Exchange.
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recommend that in major public companies there should be a requirement 
that at least three non-executive directors should form an audit 
Committee but this was rejected as being superflous and premature in 
this country. An elaborate and detailed reconmendation was introduced 
by the same M.P. by way of an amendment to the 1979 Conservative 
Government's Companies Bill. — In Clause 3 of his amendment Sir 
Rhys Williams proposed that
"Every major public company shall have in addition to any other 
directors not less than three directors who shall be non­
executive directors of the company". 2/
The purpose of his amendment was to make the non-executive directors 
an effective supervisory element on the board. To that end it was 
provided in Clause 6 that
"The non-executive directors of major public companies shall 
make a statement at each annual general meeting of the Company 
in which they shall express their confidence in the executive
\J See Pari. Deb. (H.C.). Standing Committee A on Companies Bill, 
First Sitting, Nov. 1979. at Col. 17-18.
2/ "Major Public Companies" who alone are meant to be affected by 
—  the clause were as define^ to include approximately the top 
200 companies in the U.K.
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direction and management of the company and in the way in 
which the assets of the company are employed". 1/
Sub-section (2) required that each non-executive must either sign
2/the statement —  or resign from the board. One of the objections 
to the recommendations was that if there is a set of compliant non­
executives on a board this can institutionalise fraud, deceit and 
misfeasance by giving the erroneous impression that management was 
under the board's supervision. Horse still, if such directors 
served under an autocratic or authoritarian C.E.O. or Chairman they 
would merely be "yes-men" and make it even more difficult for suspicions
of fraud or incompetence in such a company to be easily discovered or
3/established. —  These dangers can, however, be guarded against in 
the procedure for the appointment of non-executives, such as a prior 
circulation to all members of biographical notes of the candidates, 
their names and all necessary details which would be of importance to 
shareholders voting to appoint such non-executive directors and who
y  This could have had the additional advantage of giving AGMs an 
increased importance. Moscow, in "The Independent Director", 
28 Bus. Lawyer 9, even suggests that non-executives could vote 
as proxies for absent shareholders.
2/ The statement was to be attached to the balance sheet and laid 
before the company or AGM. See C L.6(3).
3/ See Standing Committee A on Companies Bill. First Sitting. 
Nov. 1980. Col. 30.
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will be thus sufficiently forewarned about the characters of the 
persons they are appointing.
It is a matter for regret that although the Minister of 
State in the Department of Trade, Mr. Cecil Parkinson found the 
proposals agreeable "in principle" he was opposed to any statutory 
requirement to introduce them in the few large companies intended 
to be affected. The Minister conceded that there is a growing trend 
toward increasing use of non-executives which is evidence of their 
popularity, but relying on certain responses to a certain Departmental 
circular details of which were not given, — he pointed out that although
1/ Perhaps the Minister had in mind the then recent joint survey by 
the Institute of Directors and Booz Allen and Hamilton, a firm 
of management Consultants. The report ¿The Responsibilities and 
Contributions of Non-Executive Directors on the Boards of U.K. 
Companies/ found that the majority of Company Directors and Chairmen 
interviewed believed that existing composition of 25 to 30 per cent 
outside directors and 70 to 75 per cent executive directors is the 
right balance, but this conflicted with the sentiments expressed 
by the Institute's Director-General, Mr. Walter Goldsmith that 
the ratio should be 2 to 1 in favour of non-executives as in the 
U.S. He described non-executive directors as one of the least 
understood but potentially most important contributions to the 
direction and management of a Company. The Institute is, however, 
opposed to any legislation making the use of non-executives 
compulsory.
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companies favoured the use of non-executives they were opposed to 
any statutory provision making their use compulsory, hence he too 
was against the introduction of the amendment clauses. He was, at 
any rate, willing to leave open the opportunity for wider debate of 
the issue in the full House where the proposals were eventually dealt 
the final blow - may be only for the moment. —
The Wilson Conmittee was also of the general view that non­
executive directors are often valuable to effective board performance 
but rejected demands that their use be made compulsory. But they 
recognised and recommended that as a necessary accompaniment to greater 
institutional shareholders participation they should ensure that company 
boards include a number of non-executives, whose "catchment" area should
be diverse enough to retain their potential contribution to boardroom
. . .  2/participation. —
If the Statutory requirement for the appointment and use of 
non-executives has to be rejected because of the element of compulsion 
involved then it seems a reasonable alternative to make it a condition 
for quotation for large listed companies. Given the success of this
1/ See Pari. Deb. (H.C.) Feb. 26 1980.
2/ Paras. 917-919. See also the Chairman's Statement in Prudential 
Assurance Annual Report and Accounts for 1978.
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approach with companies quoted in the New York Stock Exchange and 
its adoption by subsidiaries of some of those companies in the U.K. 
and given the demonstrated trend toward their increasing use one 
hopes that a system such as the one we have proposed in Chapter 9 would 
be accepted in the near future to extend this practice to the few 
companies that have yet to embrace it. It may be, as Sir Williams has 
argued, that it is amongst the few companies averse to active board
supervision by non-executive directors that real danger of abuse and 
inefficiency may be found.6. The Role Of Law.
The appointment and use of non-executives may ultimately 
be made a condition of quotation under the Stock Exchange Listing 
Agreements, but it is really through Statutory regulation that 
uniformity in practices, which is vital to business in general and 
investors in particular, can be attained. It is through Company law 
reform that business efficiency can be attained: "if we leave companies 
to find out for themselves how they can best operate, they may in some 
cases take an inordinately long time, and we need Company law so that 
the laggard are encouraged to hasten to bring themselves up to the 
standard recognised and automatic in the best". — It is for Company 
Law to ensure effective participation in the running of the company by
1/ Sir B. Rhys Williams, Standing Committee A. First Sitting. Col. 24. 
(1979).
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making it possible to get directors adequately to perform their 
supervisory functions. This, it is believed, can be achieved by 
the appointment of directors who are sufficiently independent of the 
executives and the establishment of a system of adequate flow of 
information to these directors and the entire board. —
One would agree with the assessment of Leech and Mundheim 
though made in the U.S. context, that
"Effective auditing of management performance by outside 
directors presupposes a fundamental change in the psychology 
of the relationship between management and the board 
(particularly the outside members of the board)". 2/
In most companies at the moment, the Chief executive still considers 
the board as hia board, selects members and determines who does what 
or what information gets to whom. Until these practices and attitudes 
change, the board will continue to be more of a symbolic than a realistic 
organ for corporate governance. The role of law is, therefore, to 
establish institutional arrangements through which this psychology 
of boardroom practices can be changed.
1/ See Sir Gordon Richardson, op cit, The Director, Feb. 1979.
2/ N.E. Leech and R.H. Mundheim "The Outside Director of the
Publicity Held Corporation", (1976) 31 Bus. Lawyer 1799 at 1826.
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GENERAL CONCLUSION
Writers who have considered the problem of reforming the 
traditional system of corporate governance have generally adopted one 
or a combination of three approaches:
(1) Proposing ways of increasing shareholders' rights;
(2) Proposing greater requirements for publicity and 
disclosure, and.
(3) Proposing radically alternative measures which would allow 
"client-groups of the corporation such as employees, suppliers 
and customers" — to play a formal role in the governance of
v 2/the company. —
It is impossible, within a work of this scope to consider all 
the different approaches in great depth and with full justice. However, 
we have considered various aspects of shareholders' rights and endeavoured 
to draw attention to the importance which the philosophy of disclosure has 
enjoyed in the history of company legislation up to the 1976 Act which 
it is to be hoped "will provide the framework for a more effective enforce- 
ment policy", —  and then aspects of the recent 1980 Act. On the other 
hand, we have also drawn attention to the danger of over-emphasis on and 
indefinite increase of disclosure requirements which by reason of their
\ /  M.A. Eisenberg, The Structure of The Corporation (1976) cited by 
P.L. Davies, op.cit; 56 Can. B.R. 281.
2/ See P.L. Davies, ibid, 278-281.
3/ Ibid. 280.
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quantity, complexity and the general control which management has over 
their preparation, — are of very limited importance to shareholders who 
(together with creditors) they were originally designed to protect.
Indeed, the indication now is that with the exception of the further 
requirements about accounts and audits which are to be ■ introduced 
with the implementation of the Fourth Directive of the EEC and other
2/Draft Directives no major legislation in relation to accounts are likely. —
Rather there is likely to be a change of direction from the volume of
disclosure to the technique of presentation of accounts which will make
3/them more useful to their recipients. —
In spite of this there are some, however, who suggest that it 
is futile to try to resuscitate the general meeting and that the best way 
of controlling management is through increased emphasis on disclosure 
requirements and radical alternative approaches to corporate control. It 
is submitted, however, firstly, that disclosure and publicity would by 
themselves be largely ineffective without active shareholders' control.
For example, the requirements for disclosure under Sections 47 and 48 of 
the 1980 Act would, in the absence of active shareholders' control,be easily 
frustrated and circumvented by management who would easily secure the 
general meeting's approval of the prohibited transactions with proxy votes.
See Tom Hadden (1977), 331-332.
2/ See for example, John Birds, "Government wants to reduce Disclosure 
—  requirements again". (1980) 1 Co. Law. 203.
3/ Views expressed by Dr. Paul Burns, lecturer in SIBS University of 
“  Warwick, in a private interview.
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Moreover, there is an extent to which the legislature has always been
ready to intervene and, presumably, will want to intervene in questions
of internal management and much still appears to be left under existing
law for shareholders to decide in general meeting. — ^ For this reason
the proposals in this thesis for a new approach or mechanism (not merely
new rights) for shareholders' participation and the strengthening of the
supervisory role of the board become very important, relevant and
practical. This writer strongly believes that the general meeting in
the U.K. is in danger of being abandoned as a lost cause and being
replaced by rather hasty radical measures without having sufficiently
exploited or exhausted its potentials. Dr. Tom Hadden has described
how the role of the general meeting has been resuscitated in the U.S. due
largely to "the activities of a few well-known 'professional shareholders'2/like the Gilbert brothers". —  The same learned author has described
"the shortcomings in existing procedures for the discA^ure of accounts
3/
and directors' reports", which have led to growing emphasis on improving 
the supervisory element in companies as represented in "the concept of 
management audit". This, writes the author, "is in effect a logical extension
1/ The Bullock Report envisages that some important powers like the 
veto power will still remain with the general meeting even when 
employee representation comes into operation. See for example, 
p.82 para. 31.
I f  Company Law and Capitalism (1977), at 327.
3/ Ibid., 331.
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of the principle of disclosure in giving investors a fuller and more 
searching picture of the state of their company's affairs than is possible 
on the current system of reports and accounts". —  ^ It is believed that 
the proposals in this thesis including that for the appointment of more 
representative and non-executive directors would go toward achieving 
some control over corporate management in addition to but not in 
replacement of existing rules for disclosure, prohibition and so on.
It will be apparent from the analysis of the proposals for 
change which have been considered that the potential is there for 
increased shareholders' activities and a more effective supervisory role 
for the board. To an extent, these are already being achieved by many 
shareholders and companies who have acted on their own initiatives. 
However, the mechanisms for their participation need strengthening.
Greater shareholder involvement is, of course, not an 
end in itself. Institutions could not solve every management problem 
even if they intervened in every case. Neither is the increased use of 
non-executive directors a panacea for all corporate problems. However, 
the absence of these factors has discouraged or tended to discourage 
public attitudes to investment and encouraged mismanagement. What this 
thesis proposes is, therefore, a limited goal: that is, the enchancement 
of shareholders'control by providing a mechanism for improving the decision­
making process and the fulfilment of the board's functions of supervising 
and monitoring management's performance.
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